IMPLEMENTING UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540

Abstract

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) was adopted in 2004 to address the risk that non-state actors will acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It requires all states to implement a wide range of domestic legislation to prevent such proliferation. This comprehensiveness makes 1540 an important tool, but a piecemeal approach to implementation may lead to its underutilization. This study provides a risk-based framework, focusing on the implementation of the resolution in a set of states which are the most relevant for WMD proliferation and highlighting a set of 1540 obligations which are the most important for each state to fulfill. An evaluation of implementation progress so far reveals that the vast majority of these states have few of their key obligations in place. While the universal implementation of 1540 is an important goal, ensuring that these key provisions are carried out should be a priority.

Keywords:

• Weapons of mass destruction
• United Nations Security Council
• Non-state actors
• Nonproliferation

Notes

1. The three types of weapons considered WMD are nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The Resolution itself does not use the term WMD, but explicitly specifies the three types of weapons due to the fact that there is no commonly agreed definition on what, technically, constitutes a weapon of mass destruction.

2. According to the testimony of a former Al Qaeda operative, the organization has not only declared its interest in obtaining WMD, but has made concerted efforts to acquire materials for this purpose; See, Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, “WMD Terrorism and Usama Bin Laden,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies Reports, update March 14, 2001 <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm>.

3. Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) was adopted unanimously by Algeria, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Germany, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States on 28 April 2004.

4. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention, and Biological Weapons Convention all include obligations for national implementation

5. White House Web Site, <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030923-4.html>.

6. For the remainder of this report, the term WMD in reference to 1540 will be understood to include their means of delivery and related materials.

7. Chapter VII details potential coercive action by the Security Council “with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” See Charter of the United Nations, <www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>.

8. By the terms of the Resolution, non-state actors are prohibited to develop, acquire, possess, manufacture, transport, or transfer WMD. For the purposes of this report, the term acquisition will be understood to include all such prohibitions.

9. In regard to the obligations of the Resolution, the word appropriate is used 13 times and the word effective is used 11 times.

10. Remarks by Ambassador Ashraf Jehangir Qazi to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, June 21, 2004, available at <http://www.embassyofpakistan.org/news93.php>.

11. S/RES/1540 (2004) operative para. 7.

12. Security Council Resolution 1673 (2006).

13. These 84 states are identified based on publicly available indications of their capabilities. Additional states may be added to this list if they fit the criteria used to identify particular relevance for the Resolution.

14. Specific types of facilities include nuclear power reactors, research reactors and critical assemblies, conversion facilities, fuel fabrication plants, enrichment plants, and reprocessing plants.

15. Centers for Disease Control Office of Health and Safety Web Site, <www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4s3.htm>.

16. See Iris Hunger, “Confidence Building Needs Transparency: A summary of data submitted under the Bioweapons Convention's confidence building measures 1987-2003,” The Sunshine Project, Sept. 2005.

17. See Iris Hunger, “Confidence Building Needs Transparency: A summary of data submitted under the Bioweapons Convention's confidence building measures 1987-2003,” The Sunshine Project, Sept. 2005.

18. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Web Site, <www.opcw.org/basic_facts/html/bf_int_main_frame_cwc_opcw.html>.

19. “Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2004,” the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Nov. 8, 2005, <www.opcw.org/docs/csp/csp10/en/c1004.pdf>.

20. While the OPCW also conducts verification of facilities which produce over 200 tons of discrete organic chemicals (DOCs) and over 30 tons of DOCs containing phosphorous, sulfur, or fluorine (PSF chemicals), the primary concern with such facilities is that the production of such chemicals on a large scale may have relevance to a state CW program rather than any risk of proliferation to non-state actors. DOC/PSF facilities are therefore not considered in this report. See Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Web Site <www.opcw.org/basic_facts/html/bf_int_main_frame_cwc_opcw.html>.

21. See Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site, Iran profile <www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1819.html> and Isreal profile </www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Israel/Nuclear/index.html>.

22. Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site, Libya profile <www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/index.html>.

23. In spite of Taiwan's uncertain political status, it is considered as its own entity for the purposes of this study due to capabilities of relevance for 1540. Efforts to ensure that the proliferation potential for such capabilities are addressed will likely mirror the special arrangements made by the IAEA and OPCW regarding Taiwanese facilities. The successor states to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are considered separately. See Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site, <www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/index.html>; GlobalSecurity.org Web Site,</www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/index.html>; Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945–2002,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58 (Nov./Dec. 2002), pp. 103–104, </www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd02norris>; Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Pursuits,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59 (Sept./Oct. 2003), pp. 71–72, <www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=so03norris>.

24. In addition to the states previously indicated, these include Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Democratic Republic of Congo, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

25. These states are Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, India, Iraq, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

26. Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site, </www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/index.html>.

27. While Czechoslovakia declared a defensive biological weapons program, its successor states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have not done so. Because of the maintenance of BSL-4 facilities however they are still considered important for biological weapons proliferation; Source: Iris Hunger, “Confidence Building Needs Transparency: A summary of data submitted under the Bioweapons Convention's confidence building measures 1987–2003,” The Sunshine Project, Sept. 2005.

28. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Report on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2004, Nov. 8, 2005, pp. 6–7.

29. See Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/index.html>. For Albania, see, “Bush Earmarks Funds to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents in Albania,” Press Release, United States Dept. of State, Oct. 21, 2004.

30. See Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/index.html>. For Albania, see, “Bush Earmarks Funds to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents in Albania,” Press Release, United States Dept. of State, Oct. 21, 2004.

31. The states are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. Information provided by the American Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Report on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2004, Nov. 8 2005, Annexes 4 and 5

32. Sources: The American Association of Port Authorities and, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Review of Maritime Transport, 2005.

33. See World Port Rankings 2003, The American Association of Port Authorities, available at </www.aapa-ports.org/pdf/WORLD_PORT_RANKINGS_2003.xls>.

34. These classifications are based largely on the categories used by the group of governmental experts on 1540 in their assessment matrices.

35. There are many examples of the transfer of WMD materials through various ports, including missile components from Russia to Iran (Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site, <www.nti.org/db/nistraff/1999/19990960.htm>), the shipment of a nerve agent precursor from South Korea to North Korea (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Asian Export Control Observer, Issue 4, Oct./Nov. 2004, pp. 7–8, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/asian/pdfs/aeco_0410.pdf>), and the use of false end-use certificates to ship centrifuge components from the UAE to Libya (David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: Working Toward Closing Gaps in the International Nonproliferation Regime, Prepared for the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 45th annual meeting, July 2, 2004, </www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/nuclear_black_market.html>).

36. This is done in the form of a question mark on that provision of the matrix.

37. It is important to note that this does not mean that these three states have not fulfilled any of their obligations under the Resolution as a whole; it is only a reference to the key obligations identified as particularly important for each individual state.

38. Final Document of the XIII Conference of Heads of State Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Kuala Lumpur, Feb. 24–25, 2003, para. 84. See Non-Aligned Movement Web Site <www.nam.gov.za/media/030227e.htm>.

39. See the Report Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004); April 26, 2006; Annexes VI–IX.