NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION MOTIVATIONS

Abstract

The United States failed to prevent Pakistan from building nuclear weapons because U.S. officials never fully grasped Pakistan's perception of its security situation relative to India, especially after the 1971 Bangladesh war. Because Pakistani officials considered nuclear weapons essential to national survival, none of the measures deployed by the United States to dissuade Pakistan could have worked. This and other lessons of the Pakistani experience, including exploiting willing supply networks, providing financial and programmatic autonomy to key officials, and the consequent dangers of losing control of a dangerous program conducted in strict secrecy, are analyzed and their implications for future proliferants assessed.

Keywords:

• Pakistan
• Nuclear proliferation
• Central Asia
• Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
• Khan Research Laboratory

Notes

1. The author is grateful to Adam Radin for research input and to Peter Lavoy for ideas, comments, and valuable insights.

2. Gordon Corera, Shopping For Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 14.

3. The term “fantastic cleverness” was coined by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. See Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink, Adelphi Paper 380 (London: Routledge for Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006), p. 37.

4. Pakistan's experience in the nonproliferation regime is very limited. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament in the United Nations at Geneva and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Like other non-NPT states such as India and Israel, Pakistan has bilateral safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Commission on specific facilities and nuclear materials under the INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. It is an observer in NPT deliberations and remains an outcast in the export control cartels such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Pakistan declined to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) but agreed to participate in the CTBT verification regime and has allowed the establishment of monitoring stations under its jurisdiction.

5. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001).

6. Michael Mandelbaum, “Lessons for Next War,” Foreign Affairs 74 (March/April 1995), pp. 28–30.

7. Michael Mandelbaum, “Lessons for Next War,” Foreign Affairs 74 (March/April 1995), pp. 28–30.

8. The author is indebted to Jeff Knopf for the source and comments in a discussion on this topic on Aug. 11, 2006.

9. Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 1–3. Several definitions have been used by various studies and organizations in the U.S. government to describe nuclear capacities. Terms such as “nuclear threshold status” are analogous to the CIA's definition of “standby capability.” Standby capability is defined by Ariel Levite as “possession as of now of all facilities needed to produce nuclear weapons,” in his article “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security 27 (2003), p. 66.

10. Levite defines “nuclear hedging” in its advanced form as developing the capacity “to produce fissionable materials as well as scientific and engineering expertise to package final product into a nuclear explosive charge” at a short notice. Ariel Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” p. 69.

11. Recently some U.S. authors have minimized the impact of the Indian nuclear test on triggering Pakistan's decision to develop nuclear weapons, pointing instead to a meeting in 1972 when Pakistan's Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto “reportedly exhorted a gathering of Pakistan's nuclear technology establishment to produce a fission bomb in three years, as the Americans had with the Manhattan Project.” See George Perkovich, “Could Anything Be Done to Stop Them? Lessons from Pakistan,” a paper for the Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center, available at <www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20060726-Perkovich-CouldAnythingBeDone&PDFFolder=Essays>.

12. For a detailed analysis of Pakistani strategic culture see, Feroz Hassan Khan, “Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case For Pakistan,” Strategic Insights 10 (Oct. 2005). <www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/khan2Oct05.asp>.

13. Jonathan Power, “Who Did Build The Pakistan Bomb?” Transnational Foundations for Peace and Research, 2006, <www.transnational.org/forum/power/2006/06.23_Kahn_Pakistan.html>.

14. Experts disagree on the exact date of the Pakistani “proliferation decision.” Most point to the meeting of scientists at the chief minister of Punjab's home in Multan on Jan. 20, 1972. The Multan meeting was an important milestone in Pakistan's nuclear history, but it was not exactly a watershed event. The primary purpose was to appoint a friend and proponent of the bomb lobby, Munir Ahmad Khan, as the new chairman of PAEC to replace incumbent Chairman I. H. Usmani, whom Bhutto disliked for a variety of reasons. Bhutto met with the scientists, took stock of the scientific capacity directly from them, and signaled his intent more rhetorically than as a matter of formal policy. Bhutto's intent was also to send a message to a demoralized nation that the new civilian leadership was different and was amenable and supportive of scientific pursuit of a nuclear capability. This information comes from the author's interviews with scientists and government officials present at the 1972 Multan meeting in Dec. 2005 and June 2006.

15. Shahid–ur–Rehman, The Long Road to Chagai (Islamabad, Pakistan: Print Wise Publication, 1999), p. 43.

16. Soft technology refers to basic know-how, data, designs, organization, technical advice, management techniques, technical staff, finance management, etc. Hard technology includes power reactors, reprocessing components, precision engineering and metallurgy facilities, and other sophisticated hardware. For delivery means such as ballistic missiles, hard technology refers to reentry vehicles, guidance systems, engines, and launch platforms, etc. See Aaron Karp, “Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics,”in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 51–146.

17. In fact, great suspicion was directed at anyone and everyone who displayed any interest in the nuclear program, extending even to the level of the Prime Minister in the 1990s. This was stated by senior scientists in interviews with the author in Dec. 2005 in Islamabad, Pakistan.

18. It is important to note that the PAEC was never given the same autonomy as was KRL. This premier scientific organization remained within the state's control and accountability. PAEC received imports, but did not follow the A.Q. Khan network's unprecedented practices.

19. I am indebted to Peter Lavoy for this term.

20. The Pakistan National Command Authority (NCA) met on April 12, 2006, and subsequently announced that it had reviewed the country's minimum deterrence requirement. Although the NCA “expressed satisfaction” with the state of Pakistan's current capabilities, the fact and timing of the review indicate that it viewed the emerging U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement as directly affecting Pakistan's future force needs. According to one press account, “The NCA, however, noted with concern the implications of the U.S.-India nuclear deal on strategic stability in South Asia. In view of the fact that the agreement would enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that a credible minimum deterrence requirement will be met.” See, “Concern Expressed at Indo-U.S. Deal: Deterrence Satisfactory, NCA,” Dawn (Karachi), April 13, 2006, <www.dawn.com/2006/04/13/top5.htm>.

21. M.A. Chaudhri, “The Unsung Nuclear Hero,” The Nation (Islamabad), April 22, 2006, <http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/april-2006/22/columns5.php>.

22. Farhatullah Babur, “Bhutto Footprints on Nuclear Pakistan,” The News (Pakistan), April 4, 2006, <http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/apr2006-daily/04-04-2006/oped/o3.htm>.

23. Over a lunch meeting in the spring of 2002 at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, DC, the late Senator Patrick Moynihan (Democrat of New York), who was the U.S. ambassador to India in 1974, told the author he had met Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in her office and said that the “Mughals next door aren't going to rest now and will inevitably follow suit. India will now be condemned forever to have two nuclear neighbors—China and Pakistan.” See also, Central Intelligence Agency, “Indian Test Will Spur Pakistani Effort,” National Intelligence Daily, May 24, 1974, declassified document available at the CIA's Electronic Reading Room Web Site, <www.foia.cia.gov>.

24. Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (New York: Crook Helm, 1997), pp. 136–178.

25. Two months after the end of the 1965 war, on a presidential visit to Britain in Dec. 1965, Foreign Minister Bhutto encouraged his friend Munir Ahmad Khan—then at the IAEA—to urge Ayub Khan to bring nuclear technology to Pakistan. A similar effort was made two years later when Ayub Khan was on a visit to France in 1967. Bureaucrats in the Foreign Office cited India's nuclear program and urged Khan to broach the subject of nuclear technology assistance with the French leadership, but he declined. See Chaudhri, “The Unsung Hero,” and Farhatullah Babur, “Bhutto's Footprints on Nuclear Pakistan.” See also Jonathan Power, “Who Did Build the Pakistan Bomb?”

26. In June 1983, a U.S. State Dept. secret memorandum concluded that Pakistan had crossed the “technical threshold” in uranium enrichment and possessed the capability to assemble a weapon at short notice. See National Security Archive declassified document number 02328 of the U.S. State Dept., “The Pakistan Nuclear Program,” June 23, 1983, <www.gwu/∼nsarchiiv/NSAEBB6/ipn1.htm>. See also David Albright, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 273.

27. Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p. 257.

28. Retired senior Pakistani official, name withheld by request, interview by author, Islamabad, Pakistan, June 18, 2005. President Ziaul Haq repeatedly assured U.S. interlocutors by “placing his hands over his chest and saying I will never embarrass my friend [President Reagan].” See also Kux, The United States and Pakistan, pp. 257–269.

29. On April 1984, in the local Urdu newspaper Nawai-i Waqt, A. Q. Khan was quoted boasting of having enriched weapon-grade uranium. This report was followed by arrests of some Pakistanis in the United States (Texas) and Canada for illegal exports of sensitive technologies. See Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p. 275.

30. This law required the U.S. president to certify that Pakistan was in possession of the bomb for military aid to continue. Pakistan's verbal restraint commitments in the 1980s were: not to convert enriched gas into metal, not to machine it into cores, not to put cores into warheads, not to conduct hot tests, and not to transfer nuclear technology at all costs.

31. This was the third major crisis in a series of crises that began in 1984 with the occupation of the Siachin Glacier and the Sikh insurgency and the military stand-off known as ‘Brasstacks’ in the winter of 1986–87.

32. Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p. 257.

33. See Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, And Escalation Control,” in Michael Krepon, Rodney Jones, and Ziad Haider, eds., Escalation Control and Nuclear Option in South Asia (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), pp. 75–100.

34. Pakistan's overtures to North Korea, for example, might not have materialized had there been no nuclear sanctions (under the Pressler Amendment and the MTCR that prevented Pakistan from working with European suppliers. The acquisition of ballistic missiles was as critical for Pakistan in 1990s as the earlier nuclear weapons technology purchases were in the 1970s. The motive in both cases was to respond to India‘s provocative activities (its 1974 nuclear test and the tests of Agni and Prithvi ballistic missiles in the 1990s, respectively).

35. The most critical impact was on the Canadian-supplied safeguarded KANUPP. When Canada abruptly stopped fuel and spare-part supplies, the management and safeguard regimes were put under severe strain.

36. Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and The Bomb (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 57–68.

37. During a visit to Pakistan, President George W. Bush stated that, “ … we discussed a civilian nuclear program, and I explained that Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories. So, as we proceed forward, our strategy will take in effect those well-known differences.” White House, Press Release, March 4, 2006, “President Bush and President Musharraf of Pakistan Discuss Strengthened Relationship, <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060304-2.html>.

38. Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p. 222.

39. President Musharraf has refrained from open criticism of the U.S.-India nuclear deal but has presided over the NCA, which on April 12, 2006 examined the impact of the deal on Pakistan's minimum deterrence requirements.

40. Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad Khan, interview by author, Islamabad, Pakistan, June 17, 2006. Ishfaq Ahmad Khan was a central figure in the developing Pakistani nuclear fuel cycle and weapons development program. He was chair of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission from 1991–2001.

41. Ariel Levite, “Never Say Never Again,” p. 82.

42. Kissinger did not directly threaten, but in the mid-1970s is reported to have said that should Democrat Jimmy Carter, who had campaigned against nuclear proliferation, become president, his administration, allied with Democrats in Congress, would make a “horrible example out of Pakistan.” Kux, The United States and Pakistan.

43. Levite, “Never Say Never Again,” p. 81. The author has has been unable to confirm from Pakistani sources whether Mrs. Bhutto made any such commitment or agreed to such an arrangement.

44. Talbott, Engaging India, p. 65.

45. Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p. 279.

46. Talbott, Engaging India, p. 65. See also comments made by then-Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth in “Avoiding Armageddon,” a 2003 documentary shown on the Public Broadcasting System in the United States, and a companion volume by Martin Schram, Avoiding Armageddon: Our Future 0ur Choice (New York: Basic Books, 2003), pp. 57–66. The author, based on personal knowledge and experience, believes that no such nuclear or missile preparations were made. See Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, And Escalation Control,” pp. 85–87.

47. Talbott, Engaging India, p. 162.

48. The Prime Minister had approved the nuclear command and control arrangement in a presentation made to him and his Cabinet in April 1999. Sharif decided the Prime Minister was to be the head of both the Employment Control and the Developmental Control Committees of the National Command Authority (NCA). The Sharif regime also approved the establishment of a Strategic Plans Division (SPD) as its secretariat, to be moved from General Headquarters to Joint Services Headquarters (JSHQ). The SPD, the focal point of all operational nuclear matters, was operational during the Kargil crisis, and had completed its move to JSHQ in May 1999. The formal approval of the NCA was tied up in the bureaucracy until the end of the Sharif regime. A formal announcement about the creation of the NCA was made on Feb. 2, 2000.

49. Seymour Hersh, “Watching the Warheads—The Risks to Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal,” New Yorker, Nov. 5, 2001, pp. 48–54.

50. Scott Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. W. Norton , 2002), pp. 93–95. See also “The Perils of Proliferation,” in Michael R. Chambers, ed., South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies War College, 2002), pp. 198–99.

51. See for example Ashton B. Carter, “America's New Strategic Partner?” Foreign Affairs 85 (July/Aug. 2006), p. 42. In pleading India's case for acquisition of missiles defense and giving Pakistan as a reason, see Ashley Tellis, “The Evolution of U.S.-India Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship” International Security 30 (Spring 2006), pp.140–147. On Sept. 24, 2006, President Musharraf told “60 Minutes” that shortly after the 9/11 attacks, then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told Pakistan's Director of Intelligence that if Pakistan did not sever its relations with the Taliban, the country should “be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age.” Although Armitage has denied using those specific words, he does not dispute that his message was forceful. See, “Musharraf: In the Line of Fire,” “60 Minutes,” Sept. 24, 2006, <www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/21/60minutes/main2030165.shtml>.

52. Levite, “Never Say Never Again,” p. 87.

53. See Peter R Lavoy and Feroz Hassan Khan, “Rogue or Responsible Nuclear Power? Making Sense of Pakistan's Nuclear Practices,” Strategic Insights 3 (Feb. 2004), <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/feb/lavoyFeb04.asp>. See also William Langewiesche, “The Point of No Return,” Atlantic 297 (Jan./Feb., 2006), p. 9.

54. Zahid Malik used this term on Geo Television, a Pakistani Channel on Aug. 25, 2006, following the news that A.Q. Khan had prostrate cancer. Malik is the author of A.Q. Khan's biography, A.Q. Khan and the Islamic Bomb (Islamabad: Hurmat Publications, 1992).