SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICIES

Abstract

South Africa's transition away from being a U.S. ally toward being a neutral country was followed by the development and then rollback of a nuclear weapons program. In South Africa's case, paranoia that the United States was abandoning it was a significant motive for going nuclear. Realism does not fully explain South Africa's desire for nuclear weapons, since the country faced no major strategic threats. Paranoia about communists and the loss of the United States as a major ally increased South Africa's sense of insecurity, thus it began to develop weapons and missiles. U.S. pressure increased in the late 1980s, and in 1989 the apartheid government began the process of surrendering power. South Africa signed the NPT, and in 1990 and 1991, it unilaterally disarmed. Lessons from the South Africa case include the critical role played by leaders in setting the direction of a country's strategic policy, and the unintended consequences of Western programs to promote peaceful energy. Democratic reforms may prove to be a successful long-term factor in reversing the development of nuclear weapons.

Keywords:

• South Africa
• Atoms for Peace
• Peaceful nuclear explosions
• Nuclear weapons
• Disarmament
• Dismantlement
• Nonproliferation
• Encirclement

Notes

1. Portions of this article are based on Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); and Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, “Correspondence: South Africa's Nuclear Decisions,” International Security 27 (Summer 2002), pp. 186–194.

2. Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

3. Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, and Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament: South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria, S A: Network Publishers, 2003), pp. v–xii; David Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/Aug. 1994), pp. 37–47; Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis (Johannesburg, S A: Jonathan Ball, 1990); Roe E. Horton III, Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience (Colorado Springs: U.S. Air Force Academy Institute for National Security Studies, 1998); Peter Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” International Security 26 (Fall 2001), pp. 45–86; Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a Bomb?” International Security 21 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 69–71; William J. Long and Suzette R. Grillot, “Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine,” Nonproliferation Review 7 (Spring 2000), pp. 24–40; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995); Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989–1990 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); and Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement,” Arms Control Today 25 (Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996), pp. 4–7.

4. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa's Weapons, pp. 59–60.

5. See Memorandum dated March 21, 1975, Lt. Gen. R.F. Armstrong, "The Jericho Weapon System," SADF HS/11/4/34, top secret, declassified Sept. 25, 2003 (SAHA reference no. AL2878,A 3.1.1, 1975) p. 1. See also, Peter Liberman, “Israel and the South African Bomb,” Nonproliferation Review 11 (Summer 2004), pp. 77–80, for a copy of the memo.

6. See Memorandum dated March 21, 1975, Lt. Gen. R.F. Armstrong, "The Jericho Weapon System," SADF HS/11/4/34, top secret, declassified Sept. 25, 2003 (SAHA reference no. AL2878,A 3.1.1, 1975) p. 1. See also, Michael Schmidt, “Proof of SA Nuclear Plan,” Sunday Times (South Africa), Oct. 12, 2003, p. 5.

7. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa's Weapons, pp. 55–56.

8. David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, “Jury Rigged, But Working,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Jan./Feb. 1995), p. 20.

9. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa's Weapons, p. 131.

10. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa's Weapons, p. 130; Dr. Renfrew Christie, interview by author, Bellville, South Africa, June 25, 2000.

11. Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), pp. 373–464.

12. Renfrew Christie, interview by author, University of the Western Cape, June 24, 2000. Dr. Christie helped to expose the nuclear weapons program in the 1970s and 1980s and was punished with seven years in prison.

13. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa's Weapons, p. 120.

14. Steyn et al., Armament and Disarmament, pp. 98–99.

15. Steyn et al., Armament and Disarmament, pp. 98–99.

16. Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp. 407–418. See also the Nuclear Threat Initiative's Web Site. “South Africa Profile,” <www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SAfrica/index.html>, and Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” pp. 4–7.

17. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa's Weapons, p. 126.

18. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa's Weapons, pp. 143–144.