ASSESSING THE STRATEGIC HORIZON

Abstract

Two sets of factors undermine the growing calls for a stronger U.S. role in leading the world to complete nuclear weapons disarmament. First, the history of post–Cold War nuclear proliferation shows that U.S. conventional military prowess and regional security concerns are more powerful drivers of global nuclear proliferation than U.S. nuclear policy. Thus, the relatively weak relationship between U.S. nuclear policy and the actions of proliferators is not a compelling justification for a greater U.S. effort toward a nuclear-free world. Second, in securing its vital interests, the United States must guard against various risks in a non-nuclear world, namely an increased likelihood of war between former nuclear powers; less insurance against disruptive technological challenges to U.S. military power; nuclear breakout; and the clandestine spread of nuclear knowledge. Despite these factors, the United States may still be able to reduce its nuclear arsenal. This article proposes that nuclear policy prescription should be couched in a diagnostic assessment of the international security environment to identify emerging and long-term challenges and opportunities that could affect the strategic position of the United States and the size and roles of its nuclear forces.

Keywords:

• United States
• nuclear weapons
• nuclear disarmament

Acknowledgements

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of his employer, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, the U.S. government, or any other entity. For their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, I thank Evelyn Krache Morris and two anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 5.

2. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 21.

3. Barack Obama, “Remarks of Senator Barack Obama, A New Beginning,” Chicago, October 2, 2007.

4. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A15.

5. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970, Article VI.

6. Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007, p. A19. For a more extensive argument, see, Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” Washington Quarterly 31 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 7–22.

7. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 4986, Sec. 1062, “Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.”

8. For example, see Bruce G. Blair and Thomas B. Cochran, with Jonathan Dean, Steve Fetter, Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, Lisbeth Gronlund, Henry Kelly, Hans M. Kristensen, Robert Nelson, Robert S. Norris, Ivan Oelrich, Christopher Paine, Frank N. von Hippel, David Wright, and Stephen Young, Toward True Security: Ten Steps the Next President Should Take to Transform U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2008).

9. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, “Nuclear Insecurity: Correcting Washington's Dangerous Posture,” Foreign Affairs 86 (September/October 2007), pp. 109–118.

10. Ellen O. Tauscher, “Achieving Nuclear Balance,” Nonproliferation Review 14 (November 2007), pp. 517–523.

11. J.D. Crouch, “Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,” Department of Defense, January 9, 2002, <www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html>.

12. DSB Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2006), p. 2. The DSB identifies five sets of views on the U.S. nuclear posture (without citing sources of these views): the United States, starting with its arsenal, should pursue global nuclear disarmament; U.S. nuclear weapons are the causal driver behind worldwide nuclear proliferation; nonproliferation is more important than nuclear deterrence; nuclear weapons deter only nuclear threats; and any new U.S. nuclear initiative is unnecessary to sustain deterrence and would undermine nonproliferation objectives (pp. 2–5).

13. DSB Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2006), p. 2. The DSB identifies five sets of views on the U.S. nuclear posture (without citing sources of these views): the United States, starting with its arsenal, should pursue global nuclear disarmament; U.S. nuclear weapons are the causal driver behind worldwide nuclear proliferation; nonproliferation is more important than nuclear deterrence; nuclear weapons deter only nuclear threats; and any new U.S. nuclear initiative is unnecessary to sustain deterrence and would undermine nonproliferation objectives, p. 7.

14. Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,” International Security 23 (Spring 1999), pp. 178–204.

15. Charles Duelfer, “Regime Strategic Intent,” in Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Langley, VA: CIA, 2004), p. 1, <https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html>.

16. Paul F. Power, “The Indo-American Nuclear Controversy,” Asian Survey 19 (June 1979), pp. 574–596.

17. Paul F. Power, “The Indo-American Nuclear Controversy,” Asian Survey 19 (June 1979), p. 583.

18. T.V. Paul, “The Systemic Bases of India's Challenge to the Global Nuclear Order,” Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1998), pp. 1–11,<cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/61/paul61.pdf>.

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23. Bruce Wallace, “U.S. Is Japan's Nuclear Shield, Rice Says,” Los Angeles Times, October 19, 2006, p. A7. For analysis of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, see Llewelyn Hughes, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan,” International Security 31 (Spring 2007), pp. 75–80; and Paul R. Daniels, Beyond “Better than Ever”: Japanese Independence and the Future of US-Japan Relations (Tokyo, Japan: Institute for International Policy Studies, 2004), esp. p. 18.

24. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 366.

25. Blair and Cochran et al., Toward True Security.

26. As Scott Sagan remarked in his widely cited proliferation study, “I have no quarrel with the argument that the largest number of past and even current active proliferant cases are best explained by the security model.” He goes on to argue that multicausality is at the heart of nuclear proliferation. See Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996/97), p. 85. For additional analysis of the multicausality of nuclear proliferation, which focuses on nuclear myths and mythmakers, see Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Proliferation Over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses,” Nonproliferation Review 13 (November 2006), pp. 433–454.

27. Michael J. Mazarr, “Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea,” International Security 20 (Fall 1995), p. 100. Clearly the history between the United States and North Korea during the Cold War suggests U.S. nuclear policy influenced North Korea's nuclear ambitions. After all, the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons during the Korean War. See Robert S. Norris, “U.S. Threat Helped Inspire North Korean Nuclear Urge,” Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2007, p. A15.

28. Scott D. Sagan, “How to Keep the Bomb From Iran,” Foreign Affairs 85 (September/October 2006), p. 55.

29. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1971), p. 206; Rosemary J. Foot, “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict,” International Security 13 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 92–112; and on Vietnam and nuclear use, Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International Security 29 (Spring 2005), p. 31.

30. Quoted in Elaine M. Grossman, “Senior U.S. General Sees High Nuclear Threshold,” Global Security Newswire, October 22, 2007.

31. Larry A. Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, Issue Brief for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2002), p. 4; and Federation of American Scientists, “Nuclear Weapons Program,” Federation of American Scientists web site, updated November 16, 2006, <www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html>.

32. Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, pp. 23–29; and the analyses of Rajesh Basrur and Michael Cohen in Rajesh M. Basrur, Michael D. Cohen, and Ward Wilson, “Correspondence: Do Small Nuclear Arsenals Deter?” International Security 32 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 202–214.

33. Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, pp. 35–38.

34. On the pre-1962 phase of the Cold War, see Richard K. Betts, “Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism,” in Victor A. Utgoff, ed., The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 71.

35. Basrur's letter, Basrur, Cohen, and Wilson, “Correspondence,” p. 204.

36. Ibid., pp. 205–206. As in the case of the 1969 Sino-Soviet skirmish, the Indians and Pakistanis have engaged in low-level combat over Kashmir.

37. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, “Deterrence and Foreign Policy,” World Politics 41 (January, 1989), pp. 172–173.

38. The Department of Defense uses the term “disruptive challenges” to describe “capabilities designed to disrupt or negate traditional U.S. military advantages.” See Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), p. 19.

39. Lawrence K. Gershwin, statement for the record for the Joint Economic Committee, “Cyber Threat Trends and US Network Security,” 107th Cong., 1st sess., June 21, 2001, pp. 9, 12. Although today it seems implausible that the United States would use nuclear weapons in response to cyberwarfare attacks, large-scale, coordinated attacks that destroy data to undermine the U.S. money supply, electric power distribution, or transportation networks could have the effect of weakening the U.S. economy and the projection of U.S. conventional military power. As a result, a nuclear attack might be the most viable option available to the United States. This does not mean, however, that the United States would or should employ nuclear weapons, nor does it mean others would find the threat credible.

40. China is reportedly investing in research and development of technologies designed to detect, track, and target low-observable aircraft such as the U.S. B-2 bomber and the F-22 fighter. See Wendell Minnick, “Beijing is Developing Anti-Stealth Abilities,” Defense News, June 11, 2007; and Richard Fisher Jr., “PLAAF Equipment Trends,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, October 30, 2001.

41. Bruce M. Sugden, “Closing the Prompt Global Strike Gap: Analyzing the Effects of Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” 2007, unpublished manuscript, pp. 24–26.

42. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), p. 410.

43. Charles L. Glaser, “The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament,” Survival 40 (Spring 1998), pp. 112–128.

44. Charles L. Glaser, “The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament,” Survival 40 (Spring 1998), p. 120.

45. Charles L. Glaser, “The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament,” Survival 40 (Spring 1998), p. 121.

46. Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, “How Much is Enough? Deterrence Theory and Chinese-U.S. Nuclear Relations,” paper delivered to the New America Foundation, Washington, DC, April 18, 2008, p. 11, <www.newamerica.net/events/2008/how_many_nukes_does_it_take>.

47. Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security 26 (Summer 2001), pp. 86–88.

48. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “Toward A Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, p. 13.

49. For background on RRW, see Jonathan Medalia, The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current Developments (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008).

50. For additional information on the CTBT, see Jonathan Medalia, Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008). Current nuclear weapon states that lack advanced computer simulation capabilities would find confidence in their nuclear weapons undermined far more than the United States.

51. Primers on net assessment include Paul Bracken, “Net Assessment: A Practical Guide,” Parameters 36 (Spring 2006), pp. 90–100; and Eliot A. Cohen, “Net Assessment: An American Approach,” Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Memorandum No. 29, 1990.

52. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report.

53. Paul Bracken, “The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,” November 5, 2003, MIT Security Studies Program, <web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives_03fall/bracken.htm>.

54. On the importance of identifying and managing uncertainty in defense strategic planning and of developing strategies that are robust across multiple alternative futures, see Michael Fitzsimmons, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning,” Survival 48 (Winter 2006/07), 131–146.

55. Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New Missions,” International Security 30 (Fall 2005), p. 124.

56. On the role of domestic politics in strategy formulation and implementation, see Steven E. Miller, “Politics over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Control,” International Security 8 (Spring 1984); on individuals’ reluctance to recognize the influence of preexisting beliefs, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 181–187.