Operationalizing the “Polish fangs”: Poland and long-range precision strike

ABSTRACT

In 2013, Poland embarked on an ambitious and wide-ranging program to acquire conventional long-range precision-strike capabilities. The two main reasons were to strengthen the operational capacities of the armed forces to face what they perceived to be an increased danger of a military conflict with Russia; and, second, to create a stronger deterrent effect by demonstrating a credible threat to retaliate against targets inside Russia in the event of an attack. While previously Poland had relied predominantly on the deterrence effect of its membership in NATO and its close relations with the United States, the launch of the “Polish fangs” project demonstrated a more nuanced approach. Poland would work toward increasing the credibility of NATO’s deterrence posture, while also investing in independent long-range strike capabilities as a way to broaden its options. The process of acquiring and operationalizing the elements of the Polish long-range strike complex is ongoing, with little effect so far on broader strategic stability and balance of forces in Europe.

KEYWORDS:

• Poland
• conventional long-range precision strike
• NATO
• Russia
• Europe
• strategic stability

Notes

1 Dominik Jankowski, “Beyond Air and Missile Defence: Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces,” Center of European Policy Analysis, Issue Brief no. 132, September 5, 2013, pp. 4–5, <https://cepa.ecms.pl/sites/default/files/documents/CEPA%20Issue%20Brief%20No.%20132_Beyond%20air%20and%20missile%20defense.pdf>.

2 Regarding the characteristics of the Russia approach to warfare, described as “A2/AD,” see, e.g., Billy Fabian, Mark Gunzinger, Jan van Tol, Jacob Cohn, and Gillian Evans, “Strengthening the Defense of NATO’s Eastern Frontier,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019, pp. 3–13, <https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Stengthening_the_Defense_of_NATOs_Eastern_Frontier_WEB_1.pdf>.

3 For an unclassified summary of findings, see Ministry of National Defence, “The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland,” May 2017, Warsaw, <www.gov.pl/attachment/fae62ff2-0471-46e1-95bd-c3c4208234a7>.

4 Tomasz Paszewski, “Can Poland Defend Itself?” Survival, Vol. 58, No 1 (2016), esp. pp. 121–25.

5 The term is not used in Russian doctine, but it refers to a blend of contentional and unconventional military activities and information and cyber warfare. See, e.g., Damien Van Puyvelde, “Hybrid War—Does It Even Exist?” NATO Review, May 7, 2015, <www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/05/07/hybrid-war-does-it-even-exist/index.html>.

6 Both scenarios are discussed in, e.g., Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, “Conventional Deterrence and Landpower in Notheastern Europe,” Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, Carlisle, PA, March 2019, esp. pp. 72–75.

7 Justyna Zając, Poland’s Security Policy: The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 154–55.

8 TVN24, “Tusk: potrzebujemy siły odstraszania” [Tusk: we need a deterrent force], June 3, 2013, <www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/tusk-potrzebujemy-sily-odstraszania,330122.html>.

9 The most comprehensive description of the “Polish fangs” systems and their acquisition process is found in Rafał Kopeć, “Can Poland Build Conventional Deterrence Capability against Russia?” Obrana a strategie, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2018), <www.obranaastrategie.cz/filemanager/files/408754-en.pdf>.

10 Examples include the US MQ-9 Reaper and Israeli Elbit Hermes 900.

11 Marta Rachwalska, “Naval Missile Unit Deployed to Estonia,” Defence24.com, May 8, 2019, <www.defence24.com/naval-missile-unit-deployed-to-estonia>.

12 See, e.g., Jacek Bartosiak and Tomasz Szatkowski, “Geography of the Baltic Sea. Military Perspective. Implications of the Polish Armed Forces Modernization,” National Center for Strategic Studies Recommendation Report, Warsaw, December 2013, p. 30, <http://jacekbartosiak.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/NCSS-Report_Geography-of-the-Baltic-Sea.pdf>.

13 See Adam Mount, “Conventional Deterrence of North Korea,” Federation of American Scientists, 2019, <https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/FAS-CDNK.pdf>.

14 Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland, p. 44.

15 See, e.g., Sergey Sukhankin, “David vs. Goliath: Kaliningrad Oblast as Russia’s A2/AD ‘Bubble’,” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2019), pp. 95–110.

16 Kongsberg, “NSM Coastal Defence Contract Valued at NOK 1,3 Billions with Poland,” December 19, 2014, <www.kongsberg.com/news-and-media/news-archive/2014/nsm-coastal-defence-contract-valued-at-nok-13-billions-with-poland/>.

17 Ministry of National Defence, “HIMARS System for the Polish Army,” February 10, 2019, <www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/himars-system-for-the-polish-army>.

18 Polska Zbrojna, “Interview with the Minister of National Defence Mariusz Błaszczak,” March/April 2019, English language supplement, pp. 3–4.

19 Juliusz Sabak, “JASSM for Poland—Is It Worth the Price?” Defence24.com, November 6, 2014, <www.defence24.com/jassm-for-poland-is-it-worth-to-pay-the-price>.

20 Defence Security Cooperation Agency, “News Release 16-72,” November 28, 2016, <www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/poland_16-72.pdf>.

21 Casimir Pulaski Foundation, “The Future of the Air Forces and Air Defence Units of Poland’s Armed Forces,” Pulaski for Defence of Poland, Warsaw 2016, <https://pulaski.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/The_Future_of_the_Air_Forces.pdf>. The maximum range of the S-400 air-defence system deployed in Kaliningrad is claimed to be 400 km, which would put much Polish territory at risk, but its effectiveness at such long distance is minimal. However, the capabilities of the Russian layered air-defence system allow it to intercept targets over the northeast part of Poland.

22 Sebastien Roblin, “The F-35 Will Transform the Polish Air Force—but They May Need Backup,” National Interest, September 15, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/f-35-will-transform-polish-air-force%E2%80%94-they-may-need-backup-80701>.

23 Vocal support for the option of acquiring cruise missiles was expressed by a group of MPs forming the Parliamentary Group on Armed Forces; arguments of both camps are presented in detail in Kopeć, “Can Poland Build Conventional Deterrence against Russia?,” pp. 82–84.

24 Maksymilian Dura, “Polish MoD Confirms Negotiations with the US: Tomahawk Missiles for the New Submarines?” Defence24.com, March 13, 2015, <www.defence24.com/polish-mod-confirms-negotiations-with-the-us-tomahawk-missiles-for-the-new-submarines>.

25 Defenseworld, “Swedish Parliamentary Approval Sought to Sell Poland Used Submarines,” April 15, 2020, <www.defenseworld.net/news/26752/Swedish_Parliamentary_Approval_Sought_to_Sell_Poland_Used_Submarines#.XvIG4mgzY2w>.

26 Adam Duda, “The Assessment of the 2013–2022 Technical Modernization Plan Realization: Success or Failure?” Stratpoints Foundation, Warsaw, 2017, pp. 11–13, <www.stratpoints.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/AD_OSRPMT_2017_ENG.pdf>.

27 Constellation of Small Satellites for the Mediterranean Basin Observation.

28 For example, the former head of the National Security Bureau, General Stanisław Koziej in “Mini-esej o obronie” [Some thoughts on the defence of Poland], January 10, 2018, <koziej.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Esej-o-obronie10.01.pdf>.

29 Kopeć, “Can Poland Build Conventional Deterrence against Russia?,” pp. 84–85.

30 Wiesława Lewandowska, “Polskie kły nie wystarczą” [Polish fangs won’t do], interview with Romuald Szeremietiew, Niedziela, No. 15 (2019), <www.niedziela.pl/artykul/142306/nd/„Polskie-kly”-nie-wystarcza>.

31 Sputnik, “Polish Purchase of US Missiles to ‘Provoke Conflict’ with Russia,” Sputnik News, December 28, 2016, <https://sputniknews.com/world/201612281049067578-poland-us-missiles-purchase-russia>.