Dual-use biology: building trust and managing perceptions of intent

ABSTRACT

At a time of heightened concern about potential future biological-weapons threats, this article considers how the international community can use the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention framework to strengthen compliance monitoring of rapidly increasing dual-use capacities around the globe. It presents three conceptual layers within the treaty regime which states can draw from to inform their compliance judgments: one legally binding, one politically binding, and one wholly voluntary. The article outlines how these were established and how they have been used so far, and argues for an incremental, inclusive, practical, and forward-looking approach to evolving these structures to better manage perceptions of the intent behind dual-use capacities, and to further trust between states.

KEYWORDS:

• dual-use
• biological weapons
• biosecurity
• compliance
• verification
• Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
• confidence-building measures

Acknowledgements

This article draws on my earlier work for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) report: Filippa Lentzos, Compliance and Enforcement in the Biological Weapons Regime (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/19/WMDCE4>.

Notes

1 Jesse Kirkpatrick, Gregory D. Koblentz, Megan J. Palmer, Edward Perello, David A. Relman, and Sarah W. Denton, Editing Biosecurity: Needs and Strategies for Governing Genome Editing (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 2018); National Academies of Sciences Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology (Washington, DC, 2018); Filippa Lentzos and Cédric Invernizzi, “DNA Origami: UNFOLDING risk?” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 25, 2018, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/01/dna-origami-unfolding-risk/>; Robin Fears, “Assessing the Security Implications of Genome Editing Technology: Report of an international workshop,” Herrenhausen, Germany, October 11–13, 2017, Inter-Academy Partnership, <www.volkswagenstiftung.de/sites/default/files/downloads/Summary_Report_Genome_Editing.pdf>; Gregory D. Koblentz, “The De Novo Synthesis of Horsepox Virus: Implications for Biosecurity and Recommendations for Preventing the Re-emergence of Smallpox,” Journal of Health Security, Vol. 15, no. 6, 2018, pp. 620–28; Filippa Lentzos, “Ignore Bill Gates: Where Bioweapons Focus Really Belongs,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 3, 2017, <https://thebulletin.org/2017/07/ignore-bill-gates-where-bioweapons-focus-really-belongs/>; Royal Society, “Trends In Synthetic Biology And Gain Of Function And Regulatory Implications,” Sackler Forum, 2015, <https://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/Publications/2016/sackler-report-09-2016.pdf>; Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and Kathleen M. Vogel, “Gene Drives: The good, the Bad, and the Hype,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, October 14, 2016, <https://thebulletin.org/2016/10/gene-drives-the-good-the-bad-and-the-hype/>; Inter-Academy Partnership, “The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Implications of advances in science and technology,” 2015, <http://iapbwg.pan.pl/images/files/reports/BWC_Trends_Booklet_WEB.pdf>.

2 Kolja Brockmann, Sibylle Bauer, and Vincent Voulanin, “Bio Plus X: Arms Control and the Convergence of Biology and Emerging Technologies,” Stockholm International for Peace Research Institute, March 2019, <www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/sipri2019_bioplusx_0.pdf>.

3 Kathleen M. Vogel, Phantom Menace or Looming Danger? A New Framework for Assessing Bioweapons Threats (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013); Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenges of Expertise and Organization for Weapons Development (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

4 Gregory D. Koblentz and Filippa Lentzos, “21st Century Biodefence: Risks, Trade-offs & Responsible Science,” ILPI BWC Review Conference Series Paper No. 3, November 2016, <http://nwp.ilpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/03-21st-century-biodefence-gold.pdf>.

5 Ibid.

6 Filippa Lentzos and Jez Littlewood, “DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency]'s Prepare Program: Preparing for What?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 26, 2018, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/07/darpas-prepare-program-preparing-for-what/>.

7 R.G. Reeves, S. Voeneky, D. Caetano-Anollés, F. Beck, and C. Boëte, “Agricultural Research, or a New Bioweapon System?” Science, Vol. 362, No. 6410 (2018), p. 35–37. The article was picked up in a number of news outlets including El País, The Guardian, Washington Post, New York Times, Le Monde, The Hindu, Zeit, Newsweek, and Wired.

8 See, for example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's programs on Biological Robustness in Complex Settings, Safe Genes, Ecological Manipulation, and Prepare. There is little publicly available information on non-US programs.

9 Mary Kaldor, “In Defense of New Wars,” Stability, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2013, p. 4; Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).

10 NATO, “Strategic Foresight Analysis,” NATO Futures Work report, October 2017, <www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/171004_sfa_2017_report_hr.pdf>.

11 Caitríona McLeish and Filippa Lentzos, “Chemical and Biological Security Threats,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2019: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), <www.sipri.org/yearbook/2019/08>; Caitríona McLeish and Filippa Lentzos, “Chemical and Biological Security Threats,” SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), <www.sipri.org/yearbook/2020/12>.

12 Nicholas A. Sims, The Evolution of Biological Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

13 BWC First Review Conference “Summary Record of the Twelfth Meeting,” BWC/CONF.I/SR.12, March 21, 1980, p. 3.

14 Nicholas A. Sims, “Four Decades of Missed Opportunities to Strengthen the BWC: 2001 Too?” Disarmament Diplomacy, Vol. 58 (2001), p. 16; M. Meselson, J. Juillemin, M. Hugh-Jones, A. Langmuir, I. Popova, A. Sheklokov, and O. Yampolskaya, “The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979,” Science, Vol. 266, No. 5188 (1994), pp. 1202–08.

15 See the Joint US/UK/Russian Statement of Biological Weapons, issued by the US Department of State on September 14, 1992, available in Annex D in Milton Leitenberg and Raymond A. Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

16 David C. Kelly, “The Trilateral Agreement: Lessons for Biological Weapons Verification,” Verification Yearbook (2002), pp. 93–110, <www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2002/VY02_Kelly.pdf>. For more on the Trilaterals, see John R. Walker, “The Leitenberg–Zilinskas History of the Soviet Biological Weapons Programme,” Harvard Sussex Programme Occasional Paper Issue 02, December 2012, <www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/occasional%20papers/HSPOP_2.pdf>.

17 The United Kingdom, for example, has not initiated any such consultations since the Trilaterals. Author’s personal communication with John R. Walker, August 2019.

18 See, for instance, United States, “Strengthening Confidence-Building and Consultative Mechanisms under the Biological Weapons Convention,” BWC PrepCom to the Eighth Review Conference, BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.6, April 21, 2016; European Union, “Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Consultative Provisions of Article V of the BWC,” BWC Eighth Review Conference, BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.16, October 31, 2016; United Kingdom, “Institutional Strengthening of the Convention: Reflections on the 2001 Protocol and the Verification Challenge,” BWC Meeting of States Parties, BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/WP.1, July 10, 2019.

19 BWC, “Final Document,” Second BWC Review Conference, BWC/CONF.II/13, December 30, 1986.

20 Ibid.

21 Filippa Lentzos, “Trust and Transparency in Biodefense,” in Sunit K. Singh and Jens H. Kuhn, eds., Defense against Biological Attack (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), Vol. 1, pp. 53–68, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03053-7_4>.

22 Ibid.

23 2014 BWC Meeting of States Parties, “Peer Review Pilot Exercise Held from 4 to 6 December 2013 in Paris,” Working Paper submitted by France, BWC/MSP/2014/WP.3.

24 2016 BWC Review Conference, “Confidence in Compliance: Peer Review Visit Exercise at the Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology in Munich, Germany,” Working Paper submitted by Germany, BWC/CONF. VIII/WP.11; Filippa Lentzos, “Increasing Transparency in Biodefence: A 2016 Visit to a German Military Medical Biodefence Facility,” EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Paper No. 52, November 2016, <www.sipri.org/publications/2016/eu-non-proliferation-papers/increasing-transparency-biodefence>.

25 2018 BWC Meeting of States Parties, “Transparency Visit to the Lugar Center, Georgia: An Independent Report,” Working Paper submitted by Georgia, BWC/MSP/2018/WP.11; Filippa Lentzos, “The Russian Disinformation Attack that Poses a Biological Danger,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November 19, 2018, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/the-russian-disinformation-attack-that-poses-a-biological-danger/>.

26 Filippa Lentzos, “Trust and Transparency in Biodefense,” in Sunit K. Singh and Jens H Kuhn, eds., Defense against Biological Attack (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), pp. 53–68.

27 Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Ghana, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States, “Building Confidence through Voluntary Transparency Exercises,” BWC/CONF.VIII/WP/.35, November 10, 2016.

28 Jez Littlewood, The Biological Weapons Convention: A Failed Revolution (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2015).

29 Jez Littlewood, “Revisiting BWC Verification: A Stepping Stone Approach,” Policy Brief Series to BWC MX5, King’s College London, August 2018, <www.filippalentzos.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Policy-Brief-1.pdf>.

30 Richard Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: If Not the Protocol, then What?,” Disarmament Forum, No. 1 (2011), pp. 39–50, <www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/beyond-the-btwc-rev-con-en-313.pdf>.

31 James Revill, “Revisiting BWC Verification: Consultations and Clarification,” Policy Brief Series to BWC MX, King’s College London, August 2018.

32 Filippa Lentzos, “Revisiting BWC Verification: Information-Sharing,” Policy Brief series to BWC MX, King's College London, August 2018, <www.filippalentzos.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Policy-Brief-3.pdf>. See also European Union, “Position of the European Union Relating to the Eighth Review Conference of the BWC,” BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.5, April 12, 2016; United States, “Strengthening Confidence-Building and Consultative Mechanisms under the Biological Weapons Convention,” BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.6, August 10, 2016; Germany, “Strengthening Confidence-Building Measures in Regard to Dual Use Materials,” BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.35, August 16, 2016; Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, and Switzerland, “Step-by-Step Approach in CBM Participation,” BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.36, August 16, 2016; Russian Federation, “Proposal to enhance the format of confidence-building measures under the Biological Weapons Convention,” BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.9, October 14, 2016; as well as additional working papers submitted during intersessional meetings 2012–15.

33 Littlewood, “Revisiting BWC Verification.”

34 Spiez Laboratory, “Spiez Convergence: Report on the Third Workshop,” September 11–14, 2018; Swedish Defence Research Agency, “Towards a UNSGM Biological Analysis Network: Workshop report,” June 16–17, 2015; FOI, “UNSGM Biological Analysis Network: Natural, Accidental or Deliberate Outbreak?” October 5–6, 2016.

35 Lentzos,“The Russian Disinformation Attack that Poses a Biological Danger.”