SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT A FIRST STRIKE

Abstract

This article critiques recent articles in Foreign Affairs and International Security that argue that in the foreseeable future the United States could acquire an assured first-strike capability vis-à-vis Russia and China thanks to technological improvements in U.S. nuclear delivery systems and a general decline in the numbers and capabilities of Russian nuclear forces. Notwithstanding these articles, this analysis finds that mutual deterrence will persist regardless of the scale of possible future imbalances because deterrence is a highly flexible phenomenon. The pertinent question is not whether the United States will be able, in a surprise first strike, to cripple severely Russian response capabilities, but whether political stakes in any foreseeable conflict could justify the risk of even a small retaliatory strike on the United States. This article also assesses whether the Foreign Affairs and International Security articles could inadvertently exacerbate an already highly charged anti-American sentiment in Russia, possibly laying the foundation for a revitalization and expansion of the Russian nuclear arsenal.

Keywords:

• Deterrence
• Nuclear weapons
• First strike
• United States
• Russia

Notes

1. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs 85 (March/April 2006), pp. 42–54; Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30 (Spring 2006), pp. 7–44.

2. Jeffrey Smith, “Treaty Would Cut Few U.S. Warheads,” Washington Post, April 3, 1990, p. A1.

3. Details can be found in Nikolai Sokov, Russian Strategic Modernization: The Past and Future (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 63–65.

4. Pavel Zolotarev, “Yadernaya Burya v Stakane Vody” (A Nuclear Storm in a Glass of Water), Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, March 31, 2006.

5. See discussion on the Foreign Affairs Web Site (“Nuclear Exchange: Does Washington Really Have (or Want) Nuclear Primacy?” Foreign Affairs 85 (Sept./Oct. 2006), <www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faresponse85514/peter-c-w-flory-keith-payne-pavel-podvig-alexei-arbatov-keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/nuclear-exchange-does-washington-really-have-or-want-nuclear-primacy.html>, and at analyst Pavel Podvig's Web Site, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,” <http://russianforces.org/blog/2006/03/speaking_of_nuclear_primacy.shtml> and <http://russianforces.org/blog/2006/03/russia_discusses_nuclear_weapo.shtml>.

6. Independent Task Force Report, “Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do,” Chairs John Edwards and Jack Kemp, Project Director Stephen Sestanovich, Council on Foreign Relations (March 2006), <www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Russia_TaskForce.pdf>.

7. “Rossii ne Nuzhno Ravnoe Kolichestvo Raket s NATO i SShA” (Russia Does not Need the Same Number of Missiles as NATO or the U.S.), Strana.Ru, April 3, 2006.

8. ldquo;Formiruetsya Perspektivnyi Oblik SYaS” (The Prospective Strategic Posture is Emerging), Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, No. 13 (April 5–11, 2006); Anatoli Antipov, “‘Bulava’ Dlya Neptuna i ‘Topol’ Dlya Marsa” (‘Bulava’ for Neptune and ‘Topol’ for Mars), Krasyana Zveada, April 14, 2006; Dmitri Litovkin, “Raketa-Nevidimka Sokhranit Yadernyi Paritet” (The Invisible Missile Will Preserve Nuclear Parity), Izvestiya, April 14, 2006; Alina Shernoivanova, “Rossiiskie Rakety Stanut Tverzhe” (Russian Missiles Will Become Solid), Gazeta.Ru, April 13, 2006; Nikita Petrov, “Yadernyi Armrestling” (Nuclear Arm Wrestling), Strana.Ru, April 14, 2006.

9. See, for example, Sergey Brezkun, “Vzyat na Sebya Svoyu Chast Noshi” (Each Should Shoulder His Own Burden), Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, Sept. 13, 2006.

10. See Anne Cahn, Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).

11. Pavel Podvig, “Nuclear Exchange: Does Washington Really Have (or Want) Nuclear Primacy?”

12. “Aktualnye Zadachi Razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil RF” (Current Tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), report of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Oct. 2, 2003.

13. For a detailed analysis of the evolution of Russian nuclear doctrine, see Nikolai Sokov, “Why States Rely On Nuclear Weapons? The Case Of Russia And Beyond,” Nonproliferation Review 9 (Summer 2002), pp. 101–111, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/92/92sokov.pdf>.

14. For an overview of the aspects of major military exercises relevant to the analysis of nuclear doctrine, see Nikolai Sokov, “Significant Military Maneuvers,” Part V of a research report, “Russia's Nuclear Doctrine,” on the Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site, Aug. 2004, <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/maneuver.htm>.

15. For details of the 2000 strategic modernization debates and the decisions of the Security Council, see Nikolai Sokov, “‘Denuclearization’ of Russia's Defense Policy?” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 17, 2000, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/denuke.htm>; Nikolai Sokov, “The Fate of Russian Nuclear Weapons: An Anticlimax on August 11,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Aug. 14, 2000, <http://cns.miis.edu/publs/reports/denuke2.htm>; and Nikolai Sokov, “The ‘Nuclear Debate’ of Summer 2000,” Part III of issue brief “Russian Nuclear Doctrine,” <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/debate.htm>.