THE LAST TO DISARM?

Abstract

France still sees its nuclear arsenal as essential both as insurance against future major risks and as support for an independent foreign policy. There is a wide consensus in the country to maintain a nuclear deterrent, both among political parties and the general public. A modernization program is under way that will ensure the continued efficacy of the French nuclear force well into the 2030s, and France has adopted a fairly restrictive interpretation of its disarmament commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This suggests that the likeliest future direction of France's nuclear policy is conservatism. However, other scenarios remain possible, especially in the domain of transatlantic and/or European cooperation.

Keywords:

• France
• Nuclear weapons
• Foreign policy
• Nuclear deterrence
• Nuclear policies
• NATO nuclear weapons

Notes

1. Speech of President Jacques Chirac during his visit to the French strategic forces, Landivisiau/l’Île Longue (Brest), January 19, 2006, <www.ambafrance-au.org/article.php3?id_article=1492>.

2. See 1994 Defense White Paper (Paris: Editions 10/18, 1994), p. 99.

3. Chirac, January 19, 2006.

4. 1994 Defense White Paper, p. 4.

5. Chirac, January 19, 2006.

6. By 2025, Middle Eastern countries will provide about 50 percent of European Union (EU) oil needs, while gas imports will come mainly from Russia (60 percent). Nicole Gnesotto & Giovanni Grevi, eds., The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025? (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006), p. 64.

7. Quoted in Judy Dempsey, “U.S. Lawmaker Urges Use of a NATO Clause: He Calls for Mutual Assistance on Energy,” International Herald Tribune, November 29, 2006.

8. Chirac, January 19, 2006.

9. Chirac, January 19, 2006.

10. Speech of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin at the Institute for Higher Defense Learning, October 22, 1999.

11. Statement of Amb. François Rivasseau, Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament, 2005 Review Conference of the State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), General Debate, New York, May 5, 2005, p. 7.

12. France's Pacific Experiments Center is now dismantled. Its highly enriched uranium production facility at Pierrelatte will be fully dismantled by 2010, and its plutonium production facility at Marcoule will be fully dismantled by 2040.

13. Ministry of Defense, Secretariat-General of National Defense, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Fighting Proliferation, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: France's Contribution,” 2005, p. 64.

14. Statement of Amb. François Rivasseau, Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament, 2005 Review Conference of the State Parties to the NPT, Committee 1, New York, May 19, 2005.

15. Rivasseau, NPT Review Conference, May 5, 2005.

16. Rivasseau, statement at 2005 NPT Review Conference May 19, 2005.

17. Chirac, January 19, 2006.

18. Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, “M-5/M-51,” June 23, 2006; Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Premier tir d'essai ‘réussi’ du missile stratégique M51” (First Test of Strategic Missile M51 ‘A Success’), Libération, November 10, 2006.

19. See, for example, Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, “French Nuclear Forces, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61 (July/August 2005), pp. 73–75, <thebulletin.metapress.com/content/n8rn0x5567572723/fulltext.pdf>.

20. Gen. Henri Bentegeat, in Serge Vinçon, “Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées sur le rôle de la dissuasion nucléaire française aujourd'hui” (Information Report: Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Armed Forces Commission on the Role of Nuclear Deterrence Today), Document No. 36, Ordinary Senate Session, October 24, 2006, p. 29, <www.senat.fr/rap/r06-036/r06-0361.pdf>.

21. See for instance Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Davantage de souplesse dans la dissuasion nucléaire“ (More Flexibility in Nuclear Dissuasion) Libération, February 9, 2006.

22. See “Rapport de la France sur l'application de l'article VI et de l'alinéa C) du paragraphe 4 de la décision de 1995 sur les principes et objectifs de la non-prolifération et du désarmement nucléaires” (France's Report on the Implementation of Article VI and Item C of Paragraph 4 of the 1995 Decision on the Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament), Second Session of the Preparatory Commission of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Geneva, April 30, 2003.

23. Joint press conference (in French) with French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, France-Germany Meeting, Versailles, January 23, 2006, <www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/conferences_et_points_de_presse/2006/janvier/conference_de_presse_conjointe_du_president_de_la_republique_et_de_la_chanceliere_de_la_republique_federale_d_allemagne_a_l_occasion_de_la_rencontre_franco-allemande.38681.html>.

24. “We have made sure to limit downwards the yield of the weapons we maintain, so that nobody could ever forget that nuclear weapons are, by their very nature, different.” Henri Bentegeat, in Vinçon, “Rapport d'Information fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères,” p. 25.

25. Speech of President Jacques Chirac (in French) at the Institute of Higher Defense Learning, June 8, 2001, <www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/discours_et_declarations/2001/juin/discours_de_m_jacques_chirac_president_de_la_republique_devant_l_institut_des_hautes_etudes_de_defense_nationale-paris.579.html>.

26. Prague Summit Declaration, Paragraph 4, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Prague, November 21, 2002.

27. Chirac, January 19, 2006.

28. France's Constitution of 1958 (in French), <www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/textes/constit.pdf>.

29. Alain Peyrefitte, C’était De Gaulle (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), p. 1,359; Bernard Chantebout, “La dissuasion nucléaire et le pouvoir presidentiel” (Nuclear Deterrence and Presidential Power Capacity), Pouvoirs, No. 38, 1986, p. 22; Pierre Messmer, “Notre politique militaire” (Our Military Policy), Revue de Défense Nationale, May 1963, pp. 755–765.

30. Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle Vol. III: Le souverain, 1959–1970 (The Sovereign) (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986), p. 452.

31. Decree No. 64-46 relating to the strategic air forces, January 14, 1964.

32. Henri Pac, Le droit de la défense nucléaire (The Legal Dimension of Nuclear Defense) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), pp. 79–80.

33. “The mission, the organization, and the conditions of engagement of the nuclear forces are decided upon by the Defense Council.” Decree No. 64-46, Article 1.

34. Decree No. 96-520 (in French), on the determination of responsibilities concerning nuclear forces, June 12, 1996 (revised February 5, 2004), <www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/PAHCY.htm>.

35. Decree No. 96-520 (in French), on the determination of responsibilities concerning nuclear forces, June 12, 1996 (revised February 5, 2004), <www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/PAHCY.htm>. Article 3.

36. Strategic oceanic force (force océanique stratégique) and strategic air forces (forces aériennes stratégiques).

37. Samy Cohen, La monarchie nucléaire. Les coulisses de la politique étrangère sous la Vème République (The Nuclear Monarchy: The Fifth Republic's Foreign Policy Behind the Scenes) (Paris: Hachette, 1986).

38. For 2007, see: Paul Quilès, “Avis présenté au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2007“ (Opinion: Foreign Affairs Commission on the draft budgetary law for 2007), Document No. 3366, Vol. 5–Defense, October 12, 2006; Jean Michel, “Avis présenté au nom de la commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2007“ (Opinion: National Defense and Armed Forces Commission on the draft budgetary law for 2007), Vol. 9–Defense, Equipment of the Forces, Space, Communications, Deterrence, Document No. 3367, October 12, 2006; and Sen. Xavier Pintat, “Avis présenté au nom de la commission des Affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2007“ (Opinion: Foreign Affairs, Defense and Armed Forces Commission on the draft budgetary law for 2007), Vol. 4, Document No. 81, November 23, 2006.

39. A good example is Vinçon, “Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères.“

40. Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Alliot-Marie: Défense de toucher au nucléaire” (Don't Touch Nuclear Weapons), Libération, September 8, 2004.

41. See for instance Bruno Tertrais, “Les vertus de la dissuasion nucléaire française” (The Virtues of the French Nuclear Deterrent), Le Figaro, January 21, 2006; François Géré, “Clarifications nucléaires” (Nuclear Clarifications), Le Monde, February 16, 2006.

42. Henri Bentegeat, “Dissuasion,” (Deterrence) Défense Nationale, August 2004, p. 16.

43. Socialist Party, “Réussir ensemble le changement. Le Projet Socialiste pour la France” (Achieving Change Together), July 2006, p. 31, <projet.parti-socialiste.fr/tag/le-texte-du-projet>.

44. “Débat de politique étrangère: M. Fabius offensif, M. Strauss-Kahn classique, Mme Royal inattendue” (Foreign Policy Debate: M. Fabius on the Offense, M. Strauss-Kahn Classical, Mrs Royal Unexpected), Le Monde, November 9, 2006.

45. Ségolène Royal, “Ce que j'ai dit sur… La Defense” (What I've Said on… Defense), p. 1, <www.desirsdavenir.org/actions/generate_pdf.php?id=432>.

46. French Communist Party, “Agir pour un monde de paix” (Acting for a World of Peace), April 6, 2006.

47. See Jean-Pierre Chevènement, “Préserver la dissuasion nucléaire française” (Preserving the French Nuclear Deterrent), Official Statement, January 19, 2006, <www.mrc-france.org/article.php3?id_article=19>.

48. Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF), “La france ensemble. Avant-projet législatif” (France Together: Draft Legislative Plan), p. 8, <www.udf.org/legislatives_2007/avant_projet.pdf>.

49. Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), “Contrat de législature 2007–2012” (Legislative Contract 2007-2012), November 2006, p. 10, <viphttp.yacast.net/ump/projet-ump2007.pdf>.

50. See Philippe de Villiers, “Jacques Chirac veut lutter contre le terrorisme alors qu'il l'a installé chez nous” (Jacques Chirac Wants to Fight against Terrorism, but He Had It Taking Root at Home), Official Statement, January 19, 2006, <www.pourlafrance.fr/communiques.php?n=160>.

51. Front National, Party Platform (in French), “300 Mesures pour la France,” 2001, <www.frontnational.com/doc_secu_defense.php>.

52. Ministry of Defense, “Les Français et la défense: résultats 2006 du sondage annuel réalisé par BVA pour le ministère de la défense”, (The French and Defense: 2006 Results of the Annual Poll realized by BVA for the Defense Ministry), July 13, 2006.

53. See Pierre Rousselin, “Une Dissuasion pour l'Avenir” (A Deterrent for the Future), Le Figaro, January 20, 2006; and “Chirac et la Bombe” (Chirac and the Bomb), Le Monde, January 21, 2006.

54. Interview with I-TV television channel, “Le Franc-Parler” (Let Us Speak Plainly), October 30, 2006.

55. The Green Party, “Le monde change, avec les verts changeons le monde” (With the Greens, Let's Change the World), August 3, 2006, p. 78, <www.lesverts.fr/IMG/pdf/prog060803.pdf>.

56. See the Web Site (in French) of the Commission of Justice and Peace, <justice-paix.cef.fr/>.

57. David S. Yost, “France's Nuclear Dilemmas,” Foreign Affairs 75 (January/February) 1996, pp. 108–118.

58. On June 13, 1996, Chirac announced that up to eight tests would be conducted (though only seven were in fact planned by France's Atomic Energy Agency, CEA). Even though Chirac appeared determined that international and domestic pressure should not detract France from executing this final series until its conclusion, it was nevertheless agreed that the CEA should conduct only the minimum number required for the qualification of the new TN75 warhead and the testing of the new “robust” warhead formula. After the sixth test took place on January 27, 1996, the preliminary results acquired were judged satisfactory by the CEA; this allowed the Elysée to announce the end of the series on January 29.

59. “The supreme guarantee of allied security is ensured by the alliance's strategic nuclear forces, in particular those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom, which fulfil a deterrent role of their own, contribute to overall allied deterrence and security.” This sentence was meant to make it easier for Germany to agree on a dialogue on nuclear deterrence. French-German Security and Defense Common Concept (in French), Nuremberg, December 9, 1996, <www.leforum.de/artman/publish/article_465.shtml>.

60. See Chirac, January 19, 2006.

61. “The priority of our foreign and defense policy remain to guarantee the security of our countryfellows and to assure the protection of our vital interests. Our existence as a State and as a Nation depend on it. This security and this protection also cover our friends and allies. They are within the realm of nuclear deterrence and justify that our country continues to have an autonomous nuclear deterrence force” (emphasis in the original). UMP, “Contrat de Législature 2007–2012,” p. 10. See also Hervé de Charrette, “Ouvrons le débat sur l'arme nucléaire” (Let Us Open the Debate on Nuclear Weapons), Ouest-France, December 4, 2006.

62. UDF, “La France Ensemble,” p. 8.

63. See for instance Charrette, “Ouvrons le débat sur l'arme nucléaire,” and François-Régis Hutin, “Dissuasion nucléaire: l'heure de la décision” (Nuclear Deterrence: Time for Decisions), Ouest-France, November 4–5, 2006.

64. See Bentegeat in “Rapport d'Information fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères,” p. 24; and Bruno Tertrais, “La dissuasion revisitée” (Deterrence Revisited), Notes of the Foundation for Strategic Research, January 23, 2006, <www.frstrategie.org/barreCompetences/prolifDissuasionDefenses/20060123.pdf>.

65. Nicolas Sarkozy, “La france doit porter des valeurs universelles, et les faire vivre” (France Must Carry Universal Values and Make Them Live), Interview, Le Meilleur des Mondes, No. 2, Fall 2006, p. 81.

66. Ségolène Royal, “Ce que j'ai dit sur,” p. 1.

67. “Nucléaire: les réactions” (Nuclear [Deterrence]: The Reactions), Le Quotidien Permanent du Nouvel Observateur, January 19, 2006.

68. Socialist Party, “Dissuasion nucléaire: les déclarations du Président de la République” (Nuclear deterrence: the President of the Republic's Statements), Official Statement of the National Bureau, January 24, 2006, <presse.parti-socialiste.fr/2006/01/24/305/#more-305>.

69. Quoted in “Nucléaire: épargner Chirac” (Nuclear [Deterrence]: Sparing Chirac), Téléphone Rouge, Le Nouvel Observateur, January 26, 2006, p. 49.

70. Nicolas Baverez, “Dissuasion, Mon Amour,” Le Point, January 26, 2006, p. 40.

71. Sarkozy, “La France doit porter des valeurs universelles,” p. 89.

72. In June 2001, Chirac stated that any decision by France to use nuclear weapons “would naturally take into account the growing solidarity of European Union countries” (Chirac, June 8, 2001). In January 2006, he stated that “the development of the European Security and Defense Policy, the growing intermeshing of the interests of European Union countries, the solidarity that now exists between them, make the French nuclear deterrent, by its mere existence, an unavoidable element of the security of the European continent” (Chirac, January 19, 2006).

73. Defense White Paper, 1994, p. 98.

74. The French state budget deficit for 2005 was [euro]43 billion ($58 billion)/($80 billion). The projected deficit for 2006 was [euro]59 billion. (The defense budget for 2006 was [euro]36 billion, or $49 billion.)

75. A U.S. mid-course ground-based interceptor site is to be set up on Polish territory in 2011; it is not part of the NATO program.

76. Agence France-Presse, ”Text of the Joint French-British Statement on Nuclear,” October 30, 1995. This was reaffirmed at the bilateral summit of Le Touquet in 2003.

77. The possibility of France increasing its nuclear arsenal is dubious. France ended fissile material production in 1996, and the size and weight of the TNO will limit the upload capability of the M51 submarine-launched ballistic missile (unless perhaps the nominal load is reduced to one or two).