In the nonproliferation and disarmament community, as in many other professional communities, certain observations or assertions are repeated so frequently and with such authority that they eventually become the conventional wisdom and are rarely questioned or scrutinized. Over the years, any number of statements about nuclear weapons have been treated this way. Some of these supposedly foregone conclusions include: that the use of the atomic bomb forced Japan to surrender and ended World War II; that nuclear weapons were—and are—essential to accomplishing certain military objectives; that nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, so consequently their complete elimination is impossible; and that Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) requires the legally recognized nuclear weapon states to achieve nuclear disarmament.
This last statement is the subject of the provocative and sure-to-be-debated article by Christopher A. Ford (U.S. Department of State) that opens this issue. In his detailed examination of the negotiating history and subsequent interpretation of Article VI of the NPT, Ford deconstructs what he believes are a number of myths that have grown up around the meaning of the NPT. While some might find Ford's arguments overly legalistic and reminiscent of the Reagan administration's attempts to redefine the meaning of the now-defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, others will likely welcome his views as an overdue correction and, perhaps, the basis for new discussions on how to preserve and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Our purpose in publishing Ford's article is not to choose sides but rather to encourage what we hope will become an international dialogue on the meaning of the NPT and the responsibility of all states party to the treaty to comply with its provisions.
As this issue was being edited, the United States and India wrapped up their latest and final round of negotiations on a precedent-setting civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. Leonard Weiss (Stanford University), a longtime observer and participant in nuclear nonproliferation matters, offers a thorough, timely look at the history behind this unusual agreement and its numerous and contentious provisions, as well as a strong critique of its implications for the future of India's nuclear power and weapons programs, and for the nonproliferation regime as a whole.
Kenneth Luongo and Isabelle Williams (Partnership for Global Security) look at the impact of globalization on the proliferation of biological and nuclear weapons and argue that new approaches must be implemented to counter the growing integration of economic, political, and technological spheres that threatens to undermine the nonproliferation regime. Instead of fighting globalization, they recommend that world leaders use it to develop innovative, market-based solutions, partnering with commercial institutions to manage and eradicate current proliferation threats.
Karen Winzoski (Whitman College) explores the role of the biotech-pharmaceutical industry on the Bush administration's 2001 decision to reject the verification protocol for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. She finds that although the industry's concerns about limiting the potential exposure of trade secrets led to the weakening of the proposed inspection provisions and contributed to doubts among policymakers regarding the protocol's necessary tradeoffs, ultimately the Bush administration, and in particular officials at the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency who wanted to avoid disclosure of secret weapons-related programs, bear responsibility for the final outcome.
Two articles in this issue look at the role of Congress in overseeing U.S. nuclear weapons programs. Amy F. Woolf (Congressional Research Service) reports on the history of congressional oversight of nuclear weapons (or, more often, the lack thereof), and explains the process by which the legislative branch considers annual expenditures for nuclear weapons programs. She also discusses why Congress as an institution finds it so difficult to delve into the policies underpinning the nuclear arsenal and looks at some recent developments that may portend a more assertive congressional presence in the nuclear arena.
The Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher (U.S. House of Representatives), chair of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, offers her perspective on the need for a wider and more thorough debate about the future role and composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. She also explains her conditional support for the controversial Reliable Replacement Warhead program, which the Bush administration promotes as the means to ensure the continuing effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile well into the 21st century and to rebuild the nuclear weapons production complex.
James M. Acton (King's College) urges the nuclear weapon states to consider placing greater emphasis on their commitment to nuclear disarmament as a means of ensuring increased acceptance of and compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Doing so, he argues, can only help to control the further spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-related technologies.
Finally, Quincy W. Castro (Marquette University) contributes a timely and thoughtful review of William Langewiesche's book The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, a vivid if unfocused excursion on the threat of nuclear terrorism and the consequences of the illicit trade of nuclear technology and expertise, as well as an indictment of the existing nonproliferation regime.