THE NPT

Abstract

This article assesses the successes and failures of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since its creation in 1968 by developing and applying a set of “metrics” to each of the NPT's substantive articles as well as to its withdrawal provisions. In light of this analysis, the article also puts forward some specific proposals for strengthening the NPT and its implementation, with a view to the debate and decisions at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. A concluding section turns explicitly to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and proposes pursuit of agreement on three NPT Action Plans: one for nonproliferation, one for peaceful uses, and one for nuclear disarmament. Combining vision and practicable steps, these Action Plans would set out a roadmap for action between the 2010 and the 2015 NPT Review Conferences. They could provide a foundation for substantive exchanges—in this case, on progress toward their implementation—during the preparations for the 2015 conference.

Keywords:

• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• nuclear weapons
• International Atomic Energy Agency
• safeguards
• nuclear disarmament
• United States

Notes

1. This paper draws partly on an earlier paper prepared for a workshop, “Challenges to the NPT Regime Instruments,” organized by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 6–7, 2008. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Naval Postgraduate School and its sponsors for preparation of the initial paper.

2. For this and other references to the NPT, see Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970.

3. See George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, “Looking Back: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Then and Now,” Arms Control Today 38 (July/August 2008), <www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/looking back>.

4. See Dean Rusk, “Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons before the Committee on Foreign Relations,” U.S. Senate, 90th Cong., 2nd. sess., July 1968, pp. 21, 27; Paul Nitze, See Dean Rusk, “Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons before the Committee on Foreign Relations,” U.S. Senate, 90th Cong., 2nd. sess., July 1968., pp. 55–56.

5. See Melvin Laird, “Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons before the Committee on Foreign Relations,” U.S. Senate, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., February 18 and 20, 1969, p. 384.

6. On nuclear weapons assistance in the early years, see Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1986); Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish, eds., U.S.-UK Nuclear Cooperation after 50 Years (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008); “China's Nuclear Weapon Development, Modernization and Testing,” Nuclear Threat Initiative/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <www.nti.org/db/china/wnwmdat.htm>; Warner D. Farr, “The Third Temple's Holy of Holies: Israel's Nuclear Weapons,” Counterproliferation Papers, U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, September 1999; Reuters, “Peres Biography: Israel, France Had Secret Pact to Produce Nuclear Weapons,” Ha'aretz, September 5, 2007; Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, “Israel's Nuclear Weapon Capability: An Overview,” July–August, 1996; Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); BBC News, “UK Helped Israel Get Nuclear Bomb,” August 4, 2005.

7. It is widely believed publicly that in the mid-1980s, China transferred a nuclear weapon design to Pakistan. For a summary of earlier China-Pakistan ties, see “China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, August 1999, <cns.miis.edu/research/india/china/npakpos.htm>.

8. See Shirley A. Kan, “China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service, Updated November 15, 2006, pp. 3–5.

9. “China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Archived Material: Resources on India and Pakistan.

10. See Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service, June 20, 2008, p. 9; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, November 18, 2007.

11. See David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “The A.Q. Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network and Implications for Nonproliferation Efforts,” Strategic Insights 5 (July 2006), <www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/Jul/albrightJul06.asp>.

12. See Bunn and Rhinelander, “Looking Back: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Then and Now”; Wayne Reynolds and John Simpson, “Australia: A Potential Future Proliferator?” pp. 11–13; and Etel Solingen, “The Perils of Projection: Japan's Once and Future Nuclear Status,” pp. 2–20, papers for “Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation Project,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, August 2008; Paul M. Cole, Sweden Without the Bomb: The Conduct of a Nuclear-Capable Nation Without Nuclear Weapons (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), pp. 96–112; Jurg Stussi, “Historical Outline on the Question of Swiss Nuclear Armament,” English translation of Swiss Government report, April 1996, <nuclearweaponarchive.org/Library/Swissdoc.html>.

13. David Kay, “Iraqi Inspections: Lessons Learned,” presentation at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, California, February 10, 1993.

14. See Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, “Probe of Libya Finds Nuclear Black Market,” Washington Post, January 24, 2004, p. A1; James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Libya,” November 14, 2006, <cns.miis.edu/wmdme/index.htm>.

15. For a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for concern about Iran's nuclear weapon ambitions, see Mark Fitzpatrick, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), Adelphi Paper 398.

16. See Richard Weitz, “Israeli Airstrike in Syria: International Reactions,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1, 2007, <cns.miis.edu/stories/071101.htm>; Greg Miller and Paul Richter, “U.S. Offers Evidence of North Korea-Syria Nuclear Plant,” Los Angeles Times, April 25, 2008.

17. For a discussion of the overall issue that concludes, inter alia, that the NPT has “more to do with encouraging [states] … to trade nuclear development for nuclear hedging,” see Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security 27 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 59–88.

18. See Cole, Sweden Without the Bomb: The Conduct of a Nuclear-Capable Nation Without Nuclear Weapons, pp. 106–9; Stussi, “Historical Outline on the Question of Swiss Nuclear Armament.”

19. This judgment reflects the author's discussions with various European officials and experts over the past several years.

20. For a discussion of responses to Iran's emergence as a nuclear weapon state in violation of its NPT obligations, see, Lewis A. Dunn, “After Iranian Acquisition, What?,” paper prepared for the William S. Cohen Center, University of Maine and the National Defense University, July 9, 2007.

21. This fear of runaway proliferation—and the belief that the NPT would help to prevent such proliferation—recurs throughout U.S. officials’ testimony in support of U.S. Senate consent to the ratification of the NPT. See “Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons before the Committee on Foreign Relations.”

22. See, for example, Kurt M. Campbell, Mitchell Reiss, and Robert Einhorn, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

23. Paul Leventhal, “CIRUS Reactor's Role in a U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement,” prepared remarks delivered at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Washington, DC, December 19, 2005.

24. The early discussions were pointed out to the author in a personal communication from a former senior official of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

25. For an excellent discussion of the origins of the nuclear supply regime, written by one of the participants in its creation, see Frederick McGoldrick, “International Nuclear Export Control Regimes: The Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” unpublished report, September 2008.

26. See Leventhal, “CIRUS Reactor's Role in a U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement.”

27. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, <www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/nnpa1978.htm>.

28. See, for example, William Langewiesche, “The Wrath of Khan,” Atlantic Monthly, November 2005.

29. Leonard Spector and Deborah Berman, “The Syrian Nuclear Puzzle,” unpublished manuscript, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, August 2008.

30. Some readers may question the inclusion of a metric dealing with the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in a paper assessing the pluses and minuses of the NPT; this metric has been included given the role of the IAEA in monitoring compliance with NPT safeguards obligations,.

31. See, respectively, Malcolm Rifkind, “The Work of the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq,” Guardian, June 28, 1996, <www.fas.org/news/iraq/1997/01/9701-fco-unscom.htm>; Online NewsHour, “Tracking Nuclear Proliferation—Romania,” PBS, May 2, 2005, <www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/military/proliferation/countries/romania.html>; Paul Kerr, “IAEA: Seoul's Nuclear Sins in Past,” Arms Control Today 34 (December 2004); Fitzpatrick, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, p. 15; Spector and Berman, “The Syrian Nuclear Puzzle.”

32. On the IAEA's culture, see Lawrence Scheinman, “Assuring the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Safeguards System,” Atlantic Council of the United States, October 1992, pp. 26–29.

33. See IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,” <www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html>.

34. See, for example, McGoldrick, “International Nuclear Export Control Regimes.”

35. See IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards Overview.”

36. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Article XII, para. 6, July 29, 1957, <www.iaea.org/About/statute.html>.

37. Communication to the author from Lawrence Scheinman, distinguished professor, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

38. See John Carlson and Russell Leslie, “Special Inspections Revisited,” paper presented at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 2005 Annual Meeting, Phoeniz, Arizona, July 2005.

39. See “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report Submitted to the Director General of the IAEA,” February 22, 2005.

40. See Glenn T. Seaborg, prepared statement, “Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons before the Committee on Foreign Relation,” p. 102. See also George Bunn, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems,” Arms Control Today 33 (December 2003). For a comprehensive and widely accepted study of the NPT negotiating history, see Mohammed I. Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959–1979, three volumes (London: Oceana Publications, 1980).

41. See George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, “Nuclear Disarmament: How Much Have the Five Nuclear Powers Promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty?,” paper prepared for the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, 1994, reissued June 1997. Bunn and Timerbaev were members of the U.S. and Soviet negotiating teams, respectively.

42. See George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, “Nuclear Disarmament: How Much Have the Five Nuclear Powers Promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty?,” paper prepared for the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, 1994, reissued June 1997. Bunn and Timerbaev were members of the U.S. and Soviet negotiating teams, respectively., p. 12.

43. For a recent articulation of this position, see Christopher A. Ford, “Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review 14 (November 2007), pp. 401–28. In addition to Bunn and Timerbaev, a different assessment is provided in Thomas Graham Jr., “The Origin and Interpretation of Article VI,” Nonproliferation Review 15 (March 2008), pp. 7–9.

44. Bunn and Timerbaev, “Nuclear Disarmament: How Much Have the Five Nuclear Powers Promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty?” p. 24.

45. The following discussion draws partly on the author's participation in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as an adviser to the U.S. delegation.

46. Graham, “The Origin and Interpretation of Article VI.”

47. This judgment reflects the author's own experience—directly and indirectly—in this area.

48. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, “Hearings on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” Senate Committee on Armed Services, 106th Cong., 1st sess., October 6 and 7, 1999, p. 12.

49. Statement made to the author by French officials during his visit in March 2009 to the facilities at Marcoule and Pierrelatte.

50. See Lewis A. Dunn, ed., “Foreign Perceptions of U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture: Insights, Issues, and Implications,” report prepared by Science Applications International Corporation for the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, December 12, 2006, <www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/ForeignPerspectivesUSNuclearPolicyCompleteReport.pdf>.

51. “China Profile—Nuclear,” Nuclear Threat Initiative/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, March 2009, <www.nti.nti.org/e_research/profiles/China/Nuclear/index.html>.

52. There are other more procedural NPT articles, including Article VIII on amendment process and Article IX on entry into force and definition of “nuclear weapon state.” Due to space considerations, these are not discussed here. Suffice it to note that the amendment process makes it virtually impossible to amend the NPT. In addition, the definition of a NWS as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967” precludes entry to the NPT as such a state by India, Pakistan, and Israel. This definition has significantly complicated efforts to bring these countries into a wider nuclear disarmament dialogue and into the overall nonproliferation regime.

53. See on this issue, inter alia, George Bunn and John Rhinelander, “The Right to Withdraw from the NPT: Article X is Not Unconditional,” Disarmament Diplomacy No. 79 (April/May 2005); “Working Paper on Article X,” submitted by Australia and New Zealand, 2005 NPT Review Conference, April 28, 2005; “Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” European Union common approach, working paper submitted to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, May 10, 2005; “Strengthening the Implementation of Article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” working paper submitted by the United States to the 2005 NPT Review Conference; Pierre Goldschmidt, “Saving the NPT and the Nonproliferation Regime in an Era of Nuclear Renaissance,” testimony to the House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, July 24, 2008.

54. This phrase was coined by Alton Frye. It remains apt today.