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ABSTRACT
Nationalist populists as leaders of states that possess nuclear weapons undermine the nuclear order and increase nuclear dangers in novel, significant, and persistent ways. Such leaders talk differently about nuclear weapons; they can put nuclear policy making and crisis management in disarray; and they can weaken international alliances and multilateral nuclear institutions. The rise of nationalist populists in nuclear-armed states, including some of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, shatters the presumed distinction between responsible and irresponsible nuclear powers and complicates attempts to heal rifts in the international order. Policies to wait out populists or to balance their influence in multilateral institutions seem to have had limited success. A sustainable strategy to deal with the challenge posed by populists would need to start by recognizing that we can no longer assume that nuclear weapons are safe in the hands of some states but not in others’.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers, Jonas Schneider, and Benoît Pelopidas, as well as the participants in the December 2019 Nuclear Studies Research Initiative Conference in Hamburg, for their comments and valuable feedback.
Notes
1 Here, “populist” and “populism” will be used to refer to the overarching phenomenon, while “nationalist populist” and “nationalist populism” indicate the specific subtype we aim to describe and analyze.
2 Other forms or subtypes of populism, such as left-wing populism, have arisen in other contexts, at different times, and in different world regions but are outside the scope of this paper. Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser identify the end of the 19th century as the starting point for agrarian populist movements in Russia and the United States, and three populist waves that came after this. The first populist wave swept Latin America after the Great Depression and saw left-wing populists come to power in several countries, such as Juan Perón in Argentina. This phase lasted until the 1960s. The second wave, in the 1990s, affected Latin America, with, for example, Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Carlos Menem in Argentina coming to power, and European countries, with populist leaders such as Alexander Lukashenko assuming power in Belarus. The third wave began in 1998, with Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua coming to power. According to Mudde and Kaltwasser, this third wave is still ongoing. Electoral breakthroughs and the electoral persistence of populist movements, leaders, and parties are the most obvious indicators of populism’s rise to power. But populists can be formidable political forces even without such successes at the polls. See Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017).
3 Prime examples are Victor Orbán in Hungary, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and the Syriza party in Greece.
4 Nick Ritchie, “A Hegemonic Nuclear Order: Understanding the Ban Treaty and the Power Politics of Nuclear Weapons,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2019), pp. 1–26; Benoît Pelopidas, “Nuclear Weapons Scholarship as a Case of Self-Censorship in Security Studies,” Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (2016), pp. 326–36.
5 Richard Carr, “Boris Johnson: Populists Now Run the Show, but What Exactly Are They Offering?,” The Conversation UK, July 23, 2019, <https://theconversation.com/boris-johnson-populists-now-run-the-show-but-what-exactly-are-they-offering-120808>; Manjari Chatterjee Miller, “India's Authoritarian Streak: What Modi Risks with His Divisive Populism,” Foreign Affairs, May 30, 2018, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2018-05-30/indias-authoritarian-streak>; Thorsten Wojczewski, “Conceptualizing the Links between Populism, Nationalism and Foreign Policy: How Modi Constructed a Nationalist, Electoral Coalition,” in Frank A. Stengel, David B. MacDonald and Dirk Nabers, eds., Populism and World Politics (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 251–74; Lionel Barber and Henry Foy, “Vladimir Putin Says Liberalism Has ‘Become Obsolete,'” Financial Times, June 28, 2019, <www.ft.com/content/670039ec-98f3-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36>.
6 See, for example, Jordan Kyle and Limor Gultchin, “Populists in Power around the World,” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, November 7, 2018, <https://institute.global/insight/renewing-centre/populists-power-around-world-Power-Around-the-World-.pdf>; Jordan Kyle and Yascha Mounk, “The Populist Harm to Democracy: An Empirical Assessment,” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, December 26, 2018, <https://institute.global/sites/default/files/articles/The-Populist-Harm-to-Democracy-An-Empirical-Assessment.pdf>.
7 See Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999).
8 As Christian Wagner and Oliver Thränert conclude. ”Control over the nuclear potential remains the army leadership’s bargaining chip, with which it protects its privileged position in Pakistan.” See Oliver Thränert and Christian Wagner, “Pakistan as a Nuclear Power: Nuclear Risks, Regional Conflicts and the Dominant Role of the Military,” SWP Research Paper 2009/RP 08, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, June 2009, <www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2009_RP08_trt_wgn_ks.pdf>, p. 29. Since assuming office, Khan has spoken twice on the solely defensive role of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, dismissing nuclear war as self-destructive and even suggesting giving up nuclear weapons for good—if India would do the same and the Kashmir conflict were solved. See Adnan Khan, “Imran Khan Bargains with Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” Geopolity, June 27, 2021, <https://thegeopolity.com/2021/06/27/imran-khan-bargains-with-pakistans-nuclear-weapons/>.
9 See, for example, Elizabeth J. Perry, “The Populist Dream of Chinese Democracy,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 74, No. 4 (2015), pp. 903–15, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002191181500114X>; Salvatore Babones, “Xi Jinping: Communist China's First Populist President,” Forbes, October 20, 2017, <www.forbes.com/sites/salvatorebabones/2017/10/20/populism-chinese-style-xi-jinping-cements-his-status-as-chinas-first-populist-president>; Suheun Kim, “North Korea as a Populist Regime,” Democratic Erosion, October 23, 2020, <www.democratic-erosion.com/2020/10/23/north-korea-as-a-populist-regime>.
10 Marine Le Pen, “Dissuasion: Ni Élargie, Ni Concertée, Independante!“ [Deterrence: not extended, not concerted, independent!], L’Opinion, February 10, 2020, <www.lopinion.fr/edition/politique/marine-pen-rn-dissuasion-elargie-concertee-independante-211158> (translation by the authors). In France, nuclear weapons are an important pillar of national self-image and self-identification, termed “force de dissuasion nucléaire francaise” (French nuclear deterrent force), colloquially known as the “force de frappe” (strike force). See, for example, Stéfanie von Hlatky, “Revisiting France’s Nuclear Exception after its ‘Return’ to NATO,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2014), pp. 392–404.
11 See David Gevarter, “Could European Populism Go Nuclear on NATO?” Council on Foreign Relations, July 19, 2018, <www.cfr.org/blog/could-european-populism-go-nuclear-NATO>.
12 William Walker, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order (London, UK: Routledge Global Security Studies, 2012), pp. 12–13.
13 Gregory D. Koblentz, “Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age,” Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 71, November 2014, <https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014/11/Second%20Nuclear% 20Age_CSR71.pdf>.
14 James M. Acton, “Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2018), pp. 56–99.
15 Rachel E. Whitlark, “Nuclear Beliefs: A Leader-Focused Theory of Counter-Proliferation,” Security Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (2017), pp. 545–74; Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael C. Horowitz, “When Leaders Matter: Rebel Experience and Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 77, No. 1 (2015), pp. 72–87; Jonas Schneider, “The Study of Leaders in Nuclear Proliferation and How to Reinvigorate It,” International Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2020), pp. 1–25; Christopher Way and Jessica L. P. Weeks, “Making It Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, No. 3 (2014), pp. 705–19; Elizabeth N. Saunders, "The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2019), pp. 146–84.
16 Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Populism (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017); Karen Guttieri, “Populism on the World Stage,” S&F Sicherheit und Frieden, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2019), pp. 13–18; Yehuda Ben-Hur Levy, “The Undiplomats: Right-Wing Populists and Their Foreign Policies,” Center for European Reform, August 21, 2015, <www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2015/pb_ybl_undiplo_21aug15-11804.pdf>; Catherine Kane and Caitlin McCulloch, “Populism and Foreign Policy: Deepening Divisions and Decreasing Efficiency,” Global Politics Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2017), pp. 39–52.
17 Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
18 Hymans.
19 On the early evolution of Trump into a populist, see, for example, Uri Friedman, “What Is a Populist? And Is Donald Trump One?” Atlantic, February 27, 2017, <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/what-is-populist-trump/516525>.
20 Frank Alexander Stengel, David B. MacDonald, and Dirk Nabers, “Conclusion: Populism, Foreign Policy, and World Politics,” in Frank Alexander Stengel, David B. MacDonald, and Dirk Nabers, eds., Populism and World Politics: Exploring Inter- and Transnational Dimensions (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 368.
21 See Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2004), p. 544. Because of its definitional elusiveness, there is a debate on whether populism should be classified as an ideology at all.
22 Hymans, Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation; Margaret G, Hermann, “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1980), pp. 7–46; Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back in,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2001), pp. 107–46; Herbert C. Kelman, “The Role of the Individual in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Considerations,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1970), pp. 1–17. See also David Cadier, “How Populism Spills over into Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Europe, January 10, 2019, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/78102>.
23 Byman and Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men,” p. 134.
24 See, for example, Rogers Brubaker, “Populism and Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 26, No.1 (2020), pp. 44–66.
25 Brubaker, “Populism and Nationalism.”
26 Jordan Kyle and Brett Meyer, “High Tide? Populism in Power 1990–2020,” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, February 7, 2020, <https://institute.global/sites/default/files/2020-02/High%20Tide%20Populism%20in%20Power%201990-2020.pdf>, p. 9.
27 This resembles Hymans’s description of oppositional nationalists as articulating a “stark black-white dichotomization of ‘us against them’.” See Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 25. This polarization places nationalist populism squarely in conservative US policy discourse. See J. Peter Scoblic, U.S. vs. Them: How a Half Century of Conservatism Has Undermined America's Security (New York, NY: Viking, 2008).
28 There are many examples. In the United States, Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan is the hallmark of backward-oriented policies. In Russia, Putin “[h]as skillfully appealed to tsarist and Soviet nostalgia to emphasize Russia’s rightful role as a great power.” Erdogan’s 2014 campaign slogan was “National Will, National Power.” See Angela Stent, Putin’s World: Russia against the West and with the Rest (New York, NY: Twelve, 2019), p. 42; Emre Erdogan and Sezin Öney, “And the Winner of Turkey’s Presidential Election is … Populism,” Washington Post, August 8, 2014, <www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/08/08/and-the-winner-of-turkeys-presidential-election-is-populism>.
29 T.G. Carpenter, “The Populist Surge and the Rebirth of Foreign Policy Nationalism,” SAIS Review of International Affairs, Vol. 37 (2017), pp. 33–46.
30 Kyle and Gultchin, “Populists in Power around the World,” p. 18.
31 Carpenter, “Populist Surge.”
32 Francis Fukuyama, “The Rise of Populist Nationalism,” Credit Suisse Research Institute, January 23, 2018, <www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/research/publications/future-of-politics.pdf>.
33 Guttieri, “Populism on the World Stage.”
34 Kyle and Meyer, “High Tide?” p. 4.
35 Electoral autocracies, unlike full autocracies, maintain an open, liberal, and democratic façade through elections and provide populists with the necessary tie to their constituency (see, e.g., Andreas Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006).
36 Fukuyama, “Rise of Populist Nationalism”; Kyle and Mounk, “Populist Harm to Democracy.”
37 Walker, Perpetual Menace.
38 Hugh Gusterson, “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,” Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1999), pp. 111–43.
39 See, for example, Josef Joffe, “Peace and Populism: Why the European Anti-nuclear Movement Failed,” International Security, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1987), pp. 3–40.
40 Kyle and Meyer, “High Tide?” p. 4.
41 India and Pakistan have been ruled by various prime ministers who could be described as populists. The 1998 tests by both countries took place when populists were in power. See Arundhati Roy, “The End of Imagination,” Outlook, August 3, 1998, <www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/the-end-of-imagination/205932>.
42 This is not to say that the rise of populism is simply based on perceptions. Rather, it is an indication of an estrangement between populations, on the one hand, and political parties and institutions, on the other hand, and an inability to address these issues in established forums. On how the financial crisis of 2008 fueled the rise of populism, see, for example, J. Lawrence Broz, Jeffry Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth, “Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash,” International Organization, Vol. 75, No. 2 (2021), pp. 464–94, <www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/populism-in-place-the-economic-geography-of-the-globalization-backlash/98ED873D925E0590CB9A78AEC68BB439>.
43 Angelos Chryssogelos, “Populism in Foreign Policy,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2017, <doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.467>.
44 As shown by the V-Dem Institute’s Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) Index. Anna Lührmann, Juraj Medzihorsky, Garry Hindle, Staffan I. Lindberg, “New Global Data on Political Parties: V-Party,” University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute: V-Dem Briefing Paper, No. 9, October 2020, <www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/b6/55/b6553f85-5c5d-45ec-be63-a48a2abe3f62/briefing_paper_9.pdf>.
45 See Janne E. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1989).
46 Jeffrey G. Lewis and Bruno Tertrais, “The Finger on the Button: The Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear-Armed States,” CNS Occasional Paper 45/2019, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, February 2019, p. 32, <www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Finger-on-the-Nuclear-Button.pdf>. See also Bruce Blair, “What Exactly Would It Mean to Have Trump’s Finger on the Nuclear Button?” Politico Magazine, June 11, 2016, <www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/2016-donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-missiles-nukes-button-launch-foreign-policy-213955>.
47 Elena Block and Ralph Negrine, “The Populist Communication Style: Toward a Critical Framework,” International Journal of Communication, Vol. 11 (2017), p. 182.
48 Kyle and Gultchin, “Populists in Power,” p. 17.
49 Guttieri, “Populism on the World Stage,” p. 13.
50 Alexey Arbatov, “When It Comes to Nuclear Weapons, Words Are Deeds,” Carnegie Moscow Center, February 9, 2015, <http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=59007>.
51 William C. Yengst, Stephen C. Lukasik, and Mark A. Jensen, “Nuclear Weapons that Went to War,” DNA-TR-96, Defense Special Weapons Agency, October 1996. Daniel Ellsberg lists 25 attempts at nuclear coercion by the United States since 1945. See Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2017), pp. 319–22.
52 The exception to this rule appears to be Boris Johnson, who has been reluctant to refer to the UK nuclear deterrent as a symbol of strength or pride.
53 Fukuyama, “Rise of Populist Nationalism.”
54 Kyle and Gultchin, “Populists in Power,” p. 13.
55 Between January 2017 and November 2019, President Trump sent 55 tweets containing the word “nuclear.” By comparison, President Barack Obama during his eight-year tenure sent two tweets containing the term “nuclear” (both supportive of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).
56 Diwali is the Hindu festival of lights. Quoted in “Our Nuclear Weapons Are Not for Diwali: PM Modi on Pak’s Nuclear Button Threat,” India Today, April 21, 2019, <www.indiatoday.in/elections/lok-sabha-2019/story/our-nuclear-weapons-are-not-for-diwali-pm-modi-on-pak-nuclear-button-threat-1506893-2019-04-21>.
57 Ece Toksabay, “Erdogan Says It’s Unacceptable that Turkey Can't Have Nuclear Weapons,” Reuters, September 4, 2019, <www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-nuclear-erdogan/erdogan-says-its-unacceptable-that-turkey-cant-have-nuclear-weapons-idUSKCN1VP2QN>.
58 Jeffrey Michaels and Heather Williams, “The Nuclear Education of Donald J. Trump,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2017), pp. 54–77; Amy Davidson Sorkin, “Donald Trump’s Nuclear Uncle,” New Yorker, April 8, 2016, <www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/donald-trumps-nuclear-uncle≥.
59 James Wood Forsyth, Jr., “Nuclear Weapons and Political Behavior,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol.11, No. 3 (2017), pp. 115–28.
60 Arbatov, “When It Comes to Nuclear Weapons.”
61 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957>.
62 Ankit Panda, “At Indian General Election Rallies, Modi Beats the Nuclear Drums,” Diplomat, April 23, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/at-indian-general-election-rallies-modi-beats-the-nuclear-drums/>.
63 Dmitry Adamsky, “How the Russian Church Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb: Orthodoxy’s Influence on Moscow’s Nuclear Complex,” Foreign Affairs, June 14, 2019, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2019-06-14/how-russian-church-learned-stop-worrying-and-love-bomb>.
64 Interpretation of such loose talk is further complicated by contradictory messaging from within the administration. Thus, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson played down Trump’s rhetoric by saying the following day that Americans should have “no concerns about this particular rhetoric of the last few days.” Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, “Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.,” New York Times, August 8, 2017, <www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html>.
65 Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal.
66 Trump reportedly repeated the same points several times after. See Fred Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2020), pp. 261–63.
67 Oliver Meier, “The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and the Future of Nuclear Order,” European Leadership Network, March 2, 2018, <www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-u-s-nuclear-posture-review-and-the-future-of-nuclear-order/>.
68 Kaplan, The Bomb, p. 271.
69 Kaplan, p. 271. See also Derek Seidman, “The Revolving Door Profiteer Who Helped Shape Trump’s Nuclear Policy,” LittleSis, April 16, 2018, <https://news.littlesis.org/2018/04/16/the-revolving-door-profiteer-who-helped-shape-trumps-nuclear-policy>; Tom Sauer, “The US Nuclear Posture Review Does Not Carry Trump’s Signature,” Defense News, February 8, 2018, <www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/02/08/the-us-nuclear-posture-review-does-not-carry-trumps-signature/>; Kaplan, pp. 270–84.
70 In March 2015, the Russian ambassador to Denmark said that Russia would threaten Danish Navy ships with nuclear weapons should Denmark commit such vessels to NATO’s missile-defense efforts. See Teis Jensen, “Russia Threatens to Aim Nuclear Missiles at Denmark Ships if It Joins NATO Shield,” Reuters, March 22, 2015, <www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-russia/russia-threatens-to-aim-nuclear-missiles-at-denmark-ships-if-it-joins-nato-shield-idUSKBN0MI0ML20150322>.
71 Department of Defense, “2019 Missile Defense Review,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 17, 2019.
72 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Trump Vows to Reinvent Missile Defenses, but Offers Incremental Plans,” New York Times, January 17, 2019, <www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us/politics/trump-missile-defense-pentagon.html>.
73 Vladimir Isachenkov, ”Russia Warns US Missile Defense Plans Will Fuel Arms Race,” Associated Press, January 18, 2019, <https://apnews.com/98f4ebc83c174cfb9d40474e61b1a656>.
74 Thomas Grove, “Putin Says Russia Was Ready for Nuclear Confrontation over Crimea,” Reuters, March 15, 2015, <www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-yanukovich/putin-says-russia-was-ready-for-nuclear-confrontation-over-crimea-idUSKBN0MB0GV20150315>.
75 Richard Sisk, “Interviews Reveal Chaos at Incirlik on Night of Coup Attempt in Turkey,” Military.com, August 3, 2016, <www.military.com/daily-news/2016/08/03/interviews-reveal-chaos-incirlik-night-coup-attempt-in-turkey.html>.
76 See the tweet by Jon B. Wolfsthal, cited in “Former Member of Obama's NSC Says Mattis Has Inserted Himself in the Nuke Chain of Command,” Daily Kos, December 21, 2018, <www.dailykos.com/stories/2018/12/20/1820616/-Former-Member-of-Obama-s-NSC-Says-Mattis-Has-Inserted-Himself-in-the-Nuke-Chain-of-Command>. In the closing days of the Nixon presidency, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger likewise asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to run any “unusual orders” from the president by him, apparently to prevent a nuclear launch on impulse by an unfit commander-in-chief. See Kaplan, The Bomb, pp. 289–329, 344–45.
77 As a result of the January 6 events, the Department of Defense’s Office of Inspector General has launched an investigation into whether safety procedures for the so-called nuclear football are sufficient. See Barbara Starr and Ellie Kaufman, “Pentagon Watchdog to Review ‘Nuclear Football’ Safety Procedures after January 6 Incident,” CNN, July 20, 2021, <www.cnn.com/2021/07/20/politics/dod-ig-nuclear-football-review/index.html>.
78 Quoted in Connor O’Brien and Jacqueline Feldscher, “Pelosi Asks Joint Chiefs about Preventing Trump from Launching Nukes,” Politico, January 8, 2021, <www.politico.com/news/2021/01/08/pelosi-trump-take-away-nuclear-codes-456529>.
79 O’Brien and Feldscher, “Pelosi Asks Joint Chiefs.”
80 Michael S. Schmidt, “Fears that Trump Might Launch a Strike Prompted General to Reassure China, Book Says”, New York Times, September 14, 2021, <www.nytimes.com/2021/09/14/us/politics/peril-woodward-book-trump.html>.
81 Andrew Corbett, “I Wouldn’t Want to Press the Nuclear Button for Boris Johnson,” Byline Times, July 20, 2020, <https://bylinetimes.com/2020/07/20/i-wouldnt-want-to-press-the-nuclear-button-for-boris-johnson>.
82 Like other British prime ministers, Johnson has refrained from talking about the UK deterrent, continuing the practice of “sustained reluctance amongst British governments to engage in public dialogue on strategic nuclear deterrence policy.” See Andrew Scott, “The British Government, the Public, and Nuclear Deterrence,” PhD diss., King's College London, 2017, <www.researchgate.net/profile/Andy-Corbett/publication/321051034_The_British_Government_the_Public_and_Nuclear_Deterrence/links/5a0ab5d945851551b78d5265/The-British-Government-the-Public-and-Nuclear-Deterrence.pdf>.
83 Vipin Narang, “Pulwama and Its Aftermath: Four Observations,” in “South Asia Post-Crisis Brief,” Global Zero, June 2019, p. 17, <www.globalzero.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/South-Asia-Post-Crisis-Brief.pdf>.
84 Sven Engesser, Nayla Fawzi, and Anders Olof Larsson, “Populist Online Communication: Introduction to the Special Issue,” Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 20, No. 9 (2017), pp. 1279–92.
85 Michaels and Williams, “Nuclear Education.” For a realistic scenario of how such instant messaging may contribute to crisis escalation, see Jeffrey G. Lewis, The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks against the United States: A Speculative Novel (Boston, MA: Mariner Books, 2018). Daniel Ellsberg, by contrast, argues that Donald Trump’s nuclear threats fundamentally are in line with the “institutionalized madness” that is at the core of a policy that puts control over the use of nuclear weapons into the hands of one individual. See Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2017), p. 332.
86 Heather Williams and Alexi Drew, “Escalation by Tweet: Managing the New Nuclear Diplomacy,” Centre for Science and Security Studies, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, July 2020, <www.kcl.ac.uk/csss/assets/escalation-by-tweet-managing-the-new-nuclear-diplomacy-2020.pdf>.
87 A similar, even stronger point can be made about Russia’s policies on chemical weapons, which are undermining the norms and rules embedded in the Chemical Weapons Convention. See, for example, Oliver Meier, “Chemical Weapons Attacks: The End of Anonymity,” SWP Comment 2018/C 32, Berlin, SWP, August 2018, <www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2018C32_mro.pdf>.
88 Mark Fitzpatrick, “The Ukraine Crisis and Nuclear Order,” Survival, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2014), pp. 81–90.
89 Quoted in Diego Cupolo, “Erdogan Hints at Nuclear Ambitions,” Al-Monitor, September 5, 2019, <www.al-monitor.com/originals/2019/09/erdogan-turkey-wants-nuclear-weapons.html>.
90 See Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier, “Disentangling Rather than Cutting the Gordian Knot: The North Korea Conflict and the Role of Europe,” in Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier, eds., Facets of the North Korea Conflict: Actors, Problems and Europe’s Interests (Berlin: SWP, 2018), pp. 73–82.
91 Kyle and Meyer, “High Tide?” p. 18.
92 Thus, Putin has compared Russian nuclear weapons to the “teeth and claws” of a bear protecting “his taiga”: “Maybe [the bear] should stop chasing pigs and boars around the taiga but start picking berries and eating honey. Maybe then he will be left alone. But no, he won’t be! Because someone will always try to chain him up. As soon as he’s chained they will tear out his teeth and claws.” Vladimir Putin, “News Conference of Vladimir Putin,” December 18, 2014, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47250>.
93 Populists generally prefer to interact and negotiate with national governments rather than with representatives of multinational organizations, such as the European Union.
94 Trump infamously justified withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Agreement by arguing that he “was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.” See Dan Merica, “Pittsburgh over Paris: Trump’s Nationalist Decision,” CNN, June 1, 2017, <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/01/politics/paris-pittsburgh-trump-nationalist-decision/index.html>.
95 Tobias Bunde, “Die Entwertung der NATO. Warum die ‘Illiberale Internationale’ das Nordatlantische Bündnis Gefährdet” [The devaluation of NATO: why the “illiberal international” endangers the North Atlantic Alliance], S&F Sicherheit & Frieden, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2019), pp. 19–23.
96 Robin Emmott, “Exclusive: Turkey Purges NATO Military Envoys after Failed Coup,” Reuters, October 12, 2016, <www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-NATO-exclusive-idUSKCN12C16Q>. One response by the alliance leadership to such challenges has been to emphasize the continuation of practical cooperation unaffected by political turmoil. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, when asked how the alliance would respond to the populist challenge from within, said that that in “a more dangerous world it is important that we maintain the strength of NATO, and that makes us all safe regardless of what we think about trade tariffs or climate change.” NATO, “Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the ‘NATO Talk around the Brandenburg Tor’ Conference,” November 12, 2018, <www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/opinions_160241.htm?selectedLocale=en>.
97 David E. Sanger, “Trump Followed His Gut on Syria. Calamity Came Fast,” New York Times, October 14, 2019, <www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/trump-turkey-syria.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage>.
98 Carpenter, “Populist Surge,” p. 42.
99 Quoted in “Trump Hikes Price Tag for US Forces in Korea Almost 400% as Seoul Questions Alliance,” CNN, November 15, 2019, <https://m.cnn.com/en/article/h_803cf72ff6d1214bcdf0027c9405431b>.
100 Science and Security Board, “Closer Than Ever: It Is 100 Seconds to Midnight: 2020 Doomsday Clock Statement,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 23, 2020, <https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/>.
101 Sebastian Brixey-Williams and Paul Ingram, “Responsible Nuclear Sovereignty and the Future of the Global Nuclear Order,” BASIC and University of Birmingham’s Institute for Conflict, 2017, <https://basicint.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Brixey-Williams-and-Ingram-Responsible-Nuclear-Sovereignty-Report-PDF_FINAL-2017.pdf>.
102 Yascha Mounk, “The Dictators’ Last Stand: Why the New Autocrats Are Weaker than They Look,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2019, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-08-12/dictators-last-stand>.
103 Walker, Perpetual Menace.
104 Forsyth, “Nuclear Weapons and Political Behavior.”
105 Emily Tamkin, “Lawmakers Introduce Bill Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Policy, January 24, 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/24/seNATOr-and-congressman-introduce-restricting-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons-act-trump>.
106 Reiji Yoshida and Daisuke Kikuchi, “One Year Later, Abe’s Gamble on the Unpredictable Trump Appears to Be Paying Off,” Japan Times, January 19, 2019, <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/01/19/national/politics-diplomacy/one-year-later-abes-gamble-unpredictable-trump-appears-paying-off/>.
107 Countries can choose bandwagoning in response to a threat, out of opportunism, or to secure political survival. Matias Spektor and Guilherme Fasolin, “Bandwagoning for Survival: Political Leaders and International Alignments,” Social Science Research Network, November 29, 2018, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265876>, pp. 3-4.
108 Andreas Lutsch, “Merely ‘Docile Self-Deception’? German Experiences with Nuclear Consultation in NATO,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2016), pp. 535–58.
109 These arguments have found their way into the German political mainstream. See Rolf Mützenich, “Germany and Nuclear Sharing,” International Politics and Society, May 15, 2020, <www.ips-journal.eu/regions/europe/article/show/germany-and-nuclear-sharing-4362/>.
110 In the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, the United States reportedly evaluated options for removing the US nuclear weapons that are deployed under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements at Incirlik Air Base. In the end, the weapons stayed and US officials reportedly concluded that they had become Erdogan’s “hostages.” Cited in Sanger, “Trump Followed His Gut.” See also Hans Kristensen, “Urgent: Move US Nuclear Weapons out of Turkey,” Federation of American Scientists, October 16, 2019, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey>.
111 See Alliance for Multilateralism, “What Is the ‘Alliance for Multilateralism?’” n.d., <https://multilateralism.org/the-alliance>.