INTRODUCTION

Abstract

If progress is to be made toward eventual nuclear disarmament (or even very low numbers), greater coordination among the Permanent Five (P-5) states will be needed. To date, considerable progress has been made, but much of it is reversible. Equally problematic is that reductions are now increasingly unverified and unilateral. These trends hamper efforts to bring in other parties and build the stronger nonproliferation norms necessary for further cuts in global arsenals (and the prevention of new ones). Studying P-5 nuclear plans 10 years out is important for beginning to chart possibilities (and problems) for increased coordination of international nuclear policies. Moreover, the P-5 states need to replace Cold War “zero-sum” thinking about nuclear weapons with new “positive-sum” approaches to collective security.

Keywords:

• Nuclear weapons
• United States
• Russia
• United Kingdom
• France
• China
• Arms control
• Disarmament

Notes

1. On these points, see, for example, I.C. Oelrich, “Sizing Post–Cold War Nuclear Forces,” Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Paper P-3650, October 2001; Dennis M. Gormley, “Securing Nuclear Obsolescence,” Survival 48 (Autumn 2006), pp. 127–148; and Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006).

2. Five specially selected experts provided comments on each of the papers: Jack Mendelsohn, former deputy director, Arms Control Association (commentator on the United States); David Mosher, senior policy analyst, RAND Corporation (Russia); Hans Kristensen, project director, Nuclear Information Project (United Kingdom); Dieter Dettke, executive director, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Washington, DC (France); and Bonnie Glaser, senior associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies (China).