MAKING HISTORICAL SURVEYS OF STATES’ NUCLEAR AMBITIONS

Abstract

In signalling its wish to participate in the Additional Protocol at an early stage, Sweden took several steps at the national level long before it actually ratified the protocol in May 2004. In 1998, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) initiated a project to conduct a historical survey of Swedish nuclear weapons research for the period 1945–72. Sweden thus took an important step for the sake of transparency. SKI worked out a general model of how a nationally based survey could be designed, and gradually other states approached SKI in order to learn more about the methods and goals of the historical surveys. In 2002, a cooperative project was initiated between Sweden and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Finland joined the cooperative effort, and it thus became a dialogue and project carried out by five neighboring states to make national surveys. This article presents summaries of the national reports from Sweden and the Baltic states.

Keywords:

• Baltic Sea
• Nuclear
• Additional Protocol
• Sweden
• Latvia
• Lithuania
• Estonia
• Historical survey

Notes

1. International Atolic Energy Agency (INEA), Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFIRC/540, September 1997.

2. The State is obliged to provide the IAEA with, for example, information on research and development activities regarding transformation/enrichment of nuclear material, production of nuclear fuel, reactors, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, relevant information on control of nuclear material listed by the IAEA, and of all buildings on each site. Information shall also specify the location and operational status of equipment such as zirconium tubes and reactor control rods, and the location, operational status, and estimated annual production capacity of facilities such as uranium mines, concentration plants, and thorium concentration plants. Information regarding quantities, uses, and locations of nuclear material are exempted from safeguards pursuant to Article 36 (b) and 37 of the Safeguards Agreement. Information regarding export and import of specific facilities and non-nuclear material shall also be delivered to the IAEA, as well as general plans for the succeeding ten-year period relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle (including planned nuclear fuel cycle–related research and development activities).

3. It is important to note that the Additional Protocol does not compel state parties to the NPT to carry out such historical reviews. Nevertheless, the Additional Protocol stipulates that member states have an obligation to give an account of current activities and to furnish information about approved future activities relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle (including planned nuclear fuel cycle–related research and development activities). However, the SKI has gone a step further to include also what took place in the past, and to report openly on Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945.

4. The project, its aims, and the analysis model and pedagogical methodology are described in Thomas Jonter, Making a Historical Survey of a State′s Nuclear Ambitions, Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) Report 2003:18, March 2003; Thomas Jonter, Sverige, USA och kärnenergin. Framväxten av en svensk kärnämneskontroll 1945–1995 [Sweden, USA and nuclear energy. The emergence of Swedish nuclear materials control 1945–1995], SKI Report 99:21, May 1999; Thomas Jonter, Sweden and the Bomb. The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1972, SKI Report 01:33, Sept. 2001; Thomas Jonter, Nuclear Weapons Research in Sweden. Co-operation Between Civilian and Military Research, 1947–1972, SKI Report 02:18, May 2002.

5. The Sillamäe uranium plant in Estonia is, however, an exception since the existing archive contains all the activities that took place there during the Cold War. The archive was not transported to Russia after the Estonian liberation.

6. See, for example, Morten Bremer Maerli, Atomterrorisme (Oslo, Norway: Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt, 1999).

7. Arno Ahosniemi, Jotta Suomessa voitaisiin huoletta kulkea. Ydinaseiden ja ydinpolttoainekysymyksen seuranta Suomessa kylmän sodan aikana, STUK-YTO-TR 201/Maaliskuu 2004 (Helsinki: The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, 2004). The Finnish historical survey of a nonproliferation policy for nuclear weapons, national nuclear research, and Finland's plans to establish its own nuclear fuel production cover the period 1945–75. The research was completed at the University of Helsinki (Dept. of Social Science History/Political History).

8. Lars van Dassen argues that Finnish nonproliferation policy reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) in case of a threat to Soviet or Finnish security. Accordingly, the Finnish proposal for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone in 1963 and Finnish nuclear nonproliferation policy in general were used as an instrument of President Kekkonen's—and naturally Finland's—policy of neutrality. Lars van Dassen, Finland and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Evolution and Cultivation of a Norm, SKI Report 98:15, March 1998.

9. Jonter, Sverige, USA och kärnenergin, p. 23.

10. The published reports are: Jonter, Sverige, USA och kärnenergin; Jonter, Sweden and the Bomb; Jonter, Nuclear Weapons Research in Sweden; Ello Maremäe, Hain Tankler, Henno Putnik, and Iige Maalmann, eds., Historical Survey of Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Estonia, 1946–1995 (Tallinn: Estonian Radiation Protection Centre, Dec. 2003); Illona Ekmane, Ralfs Spade, Zanda Sproge, and Dace Satrovska, Historical Survey of Nuclear Energy Activities in Latvia (Riga: Latvian Radiation Safety Centre, Aug. 2003); Lina Davulienė, Benediktas Cėsna, and Kostas Aliulis, Lithuania′s Nuclear Past: A Historical Survey (Kaunas: Lithuanian Energy Institute, 2004).

11. See, for example, Commission on Neutrality Policy, Ingrid Tersman and Hans Zettermark, trans., Had there Been a War: Preparations for the Reception of Military Assistance 1949–1969, Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU) report 1994:11, 1994; Inquiry on Security Policy, Rolf Ekéus, special investigator, Peace and security : Swedish security policy 1969–89, abridged version and translation of SOU report 2002:108, 2002.

12. In Sweden, an article in the magazine Ny Teknik in the mid-1980s gave rise to intense discussion since the author, Christer Larsson, stated that the Swedish public, parliament, and even certain members of the cabinet had been deceived by an inner circle of decisionmakers. According to Larsson, this inner circle, composed of ministers, senior officers, and scientists, conducted a secret nuclear weapons program covering the full spectrum of preparations. See Christer Larsson, “Historien om en svensk atombomb 1945–1972” [History of the Sweden Atom Bomb 1945–1972] Ny Teknik No. 3, 1985. As a consequence, the government commissioned an inquiry, which published a report, Swedish Ministry of Defense, Svensk kärnvapenforskning 1945–1972 [Swedish Nuclear Weapons Research 1945–1972], in 1987. The report concluded that the research carried out never overstepped the limits imposed by parliament and the government. In Nov. 1994, the Swedish nuclear weapons plans were the subject of an article in the Washington Post, which stated that Sweden's will to remain a non-nuclear-weapon state was questioned since parts of the ambitious research program were still in operation. See Steve Coll, “Neutral Sweden Quietly Keeps Nuclear Option Open,” Washington Post, Nov. 25, 1994, p. A1.

13. Gunnar Skogmar, De nya malmfälten. Det svenska uranet och inledningen till efterkrigstidens neutralitetspolitik [The new ore fields. Swedish uranium and the introduction of the post-war neutrality policy], Sweden Under the Cold War research program, Arbetsrapport No. 3, University of Gothenburg, Dept. of Political Science, 1997.

14. Swedish National Defence Research Institute, Försvarets forskningsanstalt (FOA), “Överenskommelse” (Agreement), H 129, 30, Oct. 30, 1950.

15. FOA, outgoing documents B IV, Vol. 4, H 35:2, 1948.

16. It was estimated that it would take two years to set up the mining and production operation, five to ten years to produce 500 to 1,000 tonnes of uranium at a production capacity of 100 tonnes per year, and one year to produce bombs ready for use.

17. FOA, “Preliminär utredning av betingelserna för framställning av atombomber i Sverige” [A preliminary inquiry into the conditions for the future of atomic weapons in Sweden], H 4011-2092, March 5, 1953.

18. Jonter, Nuclear Weapons Research in Sweden, pp. 20–21.

19. It is interesting to note that Israel was considering the same approach. During the 1950s, Norway and Israel were negotiating the sale of heavy water for the Israeli Dimona reactor. The agreement signed in 1959 meant that a big step had been taken toward producing Israeli nuclear weapons. See Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 1, 33–34, 60–62, 83, 87.

20. The Swedish Defense Staff, Alltjämt starkt försva. ÖB-förslaget 1954 (ÖB 54), [Strong Defence Preserved. The Supreme Commander's proposal 1954 (ÖB 54)], Kontakt med krigsmakten 1954:9–10, 1954.

21. Torsten Magnusson, “Utredning av betingelserna för framställning av atomvapen i Sverige” [Inquiry into the conditions for the future of atomic weapons in Sweden], FOA 87-H 163:1–21A, Nov. 25, 1955.

22. Up to summer 1955 the expectation was that the bombs would have to contain at least 10 kg of plutonium or 18 kg of U-235. At the Geneva conference, certain calculations were released concerning the critical mass of a device, which meant that the Swedish National Defence Research Institute's calculations could be heavily revised.

23. Jonter, Sweden and the Bomb, p. 47. See also Swedish Ministry of Defense, Svensk kärnvapenforskning 1945–1972, pp. 50–51. For studies of manufacture of U-235, see Vilhelm Nordström, “Gasdiffusionsanläggning” [Building gas diffusion], H-pärm II, 171–260, Direktionsarkivet (DA), Feb. 11, 1955.

24. Stephen Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 41.

25. Meyer did not investigate Swedish expertise himself; instead he bases his work on a 1972 paper by Jerome Garris, which in turn was not based on what FOA was doing but on open sources. See Jerome Henry Garris, Sweden and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, paper of the Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, 1972; Ibid., p. 207, footnote 3.

26. Lennart Berns, “A 36 – SAABs atombombare avslöjad” [The A36 – SAAB's nuclear bomber unveiled], Flygrevyn No. 4, 1991.

27. Jonter, Sweden and the Bomb, pp. 40–42.

28. Harry Brynielsson, “ Utvecklingen av svenska tungvattenreaktorer 1950–1970,” Daedalus (1989/90), p. 211. See also AB Atomenergi, “The Ågesta Nuclear Power Station, Staff report, 1964.”

29. Jonter, Nuclear Weapons Research in Sweden, pp. 19–25. The discontinuation of these reactors must also be seen in the context that Swedish heavy water technology was abandoned in favor of light water technology at the end of 1960s. These light water reactors were loaded with enriched uranium from the United States.

30. FOA, “Forskningsprogram för framtagande av underlag för konstruktion av atomladdningar” [Research program for the production of basic information for the design of atomic explosive devices], H 4041-2092, July 4, 1958.

31. FOA, “Forskningsprogram avseende skydd och försvar mot atomvapen” [Research program concerning protection and defense against atomic weapons], H 4040-2092, July 4, 1958.

32. Swedish Riksdag, Law on Radiation Protection, Bill 1958:110; SU B 53; rskr. B 83.

33. For a detailed discussion and analysis of the various lines of argument in the debate that followed, see Per Ahlmark, Den svenska atomvapendebatten (Stockholm: Aldus/Bonnier, 1965).

34. Neutralitet, Försvar, Atomvapen—rapport till Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsen [Neutrality, defense, and atomic weapons—report to the Social Democratic Party Committee] (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1960).

35. Swedish Ministry of Defense, Svensk kärnvapenforskning 1945–1972.

36. In Nov. 1959, AE replied to the Swedish National Defence Research Institute and described how and in what order the investigation work should be done. FOA, H 4067-2092, Nov. 20, 1959. The Swedish National Defence Research Institute accepted AE's proposed approach. FOA, H 4071-2092, Nov. 26, 1959.

37. “Rapport över etapp 3 av utredningsuppdrag beträffande reaktorer för produktion av plutonium av vapenkvalitet” [Report on stage 3 of study assignment concerning reactors for the production of weapons grade plutonium], in Svensk kärnvapenforskning 1945–1972 [Swedish Nuclear Weapons Research 1945–1972], p. 116; FOA, “En rapport över etapp IV beträffande val av reaktor för plutoniumtillverkning” [A report on stage IV concerning choice of reactor for plutonium production], H 4120–434; FOA, “Svensk plutoniumfabrik under 1960-talet” [Swedish plutonium factory during the 1960s], H 4162–434 June 20, 1960.

38. Swedish Nuclear Weapons Research 1945–1972, p. 118.

39. FOA, “Svar till CA på fråga” [Answer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Army to question], H 4027-403.

40. Directive I of May 5, 1960, letter of June 17, 1960. See Jonter, Sweden and the Bomb, p. 51.

41. FOA, “Kärnladdningsgruppens betänkande” [Report of the nuclear device group], HH 006.

42. FOA, “Kärnladdningsgruppens betänkande” [Report of the nuclear device group], HH 006.

43. Thomas Jonter, Sverige, USA och kärnenergin, pp. 30–38.

44. “Conversation with the Swedish Ambassador,” June 26, 1957, Special Assistance to the Secretary for Energy and Outer Space, Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1944–1963, Box 437, National Archives (NA), Washington, DC.

45. Swedish Riksdag, “Proposition 1961:1,” Government Bill 1966:1, Appendix 6, p. 188 et seq.

46. Christer Larsson, “Historien om en svensk atombomb 1945–1972.”

47. The present Sillamäe archive (SA) at the plant was the main information source on the uranium production activities in Estonia in 1946–89.

48. Vladimir Belous, “Takticheskoe yadernoe oruzhie v novykh geopoliticheskikh usloviyakh,” Yaderniy kontrol No. 14, Feb. 1996, p. 2.

49. Amy F. Woolf, “Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: Location, Command, and Control Updated,” CRS Issues Brief, 91144, Nov. 27, 1996, <www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/91-144.htm>.

50. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–56 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 102.

51. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–56 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 109–11.

52. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–56 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 176.

53. Pamyatniki nauki i tekhniki otechestvennoy atomnoy otrasli: Albom. M. [Hallmarks of Science and Technology of the Soviet atomic branch, Vol. M], 1999, p. 12; see Maremäe, et al., eds., Historical Survey of Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Estonia, 1946–1995, p. 13.

54. Decree No. 1626-718ss/op (ss/op signifies top secret operative) of July 27, 1946, of the USSR Council of Ministers; the Head of the First Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs at the Council of Ministers issued a classified Decree No. 0282ss, Aug. 6, 1946 (SA).

55. Decree No. 141ss/op, April 15, 1952 (SA).

56. Decree No. 8ss, April 3, 1947 (SA).

57. The wastes were stored in the “second zone” of the pilot plant situated on the boundary of the town Narva. Later the wastes were transported by vehicle to the waste depository at Sillamäe.

58. Pachuk is the Russian term for special equipment used for both leaching and sorption.

59. From the order No. MG-548s by the Head of the 3rd Main Directorate from March 24, 1980, (SA).

60. Decree No. 077 of June 7, 1989 of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, (SA).

61. Thomas Nilsen, Igor Kudrik, and Alexander Nikitin, “Nuclear-powered vessels,” in The Russian Northern Fleet, Bellona Foundation Report 2:96, 1996, <ww38w.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/northern_fleet/report_2-1996/11091.html>.

62. “Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Procedures and Deadlines for the Decommissioning of the Nuclear Reactors and the Guarantee of Nuclear and Radiation Safety on the Pakri Peninsula of the Republic of Estonia,” published in daily newspaper Rahva Hääl, Aug. 1, 1994.

63. Encyclopedia Astronautica web site, <www.astronautix.com/lvs/r14.htm>.

64. GlobalSecurity.org web site, “World Special Weapons Guide,” <www.globalsecurity.org>.

65. Encyclopedia Astronautica web site.

66. Ekmane, et al., Historical Survey of Nuclear Energy Activities in Latvia, p. 20

67. Valdis Gavars, Blakus dalitam kodolam (Riga: Zinatne, 2000), pp. 3–313

68. Valdis Gavars, Blakus dalitam kodolam (Riga: Zinatne, 2000), pp. 3–313.

69. Ekmane, et al., Historical Survey of Nuclear Energy Activities in Latvia, p. 31.

70. Gavars, Blakus dalitam kodolam.

71. The cabinet ministers of the Republic of Latvia accepted the order “On measures for preparations for decommissioning of Salaspils nuclear research reactor” (No. 263, May 16, 1995), which specified that it was necessary to start preparatory work for decommissioning the Salaspils nuclear reactor. The cabinet ministers accepted the order “On shutdown and procedure of financing of non-profit organization state scientific institution ‘Nuclear Research Centre of the Academy of Science of Latvia’” (No. 292, June 2, 1998), which specified the date of shutdown as June 1998. The cabinet ministers of the Republic of Latvia accepted the conception of “On Decommissioning and Dismantling of the Salaspils Nuclear Reactor,” Oct. 26, 1999. The decommissioning and dismantling of the Salaspils nuclear reactor is to be carried out until full dismantling and “green field” status in the next ten years. See Gavars, Blakus dalitam kodolam, pp. 3–313.

72. Jon Brook Wolfsthal, Cristina-Astrid Chuen, Emily Ewell Daughtry, eds., Nuclear Status Report, (Washington, DC and Monterey, CA: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2001), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/print/pdfs/nsr/status.pdf>.

73. Ekmane, et al., Historical Survey of Nuclear Energy Activities in Latvia, p. 33.

74. Ekmane, et al., Historical Survey of Nuclear Energy Activities in Latvia, p. 33.

75. RKS stands for Riga Critical Assembly in the Latvian language.

76. Gavars, Blakus dalitam kodolam, pp. 3–313.

77. The critical assembly has been shut down since Feb.1993. The core and servosystems are dismantled, and the nuclear fuel has been transferred to a storage area at the reactor site.

78. Latvian Academy of Sciences web site, <www.lza.lv/lat/centr_l.htm>.

79. Latvian Academy of Sciences web site, <www.lza.lv/lat/centr_l.htm>.

80. “Starlet” and “Dawn,” respectively, in the Russian language.

81. Ekmane, et al., Historical Survey of Nuclear Energy Activities in Latvia, p. 40.

82. Ekmane, et al., Historical Survey of Nuclear Energy Activities in Latvia, p. 40. pp. 46–51.

83. Radiation Safety Centre, Republic of Latvia, 2003.

84. Radiation Safety Centre, Republic of Latvia, 2003.

85. Modern Physics in Lithuania (Kaunas: Šviesa, 1997).

86. Jonas Gylys, Nuclear Engineering Specialists Training in Lithuania, paper presented to the PNBC 2002, proceedings of the 13th Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference, Shenzhen, China, 0ct. 21–25, 2002.

87. Kazys Almenas, Algirdas Kaliatka, and Eugenijus Usurpas, Ignalina RBMK-1500. A Source Book (Kaunas: Lithuanian Energy Institute, 1998).

88. Vladimir Penkov and Povilas Poškas, “Ignalina experience with CASTOR and CONSTOR casks loading,” proceedings of IAEA Technical Meeting/Workshop, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation, June 10–14, 2002.

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90. Information by Petras Griškevičius dated Aug. 19, 1988, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the progress of construction of the Ignalina NPP, Special Archive of Lithuania, Fund 1771, Folder 260, File 179, Sheet 88 (SAL).

91. Report of the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, April 17, 1987, Sheet 142 (SAL).

92. Report of the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, April 17, 1987, Sheet 142 (SAL). Sheet 144.

93. Report of the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, April 17, 1987, Sheet 142 (SAL). Sheet 145.

94. Report of the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, April 17, 1987, Sheet 142 (SAL). Sheet 148.

95. Resolution No. 722-162 of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated July 1, 1987, “On Task in Developing Nuclear Power Industry in the 12th Five-year and Additional Measures Ensuring Enhancement of Safety at Nuclear Power Plants,” Special Archive of Lithuania, Fund 1771, Folder 270, File 175, Sheet 17-22 (SAL).

96. Resolution No. 722-162 of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated July 1, 1987, “On Task in Developing Nuclear Power Industry in the 12th Five-year and Additional Measures Ensuring Enhancement of Safety at Nuclear Power Plants,” Special Archive of Lithuania, Fund 1771, Folder 270, File 175, Sheet 17-22 (SAL)., Appendix No. 3, Special Archive of Lithuania, Fund 1771, Folder 270, File 175, Sheet 26 (SAL).

97. Resolution No. 724-163 of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC of the CPSU) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated July 1, 1987, “On Measures Enhancing Safety of Nuclear Power Plants,” Special Archive of Lithuania, Fund 1771, Folder 270, File 175, Sheet 29 (SAL).

98. Penkov and Poškas, “Ignalina experience with CASTOR and CONSTOR casks loading.”

99. G Resolution No. 724-163 of the CC of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, July 1, 1987, Sheet 29 (SAL).

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101. Information supplied by the Museum of Militarism.

102. GlobalSecurity.org, “World Special Weapons Guide, <www.globalsecurity.org>.”

103. Krüger Consult and Baltic Consulting Group, “Inventory of Damage and Cost Estimate of Remediation of Former Military Sites in Lithuania: Final Report,” Dec. 1995.

104. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Dec. 1987, <www.state.gov/t/np/trty/18434.htm>.

105. Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat (Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Defense, 1988).

106. William Walker, “Nuclear Weapons and the Former Soviet Republics,” International Affairs 68 (1992), pp. 255–77.

107. Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Military Power.

108. Rein Taagepera, “Inclusion of the Baltic Republics in the Nordic Nuclear Free Zone,” Journal of Baltic Studies 16 (Spring 1985), pp. 33–51.

109. Krüger Consult and Baltic Consulting Group, “Inventory of Damage and Cost Estimate of Remediation of Former Military Sites in Lithuania.”

110. Krüger Consult and Baltic Consulting Group, “Inventory of Damage and Cost Estimate of Remediation of Former Military Sites in Lithuania.”

111. Information supplied by the Museum of Militarism.

112. GlobalSecurity.org, “World Special Weapons Guide.”

113. Krüger Consult and Baltic Consulting Group, “Inventory of Damage and Cost Estimate of Remediation of Former Military Sites in Lithuania.”

114. INF Treaty MOU.

115. Krüger Consult and Baltic Consulting Group, “Inventory of Damage and Cost Estimate of Remediation of Former Military Sites in Lithuania.”

116. Krüger Consult and Baltic Consulting Group, “Inventory of Damage and Cost Estimate of Remediation of Former Military Sites in Lithuania.”

117. “A large number of missiles have disappeared in Russia,” ELTA (Lithuanian News Agency), Sept. 5, 1997.

118. “Lithuania is selling nuclear weapons?” ELTA (Lithuanian News Agency), July 1, 1997.