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ABSTRACT
The US nuclear-policy community did not always accept today’s conventional wisdom that a state’s first nuclear test is a critical milestone; that even a small, rudimentary nuclear arsenal is a major concern; and that preventing states, even allies, from acquiring nuclear weapons should be a core US foreign-policy goal. Between 1958 and 1963, Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy experimented with three different responses to the French nuclear-weapons program: (1) offering to share US-owned nuclear weapons liberally; (2) leaving France to pursue nuclear weapons unaided; and (3) offering to sell France advanced submarines and missiles. Each of these approaches was the product of evolving beliefs about when a state “went nuclear,” the potency of small arsenals, and whether the proliferation of nuclear weapons among allies undermined or advanced US interests. Understanding how Washington shifted its stance during this period sheds important light on the origins and nature of US nonproliferation policy today.
Acknowledgments
My thanks to Fiona S. Cunningham, Francis J. Gavin, Gene Gerzhoy, Nicholas L. Miller, Cullen G. Nutt, Kenneth A. Oye, Kelly E. Pasolli, Reid B.C. Pauly, participants in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s second-year paper seminar, and anonymous reviewers for comments that have improved this paper. Errors are mine.
Notes
1 For this evocative description, see Jacques Hymans, “When Does a State Become a ‘Nuclear Weapon State’?” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 17 No. 1 (2010), p. 163. Hymans acknowledges that, since the early 1990s, the acquisition of a significant quantity of fissile material has become another, lower “red rung,” but views this as “highly counterproductive.”
2 Notwithstanding recent work on the geopolitical and security benefits of nuclear superiority, the United States has identified small nuclear adversaries as a direct threat to the United States since at least the early 1990s. Proliferation concerns are of course far older. For the superiority argument, see Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). For the US policy stance against the emergence of even small arsenals, see, e.g., Annual Report to the President and the Congress, DOD, January 1994, pp. xiii–xiv, <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1994_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-152508-117>; and, more recently, US DOD, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018,” pp. 11–15, <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF>.
3 Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition.” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2015), pp. 9–46.
4 On Anglo-American tensions see, e.g., Timothy Botti, The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945–1958 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1987); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945–1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
5 On the additive nature of subsequent Anglo-American nuclear relations, see Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 3.
6 See, e.g., Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 93–123; Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. 75–144; Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 85–113.
7 Francis J. Gavin, “Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2004), pp. 100–35.
8 Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, January 21, 1965. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1964–68 Vol. XI, Doc. 64. For concurring views on the salience of China’s first test, see Nicholas L. Miller, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); Gavin, “Blasts from the Past.”
9 Benoît Pelopidas, “Nuclear Weapons Scholarship as a Case of Self-Censorship in Security Studies,” Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 1 No. 4 (2016), pp. 330–31; Zachary Zwald, “Imaginary Nuclear Conflicts: Explaining Deterrence Policy Preference Formation,” Security Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2013), pp. 640–71.
10 Shane Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Jarrod Hayes, “Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India’s and Iran’s Nuclear Programs,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 4 (2009), pp. 977–99; Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 25; Glen Chafetz, “The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3 (1995), pp. 743–75; Peter Lavoy, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay,” Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1995), pp. 713–15; Walton Brown, “Presidential Leadership and US Nonproliferation Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, (1994), p. 570.
11 Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2015), pp. 91–129; Matthew Kroenig, “Force or Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy,” Security Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2014), pp. 1–32; Benoît Pelopidas, “The Oracles of Proliferation,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2011), pp. 297–314; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1982), pp. 283–306.
12 Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas L. Miller, “Keeping the Bombs in the Basement,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2015), pp 47–86; Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2015) pp. 9–46; Or Rabinowitz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and Its Cold War Deals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Maria N. Zaitseva, “Dealing with a ‘Special’ Nuclear Ally: The Changing Nature of the American Response to the Israeli Nuclear Program,” paper delivered at International Studies Association conference, New York, February 15–18, 2009.
13 For arguments centered on South Asia, see Thomas P. Cavanna, “Geopolitics over Proliferation: The Origins of US Grand Strategy and Their Implications for the Spread of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2018), pp. 576–603; Rabia Akhtar, The Blind Eye: US Non-proliferation Policy towards Pakistan from Ford to Clinton (Lahore: University of Lahore Press, 2018).
14 France decided to acquire nuclear weapons no later than 1954. In April 1958, the French government accelerated the program by setting a 1960 deadline for France’s first test. De Gaulle subsequently ratified this decision. For a concise history see Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, pp. 93–95; Benoît Pelopidas, “The Nuclear Straitjacket: American Extended Deterrence and Nonproliferation,” in Stefanie Von Hlatky and Andreas Wenger, eds., The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO and Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), pp. 86–90; Lawrence Scheinman. Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 93–128.
15 Memorandum of Discussion at the 413t‐h Meeting of the National Security Council, July 16, 1959, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. III, p. 261.
16 See Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 153–56, 196–247; Marc Trachtenberg, “France and NATO, 1949–1991,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2011), pp. 187–88.
17 Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, July 3, 1958, 11:28 a.m. FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part II, pp. 50–53.
18 Ibid.
19 Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary and General de Gaulle, Paris, July 5, 1958, 10:30 am., FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part II, pp. 53–57.
20 Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp. 194–95.
21 Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary and General de Gaulle, Paris, July 5, 1958, 10:30 am., FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part II, pp. 58–60.
22 For Eisenhower’s and de Gaulle’s desire for semi-independent European defense, see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 227–28.
23 For de Gaulle’s views on tripartite coordination, see Frederic Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe (New York: Rowman &Littlefield, 2001), p. 10.
24 Letter from President de Gaulle to President Eisenhower, Paris, September 17, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 81–83.
25 Letter from President Eisenhower to President de Gaulle, October 20, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 108–09. For similarity between Dulles’ and Eisenhower’s responses see Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, pp. 19–20.
26 See, e.g., Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, October 8, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, document 51; Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Jandrey) to Secretary of State Dulles, October 9, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, document 55.
27 See, e.g., Memorandum of Conversation between M. Jean Laloy and Walter J. Stoessen, Jr., Paris, October 2, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, p. 87; Memorandum of Conversation on Representations of Ambassador Brosio to the President re de Gaulle letter, October 6, 1958, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, p. 88; Editorial note on MacMillan–Adenauer conversation, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2. document 53; Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, p. 21.
28 Pelopidas, “The Nuclear Straitjacket,” pp. 89–90; Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, p. 94; Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Proliferation,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2014), pp. 7–51.
29 Memorandum of Conversation between President Eisenhower and President de Gaulle, Paris, September 2, 1959, noon, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 261–62; Memorandum of Conversation between President Eisenhower and President de Gaulle, Rambouillet, September 4, 1959, 7:30 a.m., FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 273–74.
30 Jacques Hymans argues that recently the acquisition of a significant quantity of fissile material has become more salient, though he argues that this development is “highly counterproductive.” See Hymans, “When Does a State Become a ‘Nuclear Weapon State’?” p. 163.
31 For weapon count, see Hans Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 5 (2013), p. 78. On missile development, see Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Country Profile, United States,” updated June 2015, <www.nti.org/country-profiles/united-states/delivery-systems/>.
32 Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary and General de Gaulle, Paris, July 5, 1958, 10:30 a.m., FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part II, pp. 58–60. Heuser argues that, for de Gaulle, this gap between French and US or Soviet nuclear forces was unproblematic. De Gaulle placed great faith in the deterrent power of small arsenals. Eisenhower, by contrast, did not. See Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, pp. 95–96.
33 Memorandum of Conversation between President Eisenhower and President de Gaulle, Paris, September 2, 1959, noon, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 261–62.
34 Memorandum of Conversation between President Eisenhower and President de Gaulle, Rambouillet, September 4, 1959, 7:30 a.m., FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 273–74.
35 Andrew P. Erdmann, “‘War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever’: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution,” in John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May, and John Rosenberg, eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 87–119.
36 Trachtenberg, “France and NATO,” pp. 186–87; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 147–56.
37 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 210–11, 229.
38 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Gates to President Eisenhower, December 17, 1959, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 315–16. For de Gaulle’s strategy of slowly removing France from NATO’s military system, see Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle, The Ruler: 1945–1970, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), p. 367. On Mediterranean Fleet withdrawal, see Telegram from Embassy in France (Lyons) to Secretary of State Rusk, March 6, 1959, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, document 98. On France’s May 1959 decision to banish US nuclear weapons, see Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 96; Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, p. 42.
39 NSC Meeting, October 29, 1959, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, p. 292; Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister on Atomic Cooperation and Missiles, April 15, 1960, FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 336–39; Memorandum of Conversation with President Eisenhower, April 22, 1960, 9:30 a.m., FRUS 1958–60, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 340–42.
40 FRUS records no mention of Franco-US nuclear cooperation in the April 1960 discussions. De Gaulle’s biographer includes a vivid description of de Gaulle and Eisenhower discussing France’s upcoming nuclear tests “in front of the fireplace in dressing-gowns,” during Eisenhower’s visit to France in September 1959, but records no nuclear discussions during the April 1960 visit. Lacouture, De Gaulle, The Ruler, pp. 368–70.
41 Dean Acheson, recorded interview by Lucius D. Battle, April 27, 1964, p. 9, John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program, <www.jfklibrary.org/sites/default/files/archives/JFKOH/Acheson,%20Dean%20G/JFKOH-DGA-01/JFKOH-DGA-01-TR.pdf.>
42 Dean Acheson, “A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future” [Boston, John F. Kennedy Library] JFKL [National Security Files] NSF [Regional Security] RS [Box] 220; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 283–86; Frank Costigliola, “Kennedy, De Gaulle, and the Challenge of Consultation,” in De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal. Robert O. Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, eds. (Oxford: Berg, 1994), pp. 177–78.
43 Acheson, “A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future.”
44 Memorandum of Conversation, President’s Visit to de Gaulle, May 31 to June 2, 1961, FRUS 1961–63, Vol. 13, document 230; Lacouture, De Gaulle, The Ruler, pp. 372–73.
45 Memorandum of Conversation with the President and the Congressional Leadership, June 6, 1961, 4:30 p.m., JFKL, NSF [Country Files, France] CF,F 70A.
46 Letter from Ambassador Gavin to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, June 30, 1961, JFKL, NSF, CF,F 71; Letter from Ambassador Gavin to President Kennedy, November 13, 1961, JFKL, NSF, CF,F, Box 71; Telegram from Paris (Gavin) to Rusk, February 16, 1962, JFKL, NSF, CF,F 71.
47 For the importance of balance of payments in US policy, see Francis J. Gavin, Gold Dollars and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).
48 Timothy Sayle, Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 64–67.
49 Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities?, pp. 115–17.
50 “US Defense Expenditures and Receipts Entering the International Balance of Payments Fiscal Years 1961–1964,” undated, early 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, 212. For France’s account surplus, see Costigliola, “Kennedy, De Gaulle, and the Challenge of Consultation,” p. 180.
51 Matthew Jones, Shane Maddock, and Erin Mahan also identify the Lavaud visit as an important turning point in Kennedy-administration policy. Matthew Jones, “Prelude to the Skybolt Crisis: The Kennedy Administration’s Approach to British and French Strategic Nuclear Policies in 1962,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2019), p. 70; Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid, pp. 167–68; Erin Mahan, Kennedy, De Gaulle and Western Europe (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), pp. 82–83.
52 The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reached the same basic conclusion in March 1962. See Memorandum to Secretary Rusk from Roger Hilsman (INR) on French Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs, March 26, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 225A
53 ; Memorandum from Paul Nitze to McGeorge Bundy on “The French Nuclear Problem,” February 27, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 225A.
54 Memorandum from Henry Owen to McGeorge Bundy on “Recent Changes in Individual Views on Nuclear Help to France,” April 10, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 225A.
55 For France’s initial requests, see “French Purchase Request,” undated, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 225A. For DOD reaction, see Memorandum from Kuss to Nitze on “US/French Cooperative Arrangements,” March 9, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 225A.
56 Later in March 1962, Kennedy delivered a “principles paper” to the Soviet Union indicating some flexibility in the US position on the status of US-owned nuclear weapons based in West Germany. Drafting this paper may have spurred Kennedy’s thinking on France’s nuclear status. See Rusk–Gromyko meeting, March 22, 1962, FRUS 1961–63, Vol. XV: Berlin Crisis, 1962––63 pp. 67–71, cited in Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2015), pp. 91–29.
57 “Memorandum of Conversation with the President,” March 1, 1962, 5:00 p.m., JFKL, NSF, [Chester V.] Clifton Papers, [Box] 345.
58 Memorandum for the President from Secretary of State Rusk, Tab A: “Missile Aid for France,” April 13, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 225A, emphasis in original.
59 Memorandum for the President from Maxwell Taylor, April 14, 1962, Attachment: Summary of DOD paper “Policy on Sharing Nuclear Information, Materials and Delivery Systems with France,” JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 225A.
60 For an indication of how dire this consideration had become, see Gavin, Gold Dollars and Power, pp. 106–07, n. 67. McNamara reportedly told President Kennedy that sharing nuclear technology with France “would be justified on balance of payments reasons alone.”
61 For a similar argument from the head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, see Draft Memorandum from W.W. Rostow to Secretary Rusk on “European Unity,” March 23, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 212.
62 Memorandum for the President from Maxwell Taylor, April 14, 1962, Attachment: Summary of DOD paper “Policy on Sharing Nuclear Information, Materials and Delivery Systems with France,’ JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 225A.
63 Minutes of meeting between President Kennedy, Secretary Rusk, and Secretary McNamara and McGeorge Bundy on April 16 at 10:00 a.m., JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 225A. For events and policy considerations leading to this meeting, see Memorandum to Henry Owen from McGeorge Bundy on Draft Memorandum for Record on Action on Nuclear Assistance to France, May 4, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 225A.
64 On balance of payments, see Gavin, Gold Dollars and Power, pp. 77–80. On British concerns, see Telegram from Rusk to US Embassy in Bonn on Franco-German nuclear cooperation, June 8, 1962; Telegram from US Ambassador to West Germany, Dowling, to Rusk, June 18, 1962. Sayle argues that British concerns proved unfounded. See Sayle, Enduring Alliance, pp. 106–07. On belief that France would continue its nuclear pursuits, see Cable from Ambassador to France, Gavin, to Rusk, June 19, 1962, JFKL, NSF, CF,F 71A.
65 McNamara Memo for JFK, June 16, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 226; Jones, “Prelude to the Skybolt Crisis,” pp. 90–95. Jones notes an apparent divergence between McNamara’s views and the subsequent trajectory of DOD and US policy.
66 Memorandum, “Some Interim Conclusions about the Responses to the President’s Questions,” June 17, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 226, emphasis in original. Note that the memo does not state that it is addressed to Rusk; however, given its contents, he is its most likely recipient.
67 Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy from Roswell Gilpatric, on “Proposed Discussions with French on R&D, Procurement and Cooperative Logistics,” July 9, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 226.
68 Telegram from Paris (Lyon) to Secretary of State Rusk, September 14, 1962. JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 226.
69 Letter from President Kennedy to Chet Holifield, Chair, JCAE, September 16, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 226; Transcript of meeting on the Soviet Union between President Kennedy, Charles Bohlen, and Llewelyn Thompson, September 29, 1962, reproduced in Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow, John F. Kennedy: The Presidential Recordings, Vol. 2 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 219–21. For decision delay until January 1963 due to congressional recess, see Letter from Roswell Gilpatric to Chet Holifield, October 4, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 226.
70 Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas Miller argue that the United States also adapted to the de facto nuclear status of Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa in order to limit damage to the nonproliferation regime and to contain the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Thomas Cavanna makes a similar argument about how the United States balanced nonproliferation with other geopolitical goals in South Asia. However, US policy toward France after it had been accepted into the “nuclear club” was markedly different; Washington offered to sell France advanced nuclear technologies. It made no similar offers to later proliferators. Rabinowitz and Miller, “Keeping the Bombs in the Basement,” pp. 47–86; Cavanna, “Geopolitics over Proliferation,” pp. 576–603.
71 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 320.
72 Richard E. Neustadt, Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Jones, “Prelude to the Skybolt Crisis,” pp. 58–109.
73 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 360
74 Neustadt, Report to JFK, pp. 84–85. Jones, “Prelude to the Skybolt Crisis,” pp. 103–04.
75 Letter from Kennedy to de Gaulle, December 20, 1962, JFKL, NSF, RS, 219. The letter was transmitted via telegram directly from Nassau, before the US delegation returned to Washington. See also Sayle, Enduring Alliance, pp. 108–09.
76 Rusk–Gromyko meeting, March 22, 1962, FRUS 1961–63, Vol. XV: Berlin Crisis, 1962–63, pp. 67–71.
77 NSC Excomm meeting, January 25, 1963, FRUS 1961–63, Vol. XIII, pp. 487–91.
78 It is worth noting that, despite Kennedy’s increased confidence on this score, the German nuclear question had not yet been settled. See, e.g., Daniel Khalessi, “Strategic Ambiguity: Nuclear Sharing and the Secret Strategy for Drafting Articles I and II of the Nonproliferation Treaty,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 22, Nos. 3–4 (2015), pp. 421–39.
79 Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy on Possible Skipjack Hearings, January 17, 1963, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 226.
80 Memorandum: JCAE Attitude on Possible Polaris Deal with France, April 4, 1963, JFKL, NSF, RS, NATO, 226.
81 See also Rabinowitz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests.
82 Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition.”
83 Cavanna, “Geopolitics over Proliferation,” p. 578.