NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION OVER THE NEXT DECADE

Abstract

The intensification of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises causes concern that deteriorating security conditions in the Middle East and Northeast Asia will lead additional countries to seek nuclear weapons. This special issue, which is based on a conference organized by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, examines the factors that are likely to shape nuclear proliferation in the next ten years. This introduction analyzes the conditions and events that might drive new countries to pursue nuclear weapons; the indicators and cautionary signs that can provide early warning that a country is trying to build nuclear bombs; and the policy measures that can be adopted to prevent or at least dissuade new proliferators. A novel analytical approach is developed, focusing on the role of nuclear myths and mythmakers to help analysts better understand and policymakers better manage nuclear proliferation over the next decade.

Keywords:

• Nuclear weapons
• Nuclear proliferation
• U.S. nonproliferation policy
• Intelligence
• Dissuasion

Notes

1. U.S. and UK efforts to deny the Soviet Union access to world uranium supplies increased after the end of World War II because prewar geological studies convinced Allied officials that Moscow had limited access to high-grade uranium. This estimate was mistaken, for the Soviets immediately exploited rich uranium deposits in the Ural Mountains that U.S. analysts did not know existed and also imported large quantities of uranium ore from Czechoslovakia. As a result, the Soviet bomb program advanced much more quickly than U.S. intelligence estimated. See Donald P. Steury, “How the CIA Missed Stalin's Bomb,” Studies in Intelligence 49 (2005), <www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol49no1/html_files/stalins_bomb_3.html>; and Charles A. Ziegler, “Intelligence Assessments of Soviet Atomic Capability, 1945–1949: Myths, Monopolies, and Maskirovka,” Intelligence and National Security 12 (Dec. 1997).

2. The main expectations of realism—or, more accurately, neo-realism—are: (1) the recurrence of balances of power in the world political system; (2) the tendency of states to balance, that is, to strengthen, themselves in the face of foreign threats; and (3) the inclination of states to imitate one another and to become socialized to the international system. Realists say that states usually balance against the most serious military threats to their security; rarely do they bandwagon, that is, accommodate or appease those making the threats. States can try to balance “internally” by relying on their own military capabilities or “externally” by relying on the military capabilities of allies. Defense planners generally prefer internal balancing because it leaves less to chance and less to the will of others; however, this strategy requires levels of national determination and resources that are beyond the reach of many countries. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 128, 168; and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), pp. 156–157.

3. For a detailed application of this point using social psychology, see Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identify, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

4. For examples, see Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: the Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: HarperCollins, 1999); and Paul Bracken, “The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,” Nov. 5, 2003, MIT Security Studies Program website, <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives_03fall/bracken.htm>.

5. For background on this point, see Peter R. Lavoy, “Pakistan's Strategic Culture: A Theoretical Excursion,” Strategic Insights 4 (Oct. 2005), < www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/lavoyOct05.asp>.

6. See J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics 14 (Oct. 1961), pp. 77–92; and William B. Moul, “The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 6 (Sept. 1973), pp. 494–513.

7. For background on this approach, see Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies 2 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 192–212; and Peter R. Lavoy, Learning to Live with the Bomb: India, the United States, and the Myths of Nuclear Security (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2007).

8. By highlighting the security factor in all nuclear proliferation decisions, this approach differs from those that point to insecurity as the cause of some states’ nuclear programs, but not others, which are said to be motivated by domestic politics, the search for prestige, or some other factor. For example, see Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 73–85.

9. For background, see Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

10. The third kind of belief, which relates to the strategic utility of owning nuclear weapons, is often discussed and debated at the outset of a nuclear bomb program, but it is far less important than other nuclear myths in actual decisions to embark on such a program. Discussion and debates over the strategic utility of nuclear arsenals tend to be much more salient after nuclear weapons are produced.

11. Stephen Burgess, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Policies,” in this issue.

12. See also Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink, Adelphi Paper 380 (London: Routledge for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006).

13. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Awakening the People (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, 1970), p. 21. For background, see Peter R. Lavoy, “Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine,” in Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen, eds., Prospects for Peace in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

14. Michael Slackman and Mona El-Naggar, “Mubarak's Son Proposes Nuclear Program,” New York Times, Sept. 20 2006, p. A14.

15. “North Korea Statement on Nuclear Test,” BBC News, Oct. 3, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5402292.stm>.

16. New York Times, Oct. 5, 1964. In Dec. 1959, Bhabha exaggerated: “We can now manufacture atomic weapons if we mean to.” Hindustan Times (New Delhi), Dec. 16, 1959. In Feb. 1961, he boasted that India could produce a nuclear weapon in two years. Shortly thereafter, Nehru affirmed Bhabha's claim, as reported in “India Could Have Bomb by 1963,” Manchester Guardian, Oct. 23, 1961.

17. Hindu (Chennai), Oct. 27, 1964; Thomas F. Brady, “Pressure Grows for India A-Bomb,” New York Times, Oct. 27, 1964.

18. This argument is developed much more fully in Lavoy, Learning to Live with the Bomb.

19. See also Gordon Corera, Shopping For Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of A.Q. Khan's Nuclear Network (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

20. This issue is relevant to the debate now fashionable in academic circles as to whether democracies are less prone to nuclear proliferation than authoritarian societies. The approach taken here suggests that the nature of governments or societies does not matter much for nuclear proliferation, but it does determine to a great degree the ability of outside analysts to obtain early warning about the evolution of nuclear myths and mythmakers, and thus about the initiation, acceleration, or even termination of nuclear bomb programs.

21. For background, see Lorne J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947–1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

22. See Central Intelligence Agency, “Indian Test Will Spur Pakistani Effort,” National Intelligence Daily, May 24, 1974, declassified document available at the CIA's Electronic Reading Room, <www.foia.cia.gov>.

23. Iraq Survey Group, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqi WMD, vol. 1, “Regime Strategic Intent,” Sept. 30, 2004, esp. p. 46, < www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol1.pdf>.

24. This is a conclusion reached in the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005, p. 156, <www.wmd.gov/about.html>.

25. Scott D. Sagan “How to Keep the Bomb from Iran,” Foreign Affairs 85 (Sept./Oct. 2006).

26. Cited in “Outcry at N. Korea ‘Nuclear Test,’” BBC News, Oct. 9, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5402292.stm>.

27. Institute for Science and International Security, “Case Studies of Illicit Procurement Networks: Education and Training,” 2003, < www.exportcontrols.org/education.html>.

28. Iraq Survey Group, Comprehensive Report, Vol. 1, “Regime Finance and Procurement,” Sept. 30, 2004, esp. pp. 3–5, < www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol1.pdf>.

29. Iraq Survey Group, Comprehensive Report, Vol. 1, “Regime Finance and Procurement,” Sept. 30, 2004, esp. pp. 3–5, < www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol1.pdf>., pp. 116–32.

30. Iraq Survey Group, Comprehensive Report, Vol. 1, “Regime Finance and Procurement,” Sept. 30, 2004, esp. pp. 3–5, < www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol1.pdf>., pp. 77–82.

31. See Ariel Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security 27 (Winter 2002–2003), p. 66.

32. Jungmin Kang, Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Richard Tanter, “South Korea's Nuclear Surprise,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61 (Jan./Feb. 2005), pp. 40–49, < www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn = jf05kang>.

33. Technically speaking, these U.S. alliances provided an assurance of security more than dissuasion to these states. For a discussion of the distinction, see Chuck Lutes, “The Role of Dissuasion in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Strategic Insights 3 (Oct. 2004), <www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/oct/lutesOct04.pdf>; and Peter R. Lavoy, Barry Zellen, and Christopher Clary, “Dissuasion in U.S. Defense Strategy,” Strategic Insights 3 (Oct. 2004), <www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/dissOct04_rpt.pdf>.

34. For background on the CDI, see Peter R. Lavoy and Gayle D. Meyers, “U.S. Counterproliferation Cooperation with Allies,” in Jim A. Davis and Barry R. Schneider, eds., Avoiding the Abyss: Progress, Shortfalls, and the Way Ahead in Combating the WMD Threat (Montgomery, ALA: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2005), pp. 315–46.

35. See also Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

36. See also Lewis A. Dunn, Peter R. Lavoy, andScott D. Sagan, “Conclusions: Planning the Unthinkable,” in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 223–57.

37. Peter R. Lavoy, “The Costs of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia,” in D.R. SarDesai and Raju G.C. Thomas, eds., Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002).

38. Kevin O'Neill, “Building the Bomb,” in Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), pp. 32–103.

39. UNDP, Human Development Report 1999 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 134–37.

40. Lt. Gen. R.K. Jasbir Singh, “The Costs of Nuclear Weaponisation,” in R.K. Jasbir Singh, ed. Indian Defence Yearbook: 1999 (Dehra Dun: Natraj, 1999), pp. 135–36.