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Abstract
In December 2006, the British government published a White Paper on the future of its nuclear deterrent that was endorsed by its House of Commons in March 2007. The White Paper focused on constructing new Trident ballistic missile submarines to be deployed in the early 2020s and also contained a number of statements about the United Kingdom's future nuclear doctrine. The Trident's role is now for strategic deterrence alone; the concept of sub-strategic deterrence (and nuclear war fighting) has been abandoned; uncertainty over the specific circumstances of use continues to be an integral part of the U.K. deterrence posture; and any actual use would adhere to the guidelines set forth in the 1996 International Court of Justice advisory opinion. The United Kingdom is also committed to participating fully in any multilateral disarmament negotiations. These decisions offer a clear vision of the strategic nuclear future of the United Kingdom.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the assistance given to me by my colleague, Kristan Stoddart, in wrestling with some of the complex historical issues contained in the early sections of this paper.
Notes
1. The official history covering these wartime events is Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–45 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1964). The reports are in Appendix II, p. 394.
2. Ian Clark and Nicholas Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1955 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 112–229.
3. The United Kingdom is currently deploying its sixth generation of nuclear warheads and seventh generation of strategic delivery systems. In chronological order, these have been: Blue Danube; Red Beard/Violet Club/Yellow Sun Mk-1; Yellow Sun Mk-2 with Red Snow; WE177/Polaris; Polaris Chevaline; and Trident. For an account of nuclear weapon activities to the end of 1952, see the two-volume official history on this period, Margaret Gowing (with Lorna Arnold), Independence and Deterrence (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1974).
4. Jan Melissen, “The Thor Saga: Anglo-American Nuclear Relations, U.S. IRBM Development and Deployment in Britain, 1955–1959,” Journal of Strategic Studies 15 (June 1992), pp. 172–207.
5. On the development of the latter, see Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 131–164.
6. For an account of this process, see John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 111–152.
7. Jan Melissen, ”The Restoration of the Nuclear Alliance: Great Britain and Atomic Negotiations with the United States, 1957–58,” Contemporary Record 6 (Summer 1992), pp. 72–176.
8. For a discussion of the Anglicization of U.S. designs by the United Kingdom, see Richard Moore, “British Nuclear Warhead Design 1958–66: How Much American Help?” Defence Studies 4 (Summer 2004), pp. 207–228.
9. For a short account of these activities through to 1965, see Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State, pp. 165–171.
10. For more on the Skybolt program, see Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957–1962 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 338–373; Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 30–55; and Richard E. Neustadt, Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Kennedy intended to offer Britain the materials and data from the Skybolt program in return for a $100 million payment to cover U.S. costs. But acquiring a failed missile program did not interest Macmillan or Thorneycroft. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had planned to promote the Hound Dog missile as a suitable replacement, but this both disappointed and offended the British. As Neustadt (citing Henry Brandon) writes (Alliance Politics, pp. 47–48), how “could Englishmen base ‘independence‘ upon something labeled Hound Dog?”
11. Section IV of the Polaris Sales Agreement included the proviso that the United States would make available “future developments of the Polaris Weapons System, including all modifications thereto.” To facilitate this provision, a Joint Steering Task Group was established that provided for close contact between all concerned. However, the agreement “excluded a lot as well, including vulnerability, system performance and the decoys. This meant that changes, called SPALTS [Special Project Alterations], were notified and arrangements made to incorporate them into U.K. missiles.” Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 38.
12. For an account of these issues, see Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945–1964, (Amsterdam: Harwood, 2000).
13. John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 304–312.
14. The U.K. National Archives (TNA), AIR 8/2201, Coordination of Anglo/American Nuclear Strike Plans, COS (58) 148, June 5, 1958; Lawrence Freedman, “British Nuclear Targeting,” in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (eds.), Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 109–126.
15. Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939–70 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 186–196.
16. Bahamas Meetings: Text of Joint Communiqués, Cmnd. 1915 (HMSO, 1962).
17. Pierre, Nuclear Politics, pp. 231–243.
18. TNA, “DWH to Prime Minister Annex B Draft Memorandum to Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, Assignment of Polaris Submarines,” DEFE 11/437, August 3, 1967.
19. That the British nuclear stockpile contributed to NATO deterrence was formally recognized by NATO in the Ottawa declaration of June 1974, see NATO Web Site, <www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b740619a.htm>. On the Moscow Criterion: As Sir Michael Quinlan, a former Deputy Under Secretary of State (Policy and Programs) in the Ministry of Defence has indicated, “the ‘Moscow criterion’ did not rest just on a narrow obsession with assailing the city itself, but reflected the fact that the characteristics of the Soviet ABM [Antiballistic Missile] system meant that abandoning the attempt to be seen as capable of defeating it would have entailed conceding effective sanctuary to a very large area around the city—its exact size and configuration depending on the precise azimuth and elevation of the incoming attack…in the order of tens of thousands of square miles.” Quoted by Kristan Stoddart, British Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1964–1983, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wales, Swansea 2006, p. 8, f. 6.
20. For an authoritative account of the political and other problems of moving Chevaline into development, see Frank Panton, “Polaris Improvements and the Chevaline System, 1967–1975/6,” in Prospero, Proceedings from the British Rocket Oral History Conferences at Charterhouse, No. 1, Spring 2004.
21. Colin McInnes, Trident: The Only Option? (London: Brassey's, 1986), pp. 26, 69.
22. Quoted in Stoddart, British Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1964–1983, p. 212.
23. Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 19, 93–123.
24. TNA, British Nuclear Weapons Policy, Fourth Meeting, Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, CAB 134/3120, Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy 1966_67 PN (67), December 5, 1967.
25. Peter Jones ”Overview of the History of UK Strategic Weapons,” Seminar Proceedings on The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent, Royal Aeronautical Society London, March 1999.
26. This much was indicated by NATO's New Strategic Concept of July 1990, which indicated a willingness “to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons,” <www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm>.
27. John Ainslie, The Future of the British Bomb, WMD Awareness Program, October 2005, p. 89, footnote 474, <www.comeclean.org.uk/content/future_of_the_british_bomb.pdf>.
28. Memorandum from Jeremy Stocker, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Written Evidence, House of Commons Defence Committee, The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context, Eighth Report of Session 2005-06, HC 986Ev 103, Paragraph 19.
29. House of Commons Defence Committee, The Progress of the Trident Programme, Third Report, Session 1987–88, HC 422, pp. 24, A43 and A44.
30. The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Cm 6994), December 2006, p. 12, Paragraphs 2–5.
31. Speech by Des Browne, Minister of Parliament, Secretary of State for Defence, “The United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent in the 21st Century,” Kings College London, January 25, 2007, <www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/TheUnitedKingdomsNuclearDeterrentInThe21stCentury.htm>.
32. By the late 1990s there would have been 288 Trident warheads; 20 reserve/refurbishment Trident warheads (the standard U.K. planning yardstick in 1970s was 10 for the first 100 warheads and 6 percent after that) and approximately 1–200 WE177 gravity bombs given plans at the time.
33. Ainslie, The Future of the British Bomb.
34. 2006 White Paper, p. 12, Paragraphs 2–3.
35. Statement by Lord Drayson, Parliamentary Under Secretary for State, Ministry of Defence, Lords Hansard text for January 24, 2007 (part 0002), Column 1107.
36. Statement by Lord Drayson, Parliamentary Under Secretary for State, Ministry of Defence, Lords Hansard text for January 24, 2007 (part 0002), Column 1107. Much of this reduction resulted from the withdrawal of the WE177B gravity bombs from service in the early 1990s. Fifty-three of these were produced in the mid-1960s with a yield of 450 kt.
37. Until that date, about 100 10-kt Red Beard gravity bombs had roles outside the NATO area and were stored in Singapore, Cyprus, in the United Kingdom, and on aircraft carriers.
38. Ainslie, The Future of the British Bomb, p. 66; Lawrence Freedman, “British Nuclear Targeting,” Defence Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1985, in Ball and Richelson (eds.), Strategic Nuclear Targeting, pp. 123–125.
39. Freedman, “British Nuclear Targeting,” in Ball and Richelson (eds.), Strategic Nuclear Targeting, pp. 123–125.
40. WE177 in Richard Moore, “The Real Meaning of the Words: A Pedantic Glossary of British Nuclear Weapons,” U.K. Nuclear History Working Paper No. 1, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, <www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/pdf/nuclear_history/Working_Paper_No_1.pdf>.
41. TNA, The British View of the Strategy for the Defence of Central Europe, DEFE 4/141, JP (62).
42. Malcolm Rifkind, “UK Defence Strategy: a Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons,” Speech at the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College London, November 16, 1993.
43. 2006 White Paper, p. 11, Paragraphs 1–10, and p. 23, Paragraphs 4–9.
44. Drayson, January 24, 2007, Column 1107.
45. Drayson, January 24, 2007, Column 1107.
46. Ainslie, The Future of the British Bomb, p. 90.
47. Estimates of this number vary widely. Shannon Kile, Vitaly Fedchenko, and Hans Kristensen in ”World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), give a total of 440 B61 bombs, including 40 inactive, p. 645. In a February 2005 report, Kristensen offers a total of ‘‘approximately 480.’’ See Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning,’’ (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005), <www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/contents.asp>. This report also throws considerable doubt on the readiness levels of these weapons.
48. Drayson, January 24, 2007, Column 1107.
49. Drayson, January 24, 2007, Column 1107.
50. Browne, “The United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent in the 21st Century.”
51. International Court of Justice: Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (request for Advisory Opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations), Communiqué No. 96/23, <www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/iunanaummary960708.htm>.
52. Excerpt from testimony provided by Minister of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Tony Lloyd to question #2851 on July 23, 1998 to the Select Committee on Defence, Eighth Report. For complete minutes of evidence of this session see, <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmdfence/138/8090389.htm>.
53. As expressed by Minister of Defence Geoffrey Hoon. See House of Commons Debate, April 29, 2002, pt. 5, Column 665, <www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ukparl_hl?DB=ukparl&STEMMER=en&WORDS=nuclear+weapon+&COLOUR=Red&style=s&url=/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020429/debtext/20429-05.htm#20429-05_spnew15>. For example, in reference to the perceived threat posed by Saddam Hussein's government, Hoon made several statements in March and April 2002 confirming the plausibility of such a response. See <www.sgr.org.uk/ArmsControl/NuclearThreatsAgainstIraq_NL25.htm>, and <news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1883258.stm>.
54. Excerpt from testimony provided by Hoon to question #237 on March 20, 2002 to the Select Committee on Defence. For complete minutes of evidence of this session see, <www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmdfence/644/2032008.htm>.
55. Excerpt from transcript of Hoon's answer to a question posed by MP Llew Smith on circumstances for Trident use. Column 1060, October 21, 2004, Oral Answers to Questions, Common Hansard Debates text for Thursday October 21, 2004, Vol. 425, Part No. 142, <www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ukparl_hl?DB=ukparl&STEMMER=en&WORDS=trident+us+&COLOUR=Red&style=s&url=/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/cm041021/debtext/41021-18.htm#41021-18_spnew7>.
56. 2006 White Paper, p. 18, Paragraphs 3–4.
57. These relationships are explored in much greater detail in Ainslie, The Future of the British Bomb, pp. 66–69.
58. This was contained in a statement made by France on behalf of the Permanent Five during the second week of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. NPT/CONF.2000/21, May 1, 2000.
59. Ainslie, The Future of the British Bomb, pp. 56–58.
60. See, for example, TNA PREM 15/1357, Burke Trend to Prime Minister, July 21, 1972; Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), p. 313; Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 244–245.
61. See Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: Final Report on Studies into the Verification of Nuclear Warheads and Their Components, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.1, Working Paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, April 18, 2005, <daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/312/81/PDF/N0531281.pdf?OpenElement>.
62. Historical Accounting and Plutonium, A Summary Report by the Ministry of Defence on the Role of Historical Accounting for Fissile Material in the Nuclear Disarmament Process, and on Plutonium for the United Kingdom's Defence Nuclear Programme, April 2000, <www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/C4840896-90AD-4A8C-BF8D-C2625C7C1DD8/0/historical_accounting.pdf>.
63. An additional £2 million contribution by the United Kingdom to the Global Partnership's activities in Central Asia was announced at the launch of the United Kingdom's 2006 Annual Report on the Global Partnership. See Building Security through Global Partnership, January 15, 2007, <www.britishembassy.gov.U.K./servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1168624704432>.
64. See for example Systematic and Progressive Efforts to Reduce Nuclear Weapons Globally: A Food for Thought Paper, submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2000/23, May 4, 2000.
65. See, for example, Verification of Nuclear Disarmament.
66. 2006 White Paper, Annex B: Options Assessment process, pp. 34–37.
67. 2006 White Paper, Annex B: Options Assessment process, p. 31, Paragraphs 7–5.
68. 2006 White Paper, Annex B: Options Assessment process, p. 19, Paragraph 3.9
69. 2006 White Paper, Paragraphs 3.9–3.12.