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ABSTRACT
During World War II, the Polish resistance movement used chemical and biological weapons (CBW) against the Third Reich. The use of CBW against the Third Reich most likely originated in a secret Polish biological-weapons program, which existed in the 1930s and went underground after the September 1939 German invasion. Between 1940 and 1942, a unit of the Polish resistance movement named WKZO (Wielkopolskie Kierownictwo Związku Odwetu—the Greater Poland Leadership of the Union of Retaliation) conducted CBW sabotage in the German-annexed area Reichsgau Wartheland and its main city Posen (today’s Poznań). By investigating the use of CBW by the WKZO until its destruction in 1942, it is possible to demonstrate how these weapons were made and used. The article also describes the German reaction, including what defensive measures the German high command took to meet the threat of CBW.
Acknowledgements
I want to express my thanks to Paulina Kędzierska, Mariola Pasham, and Marta Krystkiewicz for helping me translate Polish texts to English or Danish.
This article is my third about the Polish use of CBW. The first one was published in the Polish military journal Zeszyty Naukowe AON in 2016. The second one was published in the Danish military journal Fra Krig og Fred in 2018.
Notes
1 Piotr Bojarski, “Toksyny nur für Deutsche,” Wybrcza.pl, December 28, 2012, <http://wyborcza.pl/alehistoria/1,121681,13115135,Toksyny_nur_f%C3%BCr_Deutsche.html>.
2 Ibid.
3 Richard C. Lukas, The Forgotten Holocaust (New York: Hippocrene Books, 2012), p. 62.
4 Piotr Bojarski, Poznaniacy przeciwko swastyce (Warsaw: AGORA, 2015), pp. 45–55.
5 Karol Ner, Ogień w ampułkach (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1975).
6 Dariusz Baliszewski, “Tajna wojna Polaków,” Uważam Rze Historia, 2014, <www.historia.uwazamrze.pl/artykul/1096092>.
7 Tadeusz Pełczyński, Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945. T. 1, Wrzesień 1939–czerwiec 1941 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo, 1990); Tadeusz Pełczyński, Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945. T. 2, Czerwiec 1941–kwiecień 1943 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo, 1990); Tadeusz Pełczyński, Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945. T. 6, Uzupełnienia (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo, 1991).
8 See Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland. Volume II. 1795 to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 393–99.
9 Ibid, pp. 421–23.
10 It demonstrates Poland’s situation in the 1920s that the Ukrainian insurgents were supported by Germany, the Soviet Union, Lithuania, and sometimes also Czechoslovakia.
11 CAW, sygn. I.303.4.2527, Dywersja nieprzyjacielska na polundniowo-wschodniej czesci Rzeczy-pospolitej. Dwyersja ukrainska i bolszewica w Malopoisce Wschodniej i na Wolyniu za czas od roku 1919 do roku 1923, Warszawa 18 maja 1923, pp. 13–37.
12 Lucyna Kulińska, Działalność terrorystyczna i sabotażowa nacjonalistycznych organizacji ukraińskich w Polsce w latach 1922–1939 (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2009), p. 170.
13 CAW, sygn. I.303.4.2527, pp. 44–45.
14 Robert Gerwarth, The Vanquished (London: Penguin Books, 2016), p. 48.
15 Arthur Allen, The Fantastic Laboratory of Dr. Weigl (New York: W.W. Norton, 2015), p. 38.
16 Ibid, pp. 61–70.
17 Aleksander Wysocki, “Zarys przygotowań obronnych do wojny biologicznej prowadzonych w Polsce w latach 1918–1939,” Biuletyn Wojskowej Służby Archiwalnej, No. 23 (2000), pp. 3–4.
18 Ewa Pałasz-Rutkowska, “The Russo-Japanese War and Its Impact on Polish–Japanese Relations in the First Half of the Twentieth Century,” Analecta Nipponica, No. 1 (2011), pp. 26–32.
19 Wysocki, “Zarys przygotowań obronnych do wojny biologicznej prowadzonych w Polsce w latach.”
20 Aleksander Smoliński, “Próba oceny wartości poznawczej akt pozostałych po Oddziale II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego w kontekście możliwości opisu sytuacji wojskowej, ekonomicznej i społecznej ZSRS w latach 1921–1939,” Archiwa–Kancelarie–Zbiory, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2012), pp. 78, 84.
21 National Archives, CAB 81/54.
22 Interview with Major Ludwig Kerstyn Krzewinski, Medical Corps, Polish Army, June 14 1945 (Washington, War Department, Military Intelligence Service, July 10, 1945).
23 Intelligence Review, “Polish Biological Warfare Activities,” No. 35 (1946), p. 59.
24 Andrzej Krajewski, “Broń biologiczna w Polsce, czyli kanapka ze śmiercią,” Focus Historia, July 17, 2018, <www.focus.pl/artykul/bron-biologiczna-w-polsce-czyli-kanapka-ze-smiercia>.
25 The Geneva Protocol is a protocol to the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition. The protocol did not, however, ban the research, development, and production of CBW.
26 Jerzy Witt Mierzejewski and John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, “Poland and Biological Weapons,” in Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, eds., Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 63–69.
27 Wysocki, “Zarys przygotowań,” p. 4.
28 Robert Forczyk, Case White: The Invasion of Poland, 1939 (Oxford: Osprey, 2019), pp. 49–50.
29 Krajewski, “Broń biologiczna.”
30 Institut of National Remembrance, IPN BU 507/345.
31 Intelligence Review, “Polish Biological Warfare Activities,” p. 55.
32 Krajewski, “Broń biologiczna.”
33 Ibid.
34 Intelligence Review, “Polish Biological Warfare Activities,” pp. 57, 60.
35 B.I.12b, no date, Ministerstwo Spraw Wojskowych, Departament Artylerii, p. 40.
36 One reason why US intelligence was interested in the Polish BW program was that the Poles had some insight into the Japanese BW program. According to Krajewski, a conference was held in 1936 between representatives of the Polish and the Japanese BW programs. It is, however, unclear if there ever was any active collaboration.
37 Intelligence Review, “Polish Biological Warfare Activities,” p. 56.
38 Lukas, Holocaust, p. 4.
39 Ibid., p. 3
40 David G. Wiliamson, The Polish Underground 1939–1947 (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2012), p. 59.
41 Ibid., p. 22.
42 Ibid, p. 34.
43 Ibid, p. 12.
44 Lukas, Holocaust, pp. 43–47.
45 Williamson, Polish Underground, pp. 3–5.
46 Adam Gaafar, “Przedwojenne badania Polaków nad bronia biologiczna,” Interia Fakty, July 26, 2017, <http://fakty.interia.pl/prasa/odkrywca/news-przedwojenne-badania-polakow-nad-bronia-biologiczna,nId,2421585>.
47 Interview with Major Ludwig Kerstyn Krzewinski.
48 Pełczyński, Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, Vol. 1, document no. 28, pp. 179–80.
49 Jan Nowak, Courier from Warsaw (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1982), pp. 62–63.
50 No. 9, 19 April 1940, (Kiev), Special report by the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Ivan Serov, on the biological warfare planned by the Polish underground movement, Unpublished Documents from the Archives of the Secret Services (Lódz–Warsaw–Kiev, 2012), pp. 304–06, <http://1576.ua/uploads/files/7203/Poland_and_Ukraine_in_the_1930_s_and_1940_s._Documents_from_the_Archives_of_the_Secret_Services.pdf>.
51 Pełczyński, Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, Vol. 6, document no. 1638, p. 108.
52 Ibid., Vol. 1, document no. 139, pp. 448–49.
53 Williamson, Polish Underground, p. 55.
54 Pełczyński, Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, Vol. 6, document no. 1673, p. 199.
55 Ibid., document no. 1659, p. 178.
56 The Wehrmacht was—contrary to Nazi propaganda—not a truly modern army. About 75 percent of the Wehrmacht relied on horses for transport and the invasion of the Soviet Union began with 300,000 horses in German service. Within a year, 179,000 horses were dead because of the harsh conditions on the Eastern Front.
57 Pełczyński, Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, Vol. 6, document no. 1659, pp. 178–83.
58 Henryk Witkowski, “Kedyw” Okręgu Warszawskiego Armii Krajowej w latach 1943–1944, (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych, 1984), pp. 418–19.
59 Wojciech Wichert, “‘Exerzierplatz des Nationalsozialismus’—der Reichsgau Wartheland in den Jahren 1939–1945,” Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2018), pp. 81–89.
60 Catherine Epstein, Model Nazi: Arthur Greiser and the Occupation of Western Poland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 260–62.
61 Wichert, “‘Exerzierplatz des Nationalsozialismus’,” pp. 89–90, 95.
62 Ibid., p. 92.
63 Institut of National Remembrance in Łódź, IPN Łd 1/280, pp. 92. 129, 218–20, 377, 452.
64 Ibid., p. 324.
65 Ibid., pp. 212–13, 426, 462.
66 Przemysław Jurkiewicz, Fort VII. The German Nazi camp in Poznań (Poznań: Museum for Struggle for Independence of Wielkopolska, 2014), pp. 27–28.
67 Wichert, “‘Exerzierplatz des Nationalsozialismus’,” p. 93.
68 Epstein, Model Nazi, pp. 189–90.
69 Paul Julian Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe 1890–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 318.
70 Epstein, Model Nazi, pp. 206–07.
71 Marian Woźniak, Encyklopedia konspiracji Wielkopolskiej: 1939–1945 (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1998), pp. 538–39, 567.
72 Aleksandra Pietrowicz, “W najtrudniejszych warunkach … Zaplecze studyjno-technologiczne wielkopolskiego Kierownictwa Związku Odwetu (1940–1942),” Glaukopis, No. 30 (2014), pp. 124–25.
73 A Gestapo report puts the start of CBW production in Posen at 1941 (see Institut of National Remembrance in Łódź, IPN Łd 1/263, p. 41), but this is incorrect. Polish historical research makes clear that it began in 1940: Woźniak, Encyklopedia, pp. 628–29.
74 According to Professor Kliewe’s report.
75 Bojarski, Poznaniacy, p. 50.
76 Pietrowicz, “W najtrudniejszych warunkach,” pp. 125–29.
77 Ibid., pp. 129–32.
78 Łd 1/263, p. 41.
79 Pietrowicz, “W najtrudniejszych warunkach,” pp. 128, 135.
80 NARA, Alsos Mission: BW #1, German Intelligence Reports on Use of BW Agents by Polish Resistance Movement, pp. 93, 106, <https://research.archives.gov/id/778820?q=*:*>.
81 Łd 1/263, p. 42.
82 Woźniak, Encyklopedia, pp. 628–29.
83 Ibid.
84 Łd 1/263, p. 41.
85 Copy of letter, provided by historian Adam Gaafar.
86 Woźniak, Encyklopedia, pp. 663–64
87 Alsos Mission: BW #1, p. 95.
88 Łd 1/263, p. 46.
89 Bojarski, Poznaniacy, p. 52.
90 Łd 1/263, p. 74.
91 Ibid., pp. 71–76.
92 Alsos Mission: BW #1, p. 94.
93 Łd 1/263, p. 76.
94 Alsos Mission: BW #1, pp. 93–94.
95 Ibid., p. 103.
96 Łd1/263, p.73-75.
97 Alsos Mission: BW #1, p. 94.
98 Written statement by Halina Witaszek, Poznań, May 1957. Copy provided by historian Adam Gaafar.
99 Bojarski, Poznaniacy, pp. 51–52.
100 Adam Gaafar, “Bakterie made in Poland, część 2,” Odkrywca, Vol. 5, No. 220 (2017), p. 49.
101 Pietrowicz, “W najtrudniejszych warunkach,” p. 134.
102 Bojarski, Poznaniacy, pp. 46–47.
103 Pietrowicz, “W najtrudniejszych warunkach,” pp. 135–37.
104 Institut of National Remembrance in Łódź, IPN Łd 1/245, pp. 7–11.
105 Łd 1/280, pp. 10–12, 25.
106 Alsos Mission: BW #1, pp. 96, 136–40.
107 When war broke out the Postal Service became a part of the Signal Corps in the Polish Army.
108 The first Allied air attacks against German armament factories in Posen occurred in April 1944.
109 Institut of National Remembrance in Warsaw, GK 74/7, pp. 258–80.
110 Institut of National Remembrance in Łódź, IPN Łd 1/208, pp. 29–31.
111 GK 74/7, pp. 258–80.
112 Pietrowicz, “W najtrudniejszych warunkach,” pp. 137–39.
113 Bundesarchiv, NS 19/2557, Berlin–Lichterfelde.
114 NARA, Alsos Mission: BW#14—Directives and Correspondence of Prof. Kliewe Concerning Possible Plans of Germany's Enemies to Use BW and Defensive Measures, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/778833>, pp. 74–88.
115 Ibid., pp. 90–90 A-2.
116 Richard Švanda, “Generál Bohuslav Všetička a jeho plán tyfového útoku v době okupace,” Vojenské rozhledy, 2015, <https://vojenskerozhledy.cz/kategorie-clanku/personalie/general-bohuslav-vseticka-a-jeho-plan-tyfoveho-utoku-v-dobe-okupace>.
117 Petr Kopečný, Obrana Národa na Brněnsku 15.3.1939–29.2.1940 (Brno: Archiv města Brna, 2006), p. 70.
118 Chris Jarret, “Alois Elias Adding Poison to Paradox,” Radio Praha, February 23, 2006. <www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/alois-elias-adding-poison-to-paradox>.
119 Stephen Kotkin, Stalin—Waiting for Hitler 1929–1941 (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), p. 892.
120 Alexander Gogun, Stalin’s Commandos (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016), pp. 134–35, 140–46.
121 Bundesarchiv, R 6/27, Berlin–Lichterfelde.
122 Institut of National Remembrance in Łódź, IPN Ld 1/217, p. 49.
123 Alsos Mission: BW #1, pp. 28, 66.
124 Ibid., p. 66.
125 Erhard Geissler, Biologische Waffen—nicht in Hitlers Arsenalen (Münster: LIT, 1998), pp. 285–86.
126 NARA, Alsos Mission: BW #2—German Intelligence on French BW and Sabotage, pp. 76–81, <https://research.archives.gov/id/778821?q=*:*>.
127 Alsos Mission: BW #1, p. 97-98.
128 Geissler, Biologische Waffen, pp. 436–38.
129 Ibid., pp. 359–68.
130 Ibid., pp. 379–407.
131 Ibid., pp. 523–43.
132 Alsos Mission: BW #14, p. 90.
133 Geissler, Biologische Waffen, pp. 353–61.
134 Ibid., pp. 342–43.
135 Annie Jacobsen; Operation Paperclip (New York: Little, Brown, 2014), pp. 292–97.
136 Gebhardt Weiss, “Ozarichi 1944: Das Fleckfieberkalkül der 9. Armee,” December 5, 2018, <http://kunstraum.leuphana.de/Weiss_Ozarichi_1944_das_Fleckfieberkalkuel_der_9_Armee_05_12_2018.pdf>.
137 Bundesarchiv, R 58/1060, Berlin–Lichterfelde.
138 Perry Biddiscombe, The Last Nazis (Stroud, UK: Tempus, 2004), pp. 84–90.
139 Geissler, Biologische Waffen, pp. 302–03.