ANTICIPATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Abstract

Good intelligence is critical to support U.S. policy efforts to counter nuclear proliferation, but the historical record is mixed. This article reviews several past cases of nonproliferation success and failure, including the Soviet Union, China, India, Libya, Iraq, and the A. Q. Khan network. Intelligence frequently provides warning, and in some cases concrete and timely information has enabled nonproliferation successes. On the other hand, failures often result from a lack of detailed and specific information adequate to overturn erroneous assumptions or preconceptions. Improvements in intelligence are needed, but correct assessments of foreign programs cannot be guaranteed. A close and healthy relationship between intelligence analysts and policymakers is also a key factor in making the most of insights that are developed.

Keywords:

• Nonproliferation
• Intelligence
• Nuclear weapons
• Nuclear proliferation
• Soviet Union
• China
• India
• Pakistan
• Libya
• A. Q. Khan
• Iraq

Notes

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35. Malcolm Gladwell, “Connecting the Dots: The Paradoxes of Intelligence Reform,” New Yorker, March 10, 2003. Gladwell attributes the term to Baruch Fischhoff.

36. For example, see L. Keith Gardiner, “Dealing with Intelligence-Policy Disconnects,” in Westerfield, Inside CIA's Private World, pp. 344–46.

37. Veteran CIA analyst Jack Davis provides guidance for analysts in dealing with this perennial divide in “Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence,” Kent Center Occasional Papers 2 (Jan. 2003), <www.cia.gov/cia/publications/Kent_Papers/vol2no2.htm>.