VISIONS OF FISSION

Abstract

For many years, non-nuclear weapons states have sought binding commitments from nuclear armed states that they would not be the victim of either the threat or use of nuclear weapons—so-called negative security assurances (NSAs). The nuclear weapon states have traditionally resisted granting such unconditional NSAs. Recent U.S. efforts to use nuclear deterrence against the acquisition and use by other states of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, however, have further exacerbated this divide. This article analyzes the historical development of NSAs and contrasts U.S. commitments not to use nuclear weapons with the empirical realities of current U.S. nuclear weapons employment doctrines. The authors conclude that NSAs are most likely to be issued as unilateral declarations and that such pledges are the worst possible manner in which to handle the issue of security assurance.

Keywords:

• International relations
• History
• Arms control
• Nuclear weapons
• Nuclear nonproliferation
• Politics

Notes

1. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 587.

2. See Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institute Press, 2004), and Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 2004).

3. In the early 1980s, however, the United States did target some “third-world” countries as insurance against such states taking advantage of the United States after a general nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and U.S. Nuclear Strategy, The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Research Report 98.2, March 18, 1998, p. 9.

4. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 378.

5. For a review of the role of nuclear weapons during the Cold War see, for example, The Harvard Study Group [Albert Carnesale, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffman, Samuel P. Huntington, Joseph S. Nye Jr., and Scott D. Sagan], Living with Nuclear Weapons (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1983), pp. 133–60.

6. BASIC, Nuclear Futures, p. 8.

7. Hans Kristensen, “Targets of Opportunity: How Nuclear Planners Found New Targets for Old Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist 53 (Sept./Oct. 1997), pp. 22–8.

8. Although all nuclear states have, at one time or another, played a role in the development of NSAs, this study focuses largely on NSAs vis-à-vis the United States.

9. A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (Acheson-Lilienthal Report), Department of State Publication #2498, March 16, 1946, p. 53.

10. Janne E. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 34.

11. Peter Pringle and James Spigelman, The Nuclear Barons (New York: Holt Reinhart and Winston, 1981), p. 300.

12. Developments Regarding Positive and Negative Assurances Since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Background Paper Prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations, 2000 NPT RevCon Document NPT/Conf.2000/6, March 21, 2000, p. 8.

13. George Bunn, “The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Spring–Summer 1997), p. 2.

14. George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, “Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,” Nonproliferation Review 1 (Fall 1993), p. 11.

15. George Bunn, “Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapons States,” Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS) (1993), p. 4. At the time of the Kosygin proposal the United States, beginning in March 1955, had deployed thousands of nuclear warheads—17 different types—in West Germany. see Robert Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, “Where They Were,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55 (Nov./Dec. 1999), pp. 29 and 66.

16. Bunn, “Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation Security Assurances,” p. 4.

17. Bunn, “Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation Security Assurances,” p. 4.

18. The Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom took this position. France and China were the other two nuclear powers at that time. The former abstained from the Security Council Resolution. China's seat at the UN was held by Taiwan at the time of the NPT's formulation negotiations. Both joined the NPT in 1992. 2000 NPT RevCon document NPT/Conf.2000/6, p. 3.

19. UN Security Council Resolution 255, June 19, 1968. Specifically, the NWS pledged that “to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.” Only three NWSs were a part of the resolution: The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. France was not yet a party to the NPT, while Taiwan held the Chinese seat.

20. Jozef Goldblat, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Spring/Summer 1997), pp. 18–32.

21. These assurances, eventually ratified by all five NWS, are contained in Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The United States signal Protocol II on April 1, 1968 and ratified it on May 8, 1971. Treaty for the Prohibition of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The United States signed Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, <http://disarmament2.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf>.

22. Bunn, “The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances,” p. 5, and Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, <http://disarmament2.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf>.

23. The 1975 NPT Review Conference Final Declaration: Review of Article VII and the Security of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, <http://cnsdl.miis.edu/npt/dec1/dec1.htm#VII>.

24. These declarations came at The Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the UN's 27th plenary meeting on June 30, 1978, <http://disarmament.un.org:8080/gaspecialsession/10thsesprog.htm>.

25. Statement of United States Secretary of State Vance: U.S. Assurance on Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons, June 12, 1978, <http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/vance78.htm>.

26. Bunn, “The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States,” p. 6.

27. Belarus joined the NPT in 1993 with Ukraine and Kazakhstan following in 1994.

28. Issued jointly by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, these were “Memorandums on Security Assurances in connection with the Republic of Kazakhstan's/Ukraine's/Belarus’ accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Dec. 5, 1994. For the complete texts of these memos see Emily Bailey, Richard Guthrie, Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, eds., Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), Briefing Book Volume II: Security Assurances, No. 8 (2000), pp. 5–7, <www.ppnn.soton.ac.uk/bb2/Bb2secK.pdf>.

29. Bunn, “The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States,” p. 7.

30. For the full texts of all the NWS unilateral security assurances see Bailey et al., PPNN Briefing Book Volume II: Security Assurances.

31. United Nations Security Council Resolution 984, April 11, 1995. For the full text see <http://cnsdl.miis.edu/npt/npt_4/unsc984.htm>.

32. Bunn, “The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States,” p. 8. Emphasis added.

33. Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, 1005 NPT RevCon document, NPT/CONF.1995/32(Part1), Annex, Decision 2, Para. 8, <http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/1995dec2.htm>.

34. Jean du Preez, “Security Assurances Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons: Is Progress Possible at the NPT Prepcom?” Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) Story of the Week, March 2003, p. 5, <www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/index.htm>.

35. It also bears remembering that France and China were not party to UNSCR 255 (1968), so UNSCR 984 represents the first time security assurance declarations made by all the NWS have been jointly acknowledged.

36. Interview with the Hon. Lawrence Scheinman, Assistant Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, May 1995. Susan B. Welsh, “Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 Review and Extension Conference,” Nonproliferation Review 2 (Spring/Summer 1995), p. 15. Emphasis added.

37. Draft protocol on the prohibition of the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Working paper submitted by South Africa, 1999 NPT PrepCom document, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/9, May 11, 1999.

38. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/9. Article II of the NPT states: “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,” Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nulcear Weapons (NPT), Article II, <http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html>.

39. Para. 2 under “Article VII and security of non-nuclear weapons States,” Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, <http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/finaldoc.html>.

40. Chairman's factual summary, 2004 NPT PrepCom document, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.27, Para. 27, May 10, 2004, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/344/47/PDF/N0434447.pdf?OpenElement>.

41. Security Assurances: Working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, Sweden, and South Africa, as members of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), 2004 PrepCom document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.11, May 1, 2003, http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/2005/PC2-listofdocs.html.

42. Jean du Preez and Emily Schroeder, “2003 NPT Preparatory Committee: ‘Business as Usual?’” Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) Research Story of the Week, May 7, 2003, <www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030507.htm>.

43. Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Negative Security Assurances, Working Paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. May 5, 2003, <http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/2005/PC2-listofdocs.html>.

44. Working paper by the New Agenda Coalition, New Agenda Coalition substantive recommendations to the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/11.

45. Statement by the Republic of South Africa, In the General Debate (Item 4) of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee For the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, April 26, 2004, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/safrica26.pdf>.

46. Working paper by the Non-aligned Movement Position paper on the final outcome of the third session of the Preparatory Commission Submitted by the Non-Aligned States and other States parties to the Treaty, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/43.

47. John Simpson and Jenny Nielsen, “Fiddling While Rome Burns? The 2004 NPT PrepCom,” Nonproliferation Review 11 (Summer 2004), p. 127.

48. Statement by United States Delegation, 2004 NPT PrepCom document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.28, p. 3, May 10, 2004, <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/344/35/PDF/N0434435.pdf?OpenElement>.

49. Rebecca Johnson, “Report on the 2004 NPT PrepCom,” Disarmament Diplomacy No. 77 (May/June 2004), <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77npt.htm>.

50. Statement by the United States at the 2004 meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.28.

51. Similar qualified assurances would be elements of subsequent NWFZs. See Center for Nonproliferation Studies: Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations & Regimes, <www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/index.htm>.

52. NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.28, p. 3.

53. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal, p. 6.

54. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal, p. 5.

55. U.S. Strategic Command, “History of the United States Strategic Command, 1 June 1992 – 31 Dec. 1992,” Top Secret, [n.d.] 1993, p. 13. Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act. Quoted in Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s,” Working Paper, The Nautilus Institute, March 2000, p. 11.

56. “The Future of Nuclear Weapons,” Los Alamos Science, No. 17 (Summer 1989), p. 12.

57. “The Future of Nuclear Weapons,” Los Alamos Science, No. 17 (Summer 1989), p. 16. Emphasis added.

58. “The Future of Nuclear Weapons,” Los Alamos Science, No. 17 (Summer 1989), p. 16. Emphasis added.

59. T. W. Dowler and J. S. Howard III, “Countering The Threat of The Well-armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Review (Fall 1991).

60. Bromley, Grahame, Kucia, “Bunker Busters,” p. 33.

61. The U.S. Army's “Davy Crockett” was an “atomic-bazooka” with a yield of .01–.02 kts, whose targets included fortified positions and command posts. Moreover, it was seen as a projectile that would “force an enemy to disperse its forces.” Retired between July 1967 and early 1971, the Davy Crocket used W54 warheads. Weighing just 51 pounds and fired from recoiless rifles, this was the lightest nuclear weapon ever deployed by the United States. Ironically the final atmospheric test at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) was a W54. Detonated on July 17, 1962 it was observed by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and presidential adviser General Maxwell D. Taylor. See Chuck Hansen, The Swords of Armageddon: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development since 1945, Vol. II (Sunnyvale, CA: Chukelea Publications, 1996), pp. 40–3; Stephen Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute Press, 1998), pp. 156–7. See also, U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, United States Nuclear Test: July 1945 through September 1992 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Dec. 2000), p. 24.

62. The U.S. Army's “Davy Crockett” was an “atomic-bazooka” with a yield of .01–.02 kts, whose targets included fortified positions and command posts. Moreover, it was seen as a projectile that would “force an enemy to disperse its forces.” Retired between July 1967 and early 1971, the Davy Crocket used W54 warheads. Weighing just 51 pounds and fired from recoiless rifles, this was the lightest nuclear weapon ever deployed by the United States. Ironically the final atmospheric test at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) was a W54. Detonated on July 17, 1962 it was observed by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and presidential adviser General Maxwell D. Taylor. See Chuck Hansen, The Swords of Armageddon: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development since 1945, Vol. II (Sunnyvale, CA: Chukelea Publications, 1996), pp. 40–3; Stephen Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute Press, 1998), pp. 156–7. See also, U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, United States Nuclear Test: July 1945 through September 1992 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Dec. 2000), The “nine-megaton weapon” alternative referenced is the B53. The oldest and highest yield nuclear weapon in the U.S.'s arsenal. Designed and developed by Los Alamos and Sandia between the late 1950s and early 1960s, its massive blasting power, coupled with “unique fuzing and parachute options,” made the B53 the U.S.'s initial choice for destroying deeply buried targets. Accordingly, its original mission was against Soviet command bunkers but its inability to “dig” deep (other than producing a massively wide crater) made it impractical against today's deep bunkers. Robert Norris, “The B61 Family of Bombs,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59 (Jan./Feb. 2003) pp. 74–6. See also, Bromley, Grahame and Kucia,“Bunker Busters,” p. 43.

63. William M. Arkin, “Agnosticism When Real Values Are Needed: Nuclear Policy in the Clinton Administration,” Federation of American Scientists Public Interest Report, (Sept./Oct. 1994), p. 7, <www.fas.org/faspir/pir1094.html>.

64. Kristensen, “Targets of Opportunity,” and Bromley, Grahame, Kucia, “Bunker Busters,” p. 33.

65. Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Futures,” p. 10.

66. Strategic Air Command (SAC) was renamed STRATCOM in June 1992. In 1960 the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) at SAC developed the first Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP)—the blueprint for U.S. targeting in the event of a nuclear conflict with the Soviets and/or China. But even earlier—throughout the 1950s—SAC had considerable power over pre-SIOP nuclear targeting choices under the leadership of the zealous and highly disciplined General Curtis Lemay. see David Alan Rosenberg, “U.S. Nuclear War Planning, 1945–1960,” in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Planning (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 35–56.

67. Bromley, Grahame, Kucia, “Bunker Busters,” p. 33. See also, William M. Arkin and Robert S. Norris, “Tinynukes for Mini-Minds,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 48 (April 1992), p. 24–5.

68. Arkin and Norris, “Tinynukes for Mini-Minds.” Emphasis added.

69. As quoted in Arkin, “Agnosticism When Real Values Are Needed.”

70. As quoted in Arkin, “Agnosticism When Real Values Are Needed.”

71. Fiscal Year 1994 Defense Authorization Act Prohibition on Research and Development of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session Section 3136.

72. For an excellent overview of the 1994 NPR see Janne Nolan, “The Next Posture Review?” in Harold A. Feiveson, ed., The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1999), pp. 243–83.

73. Janne Nolan, “Preparing for the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,” Arms Control Today 32 (Nov. 2000).

74. STRATCOM was alarmed when its background check on Carter revealed “a less than favorable long-term outlook for nuclear weapons” and long-term visions of “complete denuclearization.” Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s,” Working Paper, Nautilus Institute, March 2000, p. 7.

75. “Unlike the military officials [STRATCOM], Carter correctly suspected that a stated nuclear deterrence role in WMD scenarios could have [a] negative impact on the NPT regime, regardless of whether the U.S. was legally bound by its Negative Security Assurances.” Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reforms in the 1990s”, p. 15.

76. “Unlike the military officials [STRATCOM], Carter correctly suspected that a stated nuclear deterrence role in WMD scenarios could have [a] negative impact on the NPT regime, regardless of whether the U.S. was legally bound by its Negative Security Assurances.” Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reforms in the 1990s”, pp. 13–14.

77. USSTRATCOM Memo, NPR Report #8, Working Group #5, Nov. 4, 1993, p. 2. Both documents partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act. As quoted in Ibid p. 14. Declassified documents from the NPR's Working Group #5, “The Relationship Between Alternative Nuclear Postures and Counterproliferation Policy,” can be found at the Nautilus Institute's FOIA Documents, <www.nautilus.org/archives/nukestrat/USA/Npr/WG5.html>.

78. USSTRATCOM Memo, NPR Report #8, Working Group #5, Nov. 4, 1993, p. 2. Both documents partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act. As quoted in Ibid p. 14. Declassified documents from the NPR's Working Group #5, “The Relationship Between Alternative Nuclear Postures and Counterproliferation Policy,” can be found at the Nautilus Institute's FOIA Documents, <www.nautilus.org/archives/nukestrat/USA/Npr/WG5.html>.

79. Department of Defense, “Listing, Group 5—Relationships Between US Nuclear Postures and Counterproliferation Policy, Formal STRATCOM Answers as of Nov. 22, 1993,” pp. 12–13. Secret. Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act. As quoted in Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reforms in the 1990s, p. 14. Emphasis added.

80. U.S. Strategic Command, “Nuclear Forces; Post 1994,” July 12, 1994, p. 2. Released under the Freedom of Information Act. As quoted in Ibid. pp. 15–16.

81. “By delegating authority for a sensitive and complex undertaking to working groups largely made up of mid-level officials in the Pentagon, the outcome was practically a foregone conclusion.” Nolan, “Preparing for the 2001 NPR.”

82. “U.S. policy regarding the future use of nuclear weapons against Third World states was left in the hands of a small nuclear cabal that [had] been agitating since the Gulf War to revive war-fighting strategy to counter weapons of mass destruction.” Arkin, “Agnosticism When Real Values Are Needed.”

83. These new “targeting requirements” were not reflected in the SIOP. Rather they came under the rubric of the “Strategic Reserve Force”—a force of over 1,000 warheads held in “reserve” to ensure that no country could take advantage of a depleted U.S. nuclear arsenal following a massive exchange with Russia. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reforms in the 1990s, p. 11.

84. Presidential Directive (PD) 59—Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP)—was signed on July 25, 1980. Among other things it emphasized the capability to fight and “prevail” in a prolonged nuclear war with the Soviet Union. President Reagan reaffirmed this policy in Oct. 1981 with National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 13. Ball, “Toward a Critique of Strategic Nuclear Targeting,” p. 17.

85. For a description of SAG, see the Nautilus Institute, Nuclear Strategy Project, “U.S Nuclear Strategy and War Planning: Advisory Groups, the Strategic Advisory Group (SAG),” <www.nautilus.org/nukestrat/USA/advisory/sag.html>.

86. U.S. Strategic Command, “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence,” [no date, probably late 1995]. Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act. The Nautilus Institute, Nuclear Strategy Project, <www.nautilus.org/nukestrat/USA/Advisory/Essentials95.txt>.

87. U.S. Strategic Command, “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence,” [no date, probably late 1995]. Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act. The Nautilus Institute, Nuclear Strategy Project, <www.nautilus.org/nukestrat/USA/Advisory/Essentials95.txt>. Emphasis added.

88. U.S. Strategic Command, “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence,” [no date, probably late 1995]. Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act. The Nautilus Institute, Nuclear Strategy Project, <www.nautilus.org/nukestrat/USA/Advisory/Essentials95.txt>. Emphasis added.

89. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s,” p.15.

90. U.S. Strategic Command, Nuclear Posture Review slides, Update Briefing, 3 Dec. 1993, slide 7. Secret. Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act. Quoted in, Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s,” p. 15.

91. “PDD/NSC-30: Nuclear Posture Review Implementation [Sept. 1994],” Presidential Decision Directives – PDD Federation of American Scientists, <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd30.htm>.

92. Greg Mello, “The Birth of a New Bomb, Shades of Dr. Strangelove: Will We Learn to Love the B-61-11?” Washington Post, June 1, 1997. Some contend that the B61-11 is a new, not a “modified,” nuclear weapon. “While producing the B61-11 apparently did not involve modifications to the ‘physics package’—the nuclear explosive itself—there is no question that the bomb provides a new nuclear capability.” Ibid.

93. In the 1950s there were two earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) in the U.S. arsenal: the Mark 8 and the Mark 11. Both had a yield of about 25 kt and were, “able to penetrate up to 22 feet of reinforced concrete, 90 feet of hard sand, 120 feet of clay, or five inches of armor plating.” The only other warhead given an “earth penetrating” moniker was the W86 which was developed in the 1970s but cancelled in Sept. 1980. Up until the introduction of the B61-11, the de facto nuclear “bunker buster” was the B53. However, even after the B61-11 replaced the B53 in active service in Jan. 1997, the B53 stayed on in the U.S. arsenal as a component in the “hedge” stockpile. Norris, “The B61 Family of Bombs.”

94. As quoted in, “Bunker-Busting Bomb Prompts U.S. Discord,” Defense News, Feb. 24–March 2, 1997, <www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/bunker.htm>.

95. Robert Nelson, “Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, Public Interest Report 54 (Jan./Feb. 2002), <www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n1/weapons.htm>.

96. Mello, “The Birth of a New Bomb, Shades of Dr. Strangelove.” Technically therefore, in 1996 the B61-11 reached “Phase 5: First Production,” and by 1999 was at “Phase 6: Quality Production and Stockpile.” For an explanation of the warhead life-cycle phases see, Department of Energy, Department of Energy's 2002 Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 2, <www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/02budget/weapons/dsw.pdf>.

97. Tim Weiner, “Huge Chemical Arms Plant Near Completion in Libya, U.S. Says,” New York Times, Feb. 25, 1996, p. 8; Bromley, Grahame, and Kucia, “Bunker Busters,” pp. 39-40;. Arkin, “Nuking Libya.”

98. Goldblat, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment,” p. 25; Arkin, “Nuking Libya.”

99. Protocol I of the Treaty states: “Each Protocol Member [which includes the U.S.] undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive devise against: (a) Any Party to the Treaty,” <www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/pelindab.htm>.

100. Remarks by Robert Bell at White House press briefing, April 11, 1996. As quoted in George Bunn, “Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating Its Non-Use Pledges?” Arms Control Today 26 (May/June 1996), p. 7.

101. It had been Smith, acting in conjunction with STRATCOM's 1994 NPR preparations, who had first revived alternatives to the B53 in Oct. 1993. Mello, “The Birth of a New Bomb, Shades of Dr. Strangelove.”

102. Quoted in Ibid. Emphasis added.

103. George Bunn, “Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating Its Non-Use Pledges?”

104. “PDD/NSC 60: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Guidance Nov. 1997,” Presidential Decision Directives – PDD Federation of American Scientists, <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd60.htm>.

105. “Clinton Directive Changes Strategy On Nuclear War” Washington Post, Dec. 7, 1997, p. A1, <http://abomb.physics.lsa.umich.edu/214/other/news/nuclearwarpolicy.html>.

106. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s,” p. 10. China had been removed from the SIOP in 1982.

107. “Clinton Issues New Guidelines on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine” Arms Control Today 27 (Nov./Dec. 1997).

108. In constant 1998 dollars, between 1948 and 1991 the U.S. annually spent an average of $3.6 billion to produce and service its nuclear weapons stockpile. In 2000, almost ten years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the NNSA had an annual Weapons Activities budget over $4.5 billion. For Cold War averages see Schwartz, Atomic Audit. For the FY 2000 DOE Weapons Activities budget see Department of Energy, Department of Energy's 2000 Budget Request to Congress, Weapons Activities, (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 8, <www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/00budget/weapons/weapact.pdf>.

109. This policy of “preemption” is best documented in:

1. The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” Sept. 2002, <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.

2. The classified NSPD 17 (issued on Sept. 17, 2002). For leaked excerpts see Nicholas Kravel, “Bush Approves Nuclear Response,” Washington Post, Jan. 31, 2003.

3. The White House “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Dec. 2002,<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf>. This document contains portions of NSPD 17 and codifies the NPR's recommendation to remove Clinton-era ambiguities over how the U.S. might preempt or respond to the use of CBRN. It states that, “The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—including through resort to all of our options —to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.” Ibid. p. 3. Emphasis added. In NSPD 17 the phrase “including through resort to all of our options” read “including potential nuclear weapons.” Kravel, “Bush Approves Nuclear Response.” Emphasis added.

4. U.S. House Policy Committee U.S. Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, “Differentiation and Defense: An Agenda for the Nuclear Weapons Program,” Feb. 2003.

110. The creation of the report was congressionally mandated in 2000: “Requirements of the Floyd D. Spense National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398, Title X, Subtitle E, Section 1044).”

111. Department of Defense / Department of Energy, Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 18.

112. The report emphasized the destruction of HDBT (as opposed to neutralization, through destruction of entrances and exits for example) far more than the 1994 NPR. This was due to a greater emphasis on the annihilation of supposed CBW agents within the bunker (in situ)—so-called “Agent Defeat.”

113. Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, p. 18.

114. “Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],” Global Security Organization Website, Jan. 8, 2002 <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/DOD/npr.htm>. It should be noted that China, North Korea and the former Yugoslavia developed HDBTs during the Cold War as well.

115. With current technologies, for “the shock to reach down to 1,000 feet with enough strength to destroy a hard target in dry rock, the warhead would require a yield significantly larger than 100 kilotons.” Sidney Drell, James Goodby, Raymond Jeanloz, and Robert Peurifoy, “A Strategic Choice: New Bunker Busters Versus Nonproliferation,” Arms Control Today 33 (March 2003), online. Emphasis added.

116. The boring machines used to dig the “Chunnel” (the tunnel beneath the English Channel linking France and Great Britain) were able to go 50 meters per day into solid rock. Boston's “Big Dig” included boring a 16-foot diameter tunnel (at a depth of 200–400 ft) for 17 miles. While it is debatable that these exact technologies are available or affordable to “rogue” states, their existence does demonstrate one extreme of what is possible. See Lt. Col. Eric M. Stepp, USAF, Deeply Buried Facilities: Implications for Military Operations, Occasional Paper No. 14, Air War College Center for Strategy and Technology (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, May 2000), p. 6, 9, <https://research.maxwell.af.mil>.

117. See Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets; Michael A. Levi, “Fire in the Hole: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Options of Counterproliferation,” Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, Non-Proliferation Project, Global Policy Program, No. 31 (Nov. 2002), pp. 22–5.

118. Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, p. 14.

119. Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, See also, “Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],” Global Security.org, Jan. 8, 2002.

120. William Arkin, “Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable,” Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2002.

121. William Arkin, “Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable,” Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2002.

122. William Arkin, “Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable,” Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2002.

123. “Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],” Global Security.org, Jan. 8, 2002.

124. In addition to the RNEP and low-yield weapons the NPR added a third category of new weapons. Hoping to destroy or neutralize CBW agents housed in HDBT, the NPR called for an “agent defeat” program—“thermal, chemical, or radiological neutralization of chemical/biological materials or storage facilities.” As quoted in, Arkin, “Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable.” For scientific arguments that challenge the efficacy of agent defeat nuclear weapons, and indeed demonstrate that they compound the problem of agent dissemination, see Michael May and Zachary Haldeman, Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons against Buried Biological Agents (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, 2003).

125. “Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],” Global Security.org, Jan. 8, 2002.

126. At the time North Korea was still a member of the NPT.

127. Arkin, “Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable.”

128. Arkin, “Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable.”

129. “Negative” Security Assurances’ No Longer Supported, Bolton Says.” Global Security Newswire, Feb. 22, 2002, <www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/2/22/4p.html>. See also, Arms Control Today Interview with Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton. “A New Strategic Framework: Detailing the Bush Approach to Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today 32 (Jan./Feb. 2002), <www.armscontrol.org/aca/bolton.asp>.

130. The RNEP study calls for the involvement of three weapons laboratories. LANL and LLNL currently have “red teams” “competing” in RNEP modifications. SNL, which is responsible for the non-nuclear components of U.S. nuclear weapons, is involved in the design of a new “bomb case involving high-strength casting of the bomb around a very heavy ballast.” “The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator: A More Usable Nuclear Weapon?” Nuclear Watch New Mexico, July 2003, <www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/RNEPFactSheetLowRes.pdf>; Department of Energy, Department of Energy's 2003 Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), <www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/03budget/content/weapons/dsw.pdf>. Of the three main budget categories under the NNSA's Total Weapons Activities—Directed Stockpile Work (DSW); Campaigns; and “Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF)”—RNEP funding is under the rubric of DSW. For the FY04 budget request for DSW see Department of Energy's 2004 Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2003), www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/04budget/content/weapons/dsw.pdf; for FY05 see Department of Energy's 2005 Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), <www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/05budget/content/wea pons/dsw.pdf>.

131. Department of Energy, Department of Energy's 2003 Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work. For an explanation of the warhead life-cycle phases see Department of Energy, Department of Energy's 2002 Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 2, <www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/02budget/weapons/dsw.pdf>.

132. Christopher E. Paine, “Countering Proliferation or Compounding It? The Bush administration's Quest for Earth-Penetrating and Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons.” The Natural Resources Defense Council, May 2003, p. 21, <www.nrdc.org/nuclear/bush/abb.pdf>.

133. “Congress Cuts Funding and Limits Research on New Nuclear Weapons,” Friends Committee National Legislation, Nov. 6, 2003, < www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id = 588&issue_id = 48>.

134. Matthew L. Wald, “Nuclear Weapons Money Is Cut From Spending Bill,” New York Times, Nov. 23, 2004, p. 22; Department of Energy's 2005 Budget Request to Congress.

135. James C. Dao, “Senate Panel Votes to Lift Ban on Small Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, May 10, 2003, p. 2.

136. Letter dated Dec. 5, 2003, from Linton F. Brooks, Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration, to Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Pete Nanos; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Director, Michael Anastasio; and Sandia National Laboratory President C. Paul Robinson, <www.fcnl.org/pdfs/nuc_memo.pdf>.

137. Letter dated Dec. 5, 2003, from Linton F. Brooks, Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration, to Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Pete Nanos; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Director, Michael Anastasio; and Sandia National Laboratory President C. Paul Robinson, <www.fcnl.org/pdfs/nuc_memo.pdf>.

138. Letter dated Jan. 22, 2004 from Ranking Minority Member Peter J. Vislosky and David L Hobson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, to the Honorable Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, <www.fcnl.org/pdfs/lettertobrooks.pdf>.

139. Letter dated Jan. 22, 2004 from Ranking Minority Member Peter J. Vislosky and David L Hobson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, to the Honorable Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, <www.fcnl.org/pdfs/lettertobrooks.pdf>.

140. Letter dated Jan. 22, 2004 from Ranking Minority Member Peter J. Vislosky and David L Hobson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, to the Honorable Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, <www.fcnl.org/pdfs/lettertobrooks.pdf>.

141. Wald, “Nuclear Weapons Money Is Cut From Spending Bill.” Cancelled as well was the entire $30 million request to aid in shortening the preparation time required to carry out a nuclear test, and all but $7 million of the $29.8 million asked for in erecting a new facility to fabricate plutonium pits. David Ruppe, “Congress Cancels Funding for New Weapons Research,” Global Security Newswire, Nov. 22, 2004, <www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004/11/22/80551298-a9a6-4233-98fc-8e7bf0aab2b4.html>.

142. David Ruppe, “Bush Administration Could Seek to Bypass House Committee Chairman on Nuke Research Funding,” Global Security Newswire, Dec. 17, 2004, <www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004/12/16/53147ff9-f353-4276-8c02-e1a65c4b0236.html>.

143. Department of Energy's 2005 Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work, p. 63–9. <www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/05budget/content/volumes/Volume_1.pdf>.

144. Department of Energy's 2005 Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work, p. 63–9. <www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/05budget/content/volumes/Volume_1.pdf>.p. 63.

145. Department of Energy's 2005 Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work, p. 63–9. <www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/05budget/content/volumes/Volume_1.pdf>.p. 63.

146. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 18.

147. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 24

148. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 25.

149. Statement by U.S. Delegation, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.28, United States Statement, May, 2004, p. 3.

150. Brzeniski, The Choice, p. 25.

151. Brzeniski, The Choice, p. 25.

152. The Final Document of the XIII Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement NAM, Kuala Lumpur, Feb. 2003 stated “that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional, and legally binding instrument on security assurances should be pursued as a matter of urgency, and that legally binding security assurances to NNWS parties to the NPT would strengthen the regime.” It also emphasized that specific time for deliberations on security assurances should be allocated in addition to time for nuclear disarmament and the 1995 resolution.

153. Goldblat, “Nuclear Weapons Free Zones,” p. 31.

154. See, for example, “Washington Consults With Allies on Security Assurance for North Korea,” Global Security Newswire, Sept. 8, 2003, www.nti.org.