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Abstract
Russian naval nuclear fuel and reactors pose both proliferation and environmental threats, ranging from the possible theft of highly enriched uranium fuel to the radioactive contamination of the environment, whether due to accident, neglect, or sabotage. Current conditions at Russian naval bases, together with a history of accidents and incidents involving Russia's nuclear fleet, make a convincing case for the large-scale assistance that the G8 is now providing to improve the safety and security of Russian naval reactors and fuel. However, virtually no data has been released to allow accurate, reliable, and independent analysis of reactor and fuel properties, risking misguided international efforts to assist in the areas of nuclear cleanup, nonproliferation, and security. This article identifies and assesses relevant properties and developments related to reactor and fuel design, provides a comprehensive presentation of Russian nuclear naval technologies, and examines technological trends in the context of proliferation and environmental security.
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank the former director of the Norwegian Nuclear Inspectorate, Knut Gussgard, for his inspiration in working with these issues. This article has also benefited from fruitful discussions with Povl Ølgaard, Risoe Laboratories, Denmark, who has helped us avoid some of the worst pitfalls thanks to his large effort as part of a project initiated by Nordic Research on Nuclear Safety on the design of Russian marine reactors. Cristina Chuen, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, made valuable suggestions in the final phase to focus the final policy recommendations based on her in-depth knowledge of international programs in the naval field in Russia, in addition to suggesting a striking title. However, responsibility for the final product rests solely with the authors. The article was supported by grants from the Norwegian Research Council, the Fulbright Foundation, Nordic Research on Nuclear Safety, and the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority.
Notes
1. Oleg Bukharin and William Potter, “Potatoes were Guarded Better,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51 (May/June 1995), p. 47. The authors assume that about 12 kilograms (kg) of weapons-grade uranium would be needed to produce an implosion-type nuclear device and that as much as 300 kg of U-235 is available in the reactor cores. For additional information on this topic, see Morten Bremer Mærli, “Crude Nukes on the Loose? Preventing Nuclear Terrorism by Means of Optimum Nuclear Husbandry, Transparency, and Non-Intrusive Fissile Material Verification,” PhD dissertation, University of Oslo, 2004, <www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/664.pdf%>.
2. For additional information on the Global Partnership assistance program, see Cristina Chuen, “The G8 Global Partnership: Progress and Prospects,” in this issue of the Nonproliferation Review.
3. Major initiatives include the G8 initiative, as seen in various bilateral undertakings of the G8 countries, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development's Northern Dimension Environmental Fund (NDEP) and other noteworthy bilateral initiatives, as for example in the Nordic countries.
4. Aleksei Yablokov, Facts and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to the Territory of the Russian Federation (Moscow: Office of the President of the Russian Federation, 1993). A sensation at the time of presentation, this publication provided new information on, among other things, the dumping of reactors and waste in the Kara Sea north of the Kola Peninsula in northwest Russia.
5. A criticality accident happens when a nuclear chain reaction accidentally occurs in fissile material. This releases highly dangerous radiation to the surroundings. The Chernobyl accident of 1986 was a criticality accident, or power excursion, localized to one part of the reactor core. The amount of radioactivity released is highly dependent on the nature of the accident (type and amount of fissile material, material geometry, properties of surrounding material, etc.).
6. One relevant example is Ma Chunyan and Frank von Hippel, “Ending the Production of Highly Enriched Uranium for Naval Reactors,” Nonproliferation Review 8 (Spring 2001), pp. 86–101, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol08/81/81mahip.pdf>.
7. To certain aspiring states, a nuclear submarine fleet is persistently attractive. There are now rumors that India has ambitions for a nuclear submarine fleet from which nuclear-armed cruise missiles could be launched. See T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj and Clifford Singer, “Going Global: India Aims for a Credible Nuclear Doctrine,” Jane's Intelligence Review (Feb. 2001), p. 48. The proliferation of naval technology and the drive for new HEU markets that may lie outside international control may be further boosted by the development and export of civilian naval reactor applications.
8. V. Kotcher, et al., Russkie podlodki (yadernye) – pervoe pokalenie (St. Petersburg: Rubin Institute, 1996), p. 31.
9. V. Demyanovskiy, et al., Podvodnyi shchit SSSR–Chast 1–Atomnye mnogotselevye podvodnye lodki (Rybnisk: Star, 2003), p. 2. In this process, parts of the Russian nuclear military-industrial complex emerged, as, for example, NIKIET in late 1952.
10. Redundancy might be a relevant explanation, in view of the lack of testing and prototypes; furthermore, speed might have been an issue. An unpublished paper (Ole Reistad, “Accidents and Incidents with Russian Nuclear Submarines 1958–2004,” 2004), analyzes Russia's operational experience with submarines. Preliminary results indicate that in the two decades from 1960 to 1980 (with predominantly first-generation submarines), there were over 80 incidents involving Russian nuclear submarines, mostly due to leakages or reactor failures. This might have been a consequence of the lack of time: The head start enjoyed by the United States runs like a red thread through many Russian publications on submarine warfare and operational experiences.
11. Morten Bremer Mærli, Sigurd Børresen, Knut Gussgard, Steinar Høibråten, and Matylda M. Sobieska, “Criticality Considerations on Russian Ship Reactors and Spent Nuclear Fuel,” StrålevernRapport 1998:7 (Oslo: Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, 1998).
12. Georgii Gladkov, “Building Reactor Assemblies for Submarines,” Atomnaya Energiya 73 (Oct. 1992), p. 319.
13. Gladkov, Istoriya sozdaniya, p. 16. The notation AM had already been reserved for the graphite-moderated reactor type, which was also evaluated as a basis for submarine propulsion; VM-A indicates that this was the first water-moderated reactor to be developed, since BM had already been chosen for another project (the Russian alphabet begins A, B, V). In this article, the Russian research organization NIKIET thoroughly describes the development of the first submarine reactor.
14. Since the NATO terms are often used also in Russian publications, they will primarily be used here.
15. Gladkov, Istoriya sozdaniya, p. 82.
16. The first generation of Soviet submarines operated at limited range from their home bases. It was not until some time between Feb. 2 and March 26, 1966 that the first Soviet nuclear submarine crossed the equator in the Atlantic; it then continued south of South America through the Drake Passage to the Pacific Ocean, where it joined the Soviet Pacific Fleet (See Kotcher, Russkie podlodki, p. 82). Operating histories are discussed in greater detail in Reistad, “Accidents and Incidents,” Unpublished 2005.
17. A reactor model—presumably of an early submarine reactor—at the town museum of Severodvinsk confirms this design feature, since it has both the inlet and outlet pipes above the top of the core.
18. The environmental situation in the Russian Far East at sites with decommissioned submarines is summarized in the Nuclear Threat Initiative's (NTI's) NIS Nuclear and Missile Database. See “Pavlovsk Bay,” < www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/naval/nucflt/pacflt/pavlovsk.htm>.
19. An interesting aspect is that the path of the primary coolant had to be changed, from going into the reactor and downwards along the central part, then upwards again along the peripheral parts of the reactor, in the middle of the development effort. The original plan had the flow in the opposite direction; this was changed when it was realized that the highest fuel temperatures were in the middle of the reactor. Gladkov, Istoriya sozdaniya, p. 31.
20. An interesting aspect is that the path of the primary coolant had to be changed, from going into the reactor and downwards along the central part, then upwards again along the peripheral parts of the reactor, in the middle of the development effort. The original plan had the flow in the opposite direction; this was changed when it was realized that the highest fuel temperatures were in the middle of the reactor. Gladkov, Istoriya sozdaniya, p. 17.
21. The most recent radiation incident related to decommissioned submarines occurred in 2003 at Gremikha, where November-class submarines have been stored. Gremikha staff handling solid radioactive waste from submarine reactors—including safety rods and control rods—were sickened by exposure to high levels of radiation. Rashid Alimov, “Minatom Admits Workers Were Irradiated at Gremikha Naval Base,” Bellona Website, Sept. 24, 2003, <www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/northern_fleet/decommissioning/31241.html>.
22. Vladimir A. Kuznesov, Marine Nuclear Power Plant: A Textbook (Leningrad: Sudostroenie, 1989), p. 40.
23. To avoid a criticality accident, a beam was placed above the lid to prevent it from being lifted too high. However, in one case the beam had been placed too high up, and in the other the beam had not been fixed properly. In both cases the lid and the control rods were lifted too far up, and the reactors went critical.
24. V. V. Elatomtsev, Nikolai Khlopkin, Vitaly Lystsov, Boris Pologikh, Yuri Sivintsev, A. Timonin, and A. Zotov, Nuclear Safety Assessment of Stored Afloat Non-Defuelled Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines (Moscow: RCC Kurchatov Institute, 1997), p. 20.
25. Andrei Gagarinski, Viktor Ignatiev, and Lennart Devell, “Design and Properties of Marine Reactors and Associated R&D,” Studsvik Report, Studsvik/ES/-96/29, 1996, p. 22. An exception is France, which uses low-enriched uranium (LEU) in its nuclear-powered submarines.
26. International Atomic Energy Agency, Predicted Radionuclide Release From Marine Reactors Dumped in the Kara Sea, Report of the Source Term Working Group of the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project (IASAP), IAEA TecDoc-938, April 1997, p. 22. All IAEA assessments of design information on Russian PWR submarine reactors were based on one Russian source: Yuri Sivintsev, employed with the Kurchatov Institute at that time.
27. Yaderny Kontroll (Spring 1996), p. 16. The amount of U-235 is here said to be 283.3 grams (g), of an overall uranium content of 1,448.9 g, enrichment 19.9 percent. Povl L. Ølgaard, Decommissioning of Nuclear Naval Ships (Denmark: Risø Laboratories, 1993), p. 10. This is also comparable with data on earlier U.S. submarines as stated in Viking Olver Eriksen, Sunken Nuclear Submarines–A Threat to the Environment (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1990), p. 48. As with the development of the A-bomb, the heavy espionage undertaken by the Soviet Union to catch up with the United States in the area of nuclear submarines is a subject in its own right. In this context, similar vessel, reactor, and fuel properties are of considerable interest.
28. P. M. Rubtsov and P. A. Ruzhansky, “Radiation Characteristic Estimation of Irradiated Fuel in Reactors of Nuclear Submarine and Ice-breaker ‘Lenin’ Dumped near Novaya Zemlya Archipelago,” unpublished draft of a publication by the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of the Russian Federation, presented to the IASAP expert group on inventory and source term analysis in 1996 (see endnote 26), p. 14.
29. Take, for example, the impact assessment carried out by Norwegian authorities after the sinking of the K-159. The Russian government had informed Norway that the submarine in its two reactors contained a total of 800 kg of spent fuel. This was, however, not specified any further, which made it difficult to complete a realistic impact assessment.
30. The most relevant analysis of the amount of fissile material in Russian submarine fuel is Ole Reistad and Knut Gussgard, “An Estimate of the Amount of 235U, 239Pu and the Material Attractiveness in Naval Irradiated Nuclear Fuel from the First and Second Generation of Russian Submarines”, Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 41st Meeting, New Orleans, July 2000. For low-enriched fuel (5 percent and 7.5 percent), a substantial production of plutonium (Pu), in comparison to the other cases, may be observed. Calculations show that the K-effective (effective neutron multiplication factor) goes below 1 at about the same time that the consumption rate of Pu exceeds the production rate. In cases where the fuel is enriched to 10 percent, less than 2 kg of Pu-239 is produced in the core with an initial load of 50 kg U-235. These analyses should, of course, be reviewed and extended, in particular for storage facilities with large amounts of naval fuel of early design, taking actual burn-up histories into account, as more and more information on Russian naval reactor systems and fuel becomes available.
31. Gladkov, Istoriya sozdaniya, p. 31.
32. Gladkov, Istoriya sozdaniya, p. 28.
33. Aagaard, “Initial grounds for realization”, p. 9. The same figure was presented at the NATO Advanced Workshop in Moscow, Sept. 22–24, 2004, by Nikolai Melnikov, Kola Science Center, in his presentation, “Concept and Safety Evaluation of Long-Term Storage of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel in the North-Western Russia.” Others have suggested 225 to 270 per reactor for the first generation; however, without prior justification or any discussion of this hypothesis. See Catriona Watson, Eric Hansford, and C. Crimp, “Japanese-Funded Projects at Zvezda, Set in the Context of the Overall Russian Submarine Decommissioning Program” in Proceedings of the International Seminar on Ecological Problems of Nuclear Powered Submarines Decommissioning, Severodvinsk, 2001, pp. 64–66, and Ashot Sarkisov, “Results of Investigations on ‘Environment Security Implications of Decommissioned Russian Nuclear Powered Submarines’ Carried out at the First Stage of the Advanced Technology Research Foundation (ATRP-R) Project” in Proceedings of the International Seminar on Ecological Problems of Nuclear Powered Submarines Decommissioning, Severodvinsk, 2001, pp. 107–10.
34. IAEA TecDoc-938, p. 18.
35. IAEA TecDoc-938, p. 11; stainless steel as an additional cladding material has been proposed by Sivintsev. See also, Andreas Aagaard, “Initial grounds for realization of program for use of SD-10 dry dock for removing the spent nuclear fuel and converting the nuclear submarines–A working paper,” (unpublished, 1999), p. 9. Aagaard claims that also zirconium (Zr) has been in limited use. We therefore have to assume that also other fuel matrixes besides uranium-aluminum (UAl) alloy have been tried out at an early stage. As discussed later, a design that includes Zr cladding may be preferred in fuel materials in the second and subsequent generations.
36. The information on the OK-150 reactor is primarily based on Nikolai Khlopkin, Boris Pologikh, Yuri Sivintsev, and Vladimir Shmelev, “Preliminary Study of Sea Radioactive Contamination from Dumped Nuclear Reactors,” Russian Research Center, Kurchatov Institute, Report No. 31/1-1949-93, 1993. Further information on the operating parameters may be found in Igor Afrikantov, N. M. Mordvisov, P. D. Novikov, Boris Pologikh, A.K. Sledzyuk, Nikolai Khlopkin, and N. M. Tsarev, “Operating Experience with the Nuclear Propulsion Plant on the Icebreaker Lenin,” Soviet Atomic Energy 17 (1965), pp. 1094–1104, and Anatoly Alexandrov, et al., “The Atomic Icebreaker Lenin,” in United Nations, Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 8, Part 1, Geneva , pp. 204–19.
37. According to these data, the overall fuel density in the Lenin reactor was 8.51 grams per cubic centimeter (g/cm3), 14.9 percent less than the reported value as stated earlier. The reason for this discrepancy is unknown, but probably due to inaccuracies in the original data set.
38. In 2002, the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow suggested that the Norwegian authorities could perform a search for the Lenin reactor in the Kara Sea. An agreement was duly signed; however, when the Russian Navy failed to grant the necessary special permission, the exploratory cruise had to be cancelled just before the search was initiated.
39. Lepse houses 639 damaged spent fuel assemblies stored in different storage elements and is so highly contaminated that the whole vessel is considered to be radioactive waste. After a series of failed attempts to find a solution, the Lepse Committee was established in 1998 with the participation of some donor countries, whereupon this specific problem was declared as practically solved. Six years later, the work has yet to begin, and the Lepse Committee remains unable to resolve the differences between the project manager, the French company SGN, and the recipient of international assistance on the Russian side, the Murmansk Shipping Company.
40. Kotcher, Russkie podlodki, p. 31.
41. Demyanovskiy, et al., Podvodnyi shchit, p. 18. This change was possible due to a substantial reorganization of the reactor system. The emphasis was put on lighter equipment. Compared with the first generation, we note overall greater power levels and new propulsion systems, including the use of only one shaft.
42. There seems to be a logical chain of letters in the various notations, starting with the letter ‘A’ or number ‘l’ and continuing upwards as the different configurations are established.
43. V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky, Voyenno-Morskoy Flot SSSR 1945–1991 (St. Petersburg: Istoricheskoye Morskoye Obshchestvo, 1996), p. 412.
44. Lev Giltsov, Nicolai Mormoul, and Leonid Ossipenko, La dramatique histoire des sous-marins nucléaires soviétiques (Paris: Robert Lafont, 1992), p. 85. One of the staff members perished during the operation.
45. In Kotcher, Russkie podlodki, the operating histories for all first-generation submarines are described down to operating hours and distance traveled.
46. Aaagard, “Initial grounds for realization,” p. 9.
47. Bukharin and Potter, “Potatoes Were Guarded Better,” pp. 46–50, footnote 1.
48. Sergei Zhavoronkin, Head of Bellona's Murmansk office, personal communication with author, Murmansk, Jan. 11, 2004.
49. Alexander M. Dimitriev, Anatoli C. Diakov, Jungmin Kang, Alexey M. Shuvayev, and Frank N. von Hippel, “Feasibility of Converting Russian Icebreaker Reactors from HEU to LEU Fuel,” submitted for publication in Science and Global Security (Jan. 24, 2005), p. 8.
50. Joshua Handler, “Russian Naval Reactor Characteristics” (Unpublished paper, Dec. 29, 1995), p. 9.
51. This part is primarily based on V. I. Makarov, Boris Pologikh, Nikolai Khlopkin, F. M. Mitenkov, Y. K. Panov, V. I. Polunichev, and O. A. Yakovlev, “Experience in Building and Operating Reactor Systems for Civilian Ships,” Atomic Energy 89 (1996), pp. 691–700.
52. In the OK-900 plant, the number of loops in the primary circuit was increased from two to four. Further, the main cooling pumps and steam generators were connected to the reactor tank by a pipe-inside-pipe load-bearing connection, which greatly reduced the length of the pipes in each loop. New pressurizers were introduced in which reactor pressure was regulated by varying the gas pressure above the water surface of the pressurizer through the use of an external compressed gas source. Both the inlet tubes to and the outlet tubes from the reactor tank were connected to the tank at the top, thus making it impossible for the tank to be drained because of operator error, as happened on the Lenin in 1966. Since the water in the secondary circuit gets contaminated by seawater, stainless steel cannot be used for construction of the steam generator if corrosion leaks are to be avoided. For this reason, the tubing of the steam generators and of the secondary system was made of a corrosion-resistant alloy. This should allow a service life of 50,000–60,000 hours. If a rupture should occur in the steam generator, the circulation loop is switched off from the secondary circuit, not from the primary circuit.
53. Dmetriev, Diakov, Kang et al., “Feasibility of Coverting Russian Icebreaker Reactors,” fig 6B.
54. The figures for enrichment and amount of fuel were presented in Nikolai Melnikov, “Concept and Safety Evaluation of Long-Term Storage of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel in the North-Western Russia,” presentation at the NATO Advanced Workshop, Moscow, September 22–24, 2004.
55. Vladimir Volkov, chief engineer, Murmansk Shipping Company, personal communication with author, Murmansk, Russian Federation, Feb. 20, 1997.
56. The origin of this fuel is unclear as different authors disagree on the base from which the fuel was stolen—both Zapadnaya Litsa and Andreeva Bay have been suggested, though the latter probably had no fresh fuel.
57. Demyanovskiy, et al., Podvodnyi shchit, p. 35.
58. Yuri Apalkov, Podvodnye lodki, Tom 1, Chast 2, “Mnogotselevye PL i PL spetsnaznacheniya,” (St. Petersburg: Galea Print, 2003), p. 38. For example, 20 vessels of the Akula-class (Bars) should have been completed by now; however, because of financial constraints, two vessels remain under construction in Komsomolsk upon Amur.
59. The Soviet submarine Komsomolets was the only vessel constructed in the Mike class. Komsomolets sank in the Norwegian Sea on April 7, 1989. The accident and relevant risk assessments are discussed in a report by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) from 1995. The report was reprinted in 2003. See Steinar Høibråten, Are Haugan, and Per Thoresen, “The environmental impact of the sunken submarine Komsomolets,” FFI/RAPPORT-2003/02523, Oct. 2003. A special feature of the Typhoon class is that it is provided with two parallel pressure hulls, each with a reactor and a shaft, with the missile launching tubes placed between the two hulls. The Sierra and Akula classes were built with titanium hulls.
60. Mærli, “Crude Nukes on the Loose?” p. 168.
61. Kuzin and Nikolsky, Voyenno-Morskoy Flot SSSR 1945–1991, p. 412.
62. Handler, “Russian Naval Reactor Characteristics,” p. 9.
63. There seems to be some confusion in the various sources as to the power level of this reactor. In Jane's Fighting Ships 2003–2004 (106th edition, 2003, p. 590), the power level is claimed to be 150 MW/reactor.
64. Ashot Sarkisov, “Utilization of Russian Nuclear Submarines: Contents of the Problem, Review of the Actual Status, Analysis of the Related Risks and International Cooperation,” in Ashot Sarkisov and Leo LeSage, Remaining Issues in the Decommissioning of Nuclear Powered Vessels (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), pp. 9–26.
65. U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet States, presentation by William C. Potter, March 13, 1996, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/senoral.htm>.
66. Bukharin and Potter, “Potatoes Were Guarded Better,” p. 48.
67. Høibråten, Haugan, and Thoresen, “The environmental impact of the sunken submarine Komsomolets,” p. 10.
68. Two hundred kilograms of U-235 is the amount of U-235 in modern U.S. submarine reactors, although enrichment levels in this case are above 90 percent.
69. This information was obtained from Information of Safety of Icebreaker-Transport Lighter/Containership with Nuclear Propulsion Plant Sevmorput, an unpublished, undated safety report handed over to the Norwegian government in connection with a port visit in 1991, and Kuznesov, Marine Nuclear Power Plant.
70. For an official update on the progress on this effort, information is available at <www.energetica.ru>.
71. Vladimir Kuznetsov, Alexey Yablokov, Ilya Kolton, Yevgeney Simonov, Vladimir Desyatov, Igor Forofontov, and Alexandr Nikitin, Floating Nuclear Power Plants in Russia: A Threat to the Arctic, World Oceans and Non-Proliferation Treaty (Moscow: Rakurs, 2004). The Russian government has no resources available for this kind of investment; however, the current strategy is said to involve engaging foreign investment in the project to enable further development.
72. Reistad and Gussgard, “An Estimate of the Amount of 235U,” Mærli et al., “Criticality Considerations.”
73. Volkov, personal communication with author.
74. Volkov, personal communication with author. It was also claimed that 37–55 is the standard number of fuel elements in each assembly for the Russian icebreakers.
75. Volkov, personal communication with author. It was also claimed that 37–55 is the standard number of fuel elements in each assembly for the Russian icebreakers.
76. Norwegian project manager Bjørn Borgaas, personal communication with author, Oslo, Feb. 10, 2005.
77. Mærli, “Crude Nukes,” p. 169.
78. Mærli, et al., “Criticality Considerations,” p. 47.
79. Liquid-metal coolant was considered to have several advantages. The reactor system is more compact than pressurized water reactors since it needs no moderator. Nor is a heavy pressure vessel needed; the system operates at higher temperatures and therefore has a higher thermal efficiency. The use of an intermediate reactor makes xenon poisoning less a problem; xenon production complicates the control of the reactor. Refueling is faster since the core is removed in one operation. However, there are also disadvantages. Since the melting point of the coolant is above room temperature, the primary system must be heated at all times for the coolant to remain liquid. If not, the coolant will solidify, and cooling will be interrupted. The liquid-metal coolant will gradually oxidize, and the oxides must be removed regularly to avoid blockage of the coolant flow through the core. Another issue of more recent concern has now come up, as the Mayak reprocessing plant may be unable to reprocess this type of fuel.
80. The last operating LMC submarine, K-123, was in active service until 1996.
81. The designation VT-1 has been used for this reactor type; however, this report follows the notation given in Kotcher, Podvodnye lodki, using ‘RM-1’ for this reactor type.
82. The pressure in the primary circuit built up to 70 atmospheres. Because the pressure relief system did not work, the high pressure caused a rupture of the primary circuit piping, and two tons of liquid-metal coolant flowed out into the reactor compartment, where it solidified. Leakage of the reactor tank coolant was prevented by closing the isolation valves. The coolant in the tank later solidified. At the time of the accident, the reactor had been in operation for only 10 percent of its lifetime. It was not possible to re-melt the coolant and remove the fuel.
83. Currently, decay heat is about 2 kilowatts (kW), and the coolant is frozen. This form of storage was not intended for long-term use. If the storage period lasts long enough, there is a risk that water will penetrate through the steel tank and into the core through porosity formed during the solidification of the lead-bismuth (Pb-Bi) coolant, possibly causing the core to go critical. At present, six unloaded cores are stored in such wells in Gremikha on the Kola Peninsula. Three of the cores remain in submarines.
84. Mohini Rawool-Sullivan, Paul D. Moskowitz, and Ludmila Shelenkova, “Technical and Proliferation-Related Aspects of the Dismantlement of Russian Alfa-Class Nuclear Submarines,” Nonproliferation Review 9 (Spring 2002), p. 165, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/91/91mosk.pdf>.
85. Kuzin and Nikolsky, Voyenno-Morskoy Flot SSSR 1945–1991, p. 414.
86. Alexander V. Pavlov, Warships of the USSR and Russia 1945–1995 (London: Chatham Publishing, 1997), and V. Sazonov, M. Bugreev, A. Dedul, Aleksey Zabudko, Dmitrii Pankratov, Georgy Toshinsky, V. Chitaikin, V. Stepanov, M. Vakhrushin, and Stanislav Verkhovodko, “Current Problems of Utilization of Nuclear Submarines with Liquid Metal Coolant,” in Sarkisov and LeSage, Remaining Issues, pp. 349–355.
87. Sviatoslav Ignatiev and Dimitrii Pankratov, “Defueling and Storage of Spent Fuel of Russian Submarine Reactors with Lead-Bismuth Coolant: Status and Problems,” lecture at NKS Workshop on Naval Reactor Source Term Analysis, Lillestrøm, Norway, April 25, 2003.
88. IAEA TecDoc-938, p. 16.
89. Though Rosatom is pushing the issue of metal-cooled reactors at the moment, the prospects for actually having something happen on the ground is nevertheless gloomy, towing to the lack of available technology and Russian will to allocate its own resources for a solution to the problem. For more comments, see Ole Reistad, “Naval Nuclear Clean-Up in Northwest Russia: Lessons Learned and a Roadmap to Completion,” SGP Issue Brief, Nov. 2004, p. 7, <www.sgpproject.org/publications/publications/SGPIssueBrief/Reistad.pdf>.
90. Vyacheslav Ruksha, head of the Russian Federal Agency for Marine and River Transport and former head of Murmansk Shipping Company, has stated that the design of the next generation of nuclear-powered icebreakers is to begin in 2005, with construction of the first vessels to be completed in 2015. Lev Frolov, “Rossiiskii sudprom pristupit k proektirovaniu atomnogo ledokola novogo pokalenia v 2005 godu,” ITAR-TASS, Oct. 21, 2004.
91. The Nordic Dimension Environmental Program (NDEP) is a multilateral funding and project implementation mechanism within the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).