HARNESSING GLOBAL TRADE DATA FOR BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL

Abstract

Unlike treaties dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention still lacks formal verification measures, 31 years after entering into force. Here we propose a global export-import monitoring system of biological dual-use items as an additional measure for a web of biological arms controls that could complement traditional export controls. We suggest that such a measure may help to guide consultation or verification processes in the biological area.

Keywords:

• Biological weapons
• Trade data
• Monitoring
• Non-licensing
• Dual-use
• UNSCOM/UNMOVIC
• The Harmonized System

Work for this publication was funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the joint program of the Volkswagenstiftung, the Compagnia di San Paolo, and the Riksbankensjubileumsfond.

Notes

1. Concerning the “modules,” see Trevor Findlay and Angela Woodward, “Enhancing BWC Implementation: A Modular Approach,” WMDC Study No. 23 (Oct. 2004). Concerning the concept of “building blocks,” see Jonathan B. Tucker, “Strengthening the BWC: A Way Forward,” Disarmament Diplomacy No. 78 (July/Aug. 2004), <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd78/78jbt.htm>.

2. Concerning the strengthening of national measures, see the reports under the 1540 Committee, United Nations Web Site, <http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/pressrelease.html>. Concerning better control over dangerous pathogens and toxins, see U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Select Agent Program, March 18, 2005, and first steps in Russia by the Russian Federation Government, Decree 303 on the Biological and Chemical Safety in Russia, May 16, 2005. Concerning the International Biosecurity Convention, see J.D. Steinbrunner and E.D. Harris, “Controlling Dangerous Pathogens,” Issues in Science and Technology (Spring 2003), pp. 47–54; J.B. Tucker, “Preventing the misuse of pathogens: The need for global biosecurity standards,” Arms Control Today (June 2003), pp. 3–10; Jan van Aken, S. Johansen, and R. Kollek, “Die Terror Angst und ihre Folgen,” Deutsches Ärzeblatt (Nov. 2004). Concerning the improved CBMs, see “Canadian Non-Paper: Looking forward to the 2006 BTWC Review Conference,” (2005). Concerning the consultation mechanism, see Iris Hunger and Jan van Aken, "Die Zukunft der biologischen Rüstungskontrolle," in R. Mutz, B. Schoch, C. Hauswedell, J. Hippller and U. Ratsch, eds., Friedensgutachten 2006 (Münster, Germany: LIT-Verlag, 2006). Concerning the UN Secretary General's mandate, see T. Findlay and A. Woodward, “Enhancing BWC Implementation: A Modular Approach,” WMDC Study No. 23 (Oct. 2004), and Una Becker, Harald Müller, and Carmen Wunderlich, “Impulse für das Biowaffenregime: Ein provisorischer Compliance-Mechanismus als Schritt aus der Sackgasse,” HSFK-Report Nr. 7 (July 2005). Concerning the UN verifications body, see T. Findlay, “A Standing United Nations WMD Verification Body: Necessary and Feasible,” WMDC Study No. 40 (May 2005). Concerning the legally binding protocols, see J.B. Tucker, “Strengthening the BWC: A Way Forward.”

3. The Harmonized System is operated by the World Customs Organization (WCO).

4. Monitoring of international trade with drugs and psychotropic substances is conducted by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna is monitored under the CITES Convention, and ozone-depleting substances are monitored by the UN Environment Program (UNEP), Ozone Secretariat.

5. UNSC S/22871/Rev.1 (“The Plan”), Oct. 2, 1991, and UN Security Council Resolution 715, Oct. 10, 1991.

6. UNSC S/22871/Rev.1 (“The Plan”), Oct. 2, 1991, and UN Security Council Resolution 715, Oct. 10, 1991., para. 9.

7. UNSC S/22871/Rev.1 (“The Plan”), Oct. 2, 1991, and UN Security Council Resolution 715, Oct. 10, 1991., para. 35 (g), 38, and para. 5 of Annex III.

8. UNSC S/22871/Rev.1 (“The Plan”), Oct. 2, 1991, and UN Security Council Resolution 715, Oct. 10, 1991., para. 10.

9. UNSCR 715, para. 7, Oct. 10, 1991.

10. UNSCR 986, April 14, 1995.

11. Office of the Spokesman of the Secretary General, Timescale on the use of sanctions, Resolution 986 (1995), <http://www.un.org/News/ossg/iraq.htm>.

12. UNSC document S/1995/1017, Annex I, para. 3, Dec. 7, 1995.

13. UNSCR 1051, March 27, 1996.

14. UNSC document S/1995/1017, Annex I, para. 6, Dec. 7, 1995.

15. UNSC document S/1995/1017, Annex I, para. 2.

16. UNSC document S/1995/1017, Annex I, para. 9.

17. UNSC document S/1995/1017, Annex I, para. 8.

18. UNSC document S/1995/1017, Annex I, para. 9.

19. UNSC document S/1995/1017, Annex I, para. 10.

20. Semi-annual UNSCOM reports S/1997/391, April 11, 1997, S/1997/774 Oct. 6, 1997, S/1998/322, April 16, 1998 and, S/1998/920, Oct. 6, 1998.

21. 23rd UNMOVIC Quarterly Report, S/2005/742, Nov. 29, 2005.

22. 23rd UNMOVIC Quarterly Report, S/2005/742, Nov. 29, 2005.

23. UNSCR 1284, Dec. 17, 1999.

24. S/2005/742.

25. S/2005/742., para. 36.

26. In the biological area, the only international list of critical dual-use items was that of the Australia Group. Other international regimes that were later used to refine the monitoring lists for long-range missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons include the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

27. UN Monitoring List S/1995/205 and 215.

28. UN Monitoring List S/1995/208, March, 17, 1995, para. 1.7 of Annex III.

29. UN Monitoring List S/1995/208, March, 17, 1995, Appendix to Annex III. Items have to be reported under “The Plan” (UN Security Council document S/22871/Rev.1, Oct. 2, 1991) para.s 35(g) and 38(a) and paras. 5 of its Annex III, and UN Monitoring List S/1995/205 & 215.

30. The term export-import monitoring refers not only to the exports of the supplier states but also to exports of listed goods out of Iraq. However, only very few exports of minor items out of Iraq were ever notified. Concerning the notifications from supplier states see UN Security Council document S/1995/1017, Dec. 7, 1995, “The Mechanism for the export-import monitoring,” para. 13.

31. UN Security Council documents S/2001/560, (missiles, chemical and biological weapons) and S/2001/561 (nuclear weapons), both June 6, 2001, and UNSCR 1284, para. 8, Dec. 17, 1999.

32. The Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) is a division of the American Chemical Society. The CAS numbers identify every chemical described in the literature as well as alloys and polymers.

33. S/1998/332, para. 117, April 16, 1998.

34. See, for example, UNSCR 1540, April 28, 2004 concerning Russia, <www.bis.doc.gov/News/2004/PeterTmony6_23_04.htm>, and concerning China, Asian Export Control Observer (Dec. 2004/Jan. 2005), p. 2.

35. The Harmonized System: The language of international trade, WCO Web Site, <www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/AboutUs/fiche2%20A%20ng.pdf>.

36. The system is often simply called the Harmonized System. It should not be mistaken with the Globally Harmonized System of Classifying and Labelling of Chemicals, which only deals with dangerous chemicals. For further information, please check <www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/ghs/ghs_welcome_e.html>.

37. The World Customs Organisation Web Site, <www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/AboutUs/aboutus.html>.

38. UN Statistic Division, UN Web Site, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/default.aspx>.

39. Some data in the UN COMTRADE is presented not as HS codes, but using the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). Actually, work has been done to enhance the compatibility of the two systems: Matthias Greulich, “Revision von Wirtschaftsklassifikationen bis 2007–ein Zwischenbericht,” Wirtschaft und Statistik 4/2004, Statistisches Bundesamt (2004).

40. In 1996 the WCO was still operating under the name Customs Cooperation Council. Notes of the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the OPCW, PC-XIV/9 (list of substances), July 16, 1996 and PC-XV/B/2, Aug. 2, 1996.

41. See Annex C/5 of <www.usitc.gov/tata/bground/wco/NSxxxx/NS0060B2.pdf>.

42. World Customs Organization, Amendments to the Harmonized System Nomenclature, effective from Jan. 1, 2002, published in Brussels Jan. 2001.

43. Export control regimes such as the Australia Group are politically based on an exclusive sample of member states and differ therefore from the inclusive idea of a global trade monitoring. The items listed for export monitoring could, however, be used by the regimes.

44. S/2005/545, Aug. 30, 2005, paras. 9 and 41 of the Appendix.