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ABSTRACT
This article explores emerging science and technology advances relevant to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and existing and needed frameworks for their identification, risk assessment, and evaluation of benefit. Threats from biological weapons continue to be a major concern as state and non-state actors have developed, used, or expressed interest in these types of weapons. International nonproliferation instruments and related efforts in health security, specifically the 2005 International Health Regulations and the 2014 Global Health Security Agenda, recognize deliberate biological incidents as one of three threats to address (the others being natural and accidental biological events). To date, these instruments and their subsequent regional and national-level implementation efforts focus primarily on pathogens and toxins as biological threat agents. Unlike the other instruments, the BWC focuses on preventing the diversion of peaceful and prophylactic uses of biology to the development, production, stockpiling, or dissemination and delivery of biological weapons. Accordingly, the BWC recognizes the importance of scientific and technological advances in enabling different actors to develop or disseminate biological agents, altering the risk profile of deliberate biological threats. To identify and discuss advances that may affect implementation of the BWC, the US National Academy of Sciences and the BWC Implementation Support Unit conducted or sponsored several activities to explore science and technologies that may be most relevant to the BWC. However, the biotechnology landscape continues to change drastically, expanding the focus of security risks beyond pathogens and toxins to include other biological data and materials, such as synthetic organisms. Factors promoting the development of biotechnology capabilities include new funders and funding models, practitioners from other disciplines leveraging the tools of biology, new nations investing in the biological sciences, and research leveraging advances in engineering, computer, data, materials, physical, and chemical sciences. These advances may reveal new capabilities that significantly alter biological nonproliferation efforts, including both new security threats and benefits to society.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Kathleen Vogel for inviting us to prepare this manuscript. We would like to thank Christopher Park, Robert Mikulak, and Danielle Lohman of the Department of State for their helpful discussions about the BWC. We would like to thank Jonathan Forman, formerly of the OPCW, for his helpful thoughts regarding the biological S&T advances relevant to the CWC.
Notes
1 The official title is the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
2 United Nations, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004): The Role of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in support of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004),” <www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/sc1540/>.
3 D. Feakes, “The Biological Weapons Convention,” Revue Scientifique et Technique-Office International Des Epizooties, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2017), <http://boutique.oie.int/extrait/20feakes621628.pdf>.
4 The CBD is an international, legally binding agreement to promote “conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.” The CBD has evaluated advances such as synthetic biology and gene drives (enabled by CRISPR-based gene-editing tools), which also have been discussed within the BWC context.
5 InterAcademy Panel, “The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implications of Advances in Science and Technology,” 2015; National Research Council, Trends in Science and Technology Relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Summary of an International Workshop (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011).
6 UNOG, “Biological Weapons Convention, 2019 Meeting of Experts, ” <www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/E8A05357EECA5490C12583BE00578053?OpenDocument>; Graham S. Pearson, “Time for Structural Changes to Make the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention More Effective,” Global Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2016), pp. 23–38.
7 Jenifer Mackby, “Experts Debate Biological Weapons Challenges,” Arms Control Today, September 2018, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-09/news/experts-debate-biological-weapons-challenges>.
8 Several government and nongovernmental entities have held workshops. A few examples include: (a) The National Defense University held a series of workshops on emergence and convergence that included advances in biological S&T (see <https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Media/News/Category/13529/emerging-technologies/>). (b) The Center for Health Security published an article on the implications of life-sciences advances for biosecurity and arms control (Lane Warmbrod Kelsey, James Revill, and Nancy Connell, “Advances in Science and Technology in the Life Sciences and Their Implications for Biosecurity and Arms Control,” UNIDIR, [2020]). (c) Arizona State University holds an annual workshop on biosecurity and biotechnology (for the 2019 Biosecurity Workshop see <https://csteps.asu.edu/2019-biosecurity-workshop>).
9 Matthew P. Shearer, Michael Montague, Amanda Kobokovich, Matthew Watson, Elena Martin, Gigi Kwik Gronvall, and Nancy Connell, “Global Forum on Scientific Advances Important to the Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention,” Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, 2019, <www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/events/2019-global-forum/200925-2019GlobalForumMtgRpt.pdf>; Tatyana Novossiolova and Maurizio Martellini, “Promoting Responsible Science and CBRN Security through Codes of Conduct and Education,” Biosafety and Health, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 59–64 (2019); UNODA, “UNODA Convenes a Workshop for Young Scientists to Foster Networks on Biosecurity in the Global South, ” <www.un.org/disarmament/update/unoda-convenes-a-workshop-for-young-scientists-to-foster-networks-on-biosecurity-in-the-global-south>/.
10 The concept of “dual-use dilemma” refers to research that is conducted for peaceful purposes but could be used by malicious actors to develop weapons or otherwise cause harm. This concept differs from the use of the term “dual use” in the context of export control, which distinguishes between civilian and military or national-security applications of scientific and technological advances. Although policies on the dual-use dilemma (also referred to as “dual-use life-sciences research of concern”) have been developed by the United States and other governments, a new term—“information hazard”—increasingly is being used to describe the dual-use-dilemma concept.
11 National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2004).
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