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Abstract
Military interest in incapacitating biochemical weapons has grown in recent years as advances in science and technology have appeared to offer the promise of new “non-lethal” weapons useful for a variety of politically and militarily challenging situations. There is, in fact, a long and unfulfilled history of attempts to develop such weapons. It is clear that advances are opening up a range of possibilities for future biological and chemical weapons more generally. The treaties prohibiting biological and chemical weapons make no distinction between lethal and “non-lethal” weapons—all are equally prohibited. Indeed, a sharp and technically meaningful distinction between lethal and “non-lethal” biological and chemical weapons is beyond the capability of science to make. Thus, interest in incapacitating biochemical weapons, and efforts on the part of various states to develop them, pose a significant challenge to the treaty regimes, to the norms against biological and chemical warfare that they embody, and, ultimately, to the essential protections that they provide. Preventing a new generation of biological and chemical weapons from emerging will take concerted efforts and action at the local, national, and international levels.
Notes
1. Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats, Board on Global Medicine, Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of the Life Sciences (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006), p. 5. See also pp. 178–181 and references at notes 141, 144, and 150 on p. 208 of this report.
2. Elliot Kagan, “Bioregulators as Instruments of Terror,” Clinics in Laboratory Medicine 21 (Sept. 2001), pp. 607–618.
3. 3 U.S. Army, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Field Manual 3-11.9, Jan. 10, 2005, p. I–7, <www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-11-9.pdf>.
4. Sweden stated that by the year 2000, the “scientific and technological achievements … may make it possible to produce products of human origin as B-weapons. Such products could be hormones or transmitter substances which to take effect are needed in extremely small quantities.” Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Development Relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,” BWC/CONF.II/4, Geneva, Sept.r 8–26, 1986, p. 3, <www.opbw.org>. The United States, discussing peptides, stated that “[t]heir range of activity covers the entire living system, from mental processes … to many aspects of health such as control of mood, consciousness, temperature control, sleep or emotions, exerting regulatory effects on the body. Even a small imbalance in these natural substances could have serious consequences, inducing fear, fatigue, depression or even causing death.” BWC/CONF.II/4, Add.2, p. 3, <www.opbw.org>.
5. National Academies of Science, Press Release, Jan. 31, 2006, “Global Effort Needed to Anticipate and Prevent Potential Misuse of Advances in Life Science,” <www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=11567>.
6. Kurt Kleiner, “US ‘unaware’ of emerging bioterror threats,” New Scientist.com News Service, Jan. 31, 2006, <www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn8656>; Emily Singer, “Could Terrorists Hijack Your Brain?” Technology Review (Feb. 1, 2006), <www.technologyreview.com/read_article.aspx?id=16221&ch=biotech>.
7. Executive Office of the President, Biodefense for the 21st Century, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10/National Security Presidential Directive 33, Washington, DC, April 28, 2004, <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-10.html>.
8. Christopher J. Davis, “Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 5 (July–Aug. 1999), pp. 509–512.
9. Committee for an Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology, Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2003), p. 4.
10. Paul M. Wax, Charles E. Becker, and Steven C. Curry, “Unexpected ‘Gas’ Casualties in Moscow: A Medical Toxicology Perspective,” Annals of Emergency Medicine 41 (Aug. 2003) pp. 700–705.
11. See Neil Davison and Nick Lewer, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project Research Report No. 5, (Bradford, UK: Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Bradford, May 2004), p. 39, <www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research_reports/docs/BNLWRPResearchReportNo5_May04.pdf>.
12. Donald Voet, Biochemistry, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley, 2004), p. 13.
13. Eva S. Istvan and Johann Deisenhofer, “Structural Mechanism for Statin Inhibition of HMG-CoA Reductase,” Science 292 (May 11, 2001), pp. 1160–1164.
14. Bruce D. Roth, “The Discovery and Development of Atorvastatin, a Potent Novel Hypolipidemic Agent,” Progress in Medicinal Chemistry 40 (2002), pp. 1–22. For sales data see IMS Health, “Leading Products by Global Sales, 2005,” at <www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/0,2777,6599_77478579_77479663,00.html>.
15. Field Manual 3-11.9, p. I–6.
16. James S. Ketchum and Frederick R. Sidell, “Incapacitating Agents,” in Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. Takafugi, and David R. Franz, eds., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, TMM series, Part I (Washington, DC: TMM Publications, 1997), p. 288.
17. Field Manual 3-11.9, p. I–6.
18. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, (Dec. 22, 1995), P. 3–1, available at <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/army/fm/8-285/index.html>.
19. U.S. Army Field Manual 8-285, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, (Dec. 22, 1995), P. 3–1, available at <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/army/fm/8-285/index.html>.
20. See information for Remifentanil at “Opioids” at <www.anaesthetist.com/anaes/drugs/opioids.htm>.
21. Ketchum and Sidell, “Incapacitating Agents,” p. 291.
22. Ketchum and Sidell, “Incapacitating Agents,” p. 291. For TL 2636 see Caitriona McLeish, “The Governance of Dual-Use Technologies in Chemical Warfare,” M.Sc. dissertation, University of Sussex, 1997, pp. 55–65.
23. Joan M. Lakoski, W. Bosseau Murray, and John M. Kenny, The Advantages and Limitations of Calmatives for Use as a Non-Lethal Technique (University Park, PA: Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University, 2000), p. 48.
24. Martin Furmanski, “Military Interest in Low-lethality Biochemical Agents: The Historical Interaction of Advocates, Experts, Pragmatists and Politicians,” (June 2005), p. 19, <www.armscontrolcenter.org/cbw/symposium/papers/pdf/20050601_symposium_military_interest.pdf>.
25. Furmanski, “Military Interest;” See also: Malcolm Dando, “The UK's Search for an Incapacitating (‘Non-Lethal’) Chemical Agent in the 1960s,” Bradford Science and Technology Report No. 6 (Bradford, UK: Dept. of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, Jan. 2006); <www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research_reports/docs/BDRC_ST_Report_No_6.pdf>; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), Vol. 2, pp. 124, 154, 265, 273, and Vol. 5, pp. 47–49, 127–128; J. P Perry Robinson, “Disabling chemical weapons: some technical and historical aspects,” paper delivered to the Second Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on Implementation of the CBW Conventions, Den Haag/Noordwijk, Netherlands, May 27–29, 1994.
26. U.S. Dept. of Defense, Directive 3000.3 Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons (July 9, 1996), p. 2.
27. Lt. Col. Randy Copeland, “Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program,” (June 2002), slide 2, <www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002mines/copeland.pdf>. U.S. Marine Corps, “Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons” (Jan. 5, 1988), available at <www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/NONLETH.HTM>.
28. Naval Studies Board, An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons, pp. 12–15, 20, 26, and 27. See also US/UK Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW)/Urban Operations Executive Seminar Assessment Report (Nov. 30, 2000), p. 28, at <www.sunshine-project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/usukassess.pdf>; U.S. Marine Corps, “Joint Concept”; Nick Lewer, “Introduction” in Nick Lewer, ed., The Future of Non-Lethal Weapons: Technologies, Operations, Ethics and Law (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 1; Brian Rappert, Non-Lethal Weapons as Legitimizing Forces? (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 63–65, 228–234.
29. U.S. Marine Corps, “Joint Concept.” For in depth information about, and arguments for and against, “nonlethal” weapons more generally, see John B. Alexander, Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in 21st Century Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Graham T. Allison, Paul X. Kelley, and Richard L. Garwin, Non-lethal Weapons and Capabilities, Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2004); Malcolm Dando, A New Form of Warfare: The Rise of Non-Lethal Weapons (London: Brassey's, 1996); Lewer, The Future of Non-Lethal Weapons; Douglas C. Lovelace and Steven Metz, Nonlethality and American Land Power (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998); Rappert, Non-Lethal Weapons.
30. Ketchum and Sidell, “Incapacitating Agents,” p. 295. Compare to value for VX in Table 30-2 in David R. Franz, “Defense Against Toxin Weapons,” in Sidell,. Takafugi, and Franz, Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, p. 607.
31. Malcolm Dando and Martin Furmanski, “Midspectrum Incapacitant Programs,” in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa, and Malcolm Dando, eds., Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 246–249.
32. Malcolm Dando and Martin Furmanski, “Midspectrum Incapacitant Programs,” in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa, and Malcolm Dando, eds., Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 246–249.
33. Malcolm Dando and Martin Furmanski, “Midspectrum Incapacitant Programs,” in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa, and Malcolm Dando, eds., Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 243.
34. Ketchum and Sidell, “Incapacitating Agents,” p. 295.
35. Jean Pascal Zanders, “Assessing the Risk of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists,” Nonproliferation Review 6 (Fall 1999), pp. 23–25.
36. Furmanski, “Military Interest,” p. 19.
37. John M. Kenny, “Human Effects Advisory Panel Program,” presentation at the Non-Lethal Defense IV Conference, sponsored by the National Defense Industrial Association, March 20–22, 2000, slide 23, <www.dtic.mil/ndia/nld4/kenny.pdf>.
38. Lynn Klotz, Martin Furmanski, and Mark Wheelis, “Beware the Siren's Song: Why ‘Non-Lethal’ Incapacitating Chemical Agents are Lethal,” Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, March 2003, <www.armscontrolcenter.org/cbw/wg/wg/wg_2003_sirensong_nonlethal_chemical_agents.pdf>.
39. V.L. Klochikhin, A.A. Lushnikov, V.A. Zagaynov, A.V. Putilov, V.V. Selivanov, and M.A. Zatevakhin, “Principles of Modeling of the Scenario of Calmative Application in a Building With Deterred Hostages,” paper presented to the 3rd European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Stadthalle, Germany, May 10–12, 2005.
40. L.E. Mather, “Clinical pharmacokinetics of fentanyl and its newer derivatives,” Clinical Pharmacokinetics 8 (Sept.–Oct. 1983), pp. 422–46; Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, “The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare,” (Nov. 4, 2002) <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/02110b.htm>.
41. Wax et al., “Unexpected ‘Gas’ Casualties.”
42. Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, “Outlook 2005,” p. 1, <http://csdd.tufts.edu/InfoServices/OutlookPDFs/Outlook2005.pdf>.
43. On the use of anesthesia in clinical settings, see, for example, David A.E. Shephard, “The changing pattern of anesthesia, 1954–004: A review based on the content of the Canadian Journal of Anesthesia in its first half-century,” Canadian Journal of Anesthesia 52 (March 2005), pp. 238–248.
44. See, for example, Roche Pharmaceuticals, “Versed (midazolam HCl) Injection,” package insert, <www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/01/Mar01/032101/cp00001_exhibit_02.pdf>; Bedford Laboratories, “Propofol Injectable Emulsion 1%,” package insert, <http://66.70.89.95/information/propofol.pdf>.
45. Alan S. Nies, “Principles of Therapeutics,” in Joel G. Hardman and Lee E. Limbird, eds., Goodman and Gilman's The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics, 10th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2001), p. 51.
46. See, for example, Ketchum and Sidell, “Incapacitating Agents,” p. 296.
47. Nies, “Principles of Therapeutics,” p. 48.
48. The principle of individualized treatment is the result of extensive clinical experience with the use of powerful pharmaceutical agents such as anesthetics.
49. Klochikhin et al., “Principles of Modeling,” arrive at the following important conclusion on the basis of their study: “If the level of 95% efficiency is absolutely required to neutralize terrorists and to prevent mass destruction, there is no chance to eliminate hard consequences and fatalities. Calculations show that the majority of hostages can get serious poisoning and part of them—fatality. This is the cost of releasing if no other solutions left,” p. 3. See also, Furmanski, and Wheelis, “Siren's Song,” p. 4.
50. Guy Gugliotta, “U.S. Finds Hurdles in Search for Nonlethal Gas,” Washington Post, Nov. 1, 2002, p. A30, quoting C. Parker Ferguson. In 1994, U.S. Army researchers had this to say about the problem: “For many scenarios the desired characteristics of chemical immobilizers are similar to these depicted in James Bond films. In fiction, a chemical agent knocks out people instantaneously. In reality the onset time for immobilization or unconsciousness takes longer, even when deploying the most potent anesthetic materials known. For other scenarios, a delayed onset or a less severe degree of immobilization may be desired. The other myth usually associated with stereotypical immobilizers is rapid recovery and lack of side effects.” See Edgewood Research, Development & Engineering Center (hereafter ERDEC), “Demonstration of Chemical Immobilizers,” Research Proposal , April 27, 1994, <www.sunshine-project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/edgedemon.pdf>.
51. This list of requirements summarizes information synthesized from a wide variety of sources. For some particular requirements, see the following: Lakoski, Murray, and Kenny, Advantages and Disadvantages, p. 5; Naval Studies Board, Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons, pp. 22, 27, and 107; Ketchum and Sidell, “Incapacitating Agents,” p. 288; U.S. Army Field Manual 8-825, p. 3–1. The last three requirements are of particular importance according to the committee of the Naval Studies Board: “Major research and development … issues involving the use of calmatives are (1) the quantification of the effectiveness and margin of safety for these materials and (2) the development of the method of delivery that can rapidly provide the appropriate dose.” The committee added: “to elicit the desired level of mood alteration without causing a dangerous level of respiratory depression … requires a tight control on dose level,” p. 27. See also their comment on p. 107: “Few reliable, low-risk, and low-cost methods exist for delivering and dispensing chemical NLWs precisely and accurately. This capacity … becomes critical in the delivery of calmatives, where proper doses must be achieved.” The committee recommended the development of microencapsulation to create more deliverable forms of incapacitants and sensor systems to achieve accurate delivery on target at the proper dose level. Weapons developer C. Parker Ferguson said that “major challenges remained to developing an incapacitant both potent enough to be effective and safe enough to be used,” stating “[i]t's often a tradeoff.” Quoted in David Ruppe, “New Research Offers Safer Incapacitating Chemicals,” Global Security Newswire, Nov. 6, 2002, <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_11_6.html#7>.
52. Klotz et al., Beware the Siren's Song.
53. Mark Wheelis and Malcolm Dando, “Neurobiology: A case study of the imminent militarization of biology,” International Review of the Red Cross 87 (Sept. 2005), p. 561. See also Malcolm R. Dando, “The Danger to the Chemical Weapons Convention from Incapacitating Chemicals,” First CWC Review Conference Paper Number 4 (Bradford, UK: Dept. of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, March 2003), pp. 5, 11.
54. See entry for “Acetylcholine receptors, muscarinic” at the IUPHAR Receptor Database, <www.iuphar-db.org/GPCR/index.html>.
55. For reviews of some of these important developments, see Robert J. Lefkowitz, “Historical review: a brief history and personal retrospective of seven-transmembrane receptors,” Trends in Pharmacological Sciences 25 (Aug. 2004), pp. 413–422; Soloman H. Snyder and Gavril W. Pasternak, “Historical overview: Opioid receptors,” Trends in Pharmacological Sciences 24 (April 2003), pp. 198–205; Mark S. Boguski and Allan R. Jones, “Neurogenomics: at the intersection of neurobiology and genome sciences,” Nature Neuroscience 7 (May 2004), pp. 429–433; Seth G. N. Grant, “Systems biology in neuroscience: Bridging genes to cognition,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 13 (Oct. 2003), pp. 577–582.
56. Mark Wheelis, “Biotechnology and Biochemical Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review 9 (Spring 2002), pp. 48–53. For example, Committee on Advances, Globalization, Biosecurity”; Richard Kramer and Dalia Cohen, “Functional Genomics to New Drug Targets,” Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 3 (Nov. 2004), pp. 965–972.
57. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Innovation or Stagnation: Challenge and Opportunity on the Critical Path to New Medical Products (Washington DC, March 2004), <www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/criticalpath/whitepaper.html>.
58. Robinson, “Disabling Chemical Weapons”; J.P. Perry Robinson, “Disabling Chemical Weapons: A Documentary Chronology of Events, 1945–2003,” unpublished working paper, Harvard Sussex Program, University of Sussex, Nov. 1, 2003 (hereafter Robinson Chronology); David Brown and Peter Baker, “Moscow gas likely a potent narcotic,” Washington Post, Nov. 11, 2002, p. A12; Naval Studies Board, Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons, pp. 63–64. The author is indebted to J.P. Perry Robinson for sharing his documentary chronology, which provides by far the most complete account of publicly available information on attempts to develop and use incapacitants between 1945 and 2003.
59. The WorldWide Anaesthetist Web Site, “Opioids,” <www.anaesthetist.com/anaes/drugs/opioids.htm>.
60. P.L. Bailey, J. Wilbrink, P. Zwanikken, N.L. Pace, and T.H. Stanley, “Anesthetic induction with fentanyl,” Anesthesia and Analgesia 64 (Jan. 1985), pp. 48–53.
61. Ketchum and Sidell, “Incapacitating Agents,” p. 293; Dando and Furmanski, “Midspectrum Incapacitants”; McLeish, “Governance”; Robinson Chronology.
62. Taylor Pharmaceuticals, “Sufenta (Sufentanil Citrate) Injection,” package insert, <www.akorn.com/documents/catalog/package_inserts/11098-050-01.pdf>. The package insert states, “As with all potent opioids, profound analgesia is accompanied by respiratory depression … which may persist into or recur in the postoperative period.” See also note 69.
63. Mather, “Clinical pharmacokinetics.”
64. W.F. Van Bever, C.J. Niemegeers, K.H. Schellekens, and P.A. Janssen, “N-4-Substituted 1-(2-arylethyl)-4-piperidinyl-N-phenylpropanamides, a novel series of extremely potent analgesics with unusually high safety margin,” Arzneimittel-forshung 26 (1976), pp. 1548–1551.
65. Thomas Stanley, “Human immobilization: Is the experience in Moscow just the beginning?” European Journal of Anaesthesiology 20 (June 2003), pp. 427–428.
66. ERDEC, “Synthetic Opioids”; see also Brian D. Anderson and Patrick M. Grant, “Dose Safety Margin Enhancement for Chemical Incapacitation and Less-Than-Lethal Targeting,” NIJ (National Institute of Justice) Final Report (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Jan. 1997); Lois Pilant, “Less-than-Lethal Weapons: New Solutions for Law Enforcement,” Science and Technology, publication of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (Dec. 1993), p. 3, reporting a safety ratio of 4 for alfentanil in the operating room. The source for this figure is unknown.
67. For example, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare,” <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/02110b.htm>.
68. Van Bever et al., “Novel series”; C.J. Niemegeers, K.H. Schellekens, W.F. Van Bever, and P.A. Janssen, “Sufentanil, a very potent and extremely safe intravenous morphine-like compound in mice, rats and dogs,” Arzneimittel-forschung 26 (1976), pp. 1551–1556. The WorldWide Anaesthetist Web Site, “Opioids”; Taylor Pharmaceuticals, “Sufenta.”
69. J. de Castro, A. Van de Water, L. Wouters, R. Xhonneux, R. Reneman, and B. Kay, “Comparative study of cardiovascular, neurological and metabolic side effects of 8 narcotics in dogs,” Act Anaesthesiologica Belgica 30 (March 1979), pp. 55–69; see also Klotz et al., Beware the Siren's Song, p. 7; Secretary of the Army, “Opiate analgesic formulation with improved safety,” U.S. Patent Number 5834477, Nov. 10, 1998, <www.patentstorm.us/patents/5834477-fulltext.html>; The WorldWide Anaesthetist Web Site, Opioids.” Extensive clinical experience demonstrates that the fentanyls can have significant adverse effects in a substantial portion of patients when used at doses required for anesthesia, and even at doses required for analgesia. They are considered safe in hospital settings because dosages can be individualized and for the reasons discussed in the text. One authoritative source has this to say: “SUFENTA (sufentanil citrate) SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED ONLY BY PERSONS SPECIFICALLY TRAINED IN THE USE OF INTRAVENOUS AND EPIDURAL ANESTHETICS AND MANAGEMENT OF THE RESPIRATORY EFFECTS OF POTENT OPIOIDS. AN OPIOID ANTAGONIST, RESUSCITATIVE AND INTUBATION EQUIPMENT AND OXYGEN SHOULD BE READILY AVAILABLE.” (Emphasis in original.) Taylor Pharmaceuticals, “Sufenta.”
70. Karen S. Kearns, Brent Swenson, and Edward C. Ramsay, “Dosage trials with transmucosal carfentanil citrate in non-human primates,” Zoo Biology 18 (Jan. 24, 2000), pp. 397–402.
71. L.E. Mather, A. Woodhouse, M.E. Ward, S.J. Farr, R.A. Rubsamen, and L.G. Eltherington, “Pulmonary administration of aerosolised fentanyl: Pharmacokinetic analysis of systemic delivery,” British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 46 (July 1998), pp. 37–43.
72. Franz, “Defense Against Toxin Weapons,” p. 607.
73. Stanley, “Human immobilization.”
74. ERDEC, “Opioids”; Naval Studies Board, An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons, p. 27.
75. U.S. Patent Number 5834477.
76. Snyder and Pasternak, “Opioid receptors”; Robinson Chronology, entry for Nov. 13, 1990.
77. Robinson Chronology, entry for Jan. 1992.
78. ERDEC, “Opioids.”
79. ERDEC, “Chemical Immobilizers.”
80. Anderson and Grant, “Dose Safety Margin Enhancement.”
81. John Lancaster, “Pentagon, Justice Dept. Set Plans for Sharing Non-Lethal Technology,” Washington Post, March 23, 1994, p. A3. See also U.S. Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Justice, NIJ Research Plan 1995–1996 (Washington, DC: Dept. of Justice, 1995), p. 20, regarding Memorandum of Agreement signed with the Dept. of Defense. Cooperation is ongoing, including with the Dept. of Homeland Security. See Trent DePersia “Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency,” presentation dated Jan. 25, 2004, <www.hsarpabaa.com/main/HBCU/9_DePersia.pdf>.
82. Mark Wheelis, “‘Nonlethal’ Chemical Weapons: A Faustian Bargain”, Issues in Science and Technology (Spring 2003),<www.issues.org/19.3/wheelis.htm>, citing statement by retired Rear Admiral Stephen Baker that U.S. special forces were equipped with “knockout gases.”
83. Naval Studies Board, An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons, p. 27.
84. Ruppe, “New Research.”
85. Naval Studies Board, An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons, p. 107.
86. See Neil Davison and Nick Lewer, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project Research Report No. 8, (Bradford, UK: Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Bradford, March 2006), p. 52, <www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research_reports/docs/BNLWRPResearchReportNo8_Mar06.pdf>.
87. Society for Neuroscience, quoted in Malcolm Dando, “Scientific and technological change and the future of the CWC: The problem of non-lethal weapons,” Disarmament Forum 4 (2002), p. 38, <www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1824.pdf>.
88. ERDEC, “Synthetic Opioids”; The WorldWide Anaesthetist Web Site, “Opioids”; also see Y. Chen, A. Mestek, J. Liu, J.A. Hurley and L. Yu, “Molecular cloning and expression of a mu-opioid receptor from rat brain,” Molecular Pharmacology 44 (July 1993), pp. 8–12; C. Mollereau, M. Parmentier, P. Mailleux, J.L. Butour, C. Moisand, P. Chalon, D. Caput, G. Vassart, and J.C. Meunier, “ORL1, a novel member of the opioid receptor family. Cloning, functional expression and localization,” FEBS Letters 341 (March 14, 1994), pp. 33–38; I. Kitchen, S.J. Slowe, H.W.D. Matthes, and B. Kieffer, “Quantitative autoradiographic mapping of mu, delta and kappa-opioid receptors in knockout mice lacking the mu-opioid receptor gene,” Brain Research 778 (Dec. 5, 1997), pp. 73–88; H.W. Matthes, R. Maldonado, F. Simonin, O. Valverde, S. Slowe, I. Kitchen, K. Befort, A. Dierich, M. Le Meur, P. Dolle, E. Tzavara, J. Hanoune, B.P. Roques, and B.L. Kieffer, “Loss of morphine-induced analgesia, reward effect and withdrawal symptoms in mice lacking the mu-opioid-receptor gene,” Nature 383 (Oct. 31, 1996), pp. 819–823.
89. R. Romberg, E. Sarton, L. Teppema, H.W. Matthes, B.L. Kieffer, and A. Dahan, “Comparison of morphine-6-glucuronid and morphine on respiratory depressant and antinociceptive responses in wild type and mu-opioid receptor deficient mice,” British Journal of Anaesthesia 91 (Dec. 2003), pp. 862–870).
90. Wheelis and Dando “Neurobiology”; Dando, “Danger”; Slavko Bokan, John G. Breen, and Zvonko Orehovec, “An Evaluation of Bioregulators as Terrorism and Warfare Agents,” ASA Newsletter, 02-3, Issue 90 (June 28, 2002), p. 1, <http://www.asanltr.com/newsletter/02-3/articles/023c.htm>; Lakoski, et al., Advantages and Limitations, p. 5, stating that “ the premier status of the US pharmaceutical industry in the world markets, combined with the exponential developments in the fields of pharmacology, neuroscience, anesthesia, and biotechnology fields, among others, has brought forth a diverse array of compounds that produce sedation and/or a calm state as either a primary or secondary effect.”
91. Naval Studies Board, An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons, pp. 5, 79.
92. U.S. Army, “Chemical Immobilizing Agents for Non-lethal Applications,” Topic CBD 00-108, Small Business Innovation Research Solicitation CBD 00.1, <www.acq.osd.mil/osbp/sbir/solicitations/sbir001/cbd001.htm>.
93. Optimetrics, Inc., “Chemical Immobilizing Agents for Non-Lethal Applications,” SBIR phase I award from the CBD 00.1 Solicitation, <www.nttc.edu/resources/funding/awards/dod/2000sbir/001cbd.asp>.
94. Copeland, “Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program”; see also U.S. Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate Newsletter, 2nd Quarter, 2001, as cited in Tobias Feakin, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, Research Report 3 (Bradford, UK: Dept. of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, Aug. 2001), <www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research_reports/researchreport3.php>.
95. Robert Bunker, ed., Nonlethal Weapons: Terms and References, INSS Occasional Paper 15 (Colorado Springs: U.S. Air Force Academy, USAF Institute for National Security Affairs, Dec. 1996), p. 10, <http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/ocp15.pdf>. Calmatives were classified together with gastrointestinal convulsives, malodorants, biodegrading microbes, and biomaterials as “Biotechnical” in a “Non-Lethal Technology: Taxonomy” presented by the JNLWD Director in March 2000; Col. George Fenton, “The U.S. Dept. of Defense Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, March 2000 Overview,” presentation at the Non-Lethal Defense IV Conference, sponsored by the National Defense Industrial Association, March 20–22, 2000, slide 10, <www.dtic.mil/ndia/nld4/fenton.pdf>.
96. Naval Studies Board, An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons, p. 24.
97. OC/RCA is oleoresin capsicum/riot control agent; OC is also known as pepper spray. See Robert J. Hegarty, “Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program: Non-Lethal Mortar Cartridge (NLMC),” presentation at National Defense Industry Association 2003 Picatinny Chapter/PEO Mortars Conference, Oct. 2003, <www.sunshine-project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/usamort03.pdf>; Camilo A. Sanchez, “Non-Lethal Airburst Munition(s) for Objective Individual Combat Weapon,” presentation at 2001 National Defense Industry Association Joint Services Small Arms Symposium, Aug. 15, 2001, <www.sunshine-project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/sanchez.pdf>. Although not analyzed in detail here, achieving rapid delivery of tightly controlled doses of biochemical incapacitants remains by far the greatest challenge facing those who would use existing agents or agents likely to be developed in the near future. As a 2002 technical review of the airburst non-lethal munition under development by JNLWD noted, achieving effective payload dissemination is critical for success yet remained “the highest technological risk area” in the program. “[T]he issue has not been resolved.” See Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University, Independent Technology Assessment Report of Findings: The Objective Individual Combat Weapon Non-Lethal Munition (Oct. 10, 2002), pp. 10, 15, <www.sunshine-project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/oicwairburst.pdf>. See also Klochikhin et al., “Principles of Modeling”; Naval Studies Board, An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons, note 52.
98. OC/RCA is oleoresin capsicum/riot control agent; OC is also known as pepper spray. See Robert J. Hegarty, “Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program: Non-Lethal Mortar Cartridge (NLMC),” presentation at National Defense Industry Association 2003 Picatinny Chapter/PEO Mortars Conference, Oct. 2003, <www.sunshine-project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/usamort03.pdf>; Camilo A. Sanchez, “Non-Lethal Airburst Munition(s) for Objective Individual Combat Weapon,” presentation at 2001 National Defense Industry Association Joint Services Small Arms Symposium, Aug. 15, 2001, <www.sunshine-project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/sanchez.pdf>. Although not analyzed in detail here, achieving rapid delivery of tightly controlled doses of biochemical incapacitants remains by far the greatest challenge facing those who would use existing agents or agents likely to be developed in the near future. As a 2002 technical review of the airburst non-lethal munition under development by JNLWD noted, achieving effective payload dissemination is critical for success yet remained “the highest technological risk area” in the program. “[T]he issue has not been resolved.” See Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University, Independent Technology Assessment Report of Findings: The Objective Individual Combat Weapon Non-Lethal Munition (Oct. 10, 2002), p. 124.
99. OC/RCA is oleoresin capsicum/riot control agent; OC is also known as pepper spray. See Robert J. Hegarty, “Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program: Non-Lethal Mortar Cartridge (NLMC),” presentation at National Defense Industry Association 2003 Picatinny Chapter/PEO Mortars Conference, Oct. 2003, <www.sunshine-project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/usamort03.pdf>; Camilo A. Sanchez, “Non-Lethal Airburst Munition(s) for Objective Individual Combat Weapon,” presentation at 2001 National Defense Industry Association Joint Services Small Arms Symposium, Aug. 15, 2001, <www.sunshine-project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/sanchez.pdf>. Although not analyzed in detail here, achieving rapid delivery of tightly controlled doses of biochemical incapacitants remains by far the greatest challenge facing those who would use existing agents or agents likely to be developed in the near future. As a 2002 technical review of the airburst non-lethal munition under development by JNLWD noted, achieving effective payload dissemination is critical for success yet remained “the highest technological risk area” in the program. “[T]he issue has not been resolved.” See Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University, Independent Technology Assessment Report of Findings: The Objective Individual Combat Weapon Non-Lethal Munition (Oct. 10, 2002), p. 125.
100. Klochikhin et al., “Principles of Modeling.”
101. See Davison and Lewer, Bradford Report No. 5, p. 39, <www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research_reports/docs/BNLWRPResearchReportNo5_May04.pdf>.
102. Ladislav Hess, Jitka Schreiberova, and Josef Fusek, “Pharmacological non-lethal weapons,” paper presented to the 3rd European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Stadthalle, Germany, May 10–12, 2005.
103. NATO Research and Technology Organization, Non-Lethal Weapons and Future Peace Enforcement Operations, RTO-TR-SAS-040, Dec. 2004, pp. 3–10, <www.rta.nato.int/Main.asp?topic=sas.htm#>.
104. Guo Ji-wei and Xue-sen Yang, “Ultramicro, Nonlethal, and Reversible: Looking Ahead to Military Biotechnology,” Military Review 85 (July–Aug. 2005), pp. 75–78, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/yang.pdf>. Like much of the work by non-lethal weapons enthusiasts and technology boosters, this article, which talks about a wide range of biotechnology-enabled weapons, is more science fiction than science fact. But it reveals a clear interest in the future of biotechnology for military purposes. It also includes such statements as “such devastating, nonlethal effects will require us to pacify the enemy through postwar reconstruction efforts and hatred control,” p. 76; and “[w]e can control the degree of injuries and damage produced and even provide an antidote or a cure … Providing such an anodyne to our enemies would represent real ‘mercy,’” p. 77.
105. Till Manzke, Ulf Guenther, Evgeni G. Ponimaskin, Miriam Haller, Mathias Dutschmann, Stephan Schwarzacher, and Diethelm W. Richter, “5-HT4(a) Receptors Avert Opioid-Induced Breathing Depression Without Loss of Analgesia,” Science 301 (July 11, 2003), pp. 226–229.
106. Helge Eilers and Mark A. Schumacher, “Opioid-induced Respiratory Depression: Are 5-HT4a Receptor Agonists the Cure?” Molecular Interventions 4 (Aug. 2004), pp. 197–199.
107. Gavin J. Kilpatrick and Gary S. Tilbrook, “Drug development in anaesthesia: industrial perspective,” Current Opinion in Anaesthesiology 19 (Aug. 2006), pp. 385–389.
108. Stanley, “Human immobilization.”
109. In June 2005, for example, Nature launched a new journal, Nature Chemical Biology, whose goal is to provide “an international forum for the timely publication of significant new research at the interface between chemistry and biology.” See <www.nature.com/nchembio/about/index.html>. The Committee on Advances has also written about this convergence: “The present report has several times noted that technologies are bringing chemistry and biology closer together. That toxins and synthetic biological agents, including bioregulators, immunoregulators, and small interfering RNAs, fall within the scope of both treaties is one such linkable feature.” Committee on Advances, Globalization, Biosecurity, p. 246.
110. Graham Pearson, Relevant Scientific and Technological Developments for the First CWC Review Conference: The BTWC Review Conference Experience, CWC Review Conference Paper No. 1 (Bradford, UK: Dept. of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, Aug. 2002), p. 5.
111. Wheelis, “Biotechnology and Biochemical Weapons.” The recent report of the Committee on Advances in Technology offers a definition of biological weapons which incorporates the incapacitating biochemical agents: “The terms ‘weapon’ and ‘bioweapon’ are also used broadly, and include any biological agent or biologically active molecule or other entity that is used or developed and/or stockpiled for use in an effort to cause harm to humans, plants, or animals.” Committee on Advances in Technology, Globalization, Biosecurity, p. 27.
112. United Nations, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,” (hereafter BTWC) April 10, 1972, 1015 UNTS 164 280, <www.opbw.org/>.
113. Wheelis, “Biotechnology”; World Health Organization, Public health response to biological and chemical weapons: WHO guidance, Annex 2: Toxins (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2004), <http://www.who.int/csr/delibepidemics/biochemguide/en/>. United Nations, “Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapon and on their Destruction, Final Declaration,” Geneva, Sept. 8–26, 1986, BWC/CONF.II/13, p. 3, <www.opbw.org>.
114. United Nations, “Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapon and on their Destruction, Final Document, Part II, Final Declaration,” Geneva, Nov. 25–Dec. 6, 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9 Part II, p. 15, <www.opbw.org>.
115. See the failed proposal of Chile to include the words “as well as chemical components and products of living organisms and their analogs and modified derivatives” in the reaffirmation of the coverage of Article I in the Final Declaration. United Nations, “Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapon and on their Destruction, Draft Final Declaration,” Geneva, Nov. 25–Dec. 6, 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/L.1 at <www.opbw.org>, p. 22.
116. United Nations, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction,” (hereafter CWC), Geneva, Sept. 3, 1992, I-33757, <www.opcw.org>.
117. David P. Fidler, “The meaning of Moscow: ‘Non-lethal’ weapons and international law in the early 21st century.” International Review of the Red Cross 87 (Sept. 2005), pp. 525–552.
118. David A. Koplow, “Tangled Up in Khaki and Blue: Lethal and Non-Lethal Weapons in Recent Confrontations,” Georgetown Journal of International Law 36 (Spring 2005), p. 737. During testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the CWC negotiations, Ambassador Stephen J. Ledogar stated: “My current instructions propose that riot control agents simply be defined out of the convention, not included. That position has not gained a lot of support. The majority position would take the opposite side and would have riot control agents defined in and therefore covered by all of the provisions … .Now, at present the United States is reviewing my instructions on riot control agents, I am told, to see whether some compromise between the two extremes that are on the table now in Geneva might be reached.” Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Chemical Weapons Ban Negotiation Issues, S. HRG. 102-719 (May 1, 1992), pp. 9–10.
119. Dept. of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General, International & Operational Law Division, Preliminary legal review of proposed chemical-based nonlethal weapons, Nov. 30, 1997, <www.sunshine-project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/jagchemi.pdf>.
120. JAG, Preliminary Review, p. 21.
121. JAG, Preliminary Review, p. 22.
122. Margaret-Anne Coppernoll, “The Nonlethal Weapons Debate,” Naval War College Review 52 (Spring 1999), <www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/1999/spring/art5-sp9.htm>.
123. Koplow, “Tangled Up,” pp. 737–738.
124. This is also what probably drove the committee to change the goal posts for work on calmatives, as discussed in note 90. It also appears to have led the committee, in the draft version of the report, to draw a distinction between “permissible psychological effects (e.g. calming)” versus “impermissible physiological (e.g. unconsciousness) effects.” Such a distinction ignores the fact that chemical agents that act on the brain to cause psychological effects do so by their biochemical action on physiologic systems. Committee for an Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology, Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology, DRAFT version (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2002), p. 2–39. This language was removed from the final version of the report because the State Dept. and the Defense Dept. held differing legal interpretations of the CWC. Naval Studies Board, An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons, p. xiii.
125. Ambassador Ledogar stated in his May 1, 1992, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “The US is concerned that declarations of all chemicals intended to be used for law enforcement would reveal sensitive information, such as how to defeat the chemical's effects or how to create the same chemicals for illegal use. The Chairman's text addresses this problem by requiring only declaration of chemicals held for riot control purposes.” Committee on Foreign Relations, Chemical Weapons Ban, p. 35.
126. CWC Bulletin Editors, “New Technologies and the Loophole,” CBW Convention Bulletin No. 23 (March 2004), <http://fas-www.harvard.edu/∼hsp/bulletin/cwcb23.pdf>.
127. See Fidler, “The meaning of Moscow,” citing Articles 31.1 and 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, UNTS Vol. 1155, p. 331.
128. Adolf von Wagner, “Toxic Chemicals for Law Enforcement including Domestic Riot Control Purposes under the Chemical Weapons Convention,” in Marie Chevrier, Alan Pearson, and Mark Wheelis, eds., Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons, (in press).
129. Abram Chayes and Matthew Meselson, “Proposed Guidelines on the Status of Riot Control Agents and Other Toxic Chemicals Under the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Chemical Weapons Conventions Bulletin 35 (Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, March 1997), pp. 13–17.
130. Fidler, “The meaning of Moscow,” p. 538.
131. The interpretations of Chayes and Meselson and von Wagner might be open to the same objection, albeit to a lesser degree, insofar as advances in science and technology are identifying powerful but short-acting analgesics/anesthetics such as remifentanil, whose specific action on central nervous system functions qualitatively differs from the non-specific action of traditional riot control agents such as tear gas.
132. Robin M. Coupland “‘Calmatives’ and ‘Incapacitants’ – Questions for humanitarian law brought by new means and methods of warfare with new effect,” paper presented to the Open Forum on the Chemical Weapons Convention—Challenges to the Chemical Weapons Ban, The Hague, Netherlands, May 1, 2003, p. 23, <www.central.susx.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/OpenForumCWC.pdf>. See also David P. Fidler, “‘Non-lethal’ weapons and international law: Three perspectives on the future,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival 17 (2001), pp. 199–201.
133. Of course, this would create an incentive to develop the next, “new and improved” incapacitating biochemical weapon.
134. Coupland, “Calmatives”; Wheelis, “Faustian Bargain”; Naval Studies Board, An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons, p. 27.
135. Such agents could have some utility in domestic law enforcement for the apprehension of individual criminals or the resolution of hostage crises arising spontaneously. But in many countries, the requirement for nonlethality in domestic law enforcement applications will be extremely high, much more so than for military uses. Such agents might also have some military use in the apprehension of terrorists and other adversaries. This is likely one reason for current military interest in these agents and may also explain in part why special forces may be equipped with “knock-out” agents.
136. Agentai, Inc., “Smart Non-Lethal Bullets,” Topic # Navy 02-122; and Agentai, Inc., “Rocket Assisted Safe Projectile,” Topic # Navy 02-119, Navy Small Business Innovation Research Awards, 2002, <www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pr080903support.html>.
137. Not considered here are private military contractors (or PMCs), who are increasingly prominent, but largely unregulated, purveyors of security services and armed force at the local, national, and global levels. It seems likely that PMCs could find great utility in any incapacitating biochemical weapons that might come on the market. For more information on PMCs, see for example Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
138. Wheelis, “Faustian Bargain.”
139. Wheelis, “Faustian Bargain.”
140. Others have also expressed these concerns. See for example references 2, 4, 7 and Committee on Advances, Globalization, Biosecurity, pp.178–183; also see J. Patocka and J. Fusek, “Chemical Agents and Chemical Terrorism,” Central European Journal of Public Health 12, Suppl. (2004), pp. S75–S77, stating that “calmatives” are among the chemical weapons that terrorists could use and that “prohibition of chemical weapons is not respected by terrorists and by non-conventional [sic] countries.” Noting that Dr. Fusek is among the Czech researchers involved in developing these same weapons for the Czech military, Davison and Lewer comment that “with the ongoing development of these pharmaceutical weapons many observers fear that ‘conventional’ countries such as the Czech Republic, Russia, and the United States have also lost this respect.” Davison and Lewer, Bradford Report 8, p. 52.
141. Biochemical incapacitants could also provide new tools for interrogation and torture. This capability will probably emerge even in the absence of incapacitating biochemical weapons programs, but it would certainly be facilitated by such programs.
142. Paul L. Howard, Operational Aspects of Agent CS, USATECOM Deseret Test Center technical report DTC-FR-S700M, April 1973 (unclassified Dec. 1979), as quoted in Mathew S. Meselson and Julian P. Perry Robinson, “‘Non Lethal’ Weapons and Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions,” paper delivered to the 20th Pugwash Workshop Study Group on the Implementation of the CBW Conventions, Geneva, Switzerland, Nov. 8–9, 2003, p. 3. See also Furmanski, “Military Interest,” p. 16.
143. John Hart, Frida Kuhlau, and Jacqueline Simon, “Chemical and biological weapons developments and arms control,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 645–682.
144. Allison et al., Non-lethal Weapons and Capabilities, p. 32.
145. CBW Conventions Bulletin, News Chronology entry for Dec. 5, 2000, 51, Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, March 2001, p. 35. The Council on Foreign Relations Task Force adds: “While a world free of BW and CW is not within our grasp, it is highly probably that if the United States espouses BNLW or CNLW several nations (and not only the renegades) will adopt serious military programs for the development of lethal agents in the guise of advancing the capabilities of nonlethal ones.” Allison et al., Non-Lethal Weapons, p. 61.
146. James B. Petro, Theodore R. Plasse, and Jack A. McNulty, “Biotechnology: Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefense,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 1 (Sept. 2000), pp. 161–168.
147. Davis, “Nuclear Blindness.”
148. Wheelis, “Faustian Bargain,” p. 78.
149. CBW Conventions Bulletin Editors, “‘Non-lethal’ weapons, the CWC and the BWC,” CBW Conventions Bulletin 61 (Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, Sept. 2003), p. 1.
150. Allison et al., Non-lethal weapons, pp. 62–63.
151. Graham S. Pearson, New Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the Fifth Review Conference, Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 3 (Bradford, UK: University of Bradford, Dept. of Peace Studies, 2001), p. 26, <www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/rcp3.pdf>.
152. Wheelis, “Biotechnology and Biochemical Weapons.”
153. Furmanski, “Military Interest.” See also notes 83 and 84. The report of the US/UK Executive Seminar on “non-lethal” weapons included a recommendation from the U.S. Dept. of Defense that “[i]f there are promising technologies that DOD is prohibited from pursing, set up MOA [memoranda of understanding] with DOJ [Dept. of Justice] or DOE [Dept. of Energy].” US/UK Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Seminar Report, p. 8.
154. Wheelis, “Faustian Bargain.”
155. Wheelis, “Faustian Bargain.”
156. See, for example, John D. Steinbrunner, Elisa D. Harris, Nancy Gallagher, and Stacey Okutani, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype Protective Oversight System (University of Maryland, Center of International and Security Studies, Dec. 2005), <www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/pathogens_project_monograph.pdf> and <www.biosecurityboard.gov>.
157. “Both preclinical and clinical research provides important information vital toward identification of calmatives that may be best suited for use as non-lethal techniques.” Lakoski et al., Advantages and Limitations, p. 8.
158. Feakin, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Report No. 3.