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Abstract
An examination of the first three years of the G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction indicates that the results achieved have been mixed. The elimination of fissile materials has been particularly problematic, even though Russia's partners identified this program as a priority early in the partnership process. Its critical importance for nuclear nonproliferation has not been enough to persuade world leaders to solve liability disputes that are blocking further progress. Submarine dismantlement has met with far greater success, though more has been done to ameliorate environmental risks than proliferation concerns. The greatest Global Partnership success to date is in the sphere of chemical weapons annihilation. Nonetheless, more must be done to ensure that Moscow meets final Chemical Weapons Convention deadlines. If the Global Partnership is to make a real difference in securing weapons of mass destruction and component materials, stronger leadership and more coordination are needed.
Acknowledgments
This paper was written as a chapter for a forthcoming publication, Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.
Notes
1. The G-8 is made up of the seven major industrial countries (France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada, also known as the G-7), plus Russia. “Statement by G8 Leaders: The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” June 2002, <www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/globpart-en.asp>.
2. Russia has pledged additional moneys, but Moscow and Washington argue that these funds should not count toward the $20 billion target identified at Kananaskis.
3. G8 Senior Group, “G8 Global Partnership Annual Report,” Sea Island Summit Documents, June 2004, <www.g8usa.gov/d_060904e.htm>
4. “Tokyo Summit Political Declaration: Striving For A More Secure and Humane World,” University of Toronto G8 Information Centre, July 8, 1993, <www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1993tokyo/political.html>.
5. “Plutonium MOX Fuel Initiative,” Foreign Affairs Canada, <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nndi-agency/mox_initiative-en.asp>.
6. The French delegation at Tokyo was reportedly particularly negative about the idea of forming any sort of international group to handle nonproliferation assistance. Japanese official (name withheld by request), interview by author, Dec. 20, 2004.
7. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Initiative ran from 1992 through May 2001. For information on the program, see “Completed Projects – Nuclear Safety,” Canadian International Development Agency, <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/index.htm>.
8. ITAR-TASS, Nov. 17, 1994, as cited in “Agreement With France On Construction Of Nuclear Store,” FBIS-SOV-94-223, as cited in “Russia: International Assistance Programs: France,” NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, Jan. 3, 1998, <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/intnatl/france.htm>.
9. E-mail communication from researcher at France's Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, as cited in e-mail communication from researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, as cited in “Russia: International Assistance Programs: France,” NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, Jan. 3, 1998, <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/intnatl/france.htm>.
10. In June 1998 France and Germany joined together in a trilateral program to research the MOX fuel option, though Germany pulled out of that program when it expired in June 2002. Mark Hibbs, “Germany ends trilateral Pu effort; NFI will get some Hanau equipment,” NuclearFuel, June 11, 2002. On the German-French MOX research efforts, see Guy Bousquet et al., “Mixed-Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication and Use,” Natural Resources Defense Council, 1993, <www.nrdc.org>, as cited in “Russia: MOX Fuel Overview,” NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fissmat/mox/moxover.htm>.
11. Consortium GRS-SIEMENS (Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorischerheit — Society on reactor and nuclear power plant safety), as cited in Andrei Frolov, “Germany and the Process of Excess Nuclear Weapons Elimination in Russia,” PIR Center, Autumn 2003, <www.sgpproject.org/resources/Frolov%20on%20Germany.html>.
12. German-American Academic Council and the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.-German Cooperation in Elimination of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995), pp. 23–26, <www.nap.edu/books/NX006152/html>.
13. In the early 1990s, the United Kingdom sponsored a series of seminars for Russian specialists in materials protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) and provided computers and other equipment to the Russian nuclear regulatory service; London also provided 150 supercontainers for the secure transport of nuclear munitions and participated in the upgrading of physical security at the Mayak fissile material storage facility.
Germany also cooperated with the Russian regulatory agency to improve MPC&A, providing equipment and know-how, and provided physical protection upgrades for Mayak.
Other countries were involved in similar efforts; for instance, the Netherlands provided more than $14 million for physical protection at warhead destruction sites. Vladimir Orlov and Nikolai Sokov, eds., Yadernoye nerasprostraneniye [Nuclear Nonproliferation] (Moscow: PIR Center, 2002), pp. 404–34.
14. Japan also provided several thousand containers for plutonium storage and equipment to improve the security of fissile material transports, and funded the construction of a liquid radioactive-waste processing facility for the Russian Far East. For information on the latter project, see Cristina Chuen and Tamara Troyakova, “The Complex Politics of Foreign Assistance: Building the Landysh in the Russian Far East,” Nonproliferation Review 8 (Summer 2001), pp. 134–49; Orlov and Sokov, Yadernoye nerasprostraneniye, p. 432; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website, <www2.nttca.com:8010/infomofa/jr/assist/other.html>; and Naoaki Usui, “Japan, Russia Sign Pact,” Nucleonics Week, Oct. 14, 1993, p. 13, as cited in “Russia: International Assistance Programs: Japan,” NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/intnatl/japan.htm>.
15. “Plutonium MOX Fuel Initiative.”
16. The ISTC, an international center dedicated to the employment of former Soviet weapons scientists, was formed in Nov. 1992 as a result of an idea first discussed by Genscher and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in late 1991. The European Union, Japan, Russian Federation, and the United States are permanent members of its governing board. For more information on the ISTC, see <www.istc.ru>.
17. “G8 Heads of State and Government Statement,” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 20, 2001, <http://www.mid.ru>.
18. “Progress Report on the Fight Against Terrorism,” G8 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Whistler, British Columbia, June 12–13, 2002, <www.usembassy.it/file2002_06/alia/a2061407.htm>.
19. UN Security Council, Press Release SC/7158, “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution,” Sept. 28, 2001,<www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm>.
20. See, for instance, the Jan. 18, 2002, statement by Mr. Paul Heinbecker, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, “On Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Jan. 18, 2002, <www.un.int/canada/html/s-18jan2002heinbecker.htm>.
21. For instance, on Jan. 22–23, 2002, Canada sponsored a meeting on this issue. See “Report on the G8 Meeting on Legal Measures to Combat Terrorist Financing,” Canadian Dept. of Justice, <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/g8/doc8.html>.
22. According to U.S. participants, the U.S. delegation was one of the main promoters of the partnership and lobbied intensely in order to push it through. State Dept. official (name withheld by request), interview by author, Washington, DC, Aug. 7, 2002.
23. Statement by G8 Leaders, “The G8 Global Partnership,” Kananaskis, Canada, June 2002.
24. State Dept. official (name withheld by request), interview by author, Washington, DC, Aug. 7, 2002.
25. For a summary of the 1999–2003 negotiation of the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation and the taxation issue, see Egil Tronstad and Cristina Chuen, “The Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR),” June 4, 2003, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/030604.htm>.
26. Negotiations over liability provisions related to MOX fuel projects were the most contentious, with all of Russia's partners arguing that MNEPR-like provisions did not provide sufficient protection for the sorts of activities the MOX project entails. These negotiations continue both on a bilateral U.S.-Russian basis and on a multilateral basis (involving Canada, Japan, and European nations). For more information, see the discussion of plutonium disposition, below.
27. Previous expenditures from Canadian International Development website, <www.acdi-cida.gc.ca>; Global Partnership commitment as cited in “G8 Senior Officials Group Annual Report,” 2003 Evian Summit, Evian, France, June 2003, <www.g8.fr/evian/english/home.html>.
28. “G8 Senior Officials Group Annual Report.”
29. “Progress Report on the Fight Against Terrorism”.
30. For more information on the ISTC, see the ISTC Website, at <www.istc.ru>.
31. “The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.”
32. In fact, the exact nature of these environmental and security risks has yet to be fully determined. For a detailed overview of the available data and the implications of informational lacunae for foreign assistance projects, see Ole Reistad, Morten Bremer Mærli, and Nils Bøhmer, “Russian Naval Reactors and Fuel: Dangerous Unknowns,” in this issue of Nonproliferation Review.
33. The spent fuel from 346 reactor cores, currently stored in several service vessels, four ex-naval bases, and some 78 submarines, contains about 400 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and significant quantities of plutonium. The many years some reactors have been decommissioned have reduced the radioactivity of the nuclear fuel, and it could therefore be handled by would-be terrorists not overly concerned with personal safety. Other reactors have fuel rods that were never fully burned up in the first place. While most of the spent naval fuel is enriched to just 20–40 percent, meaning that a great deal of material, and sophisticated equipment would be needed to develop weapons-usable material from the uranium contained in the fuel, a “quick and dirty” reprocessing of this spent fuel could result in plutonium useful for a nuclear device. Irradiated fuel might also be used in a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty bomb,” or leaked fuel from aging storage facilities could create an environmental disaster. Figures for decommissioned submarines from presentation by Viktor Akhunov, head of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy Dept. for Decommissioning of Nuclear Installations, presentation “Kompleksnaya utilizatsiya APL i reabilitatsiya radiatsionno-opasnykh obyektov na beregovykh tekhnicheskikh bazakh” (Integrated dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines and rehabilitation of dangerous irradiated sites at on-shore technical bases) to the 16th IAEA Contact Expert Group (CEG) meeting, The Hague, Netherlands, April 23–25, 2003; reactor core figure from V.A. Shishkin, “Programme for Decommissioning of Multipurpose Nuclear Submarines in the North-West of Russia,” paper presented to the 16th CEG meeting, The Hague, Netherlands, April 23–25, 2003.
34. Viktor Akhunov, “Kompleksnaya utilizatsiya APL i reabilitatsiya radiatsionno-opasnykh obyektov na beregovykh tekhnicheskikh bazakh” (Comprehensive dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines and rehabilitation of radioactive sites at onshore technical bases), paper delivered to The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction conference, organized by the PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia and the Board on Sustainable Partnership for Russia, Moscow, Russia, April 23–24, 2004.
35. Sources for this table include: “Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials,” <www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home.asp>; Franco Adriano, “Nucleare Russo, un affare italiano: Voce per voce la prima tranche dell'impegno con Putin sottoscritto da Berlusconi a Roma” (Russian nuclear power, an Italian matter: Item by item the first plank in the commitment with Putin signed by Berlusconi in Rome), Milano Finanza, Jan. 25, 2005, <www.milanofinanza.it>; French Foreign Ministry Official (name withheld by request), interview by author, Washington, DC, Jan. 6, 2005; The G8 Global Partnership, First Annual Report 2003: Progress report on the UK's programme to address nuclear, chemical and biological legacies in the Former Soviet Union, <www.dti.gov.uk/energy/nuclear/fsu/news/First_annual_report.pdf>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-Russia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting: Overview of Results,” Jan. 14, 2005, <www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/meet0501.html>; Nadezhda Shcherbinina, “Yest frantsuzskiy interes, italyanskiy tozhe” (There is French interest, and Italian too), Zvezdochka (Severodvinsk), Nov. 3, 2004; NIS Nuclear and Missile Databases, <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs>; NDEP Official (name withheld by request), e-mail correspondence with author, Feb. 28, 2005; Sergio Rossi, “Un affare smantellare l'atomo” (A transaction to dismantle the atom), Il Sole 24 Ore (Milan), Jan. 17, 2004, <www.ilsole24ore.com>; U.S. Dept. of Energy, “U.S. Dept. of Energy Budget Roll-Out Media Availability Secretary Spencer Abraham,” Feb. 2, 2004, <www.energy.gov/engine/doe/files/dynamic/512004105158_BudgetRollout2005Transcript.pdf>; William Hoehn, “Analysis of the Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Requests for U.S.-Former Soviet Union Nuclear Security: Dept. of Energy Programs,” Aug. 10, 2001, <www.ransac.org>; William Hoehn, “Update on Congressional Activity Affecting U.S.-Russian Cooperative Nonproliferation Programs,” July 26, 2002, <www.ransac.org>.
36. Additional moneys are expected for new projects in 2005; $0.5 million have been spent on bilateral projects, €10 million was donated to the NDEP for 2002–2005, and €6 million has been pledged for 2006–2008. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance, Press Release, Feb. 16, 2005, “Sweden to Support Environmental Work in Russia,” <www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/5250/a/39029>
37. Sergio Rizzo, “L'Italia distruggerà l'arsenale russo” (Italy will destroy the Russian arsenal), Corriere della Sera (Milan), Nov. 2, 2004, <www.corriere.it>.
38. French Foreign Ministry official (name withheld by request), interview by author, Washington, DC, Jan. 6, 2005.
39. Currently, the NDEP is cooperating with France, the European Union, and Russia on several projects in Gremikha. Projects that may begin in summer 2005, if approval for financing them is received in time, are: improvement of spent fuel storage, fuel off-loading equipment, and physical protection. NDEP official (name withheld by request), e-mail correspondence with author, Feb. 28, 2005.
40. The NDEP hired the Energy Safety Analysis Center, a division of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Nuclear Safety Institute, together with the Kurchatov Institute and NIKIET (the R&D Institute of Power Engineering of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy) to compile the master plan.
41. The executive summary is Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP), “Strategic Approaches in Solving Decommissioning Problems of Retired Russian Nuclear Fleet in the North-West Region” (Moscow: 2004), and has been made available to NGOs such as the Center for Nonproliferation Studies as well.
42. Charles Digges, “Russian, European officials optimistic about Russian nuclear ‘Master Plan,’” Feb. 11, 2005, <www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/37176.html>.
43. Donations to the NDEP are captured under individual country contributions in . NDEP contributors include Canada (CD$32 million, or €20.8 million), Denmark (€10 million), the EU (€50 million), Finland (€10 million), France (€40 million), Germany (€10 million), the Netherlands (€10 million), Norway (€10 million), Russia (€10 million), Sweden (€16 million), and the UK (£10 million, or over €16 million). Funds are either earmarked for nuclear activities or available for those activities.
44. The program, begun as a Norwegian initiative to combine the efforts of the United States, Norway, and Russia to address environmental problems in the Arctic region associated with Russian nuclear submarine decommissioning, officially started on Sept. 26, 1996. The United Kingdom joined the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) in June 2003. AMEC website, <http://osiris.cso.uiuc.edu/denix/Public/Intl/AMEC/RTC/feb.html>; “United Kingdom Joins Arctic Military Cooperation,” M2 Presswire, June 20, 2003, <www.presswire.net>.
45. Norwegian officials (names withheld by request), interviews by author, Oslo, Jan. 2005.
46. Adriano, “Nucleare Russo, un affare italiano”; Rossi, “Un affare smantellare l'atomo”; Shcherbinina, “Yest frantsuzskiy interes.”
47. Adriano, “Nucleare Russo, un affare italiano.”
48. In early 2005, however, France began to discuss implementing some projects under the framework of the NDEF. The Gremikha base was the base for the Russian Navy's liquid-metal cooled Alfa-class submarines. There is as yet no technology for recycling spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from these reactors, so any project in this area will be lengthy and expensive.
49. Akhunov, “Kompleksnaya utilizatsiya APL.” For a breakdown of projects and estimated costs, see Cristina Chuen, “The Global Partnership and Submarine Dismantlement,” June 8, 2004, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040608.htm>.
50. U.S. State Dept. personnel (names withheld by request), interviews by author, Washington, DC, June 2004. For more details on the various organizations related to nonproliferation assistance in the naval sphere, see “Coordinating Submarine Dismantlement Assistance in Russia,” Sept. 2004, <www.nti.org/c_press/analysis_subs_090104.pdf>.
51. There are also reports that Italy may become involved in work at Andreyeva Bay. Shcherbinina, “Yest frantsuzskiy interes.”
52. The U.S. Dept. of Defense is involved in scrapping ballistic missile submarines and related activities; the U.S. Dept. of Energy is completing projects to improve materials protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) at naval sites; and the Japanese government is funding the dismantlement of submarines at Zvezda Shipyard, near Vladivostok. The only other country that has committed funds to the Russian Far East is Australia; however, these funds are to be expended via the Japan-Russia Committee on Cooperation for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which will thus serve as a coordinating body. “Japan-Russia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (Summary of Results),” June 24, 2004, <www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/meet0406.html>.
53. Norway has been offering to provide a nuclear fuel transport ship for several years, but this offer has not been accepted by Oslo's Russian counterparts. Ole Reistad, Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, interview by author, Oslo, Jan. 12, 2005.
54. European officials (names withheld by request), interviews by author, Sept., Oct., Nov. 2004. One case that illustrates the difficulty of obtaining information in Russia is that of the Murmansk Initiative, a U.S-Norwegian-Russian project launched in 1996 to increase the capacity of an experimental liquid radioactive waste treatment facility to industrial scale. The facility, far over budget, has yet to enter operation. Rostekhnadzor, the Russian nuclear regulatory agency, has been quoted as stating that the initial contractors were incompetent and the initial design flawed. Information on this initial contracting remains murky. Throughout the ensuing years, officials from donor nations traveled to Atomflot to inspect the facility and agreed to increase funding without obtaining a complete picture of the problems at the facility. See Bellona Foundation, “The Murmansk Initiative-RF: An observer's point of view,” Dec. 5, 2003, </www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/northern_fleet/decommissioning/31925.html>. At present, information about the project continues to be lacking. Rosatom has yet to inform its foreign partners, despite numerous requests, of the exact nature of the continuing flaws in the facility and what must be done (at what cost) to bring all equipment up to code.
55. Ariane Sains, “Better environmental assessments urged for Russian sub cleanup,” Nucleonics Week 45 (July 29, 2004), pp. 15–16.
56. This point was driven home to the author by a presentation of the results of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) performed by the Onega Research and Design Engineering Bureau on the dismantlement of a Victor II-class attack submarine. The results of the EIA suggested that even were an airplane to hit the submarine during defueling, the resulting radiation would not require an evacuation or result in radiation emissions exceeding regulation levels. Given that on Aug. 10, 1985 the K-314, an Echo II cruise missile submarine, caught fire and vented radiation in Chazhma Bay, in the Russian Pacific, at the close of a refueling operation resulting in serious bodily injuries and contamination that remains a problem to this day, it would be highly valuable to understand the assumptions underlying the new EIAs that equally devastating accidents could not occur during other types of defueling operations, even were external shocks such as airplane strikes involved. “Scientific and Technical Issues in the Management of SNF and RW of Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines and Nuclear-Powered Surface Vessels,” paper delivered to the NATO-Russia Advanced Research Workshop, Moscow, Russia, Sept. 22–24, 2004.
57. For information on the convention, see the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons website, at <www.opcw.org>.
58. Two of Russia's CW storage sites, in Kambarka (Udmurtiya) and Gornyy (Saratov region), hold lewisite, mustard, and lewisite-mustard mixtures—older, arsenic-based chemical weapons. The other five sites—Shchuchye (Kurgan region), Kizner (Udmurtiya), Maradykovskiy (Kirov region), Pochep (Bryansk region), and Leonidovka (Penza region)—hold newer and more lethal Russian nerve agents (VX, sarin, and soman, in addition to smaller amounts of lewisite, lewisite-mustard, and phosgene) in varied weapons configurations. Robert J. Einhorn and Michèle A. Flournoy, “Protecting against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership” (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jan. 2003), p. 54.
59. The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program has funded CW destruction since 1992. The Dept. of Defense installed security upgrades at the Shchuchye and Kizner facilities, which house portable nerve agents. By 2000, the United States had also spent more than $140 million on the development and design of a pilot nerve-agent destruction plant in Shchuchye, which is supposed to destroy all of the nerve agents stored in Shchuchye and Kizner. However, in Oct. 1999 the U.S. Congress canceled the $130 million that had been budgeted for construction of the plant in 2000, due to uncertainty over costs, doubts about the Russian commitment to meet its CWC obligations, the limited amount of funding received from other nations, and the lack of a coordinated federal CW destruction plan in Russia. A Clinton administration request for $35 million in 2001 was similarly rejected. Work on the Shchuchye plant continued at a delayed pace with previously budgeted funds, until funding was reinstated in 2002 ($50 million). The United States plans to finance the construction of all buildings within the Shchuchye facility, except for one destruction building, which the Russians will fund. Other nations are funding facility infrastructure, such as electricity substations and railways, located outside of the elimination facility itself.
60. The EU also committed €6 million to the Gornyy project, transferring responsibility for project implementation to the German Foreign Ministry. The G8 Global Partnership: German-Russian Cooperation (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, May 15, 2004), p. 45.
61. Germany has experience in eliminating blister agents from similar activities during World War II. German aid to Russia for CW elimination (in millions of U.S. dollars) is as follows:
(Funding numbers from Natalia Kalinina, “The Effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention Depends Upon Russia's Actions,” Yaderny Kontrol 9, <www.sgpproject.org/Kaliniarus_CW.pdf>.) With the launch of the Gornyy facility in 2002, German contributions dropped. However, in July 2003 Germany signed an agreement with Russia regarding construction of another blister agent elimination facility, at Kambarka. As of Feb. 2004, €150 million were already under contract for work at this site, where Germany will fund a thermal destruction facility for solid and liquid residual CW agent materials, a system for draining the Lewisite cisterns containing the chemical agents, and filter systems for contaminated buildings. Strengthening the Global Partnership, “Donor Factsheet: Germany,” <www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/Germany.html>.
62. According to the testimony of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation Lisa Bronson, the decrease in CTR spending at Shchuchye in 2005 reflects the “completion of the capital-intense construction phase [of the project], not a decrease in commitment.” U.S. Senate, Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 10, 2004, in Federal Document Clearinghouse Media, Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <www.lexis-nexis.com>; budget numbers from Defense Threat Reduction Agency, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/FY 2005 Biennial Budget Estimates: Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction Appropriation,” Feb. 2003, <www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2004/budget_justification/pdfs/operation/Volume_1_-_DW_Justification/CTR_FY04-05_PB.pdf>.
63. German Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, The G8 Global Partnership: German-Russian Cooperation (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, May 15, 2004), p. 49.
64. Paris has submitted a draft agreement on cooperation on CW elimination to Moscow. There has also been some discussion of funding projects under the Swiss agreement with Russia. In Nov. 2004, French officials involved in the Global Partnership met with their Russian counterparts to discuss CW elimination and announced that they would construct an environmental monitoring system near Shchuchye, to be completed by early 2006. Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey (Moscow), Nov. 25, 2004. Media reports suggested that a Franco-Russian agreement might be reached during meetings of the Russian-French Cooperation Council (known in French as the Conseil de coopération franco-russe sur les questions de sécurité [CCQS]) on Jan. 21, 2005. See, for instance, Aleksey Sobolev, “Rossiya prosit u Frantsii zashchity ot Evropy” (Russia asks France for protection from Europe), Kommersant (Moscow), Jan. 21, 2005, <www.kommersant.ru>. However, no agreement has since been reported.
65. Foreign Affairs Canada, “Canada and NTI Conclude Agreement to Help Destroy Chemical Weapons in Russia,” Feb. 7, 2005, <www.canadianembassy.org/homepage/050207-en.asp>.
66. The G8 Global Partnership: German-Russian Cooperation, p. 47.
67. Sergey Ptichkin, “S khimiyey ne khimichat – bezopasnost” (With chemicals you can't stint on safety), Rossiyskaya gazeta (Moscow), May 26, 2004, <www.rg.ru>.
68. The G8 Global Partnership, Second Annual Report: Progress during 2004 on the UK's programmes to address nuclear, chemical and biological legacies in the Former Soviet Union, Dec. 2004, pp. 10–11, <www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PostG8_POL_DTI_Second_annual_report.pdf>.
69. Sources for this table include: “Cooperative Threat Reduction: Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2006,” <www.ransac.org/documents/fy06_ctr_annual_report_to_congress.pdf>; Foreign Affairs Canada, “Chemical Weapons Destruction,” <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/global_partnership/destruction-en.asp>; “Czech Rep Gives Two Million to Scrap Russian Chemical Weapons,” Czech News Agency, Oct. 22, 2004, in Lexis Nexis Academic Universe, <www.lexis-nexis.com>; Foreign Affairs Canada, “Canada and NTI Conclude Agreement”; Strengthening the Global Partnership, “Donor Factsheets,” <www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/Index.html>; General Accounting Office Report, GAO-04-361, “Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention Raise Concerns About Proliferation,” <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04361.pdf>, p. 22; The G8 Global Partnership: German-Russian Cooperation (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, May 15, 2004), p. 47; The G8 Global Partnership: Progress during 2004 on the UK's programmes, p. 18; Kalinina, “The Effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention;” “NZ Joins Efforts to Destroy Russia's Chemical Weapons,” New Zealand Herald, July 8, 2004, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <www.lexis-nexis.com>; “Russia to Increase Spending on Dismantling Chemical Weapons,” Associated Press, Oct. 6, 2004; Capitol Hill Press Release, Nov. 19, 2003, “Statement by Senator Richard Lugar, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute”; “Switzerland to Allocate $12 Bln for Russian Chemical Weapons Elimination,” RIA Novosti, Jan. 28, 2004.
70. Additional funding is expected after 2006 from the European Union's Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction program.
71. Project on Managing the Atom, “Russian Plutonium Disposition,” Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials Database, <www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/reducing/rpdispose.asp#_ednref25>.
72. As of Dec. 31, 2004, 231.5 metric tons of HEU had been downblended, the equivalent of 9,261 nuclear warheads eliminated. “Progress Report: US-Russian Megatons to Megawatts Program,” Dec. 31, 2004, <www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/Megatons_status.asp>.
73. Nuclear.ru, “Soglasitelnaya komissiya Kongressa SShA otkazala v finansirovanii dopolnitelnykh zakupok rossiyskogo NOU” (U.S. Congressional conference committee refuses to finance additional LEU purchases), Nov. 10, 2003, <www.nuclear.ru>.
74. See, for instance, Morten Bremer Mærli and Lars van Dassen, “Europe, Carry Your Weight,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60 (Nov./Dec. 2004).
75. If the umbrella agreement is neither ratified by the Russian parliament nor extended beyond its date of expiration, most U.S. assistance projects will be at risk.
76. In May 2003, $466 million was awarded to Washington Group International and Raytheon Technical Services to begin work on the fossil-fuel power plants. U.S. Dept. of Energy, “U.S. and Russia Take Major Steps Toward Shut Down of Last Three Weapons Reactors: Contracts Signed for Fossil-Fuel Plants,” Sept. 29, 2003, <www.energy.gov>.
77. Dept. of Energy official (name withheld by request), interview by author, Washington, DC, July 19, 2004.
78. The conference was attended by 11 countries, the European Commission, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. National Nuclear Security Administration, Press Release, Feb. 14, 2005, “Nations Gather to Help Nuclear Cities Shut Down Plutonium Production Reactors.”
79. U.S. Dept. of State, “Joint Statement by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States of America on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery,” Moscow, Jan. 14, 1994.
80. NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, “Plutonium Disposition Overview,” <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fissmat/plutdisp/puovervw.htm>.
81. For the text of the agreement, see: NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, “Text: U.S.-Russian Agreement on Management of Used Plutonium,” <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/plutdisp/98Ag.htm>. An in-depth discussion of the liability issue and possible solutions can be found in R. Douglas Brubaker and Leonard S. Spector, “Liability and Western Nonproliferation Assistance to Russia: Time for a Fresh Look?” Nonproliferation Review 10 (Spring 2003), pp. 1–39.
82. Charles Digges, “Technical Agreement for Plutonium Disposition Allowed to Lapse by US,” July 30, 2003, <www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/co-operation/30596.html>.
83. U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton made this argument on June 15, 2004, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sea Island and Beyond: Status Report On the Global Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 15, 2004, <http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2004/hrg040615a.html>.
84. The G8's Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit of April 1996 called for action on plutonium disposition and initiated the international process under which disposition options were considered, joint scientific work is being conducted, and financial commitments are being made. For information on this summit, see University of Toronto G8 Information Centre, “Nuclear Safety and Security Summit,” <www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1996moscow/index.html>.
85. Indeed, on Feb. 14, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice informed Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Pete Domenici that Washington had recently sent a proposal to Moscow to resolve the liability dispute. Mike Nartker, “Experts Praise U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security Enhancements, Say More Must Be Done,” Global Security Newswire, Feb. 25, 2005, <www.nti.org>.
86. Peter Baker and Dafna Linzer, “Policy Shifts Felt After Bolton's Departure from State Dept.,” Washington Post, June 20, 2005, p. A2.
87. “Construction cost of MOX fuel plant estimated at 29 billion rubles,” Interfax, Nov. 12, 2004; “Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials.”
88. Sources for this table include: “Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials,” <www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home.asp>; Strengthening the Global Partnership Project, “Plutonium Disposition,” <www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/ProjectAreas/PU.html>.
89. Vibropacking is an alternative to the creation of pellet fuel. Glove boxes or hot cells are used to fabricate MOX fuel rods; the fabrication process and equipment is simpler than conventional aqueous conversion processes and pellet fuel fabrication technology, according to Russian and Japanese nuclear experts. Further, Japanese Ambassador Yukiya Amano, Director General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs at the Japanese Foreign Ministry, has pointed out that the irradiation of MOX fuel in light-water reactors requires years of work, while vibropacking could be launched far sooner. Thus, Tokyo is focusing its plutonium disposition assistance in this area. “Vibropacking technology,” All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (NIIAR) Website, <www.niiar.ru/xtoengl/englisch/dost3.htm>; “American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting,” Aug. 2001, <http://www.ans.org/pubs/magazines/nn/docs/2001-8-3.pdf>; “Japanese View on the G8 Global Partnership,” statement to the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference, sponsored by the Carnegie Moscow Center and the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center), Moscow, September 19, 2003, <http://www.pircenter.org/conf2003/data/amano_e.html>.
90. The FMSF was designed to hold 50 metric tons of plutonium and 200 metric tons of HEU. In 2003, then-Minister of Atomic Energy (now Rosatom head) Aleksandr Rumyantsev announced that the FMSF would house just 25 tons of plutonium and no uranium. However, according to experts cited in a Bellona Foundation report of Dec. 2004, the facility could hold significantly more than the initial 250 tons of material. Charles Digges, “Rumyantsev letter reveals specific amounts of nuke usable material, but raises many questions,” Dec. 2, 2004, <www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/36391.html>.
91. The G8 Global Partnership: Progress during 2004 on the UK's programmes.
92. The G8 Global Partnership: Progress during 2004 on the UK's programmes. p. 21.
93. State Dept. official (name withheld by request), interview by author, Washington, DC, Dec. 8, 2004.
94. The UK-Russian Federation Closed Nuclear Cities Partnership aims to facilitate “lasting alternative civil sector employment for former nuclear weapons scientists, engineers and technicians, and [support] the longterm economic viability of the closed nuclear cities.” The G8 Global Partnership: Progress during 2004 on the UK's programmes.
95. This is particularly true of the HEU in Kharkiv, Ukraine. The Ukrainians appear willing to transfer the material to a country other than Russia, but the United States is unlikely to accept the material, and no other country has offered an alternative solution.
96. DOE official (name withheld by request), interview by author, Washington, DC, Jan. 6, 2005. For more information on RTGs, see “Increasing International Attention Paid to RTGs in Russian Arctic,” NIS Export Control Observer, May 2004, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/pdfs/ob_0405e.pdf>, p. 8; and Rashid Alimov, “Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators,” Bellona Working Paper, Nov. 24, 2003, <www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/northern_fleet/incidents/31772.html>.