NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN EUROPE

Abstract

Proliferation in Europe stopped in the 1960s due to the nuclear guarantee given by the United States and the European integration process. These factors still apply today but emerging nuclear programs in the European Union (EU) neighborhood and the distension of the transatlantic link make the possibility of a new nuclear country in Europe not completely unthinkable. Turkey would be a prime candidate. In addition, some isolated states could go nuclear if faced with a perceived security threat. Ukraine would be the most likely case. Finally, in extreme circumstances, an EU member could consider a nuclear program. In light of such possibilities, the U.S. security guarantee to Europe, including a nuclear dimension, remains an important nonproliferation instrument.

Keywords:

• Nuclear weapons
• Nuclear proliferation
• Security guarantees
• Nuclear deterrence
• European Union
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Notes

1. John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5–56.

2. Nuclear proliferation occurred in two of Mearsheimer's scenarios. In one, proliferation was “mismanaged.” In another, proliferation was “well managed.” This last scenario, though recognized by the author as unlikely, was deemed by him as “probably … the best hope for maintaining peace in Europe.” Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” pp. 7–8.

3. John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993), pp. 50–66.

4. On this point see Paul Cole, Sweden Without the Bomb: The Conduct of a Nuclear-Capable Nation Without Nuclear Weapons, MR-460 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1994).

5. Inspections are conducted under tripartite agreements binding the Member States, EURATOM, and the IAEA.

6. Hans M. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, Feb. 2005), <www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/contents.asp>.

7. Hans M. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, Feb. 2005), <www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/contents.asp>.

8. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey,” in Harold Muller, ed., Europe and Nuclear Disarmament (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1998), pp. 161–193.

9. Deniz Eeyrek, “Pakistan's Offer for Cooperation,” Radical (June 1998).

10. Quoted in David H. Martin, Nuclear Threat in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Case Against Turkey's Akkuyu Nuclear Plant (Uxbridge, Ontario: Nuclear Awareness Project, June 2000).

11. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Iran's Nuclear Program May Trigger the Young Turks to Think Nuclear,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dec.r 20, 2004, </www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16284>.

12. America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, June 13, 2006).

13. Kibaroglu, “Iran's Nuclear Program.”

14. Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey, Iran, and Nuclear Risks,” in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Washington, DC: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2005), p. 99, <www.npec-web.org/Books/Book051109GettingReadyIran.pdf>.

15. Eurobarometer 65 (Brussels: European Commission, July 2006).

16. Interfax, “Ukraine Vows Not to Host NATO Nuclear Arms,” June 30, 2005.

17. Stephen Mulvey, “Ukraine's Strange Love for Nuclear Power,” BBC News, April 26, 2006.

18. See for instance Interfax, “Ukrainian Defense Minister Denies Possibility of Restoring Nuclear Potential,” Dec. 11, 2003.

19. Interfax, “Ukraine Won't Change its Nuclear-free Status—President,” Nov. 12, 2003.

20. Mulvey, “Ukraine's Strange Love for Nuclear Power.”

21. “Ukraine to Develop New Missile System,” Defense-Express Web Site, BBC Monitoring, April 28, 2006.

22. See William C. Potter, Djuro Miljanic, and Ivo Slaus, “Tito's Nuclear Legacy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56 (March/April 2000), pp. 63–70.

23. Mearsheimer's proliferation scenarios assumed that NATO ceased to function as an alliance, and that U.S. forces, conventional and nuclear, are withdrawn from the continent. Writing at the very end of the Cold War, he did not take into account the creation of the EU, which considerably weakens the probability of his “multipolar Europe” hypothesis.

24. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, p. 34.

25. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, p. 34.

26. Kate Connolly, “Germany ‘Needs a Nuclear Arsenal of its Own,’” Daily Telegraph, Jan. 27, 2006, <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/01/27/wgermany27.xml>.

27. Quoted in Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, p. 50.

28. Nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Okinawa decades ago and from South Korea in 1992.

29. Such a norm would lessen the chances of seeing another nuclear-capable state deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of another one (e.g., Pakistan and Saudi Arabia).

30. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, pp. 9, 11.

31. Federation of American Scientists, Strategic Security Project Blog, “Turkish Parliament Debates U.S. Nuclear Weapons at Incirlik Air Base,” June 7, 2006, <www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/06/turkish_parliament_debates_us.php>.