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Abstract
Multiple non-nuclear-armed states in alliances with nuclear-armed states are in the process of acquiring long-range, conventionally armed precision-strike weapons, some of which have potential to contribute to attacks on enemy nuclear forces. This change in the distribution of advanced military technologies has the unintended consequence of giving these non-nuclear-armed states an active role in strategic stability. We provide a theoretical framework for understanding the newly emerging pathways to nuclear use that result. We also investigate perceptions of the role of precision-strike capabilities in six non-nuclear-armed states at various stages in the process of developing these capabilities.
Notes
1 Observations from the London workshop appear in this issue in David Blagden, “Strategic Stability and the Proliferation of Precision Conventional Strike: A (Bounded) Case for Optimism?”
2 Discussions of the roots of the concept of stability can be found in Robert Ayson, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as Social Science (London: Frank Cass, 2004); Michael S. Gerson, “The Origins of Strategic Stability: The United States and the Threat of Surprise Attack,” in Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson, eds., Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2013), pp. 1–46. The phrase “Golden Age of Strategy” is from Robert Ayson. Accounts of the period appear in Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1981); Fred M. Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1983).
3 Thomas C. Schelling, “The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack,” Paper P-1342, RAND Corporation, April 16, 1958 (revised May 28, 1958). This essay also appears as a chapter in Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 205–29.
4 John D. Steinbruner, “National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1978), pp. 411–28; Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993).
5 The potential Soviet threat to US leadership had long been recognized within the American government, but not necessarily seen as part of a reciprocal problem to be minimized in the common interest. See Peter J. Roman, “Ike’s Hair-Trigger: U.S. Nuclear Predelegation, 1953–60,” Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1998), pp. 121–65.
6 Franklin A. Long, Donald Hafner, and Jeffrey Boutwell, eds., Weapons in Space (New York: W.W. Norton for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1986); James M. Acton, “Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2018), pp. 56–99.
7 An instance of these dynamics emerges from the record of US deliberations during the 1961 Berlin Crisis. See Fred Kaplan, “JFK’s First-Strike Plan,” The Atlantic, October 2001, <www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/10/jfks-first-strike-plan/376432/>.
8 See, for example, Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).
9 For a concise account, see Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 153–75.
10 Raymond L. Garthoff, “BMD and East–West Relations,” in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 275–329.
11 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, NY: Random House, 1988), p. 547.
12 Robert Powell, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2003), pp. 86–118.
13 Powell treats brinkmanship, not preemption, as the mechanism of nuclear escalation. On brinkmanship, see Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, pp. 187–203.
14 Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995). See especially Chapter 9, pp. 188–212.
15 On Chinese views in particular, see Thomas Mahnken, “Armaments Developments since the Cold War,” in Thomas Mahnken, Joseph Maiolo, and David Stevenson, eds., Arms Races in International Politics: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 270–86.
16 Christopher P. Twomey and Michael S. Chase, “Chinese Attitudes toward Missile Defense,” in Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Peter Dombrowski, eds., Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 203–04; Tong Zhao, “Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security Dilemma,” in Lawrence Rubin and Adam N. Stulberg, eds., The End of Strategic Stability? Nuclear Weapons and the Challenge of Regional Rivalries (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018), pp. 183–84, 188–90. In this issue, see Tong Zhao, “Conventional Long-Range Strike Weapons of US Allies and China’s Concerns of Strategic Instability.”
17 James M. Acton, “Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons: Concerns and Responses,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2015), pp. 141–54; Joshua H. Pollack, “Boost-Glide Weapons and US–China Strategic Stability,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2015), pp. 155–64; James M. Acton, ed., Entanglement: Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017). In this issue, see Dmitry Stefanovich, “Proliferation and Threats of Reconnaissance-Strike Systems: A Russian Perspective.”
18 Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 2019), p. xi.
19 Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 60.
20 Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. xi.
21 Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. xiii.
22 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1999), pp. 24–39; Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp. 397–402; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 224–39; Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), pp. 7–9, 14–23, 30–31. The critical briefing is documented in a memorandum by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. See Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 204–07.
23 “My thinking went like this: if we installed the missiles secretly and then if the United States discovered the missiles were there after they were already poised and ready to strike, the Americans would think twice before trying to liquidate our installations by military means. I knew that the United States could knock out some of our installations, but not all of them. If a quarter or even a tenth of our missiles survived—even if only one or two big ones were left—we could still hit New York, and there wouldn’t be much of New York left.” Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 493–94.
24 On investments in ISR supporting nuclear counterforce, see Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, Nos. 1–2 (2015), pp. 38–73. On the persistent challenges of hunting mobile missiles, see Alan J. Vick, Richard M. Moore, Bruce R. Pirnie, and John Stillion, “Aerospace Operations against Elusive Ground Targets,” MR-1398-AF, RAND Corporation, 2001; Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2016), pp. 62–74.
25 Despite repeated US efforts to find and kill Saddam Hussein and his close associates with airpower at the outset of the war with Iraq in 2003, intelligence about their whereabouts repeatedly fell short. Highly precise bombs and cruise missiles did their job on more than one occasion—but found the wrong targets. See Human Rights Watch, “Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq,” December 2003, pp. 21–41.
26 Bob Woodward, Fear: Trump in the White House (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2019), pp. 94–95. Woodward does not attribute this account to any named sources, but implies that it was provided by President Obama’s director of national intelligence.
27 Kier A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2017), pp. 9–49.
28 Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 61.
29 Preemptive war is a type of self-fulfilling prophecy. See Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), pp. 115–18.
30 On the outbreak of World War I, see, inter alia, Ole R. Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1972). On the outbreak of the June 1967 war, see Avner Cohen and Joshua H. Pollack, “Introduction to the Special Section on the 1967 Middle East War,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 25, Nos. 5–6 (2018), pp. 355–58. Dan Reiter also counts China’s October 1950 intervention against the United States and its allies in Korea as a preemptive war. See Dan Reiter, “Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1995), pp. 5–34.
31 For an argument that the polarity of the international system shapes the durability of alliances, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 161–93. For an argument that offense-dominant eras foster a bipolar system, see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978), pp. 167–214. For an argument that the increasing destructiveness of arms technologies, culminating in nuclear weapons, has discouraged transitory, secret pacts between partners of convenience bent on territorial aggrandizement, and encouraged stable, public arrangements meant to deter war, see Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution, pp. 145–51.
32 Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1984), pp. 466–68. Snyder credits “abandonment” and “entrapment” to Mandelbaum, who draws upon Thucydides for examples before situating the same concepts in both prewar and postwar Europe. See Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution, pp. 151–53.
33 Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” pp. 466–68.
34 If, other things being equal, the frequency of such wars varies inversely with security assurances from a third state, then it may be argued that an “extended-deterrence” effect has been detected. Independent variables tested within these models have included nuclear capabilities, the local military balance, and credible signals of commitment. See Erich Weede, “Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1983), pp. 231–53; Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1984), pp. 496–526; Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference,” World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 4 (1990), pp. 466–501; Vesna Danilovic, “The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2001), pp. 341–69. For a critique of this research program, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1990), pp. 336–69.
35 Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
36 Brett V. Benson, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay, “Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2014), pp. 307–35; Neil Narang and Rupal N. Mehta, “The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client State,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 63, No. 1 (2019), pp. 218–50.
37 Airforce Technology, “Taurus KEPD 350 Long-Range Air-to-Surface Missile,” <www.airforce-technology.com/projects/taurus-kepd-350-missile-german/>.
38 Interview with officials in Brussels, August 2018; Christian F. Anrig, The Quest for Relevant Air Power, Continental European Responses to the Air Power Challenges of the Post-Cold War Era (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, Air Force Research Institute, 2011); Federal Ministry of Defence, “White Paper 2016: On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr,” July 2016, <https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/111704/2027268/2016%20White%20Paper.pdf>.
39 Federal Ministry of Defence, “White Paper 2016,” p. 74.
40 Interviews with officials and academics in Brussels, August 2018.
41 Alice Billion-Galland and Yvonni-Stefania Efstathiou, “Are PESCO Projects Fit for Purpose?” European Defence Policy Brief, February 20, 2019. <www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Final-PESCO-policy-brief-ELN-IISS-20-Feb-2019-ilovepdf-compressed.pdf>.
42 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Poland—JASSM-ER with Support,” November 28, 2016, <www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/poland-jassm-er-support>.
43 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Poland—High Mobility Artillery Rocket System HIMARS and Related Support and Equipment,” November 29, 2018, <www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/poland-high-mobility-artillery-rocket-system-himars-and-related-support-and>.
44 Maciej Szopa, “Harpia Fighter Procurement Details—Polish F-35 Deal Unveiled,” Defence 24, January 31, 2020, <https://defence24.com/harpia-fighter-procurement-details-polish-f-35-deal-unveiled>.
45 Premier.pl.gov, “Prime Minister Tusk Pays a Visit to Air Cavalry Soldiers,” August 16, 2013, <https://archiwum.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/prime-minister-tusk-pays-a-visit-to-air-cavalry-soldiers.html>.
46 Ministry of National Defence, “The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland,” May 2017, <www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/defenceconcept-publication>.
47 See, in this issue, Łukasz Kulesa, “Operationalizing the ‘Polish Fangs’: Poland and Long-Range Precision Strike.”
48 A Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs document, Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021, as well as Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022, adopted by the Resolution of the Council of Ministers April 9, 2013, are two key Polish government sources that highlight this theme throughout. Although contributing to NATO is not explicitly listed as a secondary benefit of capability enhancement, national defense and deterrence appear to be the driving forces.
49 Interviews with officials in Brussels, August 2018.
50 See, in this issue, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, “Friends with (Some) Benefits: How Non-allied Sweden and Finland View Long-Range Conventional Precision Strike.”
51 See, for example, Drew Thompson, “Hope on the Horizon: Taiwan’s Radical New Defense Concept,” War on the Rocks, October 2, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/hope-on-the-horizon-taiwans-radical-new-defense-concept/>.
52 Salonius-Pasternak, “Friends with (Some) Benefits.”
53 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Finland—F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft with Air-to-Air Missiles and Air-to-Ground Precision Guided Munitions,” October 9, 2020, <www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/finland-f-35-joint-strike-fighter-aircraft-air-air-missiles-and-air>.
54 Parliament of Finland, “Government Bill to Parliament on the approval of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Production, Stockpiling, and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and their Destruction,” HE15/2011, August 12, 2011.
55 Helsinki Times, “Joining Ottawa Treaty Was ‘a Blunder by a Peacetime Fool,’ Says Minister of Defence,” July 17, 2018, <www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/politics/15686-joining-ottawa-treaty-was-a-blunder-by-a-peacetime-fool-says-minister-of-defence.html>.
56 Interview with officials in Stockholm, February 2018.
57 Interviews with official and academics in Helsinki, February 2018.
58 See, in this issue, Joshua H. Pollack and Minji Kim, “South Korea’s Missile Forces and the Emergence of Triangular Strategic (In)stability.”
59 Pollack and Kim.
60 Interviews with South Korean officials and experts, Seoul, June 2018.
61 Mike Yeo, “Japan Confirms Long-Range Missile Interest in an About-Face,” Defense News, December 11, 2017, <www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2017/12/11/japan-confirms-long-range-missile-interest-in-an-about-face/>.
62 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan’s F-35 Stealth Fighters Get New Standoff Anti-Ship Capability,” The Diplomat, March 13, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/japans-f-35-stealth-fighters-get-new-standoff-anti-ship-capability/>.
63 Interviews with Japanese officials and experts, Tokyo, June 2018.
64 22 US Code § 2778—Control of arms exports and imports, (a)(2).