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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the shifting focus of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) during the first 25 years of its implementation, from the verification of destruction of declared chemical-weapon (CW) stockpiles to the attribution of CW use. The article identifies the repeated use of chemical weapons by Syria and the resultant creation of a new attribution norm under the CWC as a critical juncture in the regime’s evolution. Repeated calls for accountability for the use of so-called Novichok nerve agents for assassination purposes serve as the first manifestation of the new attribution norm. The article further outlines steps CWC states parties should take in the context of the Fifth CWC Review Conference in May 2023 to prepare the CW-prohibition regime for its next 25 years of operation by (1) adapting the implementation of key regime norms following the anticipated completion of CW destruction later in 2023 and (2) incorporating the investigation and attribution work of the Investigation and Identification Team into the programmatic work of the OPCW.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. Work on this article was made possible by research grant FP 08/20-SP03/05-2020 from the German Foundation for Peace Research.
Notes
1 Chemical Weapons Convention, January 13, 1993, Article I. The treaty text is available at <https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention>.
2 The term “norm” is used to refer to “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations”; see Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), p. 186.
3 See, for example, James J. Wirtz, “Nuclear disarmament and the end of the chemical weapons ‘system of restraint,’” International Affairs, Vol. 95, No. 4 (2019), pp. 785–99.
4 Another example of such underestimation can be found in the debate about the demise of NATO following the end of the Cold War. Despite the expectation of some that NATO might go out of business, the organization has not only survived, but grown in membership and continues to play a key role in European and transatlantic security relations 30 years later.
5 The adoption of such a perspective in this article is not meant to be a formal test of a theory or a comparison to competing approaches. For an overview, see Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); and Thomas Rixen, Lora Anne Viola, and Michael Zürn, eds., Historical Institutionalism and International Relations: Explaining Institutional Development in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
6 Orfeo Fioretos, “Historical Institutionalism in International Relations,” International Organization, Vol. 65, No. 1 (2011), p. 369.
7 For OPCW annual reports, see OPCW, “Reports of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Annual Reports,” <https://www.opcw.org/resources/documents/annual-reports>. The most consistent and prominent example of monitoring and reporting by a nongovernmental organization in this area is the CBW chapters in the annual SIPRI Yearbook. Most of these are freely available online at <https://sipri.org/yearbook/archive>.
8 A comprehensive discussion of these normative guideposts is beyond the scope of this article.
9 Giovanni Cappoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures. Theory, Narrative and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics, Vol. 59, No. 3 (April 2007), pp. 341–69, here p. 344.
10 Arms Control Association, “The Final Push for U.S. Chemical Weapons Demilitarization,” March 14, 2022, <https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2022-03/final-push-us-chemical-weapons-demilitarization>.
11 “Fully implemented” in this context refers to the verified destruction of declared chemical warfare agents. It is not an assessment of the completeness or accuracy of declarations by possessor states, such as Russia and Syria, about which serious doubts remain.
12 The date for the Review Conference was agreed by the OPCW Conference of the States Parties at its 26th session in November 2021. See OPCW, “Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session of the Conference of the States Parties,” C-26/5, December 2, 2021, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/12/c2605%28e%29.pdf>. Debates about the future priorities of the OPCW in a post-CW-destruction world could build on previous analyses and reports such as the one issued by the Advisory Panel on Future OPCW Priorities (chaired by Rolf Ekéus) in 2011 or the paper produced by the OPCW Technical Secretariat on “The OPCW in 2025.” The latter conceptualizes the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical weapons as a guiding principle for the future work of the organization. See OPCW, “Report of the Advisory Panel on the future priorities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,” S/951/2011, July 25, 2011, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/PDF/Advisory_Group_report_s-951-2011_e_.pdf>; OPCW, “The OPCW in 2025: Ensuring A World Free of Chemical Weapons,” S/1252/2015, March 6, 2015, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2015/en/s-1252-2015_e_.pdf>.
13 This focusing leaves other important areas of CWC implementation, such as capacity development and S&T monitoring, unaddressed. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to provide a sufficiently detailed account of all areas of CWC implementation over a 25-year period.
14 In addition, the article draws on analysis of public meetings of the OPCW Conference of the States Parties. Video recordings of most CSP sessions since 2013 are available on the OPCW’s YouTube channel at <https://www.youtube.com/user/opcwonline>.
15 CWC Article VI regulates the permitted uses of toxic chemicals.
16 These activities are covered in CWC Articles IV and V, and Parts IV and V of the CWC Verification Annex. See Ralf Trapp and Paul Walker, “Article IV: Chemical Weapons,” in Walter Krutzsch, Eric P. J. Myjer, and Ralf Trapp, eds., The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 119–50; Ralf Trapp, “Article V: Chemical Weapons Production Facilities,” in Krutzsch, Myjer, and Trapp, The Chemical Weapons Convention, pp. 151–72.
17 The following states have declared chemical weapons to the OPCW: Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
18 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen define the conversion of norms as one of four modes of gradual institutional change. Accordingly, norm conversion refers to the different uses of a norm in the institutional context. See James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in Mahoney and Thelen, eds., Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), pp. 1–37.
19 Alexander Kelle, Prohibiting Chemical and Biological Weapons: Multilateral Regimes and Their Evolution (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014), pp. 117–23.
20 In the Russian case, this refers to the first phase of the destruction process, which has resulted in large amounts of highly toxic waste, which, in turn, have to be disposed of. See Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Russia Destroys Last Chemical Weapons,” Arms Control Today, November 2017, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-11/news/russia-destroys-last-chemical-weapons>; Global Security, “Russian CW Destruction Techniques,” <https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/cw-1.htm>.
21 These provisions are contained in CWC Article VI and Parts VI-IX of the Verification Annex. See Mirko Sossai, “Article VI: Activities not Prohibited under the Convention,” in Krutzsch, Myjer, and Trapp, The Chemical Weapons Convention, pp. 173–94.
22 Ralf Trapp, “Annex on Chemicals,” in Krutzsch, Myjer, and Trapp, The Chemical Weapons Convention, pp. 431–44.
23 OPCW, “Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2015,” C-21/4, November 30, 2016, p. 8, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CSP/C-21/en/c2104_e_.pdf>; OPCW, “Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction in 2019,” C-25/4, April 20, 2021, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/04/c2504%28e%29.pdf>.
24 These provisions are contained in Articles IX and X and Parts X and XI of the convention’s Annex on Implementation and Verification.
25 UN Security Council Resolution 2235, S/Res/2235, August 7, 2015, <https://undocs.org/S/RES/2235(2015)>.
26 Alexander Kelle, “The International Regime Prohibiting Chemical Weapons and Its Evolution,” in Nik Hynek, Ondrej Ditrych, and Vit Stritecky, eds., Regulating Global Security: Insights from Conventional and Unconventional Regimes (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 115–41.
27 Kenneth D. Ward, “Syria, Russia, and the Global Chemical Weapons Crisis,” Arms Control Today, September 2021, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-09/features/syria-russia-global-chemical-weapons-crisis>.
28 Skripal is a former Soviet/Russian spy now residing in the United Kingdom. He and his daughter were assassinated with a type of Novichok nerve agent originally developed by the former Soviet Union.
29 OPCW, “Decision: Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use,” C-SS-4/DEC.3, June 27, 2018, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CSP/C-SS-4/en/css4dec3_e_.doc.pdf>; Mirko Sossai, “Identifying the Perpetrators of Chemical Attacks in Syria: The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as Part of the Fight Against Impunity?,” International Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2019), pp. 211–27, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqz013>.
30 OPCW, “First Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS-4/Dec.3, ‘Addressing the Threat From Chemical Weapons Use’ Ltamenah (Syrian Arab Republic) 24, 25, and 30 March 2017,” S/1867/2020, April 8, 2020, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/04/s-1867-2020%28e%29.pdf>.
31 OPCW, “Note by the Technical Secretariat: Second Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3, ‘Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use’ Saraqib (Syrian Arab Republic)—4 February 2018,” S/1943/2021, April 12, 2021, p. 2, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/04/s-1943-2021%28e%29.pdf>.
32 OPCW, “Decision: Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic,” EC-94/DEC.2*, July 9, 2020, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/07/ec94dec02%28e%29%20%282%29.pdf>.
33 OPCW, “Decision: Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic,” No. C-25/DEC.9, April 21, 2021, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/04/c25dec09%28e%29.pdf>. A further incident of CW use occurred at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in early 2017. In that incident, Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, was attacked with the nerve agent VX. However, this case was largely handled as a domestic criminal matter and resulted in limited OPCW involvement. See Cindy Vestergaard, “Chemical Assassination: The Role of International Organizations,” Stimson Center, March 2, 2017, <https://www.stimson.org/2017/chemical-assassination-role-international-organizations/>.
34 OPCW, “Report by the Director-General: Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme,” EC-102/DG.3, December 23, 2022, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2022/12/ec102dg03%28e%29.pdf.
35 Caitríona McLeish, “The Skripal case: Assassination attempt in the United Kingdom using a toxic chemical,” SIPRI Yearbook 2019: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, pp. 408–17, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB19c08sII.pdf>.
36 The OPCW's designated laboratories are a group of high-end chemistry laboratories in different parts of the world that have to prove their capabilities in regular tests conducted by the OPCW. They perform “analysis of chemical samples collected by OPCW inspectors from chemical production facilities, storage depots and other installations, or from the site of an alleged use of chemical weapons.” OPCW, “Designated Laboratories, n.d., <https://www.opcw.org/designated-laboratories>; OPCW, “Summary of the Report on Activities Carried out in Support of a Request for Technical Assistance by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/02/18),” S/1612/2018, April 12, 2018, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2018/en/s-1612-2018_e___1_.pdf>; “Summary of the Report on Activities Carried out in Support of a Request for Technical Assistance by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/03/18 and TAV/03B/18 ‘Amesbury Incident’),” S/1671/2018, September 4, 2018, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/09/s-1671-2018%28e%29.pdf>.
37 Stefano Costanzi and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Controlling Novichoks after Salisbury: revising the Chemical Weapons Convention schedules,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 26, No. 5-6 (2019); pp. 599–612, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2019.1662618>.
38 Stefano Costanzi and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Updating the CWC: How We Got Here and What Is Next,” Arms Control Today, April 2020, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-04/features/updating-cwc-we-got-here-what-next>.
39 OPCW, “Note by the Technical Secretariat: Summary of the Report on Activities Carried Out In Support of a Request for Technical Assistance by Germany (Technical Assistance Visit - TAV/01/20),” S/1906/2020, October 6, 2020, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/10/s-1906-2020%28e%29.pdf>.
40 Ward, “Syria, Russia, and the Global Chemical Weapons Crisis.”
41 OPCW, “Correspondence Between OPCW and Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the OPCW, from 1/10/2020 to 21/12/2020, in Relation to a Request for a Technical Assistance Visit to the Russian Federation Under Subpar. 38(e), Article VIII of the CWC,” December 21, 2020, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/12/Correspondence%20ODG_RF%20re%20TAV.pdf>.
42 The procedure contained in CWC Article IX.2 represents the lowest-level clarification request under the convention. In principle, this could be escalated all the way to a challenge inspection request under a different part of Article IX, but no CWC state party has up to now pursued a challenge inspection. OPCW, “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Request for Circulation of a Document at the Ninety-Eighth Session of the Executive Council,” EC-98/NAT.7, October 5, 2021, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/10/ec98nat07%28e%29.pdf>.
43 OPCW, “Russian Federation: Request for Circulation of a Document at the Ninety-Eighth Session of the Executive Council,” EC-98/NAT.8, October 7, 2021, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/10/ec98nat08%28e%29.pdf>; Oliver Meier and Alexander Kelle, “The Navalny poisoning: Moscow evades accountability and mocks the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 19, 2021, <https://thebulletin.org/2021/10/the-navalny-poisoning-moscow-evades-accountability-and-mocks-the-chemical-weapons-convention/>.
44 Bulgaria, Joint Statement on behalf of 55 States Parties delivered by H.E. Ambassador Krassimir Kostov, Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the OPCW at the Twenty-Sixth Session of the Conference of the States Parties under Agenda Item 9(d), November 29, 2021, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/11/BG%20on%20behalf%20of%2055%20on%20Navalny%20CSP-26%20Item%209d.pdf>.
45 Alexander Kelle, “Adding Novichok Nerve Agents to the CWC Annex on Chemicals: a technical fix and its implications for the chemical weapons prohibition regime,” UNIDIR, Geneva, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/WMDCE/01>; Stefano Costanzi and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Strengthening controls on Novichoks: a family-based approach to covering A-series agents and precursors under the chemical-weapons nonproliferation regime,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 28, Nos. 1–3 (2022), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2021.2020010>.
46 See UN News, “Russia responsible for Navalny poisoning, rights experts say,” March 1, 2021, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1086012>.
47 Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann, “Norms under Challenge: Unpacking the Dynamics of Norm Robustness,” Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2019), pp. 2–17, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogy041>.
48 For more details, see <https://www.noimpunitychemicalweapons.org/-en-.html>.
49 Rebecca Hersman, “Resisting Impunity for Chemical-Weapons Attacks,” Survival, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2018), pp. 86–7.
50 OPCW, “Report of the Advisory Panel”; OPCW, “The OPCW in 2025.”
51 Alexander Kelle, “The Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention and beyond: key themes and the prospects of incremental change,” International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 1 (2013), pp. 143–58, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12009>.
52 OPCW, Report of the Ninety-Ninth Session of the Executive Council, EC-99/2, March 10, 2022, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2022/03/ec9902%28e%29.pdf>.
53 See Alexander Ghionis, Alexander Kelle and María Garzón Maceda, “Preparing for Success at the Fifth Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference: A Guide to the Issues,” UNIDIR, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/CWC/01>.
54 See Paul F. Walker, “Three Decades of Chemical Weapons Elimination: More Challenges Ahead,” Arms Control Today, December 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-12/features/three-decades-chemical-weapons-elimination-more-challenges-ahead>.
55 OPCW, Note by the Director General: Report of the Advisory Panel on Future Priorities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, S/951/2011, July 25, 2011, p. 10, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/PDF/Advisory_Group_report_s-951-2011_e_.pdf>.
56 OPCW, “The OPCW in 2025.”
57 OPCW, Chairperson's Report of the Proceedings of the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons (Fourth Review Conference), RC-4/3/Rev.1, November 30, 2018 (hereafter cited as “Chairperson‘s report of the 4th CWC Review Conference”), pp. 14–15, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/12/rc403r1%28e%29.pdf>.
58 OPCW, Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction in 2019, C-25/4, April 20, 2021, p. 21, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/04/c2504%28e%29.pdf>.
59 OPCW, Decision: Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2021, C-25/Dec.7, December 1, 2020, p. 5, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/12/c25dec07%28e%29.pdf>.
60 OPCW, “The OPCW in 2025,” p. 4.
61 OPCW, “The OPCW in 2025,” p. 4.
62 OPCW, Chairperson’s report of the 4th CWC Review Conference, p. 18.
63 OPCW, Chairperson’s report of the 4th CWC Review Conference, p. 19.
64 See OPCW, “Report by the Director-General: Overview of the Status of Implementation of Article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 31 July 2022,” EC-101/DG.13* C-27/DG.9*, September 9, 2022, p.2 <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2022/09/ec101dg13%20c27dg09%2B%28e%29%20%281%29.pdf>.
65 OPCW, Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2021, pp. 82–3.
66 OPCW, First Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team, p. 1.
67 “The Future of the Global Norm Against Chemical Weapons: An Interview With Susanne Baumann, German Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2021, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-07/interviews/future-global-norm-against-chemical-weapons-interview-susanne-baumann-german>.
68 OPCW, “IIT Coordinator’s Remarks on the First Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team,” April 8, 2020, p. 1, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/04/IIT%20Coordinator%27s%20Remarks%20on%20the%20First%20Report%20by%20the%20IIT%208%20April%202020.pdf>.
69 OPCW, “Note by the Director-General: Status of the OPCW’s Contribution to Global Anti-Terrorism Efforts,” EC-90/DG.8, February 12, 2019, <www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/02/ec90dg08%28e%29.pdf>.
70 The General Purpose Criterion is contained in Article II 1. (a) of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This defines as chemical weapons “[t]oxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.” In other words, all toxic chemicals that are used with the intention to kill or harm humans or animals are prohibited by the CWC, not just those that may appear on a list, such as the CWC’s Schedule of Chemicals.
71 The recent clarification of the permissibility of using certain aerosolized chemicals that act on the central nervous system in a law enforcement context could serve as a precedent for such a clarification of the General Purpose Criterion. See OPCW, “Decision: Understanding Regarding the Aerosolised Use of Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals for Law Enforcement Purposes,” C-26/DEC.10, December 1, 2021, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/12/c26dec10%28e%29.pdf>.
72 Ward, “Syria, Russia, and the Global Chemical Weapons Crisis.”
73 OPCW, “Decision: Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use,” p. 4.
74 OPCW, “Decision: Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use,” p. 3.
75 These prerequisites would entail either a generic mandate for the ICC to prosecute or an authorization by the UNSC to do so in specific cases. Yasmin Naqvi, “Crossing the red line: The use of chemical weapons in Syria and what should happen now,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 99, No. 3 (2017), pp. 959–93, <https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/906_7.pdf>.
76 On the first such criminal complaints, see Open Society Justice Initiative, “First Criminal Complaint against Syrian Government Officials for Chemical Weapons Attacks,” October 5, 2020, <https://www.justiceinitiative.org/litigation/german-criminal-investigation-into-chemical-weapons-attacks-in-syria>; Syrian Archive, “Filling [sic] of criminal complaint in France regarding the chemical attacks in Syria,” March 2, 2021, <https://syrianarchive.org/en/investigations/Frenchcriminalinvestigation>.
77 Humeyra Pamuk, “U.N. Security Council to convene on Friday at Russia's request,” Reuters, March 11, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/un-security-council-convene-friday-russias-request-diplomats-2022-03-11/>.
78 Milton Leitenberg, “Russian nuclear and biological disinformation undermines treaties on weapons of mass destruction,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 10, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russian-nuclear-and-biological-disinformation-undermines-treaties-on-weapons-of-mass-destruction/>.
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Alexander Kelle
Alexander Kelle is a senior researcher at the Berlin office of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, where he leads a project funded by the German Ministry for Education and Research on strengthening the norms against chemical and biological weapons. Previously, he was a senior policy officer in the Office of Strategy and Policy of the OPCW from 2013 to 2019. The funders of his research include the European Union, the British Academy, the MacArthur Foundation, NATO, and the German Foundation for Peace Research. He has been published in numerous outlets, such as Contemporary Security Policy, International Affairs, Science and Engineering Ethics, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He is the author of Prohibiting Chemical and Biological Weapons: Multilateral Regimes and Their Evolution (2014).