EXPORT CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Abstract

Export controls and international safeguards are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of export controls and international safeguards rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.

Keywords:

• Export controls
• safeguards
• nonproliferation
• International Atomic Energy Agency
• Resolution 1540

Acknowledgements

This paper incorporates material from presentations made at the July 2006 Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, in Nashville, Tennessee, by coauthors Richard Goorevich, “Introductory Remarks on Integrating Safeguards and Nuclear Export Controls”; Lawrence Scheinman, “The Intersection Between Nuclear Export Control, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 and International Safeguards: Opportunities to Strengthen the Nonproliferation Regime”; and Danielle Peterson, et al., “Opportunities for Mutual Reinforcement of International Safeguards and Export Control Regimes.”

Notes

1. Other examples include bilateral nuclear supply agreements; activities of the Group of Eight with respect to global threat reduction, including the Global Partnership of 2002 to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies and the 2006 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; the Global Threat Reduction Initiative of 2004 to minimize the availability of weapons-usable nuclear material; the launching of the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict illicit and clandestine trade in components for nuclear weapon programs; the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities; the Recommendations of the IAEA Expert Group on Physical Protection (INFCIRC/225); and UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970, Article III.2.

3. IAEA, “Communications Received from Members Regarding the Export of Nuclear Material and of Certain Categories of Equipment and Other Material,” INFCIRC/209, September 3, 1974.

4. See NSG, Participants, <www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/member.htm>.

5. NSG, “Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers” (IAEA INFCIRC/254 Part 1), February 2006.

6. Included as a consolation for London Club participants who wanted the guidelines to require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply, the paragraph the sentence appears in as first drafted called for a reconsideration of the safeguards requirements by the end of 1976. This did not happen, and while the paragraph survived, references to any particular time for reconsideration were deleted. See Richard Goorevich, “Integrating International Safeguards and Nuclear Export Controls,” International Security News, June 2007, pp. 3–5.

7. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970, Article III.1.

8. The basic principles of the NPT safeguards system are set out in the preamble and Article III.1. These principles are fully reflected in “The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection With the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (INFCIRC/153), established in the immediate aftermath of entry into force of the NPT.

9. Rich Hooper, “The IAEA's Additional Protocol,” UNIDIR Disarmament Forum, No. 3, 1999, p. 8.

10. Rich Hooper, “The IAEA's Additional Protocol,” UNIDIR Disarmament Forum, No. 3, 1999, p. 9.

11. IAEA, “The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency,” p. 14, <www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf>.

12. IAEA Safeguards Statement for 2004, <www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2004.html>.

13. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA director general, “Statement to the 48th Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference 2004,” DG20092004, September 24, 2004.

14. Lawrence Scheinman, “The Intersection Between Export Control, UNSC Resolution 1540 and International Safeguards: Opportunities to Strengthen the Nonproliferation Regime,” Proceedings of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) 47th Annual Meeting, Nashville, TN, July 16–20, 2006 (Northbrook, IL: INMM, 2006).

15. UN Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004), S/Res/1540, April 28, 2004.

16. UN Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004), S/Res/1540, April 28, 2004.

17. Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter III, Department of Energy, Subchapter I: Sales Regulations, Part 810, “Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities.” For details, see <www.gpoaccess.gov/cfr/index.html>.