PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARD A WORLD WITHOUT CIVILIAN HEU

Abstract

In the last three decades, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactors program has made great progress in developing the technical means to eliminate HEU use in most civilian applications. Yet in practice, this has not translated into significant global reductions in HEU use. This article identifies steps to build the international consensus needed to reduce the risks posed by HEU. Immediate steps include devising new incentives for reactor shutdown and conversion; establishing research reactor coalitions; launching a global HEU database; giving the International Atomic Energy Agency a mandate to promote HEU minimization; and improving physical protection standards. Intermediate measures include the adoption of HEU management guidelines and a code of conduct. Further, national governments should pass laws phasing out domestic use of HEU and conditioning HEU exports on conversion commitments. In the long term, international legal measures must be adopted to eliminate the risks posed by HEU.

Keywords:

• Highly enriched uranium
• low-enriched uranium
• nuclear reactor
• terrorism

Notes

1. IAEA, “Advanced Fuel Cycle and Reactor Concepts” (Report of International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) Working Group 8), Vienna, Austria, STI/PUB/534, 1980, p. 43.

2. In 1978 the DOE initiated the RERTR program to convert large research reactors with U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel from HEU to LEU; the program has since been greatly expanded. The Soviet Union launched a similar program in the late 1970s, replacing nuclear fuel of approximately 80 percent enrichment with 36 percent enriched fuel in Soviet-supplied reactors outside of the Soviet Union. Security concerns regarding fresh and spent HEU fuel stored at research reactor sites around the globe also led to the creation of “acceptance” programs for nuclear fuels of U.S. and Russian origin, known as the U.S. Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRR SNF) acceptance program and the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) program. In 2004, these programs were all combined under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), and additional programs were added: the Emerging Threats and Gap Material Program and the Global Research Reactor Security (GRRS) Program.

3. There are also some 1,725 metric tons of HEU in military use worldwide, and an additional 125 MT of HEU declared “excess” to military needs by the United States. See David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, “Civil HEU Watch: Tracking Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium,” Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), February 2005 (revised August 2005), <www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/civil_heu_watch2005.pdf>. For more information on HEU use today, see the article by Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit in the special section in this issue; for general statistics on HEU holdings, both civilian and military, see William C. Potter's article.

4. The IAEA considers 25 kg a “significant quantity” of HEU. While a less sophisticated terrorist group is likely to require 30–40 kg of HEU to build a weapon, very sophisticated groups could build a device with less than 25 kg. The Natural Resources Defense Council has argued that as little as 2.5 kg of HEU (one-tenth of the IAEA's value) could be used to make a low-yield bomb using a highly sophisticated bomb design. According to their analysis, a Hiroshima-size bomb (15 kilotons) requires just 14–15 kg of HEU when assembled with “low” technical sophistication. See, Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, “The Amount of Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons,” Natural Resources Defense Council, revised April 13, 1995.

5. These predecessors included the RERTR program, the U.S. FRR SNF acceptance program, and the Russian RRRFR program.

6. Horacio Taboada of the National Atomic Energy Commission of Argentina (CNEA) called allowing just five countries to receive HEU from the United States for production of medical isotopes a “double standard” that contradicts HEU minimization policy. Presentation at RERTR 2006 International Meeting, Cape Town, South Africa, October 29–November 2, 2006. For further information on the 2005 Energy Act, see the article by Anya Loukianova and Cristina Hansell in the special section in this issue.

7. Such a bargain might, for instance, persuade South Africa to blend down some of its large HEU stocks. Otherwise, it will be exceedingly difficult to persuade this country—one of the few that has abandoned a nuclear weapons capability—to reduce its HEU stockpiles. While South Africa's nuclear operators have been very cooperative with RERTR, its diplomats are loath to join a nuclear nonproliferation program they view as U.S.-led without a quid pro quo in some area related to nuclear disarmament. Given South Africa's status as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), it is important to consider the trade-offs that could induce it to minimize its holdings of HEU. According to estimates by ISIS, South Africa has 430–580 kg of HEU. ISIS, <www.isis-online.org/mapproject/country_pages/southafrica.html>.

8. For more on this, see the article by William C. Potter, and the article by Anya Loukianova and Cristina Hansell, in the special section of this issue.

9. Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Libya, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States, and Uzbekistan have all participated in RERTR projects.

10. In addition to consolidating pre-existing programs, GTRI also included a GRRS (mentioned in endnote 2), a review of research reactors and associated facilities worldwide that included a preliminary risk assessment of materials and sites relative to vulnerability to sabotage, theft, or terrorist attack. This study and follow-on efforts are discussed below.

11. For data demonstrating the importance of reactor decommissioning to reducing overall HEU use, see the article by Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit in the special section in this issue.

12. While conversion and HEU removal planners understand that facility threat levels vary—indeed, the original RERTR mission was to develop LEU fuel for foreign research and test reactors that the United States was supplying with HEU that posed the greatest threat (those with power levels of more than 1 megawatt)—they have been unable to translate this prioritization into action due to the lack of political support needed to initiate HEU minimization projects at top priority sites.

13. See “‘Civilian HEU Reduction and Elimination Database, Germany Profile,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <www.nti.org/db/heu/germany.html>.

14. William C. Potter and Elena Sokova, “Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: What's New? What's True?” Nonproliferation Review 9 (Summer 2002), pp. 112–120.

15. See the article by William C. Potter in the special section of this issue.

16. Philipp Bleek and Laura Holgate, “Minimizing Civil Highly-Enriched Uranium Stocks by 2015: A Forward-Looking Assessment of U.S.-Russian Cooperation,” The Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian Academy of Sciences'-U.S. National Academies' Workshop (forthcoming).

17. Philipp Bleek and Laura Holgate, “Minimizing Civil Highly-Enriched Uranium Stocks by 2015: A Forward-Looking Assessment of U.S.-Russian Cooperation,” The Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian Academy of Sciences'-U.S. National Academies' Workshop (forthcoming).

18. Bleek and Holgate discuss the need for the United States and Russia to provide a broader menu of inducements to facility operators to cooperate in GTRI programs, but their recommendations apply equally to the global community.

19. Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007 (Cambridge, MA, and Washington, DC: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2007), p. 122.

20. Nicky Smith, “Second Reactor Mooted,” Financial Mail, November 23, 2007.

21. Atomical, March 2007, <www.ansto.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/9361/Atomical_MAR07_v4.pdf>.

22. Interview of Shane Kennedy, neutron-beam instrument project leader, Bragg Institute of ANSTO, “OPAL Nuclear Reactor's International Role,” Radio Australia, April 16, 2007, <www.abc.net.au/ra/innovations/stories/s1898472.htm>. A further example of international cooperation at OPAL is the ANSTO-AINSE Neutron School on Diffraction, November 29–December 3, 2007, held in collaboration with the IAEA, which sponsored two Ph.D. students from China and India. “Opal News,” Bragg Peaks, No. 4, October 2007, <www.ansto.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/20382/BraggPeaks_4_oct07.pdf>.

23. Ira Goldman, Pablo Adelfang, Arnaud Atger, Kevin Alldred, and Nigel Mote, “Developing Research Reactor Coalitions and Centres of Excellence,” paper presented at the Eleventh International Topical Meeting of the Research Reactor Fuel Management (RRFM) and International Group on Reactor Research (IGORR), Lyon, France, March 11–14, 2007; Bleek and Holgate, “Minimizing Civil Highly-Enriched Uranium Stocks by 2015.”

24. Consultancy on “Assessing HEU Facilities for Future Conversion Efforts,” Vienna, Austria, February 8–10, 2006.

25. Steven Aftergood, “Program Tracks Nuclear Materials Worldwide,” Secrecy News, Federation of American Scientists, May 8, 2008, <www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2008/05/program_tracks_nuc.html>; DOE and GTRI database efforts are also mentioned in Bleek and Holgate, “Minimizing Civil Highly-Enriched Uranium Stocks by 2015,” based on their communications with an National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) official, October 2007.

26. Goldman, Adelfang, Atger, Alldred, and Mote, “Developing Research Reactor Coalitions and Centres of Excellence.”

27. Bleek and Holgate, “Minimizing Civil Highly-Enriched Uranium Stocks by 2015”; “Refuelling a Polish Reactor with Argentine Silicide Fuel Elements,” INVAP News, June 11, 2007, <www.invap.net/news/novedades-e.php?id=20070627215653>.

28. Relevant IAEA activities include: CRP on Developing Techniques for Small-Scale Indigenous Production of Mo-99 Using LEU or Neutron Activation (T.1.20.18), 2005–2009; CRP on Mo-99 from LEU/Neutron Activation; CRP on conversion of MNSRs; Technical Workshop and International Symposium on Minimization of HEU in the Civilian Nuclear Sector, June 17–20, 2006, Oslo, Norway; Consultancy Meeting (CM) on Assessing Facilities Utilizing HEU for Possible Future Conversion Efforts, Vienna, Austria, February 8–10, 2006; CM on Developing Proposals for Research Reactor Coalitions and Centers of Excellence, Vienna, Austria, August 31–September 5, 2006; CM on Homogenous Reactors for Radioisotope Production, 2007; CM on Status of Pulse Reactors and Critical Assemblies, Vienna, Austria, January 16–18, 2008; Technical Meeting (TM) on the Use of LEU in Accelerator Driven Subcritical Assemblies, Vienna, Austria, October 10–12, 2005; Technical Cooperation (TC) projects related to reactor conversion, including projects in Bulgaria, Chile, Kazakhstan, Libya, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Ukraine, Uzbekistan; projects in support of the Russian RRRFR Program (mainly under TC Project RER/4/028, “Repatriation, Management and Disposition of Fresh and/or Spent Nuclear Fuel from Research Reactors”) and, in support of the U.S. FRR SNF Acceptance Program, a TM that brought together reactor operators and managers that have successfully shipped spent fuel back to the country of origin—the information provided at the meeting will be published for the benefit of facility managers and operators that have not made any shipments yet but are considering the return of their spent fuelin the future.

29. George Bunn, Chaim Braun, and Fritz Steinhausler, “Nuclear Terrorism Potential: Research Reactors vs. Power Reactors?” Proceedings, EU-High Level Conference on Physical Protection, Salzburg, Austria, September 8–13, 2002.

30. For a detailed discussion of this issue, and illustrations of the variety of physical protection systems from site to site, see Bunn, Braun and Steinhausler, “Nuclear Terrorism Potential.”

31. The paper put forward four significant recommendations: 1) it encourages all countries to consider and, if deemed necessary, implement additional measures to protect and control existing stocks of HEU; 2) it supports minimizing the use of and commerce in HEU for civilian purposes and the goal of eliminating HEU in the civilian nuclear sector as soon as technically feasible; 3) it encourages all countries to eliminate or commit to converting to LEU fuels as soon as technically feasible those civilian HEU-fueled installations under their control, for which there is a need; and 4) it discourages all countries from undertaking or supporting new civilian projects involving HEU fuel other than for the purpose of down-blending that fuel to LEU. “Combating the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism by Reducing the Civilian Use of Highly Enriched Uranium,” working paper submitted by Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2005/MC.III/WP.5.

32. “G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation,” G-8 Summit, Sea Island, Georgia (United States), June 9, 2004, G-8 Information Center, <www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2004seaisland/nonproliferation.html>.

33. “Heiligendamm Statement on Nonproliferation,” G-8 Summit, Heiligendamm, Germany, June 8, 2007, Government of Canada, <www.g8.gc.ca/pdf/2007-heilig-stat-non-prolif-prop-en.pdf>.

34. “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Joint Statement,” Astana, Kazakhstan, June 12, 2007, accessed on the U.S. State Department website, <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/jun/86331.htm>.

35. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Workshop on Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) Production Using Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) was held December 2–5, 2007 in Sydney. It was cosponsored by the United States (NNSA) and Australia (Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization), and attended by fifty participants from fourteen countries and the IAEA, including partners of the Global Initiative, non-partners as observers, and key private sector stakeholders involved in Mo-99 production and use.

36. The workshop report also recommends that participants “[e]mphasize to the partners in the Global Partnership that conversion of the Mo-99 production process to LEU is also consistent with the principles of the G8 Global Partnership and recommend that resources provided under the Global Partnership could be attributed to this activity in the future.” See “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Workshop on the Production of Mo-99 Using Low Enriched Uranium Final Report,” December 5, 2007.

37. Statement by CNEA engineer, Sydney, December 2007. According to George Vandegrift, Nordion cooperation improved every time the Canadian company was applying for an export license. George Vandegrift, Argonne National Laboratory, “ANL (GFV) Perspective on Conversion of Mo-99 Production from High- to Low-Enriched Uranium,” presentation for the NAS study on the production of medical isotopes without highly enriched uranium, mandated by Section 630 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, <dels.nas.edu/nrsb/presentations/vandergrift.pdf>.

38. NNSA, “NNSA Successfully Converts Third Domestic Research Reactor in the Last Year,” press release, September 13, 2007.

39. Presentation by JHR program director Daniel Iracane, “Jules Horowitz Reactor and LEU,” Technical Workshop on HEU Minimization in Oslo, Norway, June 18, 2006.

40. Iracane, “Jules Horowitz Reactor and LEU.”

41. Currently, a 4.8 grams of uranium per cubic centimeter uranium silicide fuel is being used; however, CERCA is qualifying a higher density (5.8 grams per cubic centimeter) fuel that could possibly be used in the JHR; however, more testing is required, and performance may not be the same as with the lower density fuel. Iracane, “Jules Horowitz Reactor and LEU.”

42. The “Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium” were published in IAEA, INFCIRC/549, March 16, 1998, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc549.pdf>.

43. There are just nine states with significant holdings, and all were involved in drafting the plutonium guidelines. It should be noted, however, that several other countries have separated plutonium, and all states using nuclear power have plutonium in their spent fuel. There has not yet been an effort to engage additional countries in reporting their plutonium management strategies and holdings. For more details on the plutonium guidelines and their adoption, see the statements made by Andreas Friedrich, head of the Arms Control and Nuclear Affairs Section, Political Directorate, Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs (the former chairman of the consultation group on plutonium) and Jim Finucane, DOE (who created the plutonium inventory projections at the IAEA), at the ISIS conference “Civil Separated Plutonium Stocks—Planning for the Future,” Washington, DC, March 14–15, 2000, <www.isis-online.org/publications/civil_pu_conference/chap3.pdf>.

44. “Final Document,” 2000 NPT Review Conference, vol. I, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), <disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/2000FD.pdf>.

45. Statement by the head of the French delegation, First Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Vienna, April 30–May 11, 2007, <www.delegfrance-cd-geneve.org/actualite/intervention_dobelle_tnpV_10mai2007_englishversion.htm>.

46. See William C. Potter's article in the special section in this issue.

47. Russian naval storage sites house large quantities of highly enriched spent naval fuel. Several of these sites, such as Andreyeva Bay, Murmansk region, do not have sufficiently high security. See the article by Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit in the special section in this issue.

48. Framatome official, personal interview with author, December 4, 2007.

49. For a discussion of doses associated with spent HEU from Mo-99 production and scenarios related to the production of uranium metal from this material, see George F. Vandegrift, Allen J. Bakel, and Justin W. Thomas, “Overview of 2007 ANL Progress for Conversion of HEU based Mo-99 Production as Part of the U.S. Global Threat Reduction—Conversion Program,” presented at the RERTR 2007 International Meeting in Prague, September 24–27, 2007, pp. 5–6.

50. Two equivalent experimental protocols should be given, one for measurement in air and the other for measurement underwater. Both should specify the orientation of the fuel assembly/HEU material with respect to the measurement device, as well as the type of detector to be used and its sensitivity.

51. The idea of a code of conduct on HEU was suggested by Lars Van Dassen of the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate in his talk, “HEU Minimisation: If It Is a Good Idea—What Should We Do Next?” at the International Symposium on Minimization of HEU in the Civilian Nuclear Sector, Oslo, Norway, June 20, 2006.

52. For details on the NECSA statement, as well as the plans that Nuclear Research & consultancy Group has for development of LEU targets for the HFR reactor in Petten, see the article on medical isotope production by Cristina Hansell in the special section in this issue.

53. As Matthew Bunn has noted, there have been virtually no public discussions of nuclear terrorism or securing nuclear stockpiles at meetings with foreign leaders by the president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, or even the deputy secretary of state or the relevant undersecretary of state. He notes that there was no public mention of nuclear security in any of the statements or briefings surrounding President George W. Bush's 2006 meeting with Chinese president Hu Jintao, although lower-level officials have been working for years to gain Chinese agreement to allow cooperation on security upgrades beyond the one civilian facility that has been upgraded so far. Similarly, the negotiation of the U.S.-India nuclear deal did not include nuclear security issues, though lower-level officials had been trying to convince India to cooperate on nuclear security improvements for years. Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007, p. 145.

54. Matthew Bunn has recommended that the United States at least double the total amount of its HEU declared excess to its military needs. He argues further that, “the United States and Russia should reduce their HEU stockpiles to the minimum required to support the warhead stockpiles they will retain, along with a few decades' supply for military reactors.” Matthew Bunn, “Reducing Excess Stockpiles: U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition,” Securing the Bomb, <www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/reducing/heudispose.asp>.