LEVERAGING U.S. POLICY FOR A GLOBAL COMMITMENT TO HEU ELIMINATION

Abstract

U.S. leadership has been the driving force behind reducing the civilian use of highly enriched uranium (HEU). By tracing the history of linkages between U.S. HEU policies at home and abroad, this paper examines the reasons why the U.S.-led Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) and HEU removal programs, despite great technical successes, have not led to quicker elimination of weapon-grade uranium. It argues that the United States must take urgent steps domestically and internationally in order to achieve global elimination of the use of HEU in the civilian sphere. Washington must restore consistency of HEU policy by rescinding the Burr Amendment and consider reductions in the U.S. military stockpile as a means of signaling its commitment. U.S. leaders must also find more creative ways to engage countries and individual facilities in HEU minimization and to extend the norm against HEU use worldwide.

Keywords:

• United States
• highly enriched uranium
• low-enriched uranium
• RERTR program

Acknowledgements

Scott Parrish contributed to earlier versions of this article while he was a senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The authors would like to thank Laura Holgate of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Jim Matos of Argonne National Laboratory, Parrish Staples of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Allan S. Krass and Ellie Busick, both formerly of the State Department, as well as other current and former U.S. government officials for their helpful comments in the preparation of this paper. Any errors are the responsibility of the authors alone.

Notes

1. Jim Matos, Argonne National Laboratory, e-mail communication with Cristina Hansell, March 26, 2008.

2. See Leonard Weiss, “Atoms for Peace,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59 (November 2003), pp. 34–41, 44. The importance of Atoms for Peace in the emergence of a normative framework is detailed in Lawrence Scheinman, “Shadow and Substance: Securing the Future of Atoms for Peace,” IAEA Bulletin 45 (December 2003), pp. 7–9, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull452/article3.pdf>.

3. Albert Wohlstetter et al., Moving toward Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd?, report to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1976); and Albert Wohlstetter et al., Swords from Plowshares: The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

4. The high-level commitment to the civilian HEU minimization issue was provided by Jimmy Carter, “Nuclear Power Policy: Statement on Decisions Reached Following a Review,” April 7, 1977, cited in American Presidency Project, <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7316>. Jim Matos, Argonne National Laboratory, e-mail communication with Cristina Hansell, March 26, 2008.

5. Armando Travelli, R. Domagala, Jim Matos, J. Snelgrove, “Development and Transfer of Fuel Fabrication and Utilization Technology for Research Reactors,” paper presented at International Conference on Nuclear Technology Transfer, Buenos Aires, November 1, 1982. Several other countries, including Canada, France, Germany, and Japan, established similar programs in the 1970s while the IAEA provided a forum for cooperative technical research. In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union began replacing very highly enriched uranium fuels in research reactors outside of the Soviet Union with 36 percent enriched fuel. See the article by Elena Sokova in the special section in this issue.

6. With some of the most technically challenging reactor conversions in the United States, at facilities like M.I.T. and Oak Ridge, the U.S. promise to convert all reactors by 2014 should be particularly meaningful to international parties.

7. See Weiss, “Atoms for Peace.”

8. On the Baruch plan, see Randy Rydell, “Going for Baruch: The Nuclear Plan That Refused to Go Away,” Arms Control Today 36 (June 2006), pp. 45–48. On crafting the McMahon Act, as Weiss explains in “Atoms for Peace,” the McMahon Act “made secrecy and the non-sharing of nuclear information official U.S. policy . … The law was crafted to keep the U.S. nuclear monopoly intact and to give the United States an edge in the development of nuclear technology by denying it to others.” Also see Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty (Washington, DC: Office of Technology Assessment, 1984), OTA-E-216, p. 144.

9. Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act), Public Law 585, 79th Cong.

10. Jim Matos, Argonne National Laboratory, e-mail communication with Cristina Hansell, March 26, 2008.

11. The act also detailed the export licensing process and congressional review of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. For more information, see Weiss and Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty, p. 144.

12. Information on early history of U.S. nuclear fuel exports from Jim Matos, Argonne National Laboratory, e-mail communication with Cristina Hansell, March 26, 2008.

13. Jim Matos, Argonne National Laboratory, e-mail communication with Cristina Hansell, March 26, 2008.

14. Comment by Marin Ciocanescu, Institute for Nuclear Research, Arges, Romania, at the Technical Workshop on HEU Minimization, Oslo, Norway, June 17, 2006. Romania's TRIGA reactor was the most powerful TRIGA ever built.

15. Albert Wohlstetter, The Spread of Nuclear Bombs, report to the Energy Research and Development Administration (Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1976), p. 10.

16. DOE, Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking a Balance, A Historical Report on the United States Highly Enriched Uranium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization Activities from 1945 through September 30, 1996 (Washington, DC: Department of Energy, 2001), p. 96. See also Steven Aftergood and Frank N. von Hippel, “The U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium Declaration: Transparency Deferred but not Denied,” Nonproliferation Review 14 (March 2007), pp. 149–161.

17. DOE, Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking a Balance, p. 100.

18. DOE, Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking a Balance, p. 98.

19. Sam Roe, “An Atomic Threat Made in America,” Chicago Tribune, January 28, 2007, p. 1.

20. Former State Department official, phone interview with Cristina Hansell, March 5, 2008.

21. Former State Department official, phone interview with Cristina Hansell, March 5, 2008.

22. Representatives of the newly established (RERTR) program also took part in the discussions of INFCE Group 8, on the feasibility of operating research reactors with LEU fuel. Armando Travelli, “Status and Progress of the RERTR Program in the Year 2004,” paper presented at International Conference on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors, Vienna, Austria, November 7–12, 2004, <www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR26/pdf/03-Travelli.pdf>; IAEA, “Advanced Fuel Cycle and Reactor Concepts” (Report of INFCE Working Group 8), Vienna, STI/PUB/534, 1980, p. 43.

23. “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fact Sheet on the Proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977,” April 27, 1977, American Presidency Project, <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7409>.

24. For example, NECSA would not have cooperated until it knew that Nuclear Research & consultancy Group (NRG) was converting a similar reactor, the High Flux Reactor, that it operates at Petten, in the Netherlands. Both reactors converted in the past few years. E-mail correspondence with former ACDA and State Department official, March 28, 2008.

25. Former State Department official, phone interview with Cristina Hansell, March 5, 2008.

26. Paul Leventhal and Alan Kuperman, “RERTR at the Crossroads: Success or Demise?” paper presented to the RERTR 1995 International Meeting, Paris, France, September 18, 1995, <www.nci.org/s/sp91895.htm>.

27. Stephanie Cooke, “Reagan Administration Tries to Renege on U.S. Commitments to LEU Development,” NuclearFuel, March 2, 1981, p. 5; “NRC Pleads to Keep Up DOE's LEU Program,” NuclearFuel, May 25, 1981, p. 4.

28. Code of Federal Regulations, “Limitations on the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) in Domestic Non-Power Reactors,” Title 10, Part 50, Section 64 (51 FR 6519), February 25, 1986.

29. Christine Hudgins, “DOE Asks Other Agencies for Funds for RERTR Effort,” NuclearFuel, June 4, 1984, p. 17.

30. “DOE Plumps for Gradual Conversion of U.S. Research Reactors to LEU,” NuclearFuel, January 2, 1984, p. 13; Dave Airozo, “Nonproliferation Group Seeking Rule on Conversion of DOE Reactors,” NuclearFuel, August 10, 1987, p. 13.

31. This contradiction was understood in the United States at the time. See, for example: Daniel Charles, “DOE Undermines Own Nonproliferation Effort: The Department is Trying to Persuade Other Countries to Move away from Highly Enriched Uranium in Research Reactors but Is Planning a Reactor of Its Own that Will Use the Material,” Science 238 (November 27, 1987), p. 1224.

32. Former ACDA and State Department official, phone interview with Cristina Hansell and Anya Loukianova, March 7, 2008. Dave Airozo, “DOE Funding May be Swan Song for Reduced Enrichment Effort,” NuclearFuel, January 23, 1989, p. 12.

33. Dave Airozo, “Embattled RERTR Program Faces Funding Woes, New HEU Reactor,” NuclearFuel, November 30, 1987, p. 16.

34. Dave Airozo, “Embattled RERTR Program Faces Funding Woes, New HEU Reactor,” NuclearFuel, November 30, 1987, p. 16.

35. Dave Airozo, “ACDA Says it Plans to Phase Out HEU Reactor Conversion Program,” NuclearFuel, June 27, 1988, p. 11. Throughout the 1980s, stories in Platts publications, such as NuclearFuel, described RERTR as “an unwanted stepchild” when the program was given the “cold shoulder” in the interagency process, “Lazarus-like” when it barely survived budget cuts.

36. Dave Airozo, “Senate Committee Okays $1.3 Million for DOE Reduced Enrichment Program,” NuclearFuel, July 23, 1990, p. 12.

37. See statement by Senator Tim Wirth, Democrat of Colorado, in Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1992, HR 2427, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 137 (July 10, 1991): S 9442.

38. Daniel Horner and Deborah J. Holland, “SDI No Answer to Nuclear Terrorism,” Washington Post, March 28, 1990, p. A23. For an excellent summary of RERTR's impact on U.S. HEU exports, see, Alan J. Kuperman, “Codifying the Phase-Out of Bomb Grade Fuel for Research Reactors,” in Paul Leventhal, Sharon Tanzer, and Steven Dolley, eds., Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002), pp. 251–260.

39. Former ACDA and State Department official, phone interview with Cristina Hansell and Anya Loukianova, March 7, 2008.

40. In addition, in 1986, U.S. House members initiated and the Reagan administration signed into law the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act (Public Law 99–399), which directed the executive “to keep to a minimum the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material in international transit.”

41. The Nuclear Control Institute, Natural Resources Defense Council, and other nonproliferation and environmental organizations promoted the program, as did Jack Edlow of the nuclear fuel shipping concern Edlow International. Former State Department official, phone interview with Cristina Hansell, March 5, 2008. Also see, “Political Changes Warrant Revival of HEU Fuel Program, NCI Says,” NuclearFuel, March 19, 1990, p. 7; Edlow International Company, <www.edlow.com>.

42. Airozo, “Senate Committee Okays $1.3 Million for DOE Reduced Enrichment Program.”

43. See statement by Representative James Scheuer, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1991, HR 5019, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 136 (June 19, 1990): H 3748.

44. George F. Vandegrift, “RERTR/GTRI Mo-99 Technology-Development History,” unpublished paper, 2007. For an explanation of the production and uses of Tc-99m, as well as a history of conversion efforts, see the article by Cristina Hansell in the special section in this issue.

45. See Michael Knapik, “Renewal of Off-Site Fuels Policy Still Dogs Watkins in Last Days of His Watch,” NuclearFuel, November 23, 1992, p. 16.

46. Former State Department official, phone interview with Cristina Hansell, March 5, 2008. Also see Argonne National Laboratory, Nuclear Engineering Division, RERTR, Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel, <www.rertr.anl.gov/FRRSNF.html>.

47. DOE, Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking a Balance, p. 98.

48. “Non-Proliferation Efforts Bolstered,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, July 20, 1992.

49. David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996, World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 239. Wilson Dizard III, “Suspension of HEU Production Viewed Favorably by Friends, Foes of UEE Bill,” NuclearFuel, November 25, 1991. In 1994 Schumer also pushed to tighten control over retransfer of U.S.-origin HEU as part of the U.S.-Euratom agreement, see Kathleen Hart, “Lawmakers Want Tight Control Over HEU Transfers in U.S.-Euratom Accord,” NuclearFuel, August 29, 1994, p. 4.

50. HR 776, Comprehensive Nuclear Energy Act, Sec. 903, Restrictions on Nuclear Exports: Amendments to Chapter 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. For further information on the Schumer Amendment, see Alan J. Kuperman, “Bomb-Grade Bazaar: How Industry, Lobbyists, and Congress Weakened Export Controls on Highly Enriched Uranium,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62 (March/April 2006), pp. 44–50.

51. Frank von Hippel, “A Comprehensive Approach to Elimination of Highly-Enriched-Uranium From All Nuclear-Reactor Fuel Cycles,” Science and Global Security 12 (2004), p. 146.

52. DOE, Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking a Balance, p. 96.

53. Since 1989, the United States has exported HEU, or approved licenses to do so, to Belgium, Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. See Alan J. Kuperman, “Codifying the Phase-Out of Bomb Grade Fuel for Research Reactors,” p. 252.

54. While the text of the directive is classified, see the White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy,” September 27, 1993, <www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/w930927.htm>. Among other items, the policy stated that the United States will “seek to minimize the civil use of highly-enriched uranium.” Also see Mark Hibbs, “Fate of U.S. DOE LEU Program May Spell Future of FRM-2 Fuel,” NuclearFuel, July 4, 1994, p. 6. Hibbs reported that there were disagreements between administration officials on implementation of the HEU language in the directive.

55. For a discussion of the politics surrounding construction of the FRM-II, see the “Civilian HEU Reduction and Elimination Database, Germany Profile,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <www.nti.org/db/heu/germany.html>.

56. Studies on running the ANS LEU were launched in 1993. See C.D. West, “Studies of the Impact of Fuel Enrichment on the Performance of the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor,” and M.M. Bretscher et al., “Relative Performance Properties of the ORNL Advanced Neutron Source Reactor with Reduced Enrichment Fuels,” presentations at the RERTR 1994 International Meeting, Williamsburg, Virginia, September 18–23, 1994.

57. Former ACDA and State Department official, phone interview with Cristina Hansell and Anya Loukianova, March 7, 2008.

58. The United States has also since been reluctant to voluntarily declare its HEU stockpile as part of its annual IAEA INFCIRC/549 declaration, which required declaration of plutonium holdings, while countries like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have chosen to do so. See table in Cristina Chuen, “Developing HEU Guidelines,” presentation at RERTR 2007 International Meeting, Prague, September 24, 2007.

59. The IAEA began applying safeguards to excess HEU in 1994. DOE, Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking a Balance, p. 17. For an update, see Frank Munger, “International Inspections Coming to a Close at Y-12,” Knoxville News Sentinel, March 5, 2008.

60. For more information, see Steven Aftergood and Frank von Hippel, “The U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium Declaration: Transparency Deferred but Not Denied,” Nonproliferation Review 14 (March 2007), p. 155.

61. DOE, Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking a Balance, p. 2; Aftergood and von Hippel, “The U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium Declaration,” p. 154.

62. From a proliferation point of view, the fresh fuel stocks present the greatest concern, since fresh HEU fuel is easily converted into the raw material that can be used to make an improvised nuclear explosive device. Spent fuel can be less of a proliferation risk, if it has been irradiated long enough to make it highly radioactive (“self-protecting”). Irradiation also “burns” up some of the U-235 that was originally present, reducing the enrichment level of spent HEU fuel, and making it less attractive to terrorists seeking raw material for an improvised nuclear device. However, critical assemblies and fast reactors often do not irradiate materials for very long; HEU used in these applications is sometimes considered akin to fresh fuel. Additionally, spent fuel loses its radioactivity over time. For more information on radiation barriers, see the article by Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit in the special section in this issue.

63. By 2007, the United States had downblended 87 MT of HEU. International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2007: Second Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, p. 19, <www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf>.

64. William C. Potter, “Project Sapphire: U.S.-Kazakhstani Cooperation for Nonproliferation,” in John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 345–362.

65. For details, see Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Georgia: Operation Auburn Endeavor,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/georgia/auburn.htm>.

66. For a discussion of spent fuel return programs, and the difficulties in persuading countries to give up HEU, see the article by William C. Potter and Robert Nurick in the special section in this issue.

67. For a discussion of the Soviet program, as well as details on more recent U.S.-Russian efforts, see the article by Elena Sokova in the special section in this issue.

68. Armando Travelli, “Status of the U.S. RERTR Program,” presentation at the RERTR 1994 International Meeting, Williamsburg, Virginia, September 18–23, 1994, <www.osti.gov/energycitations/servlets/purl/10119644-gnbRB6/webviewable/10119644.pdf>.

69. Leventhal and Kuperman, “RERTR at the Crossroads: Success or Demise?”

70. Ann MacLachlan, “Reactor Operators Ask Clinton for Help in Pushing RERTR Goals,” NuclearFuel, September 25, 1995, p. 8.

71. Michael Knapik and Elaine Hiruo, “DOE to Renew Accepting Spent Fuel from Non-US Research Reactors,” Nucleonics Week, May 16, 1996, p. 5. Also see Argonne National Laboratory, Nuclear Engineering Division, RERTR, Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel.

72. DOE, Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking a Balance, p. 96.

73. Former ACDA and State Department official, phone interview with Cristina Hansell and Anya Loukianova, March 7, 2008.

74. Armando Travelli, “Status and Progress of the RERTR Program in the Year 2002,” presentation at RERTR meeting, San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina, November 3–8, 2002, <www.rertr.anl.gov/Web2002/2003Web/FullPapers-PDF/Travelli.pdf>.

75. Joint Expert Group recommendation, as cited in Travelli, “Status and Progress of the RERTR Program in the Year 2002.”

76. Travelli, “Status and Progress of the RERTR Program in the Year 2002.”

77. For more information about the latter program, established in 2002 to facilitate the return of Soviet-origin spent fuel to Russia, see the article by Elena Sokova in the special section in this issue.

78. See William C. Potter, Djuro Miljanic, and Ivo Slaus, “Tito's Nuclear Legacy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 56 (March/April 2000), pp. 63–70; Philipp C. Bleek, “Project Vinca: Lessons for Securing Civil Nuclear Material Stockpiles,” Nonproliferation Review 10 (Fall-Winter 2003). Forty-eight kg of fresh fuel was finally removed from the site in 2002. In April 2008, the IAEA announced progress on plans to package and transport 8,000 spent fuel elements to Russia, where they will be reprocessed. See Staff Report, “EC Infuses Serbian Nuclear Relic Cleanup with Critical Donation: Additional $25 Million Needed to Complete Fuel Repatriation for Aging Reactor,” IAEA News Centre, April 15, 2008, <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/ecserbia.html>.

79. GTRI was also expanded to include a focus on radiological materials.

80. GTRI also subsumed the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction program, which had been established in 1997. Von Hippel and Glaser, “Reducing the Threat,” p. 7; DOE, “Department of Energy Launches New Global Threat Reduction Initiative,” May 26, 2005.

81. Travelli, “Status and Progress of the RERTR Program in the Year 2004.”

82. RERTR management (names withheld by request), interviews with Cristina Chuen at RERTR 2006 International Meeting, Cape Town, October 29–November 2, 2006; and at RERTR 2007 International Meeting, Prague, September 23–27, 2007.

83. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement by President Bush, President Fox, and Prime Minister Martin,” White House Press Release, March 23, 2005.

84. NNSA, “Research Reactor at University of Florida Has Been Converted,” October 18, 2006.

85. By fiscal 2007, GTRI was receiving $115 million. The Bush administration's funding request for GTRI for fiscal 2008 was approximately $119 million; however, Congress increased it to $195 million. See discussion in Daniel Horner, “Congress Provides $50 Million in FY-08 Funding for Fuel Bank,” Nuclear Fuel, January 14, 2008, p. 3.

86. Daniel Horner, “Conversion of Two US Reactors from HEU to LEU Completed,” NuclearFuel, November 6, 2006, p. 6; Jordi Roglans-Ribas, “U.S. Domestic Efforts to Convert Remaining Civilian HEU Research Reactors,” presentation at the Symposium on Minimization of HEU in the Civilian Sector, Oslo, Norway, June 17–20, 2006, p. 2; Ann MacLachlan, “Research Reactor Conversion Approaching Halfway Mark,” NuclearFuel, November 19, 2007, p. 8.

87. Roglans-Ribas, “U.S. Domestic Efforts,” pp. 10–11.

88. For a discussion of which reactors are included and which not, and for an argument for further expansion of the list, see the article by Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit in the special section in this issue. Roglans-Ribas, “U.S. Domestic Efforts to Convert Remaining Civilian HEU Research Reactors”; Christopher Landers, “Reactors Identified for Conversion: Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program,” paper presented at the RERTR 2005 International Meeting, Boston, November 6–10, 2005, p. 2; GAO, “DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Useable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors,” GAO-04-807, July 2004, pp. 7–9; Charles Ferguson and Todd C. Robinson, “An Analysis of the Technical and Political Dimensions of Highly Enriched Uranium Use in Civilian and Naval Sectors,” report for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, March 2006, p. 9.

89. NNSA, “Strategic Plan: Reducing Nuclear and Radiological Threats Worldwide,” January 2007, <nnsa.energy.gov/nuclear_nonproliferation/documents/GTRI_StrategicPlan.pdf >, pp. 6–7.

90. Parrish Staples and John Creasy, “The Conversion Program,” paper presented at the 2008 Research Reactor Fuel Management (RRFM) Conference, Hamburg, Germany, March 2–5, 2008, p. 1.

91. NNSA, “GTRI: More Than Three Years of Reducing Nuclear Threats,” September 2007.

92. Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007 (Cambridge, MA, and Washington, DC: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2007), p. 88.

93. C. Messick and J. Taylor, “Reactor Fuel Management (RRFM)—United States Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Program: 2008 Update,” presentation at the 2008 RRFM Conference, Hamburg, Germany, March 2–5, 2008.

94. NNSA, “GTRI: More That Three Years of Reducing Nuclear Threats.”

95. GAO, “DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Useable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and Russia,” GAO-05-57, November 2004, p. 8; Chuck Messick, “Global Threat Reduction Initiative: U.S. Nuclear Remove Program”; NNSA, “NNSA Removes All U.S.-Origin Highly Enriched Uranium Fuel from the Republic of Korea,” September 19, 2007.

96. See, “What's New,” Edlow International Company, <www.edlow.com/news.html>.

97. Andrew Bieniawski, “Where to Take HEU Minimization—The U.S. Perspective,” paper presented at the Symposium on Minimization of HEU in the Civilian Sector, Oslo, Norway, June 17–20, 2006.

98. NNSA, “Strategic Plan,” p. 10.

99. NNSA, “GTRI: More That Three Years of Reducing Nuclear Threats.”

100. Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007, pp. 88–89.

101. Andrew Bieniawski, cited in Ann MacLachlan, “Fresh HEU from Russian Reactors Moves, but Spent Fuel Pace Slower,” NuclearFuel, November 19, 2007, p. 8.

102. For additional information, see Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Civilian HEU Reduction and Elimination,” <www.nti.org/db/heu/pastpresent.html#sovfuel>.

103. Ann MacLachlan, “Czech Spent HEU Fuel Shipped to Russia for Reprocessing,” NuclearFuel, December 17, 2007, p. 11.

104. Bieniawski, “Where to Take HEU Minimization.”

105. For a detailed analysis of the obstacles facing the removal of HEU materials from Ukraine and Belarus, see the article by William C. Potter and Robert Nurick in the special section in this issue.

106. On this point, see Philipp C. Bleek, “Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat,” Harvard University, Belfer Center for International Affairs, September 2004, p. 25. Recommendations to engage NGOs and commercial organizations have been further specified in Philipp Bleek and Laura Holgate, “Minimizing Civil Highly-Enriched Uranium Stocks by 2015: A Forward-Looking Assessment of U.S.-Russian Cooperation,” The Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian Academy of Sciences’-U.S. National Academies’ Workshop (forthcoming).

107. Andrew Bieniawski, “Global Threat Reduction Initiative,” presentation at the Global Initiative Technical Workshop on Anti-Nuclear Smuggling Assistance, September 6, 2007, <www.berr.gov.uk/files/file41328.ppt>.

108. Frank N. von Hippel, “Opportunities to Minimize Stocks of Nuclear-Explosive Materials,” presentation at the Green Cross/Rosatom “Nuclear National Dialogue on the Atom, Society, and Security,” Moscow, Russia, April 18–19, 2007.

109. This is in contrast to security levels at some civilian facilities. Government audits have repeatedly indicated that efforts to strengthen NRC regulations and implement security upgrades to university reactors have been insufficient.

110. While the details of the revised DBT are classified, it reportedly calls for facilities to be prepared against a larger, more well-organized terrorist threat than the pre-9/11 DBT. According to some sources, these facilities are now required to also be able to defend against a squad-sized force of sophisticated attackers with help from multiple insiders. The deadline for facilities to meet the revised 2004 DBT was 2008.

111. GAO, “Nuclear Security: Actions Needed by DOE to Improve Security of Weapons-Grade Material at Its Energy, Science, and Environment Sites,” GAO-05-934T, July 26, 2005, p. 1.

112. GAO, “Action May Be Needed to Reassess the Security of NRC-Licensed Research Reactors,” GAO-08-403, January 31, 2008, p. 12.

113. Ted Sherry, “Y-12 Is Essential to National Security,” presentation at East Tennessee Economic Council, June 24, 2007, <www.eteconline.org/images/Sherry_Presentation_2006.pdf>.

114. This new structure will replace Building 9705-5, a wood-frame warehouse built in 1944 during the Manhattan Project. “HEUMF—Increasing Nuclear Construction Rigor at Y-12,” Y-12 Report 4 (Spring 2007), <www.y12.doe.gov/news/report/toc.php?vn=4_1&xml=p06>; DOE/NNSA, “Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF) Project,” 2006 Project Management Workshop, <management.energy.gov/06W_LLCan.ppt>; Ellen Rogers, “HEUMF Construction Starts Again this Week,” Oak Ridger, March 29, 2006.

115. GAO, “Action May Be Needed to Reassess the Security of NRC-Licensed Research Reactors,” p. 16.

116. DOE, “DOE to Remove 200 Metric Tons of Highly Enriched Uranium from U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” November 7, 2005.

117. International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2007: Second Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, p. 19.

118. Author's conversations with attendees at the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Conference, where Bodman made his announcement, November 2005.

119. Suggestion made by Laura Holgate, Nuclear Threat Initiative, e-mail communication with Cristina Hansell, March 26, 2008.

120. See Kuperman, “Bomb-Grade Bazaar,” pp. 44–50.

121. For an overview of the discussions on obtaining an agreement to convert Mo-99 production, first among producers themselves and later among Mo-99 producing nations, see the article on isotopes by Cristina Hansell in the special section in this issue. The efforts to draft HEU guidelines are discussed in this issue's special section's concluding article by Cristina Hansell.

122. Alan J. Kuperman, “The Global Threat Reduction Initiative and Conversion of Isotope Production to LEU Targets,” paper presented at 2004 the RERTR International Meeting, Vienna, Austria, November 7–11, 2004, p. 3.

123. Kuperman, “Bomb-Grade Bazaar,” pp. 47–48.

124. Recipient countries are clearly listed in Section 630 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Public Law 109–58). The law also opened a loophole allowing the possible export of U.S. HEU to the twenty-one member states of the European Union, since the U.S.-Euratom nuclear cooperation agreements allow nuclear material transferred to one Euratom state to be transferred to another without notification or permission. As the European Union expands into Eastern Europe, the list of states to which U.S. HEU might be exported will expand further.

125. .Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Public Law 109–58).

126. Daniel Horner, “Congress Alters HEU Export Law Amid Mixed Signals From DOE,” NuclearFuel, August 15, 2005, pp. 7–9.

127. Letter from Paul M. Longsworth, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, DOE, to Kurt Gottfried, Union of Concerned Scientists, July 15, 2005, <www.nci.org/05nci/08/domenic04/DOELetter-July2005.gif>.

128. Though more actual reductions resulted from reactor shutdowns, the RERTR program and related policies that discouraged the construction of new facilities using HEU were critical in changing norms and causing HEU use to begin tapering off. See also: “Management of High Enriched Uranium: Status and Trends,” IAEA-TECDOC-1452, June 2005, p. 39, <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1452_web.pdf>.

129. It is notable that once it became clear U.S. policy makers were serious about conversion, the managers of the most powerful and prestigious U.S. research reactors, such as those at M.I.T. and Oak Ridge National Laboratory, accepted the program and began working toward conversion.

130. For a discussion of the need for HEU Guidelines, new international security recommendations, and an IAEA mandate to pursue HEU minimization, see the discussion in the concluding article of the special section in this issue.

131. Matthew Bunn has recommended that the United States “at least double the total amount of its HEU declared excess to its military needs. Over time, the United States and Russia should reduce their HEU stockpiles to the minimum required to support the warhead stockpiles they will retain, along with a few decades’ supply for military reactors.” Matthew Bunn, “Reducing Excess Stockpiles: U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, March 5, 2003.