TOGETHER TOWARD NUCLEAR ZERO

Abstract

To understand the prospects for engaging China and Russia on disarmament, the authors examine views of U.S. strategic policy in Beijing and Moscow, the two countries’ mutual perspectives, and prospects for particular disarmament measures. Through an appraisal of nuclear force postures and doctrines and linkages to missile defense, conventional military capabilities, and possible space weaponization, the authors explain why nuclear disarmament involves strategic considerations writ large, and not simply nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. They analyze Chinese and Russian views of a variety of possible disarmament and arms control measures and relevant strategic considerations. While formal arms reduction negotiations are only likely with Russia in the short term, they note that confidence-building measures could already be instituted that involve China. Finally, they note there exists a small window of opportunity to move cooperatively toward nuclear zero; however, as decisions on military procurement are realized, this window will shrink.

Keywords:

• Disarmament
• nonproliferation
• United States
• Russia
• China
• nuclear zero

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for supporting their research. The viewpoints expressed in the article are those of the authors alone. An early version of this article was presented at the conference “Trilateral Relations Among China, Russia, and the U.S.A.: Structure, Perceptions and Politics,” Shanghai, China, September 26–28, 2008. The authors would like to thank conference participants for their comments, which helped to inform their later work. Similarly, the authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewer of their article “Strategic Relations between the United States, Russia, and China and the Possibility of Cooperation on Disarmament” (published in Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter, eds., James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 15, April 2009), of which this article is an updated version.

Notes

1. “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009.

2. For more discussion of Russian nuclear doctrine, see Nikolai Sokov, “The Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia's Security Policy,” in Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter, eds., Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 15, April 2009.

3. Russia resumed strategic bomber patrol flights over the Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic oceans in August 2007. Strategic submarine patrols have also become increasingly regular (ten nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine [SSBN] patrols in 2008, compared with three in 2007, five in 2006, and none in 2002). Though quite modest compared to during the Cold War, they could lead to a return to continuous patrols. “Russian Strategic Bombers Conduct Patrols over Arctic,” RIA Novosti, January 21, 2009; Hans Kristensen, “Russian Strategic Submarine Patrols Rebound,” Federation of American Scientists Strategic Security Blog, February 17, 2009, <www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/02/russia.php#more-816>.

4. “Strategiya natisonalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda” [National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation through 2020], confirmed by Russian Presidential Decree No. 537 of May 12, 2009, Russian Security Council, <www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>.

5. China has traditionally viewed the concept of “deterrence” as negative and until recently used this term to refer to the practice employed by the United States, for example, not China itself. China's nuclear force was instead used to prevent the use of deterrent forces to attack or coerce China—“defensive” deterrence, as opposed to the “offensive nuclear deterrence of hegemonism.” See Michael S. Chase and Evan Medeiros, “China's Evolving Nuclear Calculus: Modernization and Doctrinal Debate,” in James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, eds., China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, December 2005), pp. 119–54.

6. The Chinese term zuidi xiandu weishe is commonly translated as “minimum deterrence”; Jeffrey Lewis more accurately translates it as “minimum means of reprisal.” Jeffrey Lewis, “The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age,” PhD diss., University of Maryland at College Park, 2004, p. 13.

7. While a U.S. (or Russian) president would have only six or seven minutes to decide whether to launch a nuclear counterattack should he be given news of a first strike launched toward U.S. (or Russian) territory, there is no evidence that the Chinese nuclear forces have ever been put on alert. See Lewis, “The Minimum Means of Reprisal,” p. 16.

8. Interview with Sha Zukang, director-general of Department of Arms Control And Disarmament ofMinistry of Foreign Affairs, in Tseng Shu-wan, “US Nuclear Proliferation Threatens Global Security—Sha Zukang on Ways China Should Handle It, Stressing Needs To Ensure The Effectiveness ofRetaliatory Capacity,” Wen Wei Po, June 11, 2000, FBIS Document CPP-2000-0711-000024, as cited in Lewis, “The Minimum Means of Reprisal,” p. 13.

9. China does not have a capable, blue-water SSBN force. However, three or four Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs are currently under construction. This number is not sufficient to maintain one vessel on continuous patrol for deterrence purposes; should Beijing decide to create this sort of naval deterrent, several more Jin-class boats would be needed. For details on the new SSBN, see Hans Kristensen, “New Chinese SSBN Deploys to Hainan Island,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, April 24, 2008, <www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/04/new-chinese-ssbn-deploys-to-hainan-island-naval-base.php>.

10. For an examination of Chinese writings on limited deterrence, see Chase and Medeiros, “China's Evolving Nuclear Calculus.”

11. Sun Xiangli, “Analysis of China's Nuclear Strategy,” China Security, No. 1 (August 2005), pp. 23–27, as cited in Jeffrey Lewis, “Chinese Nuclear Posture and Force Modernization,” in Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter, eds., Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 15, April 2009.

12. Jun Xue, “Views on Improving the Capabilities of the Military in Implementing Its Historic Mission,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, October 20, 2007, pp. 104–108, 124, in “PRC: PLA Must Improve Capabilities, Safeguard Party's ‘Ruling Status’ in New Era,” FBIS Document CPP-20080618436001.

13. Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs 85 (March/April 2006). The article was much commented on in the Russian and Chinese press, including several articles in the Autumn 2006 China Security, <www.worldsecurityinstitute.org/showpublications.cfm?id=149>.

14. George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “European Missile Defense: The Technological Basis of Russian Concerns,” Arms Control Today, October 2007.

15. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-23, December 16, 2002, <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-23.htm>.

16. “SShA issleduyet vozmozhnosti i sistemy PRO po unichtozheniyu rossiyskikh i kitayskikh raket—ekspert RVSN” [U.S. Studies Missile Defense Capabilities and Systems for the Destruction of Russian and Chinese Missiles—Strategic Rocket Forces Expert], ARMS-TASS, December 8, 2008.

17. Lewis and Postol, “European Missile Defense.”

18. Eric Hundman, “Russian Nuclear Arsenal,” Center for Defense Information, July 30, 2008, <www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=2967>.

19. “S-400 (SA-20 Triumf),” Missilethreat.com, Claremont Institute, <www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.52/system_detail.asp>.

20. “Vozmozhnosti i perspektivy novykh zenitnykh raket S-400” [Capabilities and Prospects for the New S-400 Anti-Aircraft Missile], RIA Novosti, July 13, 2007.

21. “Russian Missiles near Poland to ‘Offset’ U.S. Shield—NATO Envoy,” RIA Novosti, November 5, 2008.

22. “Joint Statement by Dmitry A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, on Missile Defense Issues,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 6, 2009.

23. Sha Zukang, “The Impact of the U.S. Missile Defense Programme on the Global Security Structure,” CPAPD/ORG Joint Seminar on Missile Defense and the Future of the ABM Treaty, March 13–15, 2000, Beijing, as cited in Li Bin, “The Impact of U.S. NMD on Chinese Nuclear Modernization,” Pugwash Workshop on East Asian Security, April 3–6, 2001, Seoul, <www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/rc8e.htm>.

24. Li Bin categorizes the various options that have been discussed as follows: 1) methods to overwhelm the defense by building more ICBMs, MIRVing the Chinese ICBMs to multiply the number of warheads, releasing decoys from the missiles, or dispersing chaff to fool the sensors of the defense; 2) methods to lower the observability of the warheads by applying stealth technology; 3) methods to create a rivalry between the warheads and the interceptors during the flight, such as through maneuverable warheads; and 4) means to raise the survivability of the Chinese ICBMs by deploying mobile ICBMs and/or SLBMs, building a missile defense, or putting the Chinese nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. Li Bin, “The Impact of U.S. NMD on Chinese Nuclear Modernization.”

25. “Joint Statement of The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation On Major International Issues,” Chinese Foreign Ministry, May 23, 2008.

26. Roland Timerbaev, Rossiya i yadernoye nerasprostraneniye, 1945–1968 [Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945–1968] (Moscow: Nauka, 1999).

27. The information in this paragraph is largely derived from Shizilukou Shang de Shijie [The World at a Crossroads] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Press, 2000), “Excerpt of PRC Book on International Strategy,” FBIS Document CPP20070110320011.

28. The information in this paragraph is largely derived from Shizilukou Shang de Shijie [The World at a Crossroads] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Press, 2000), “Excerpt of PRC Book on International Strategy,” FBIS Document CPP20070110320011. The agreement, “On Not Aiming Guided Missiles at Each Other and Not Using Nuclear Weapons Against Each Other First,” was promulgated in August 1994.

29. Yang Jiemian, Dahezuo [Grand Cooperation] (Tianjin: Renmin Chubanshe, 2005), as translated in “Excerpt of PRC Book on China's Global Strategy,” FBIS Document CPP20070618320001.

30. Some Russian politicians began to note that Russian and Chinese approaches to many international issues were very similar, in particular on disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. See statement by Amur region Senator Igor Rogachev, “Russian-Chinese Relations—Together on the Road of Partnership and Cooperation,” Xinhua, January 12, 2002.

31. See, for example, briefing by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, January 20, 1999, <www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/news99/t01201999_t0120md.htm>, at which Cohen stated that “[missile defense] deployment might require modifications to the [ABM] treaty and the Administration is working to determine the nature and the scope of these modifications. … The ABM Treaty also provides, of course, for right of withdrawal with six months notice if a party concludes it's in its supreme national interests.” A joint regional missile shield was reportedly discussed during both Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian's January 2000 visit to Moscow and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov's February 2000 visit to Beijing. Vladimir Kucherin, “Ne tolko v oblasti baleta” [Not Only in the Sphere of Ballet], Rossiyskaya gazeta, May 25, 2000.

32. For example, Russia was wary of selling the most modern fighter aircraft (such as the Su-37) and advanced air defense systems. Some Russian experts have argued that the weapon systems sold to China have already been excessive.

33. Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, July 16, 2001, Chinese Foreign Ministry, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm>.

34. Sergei Brezkun and Victor Mikhailov, “Kak uderzhat globalnyy treugolnik” [How to Maintain the Global Triangle], Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer [Military-Industrial Courier], October 12–18, 2005.

35. Brezkun and Mikhailov, “Kak uderzhat.”

36. Vyacheslav Baskakov and Aleksandr Gorshkov, “Raketno-yadernyy arsenal Pekina” [Beijing's Nuclear Arsenal], Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye [Independent Military Observer], April 5, 2002.

37. Aleksandr Khramchikhin, “Ugroza, kotoraya sama po sebe ‘ne rassosetsya’” [The Threat that Will ‘Not Be Resolved’ by Itself], Nezavisimaya voyennoye obozreniye [Independent Military Observer], February 22, 2008.

38. Aleksandr Khramchikhin, “Ugroza, kotoraya sama po sebe ‘ne rassosetsya’” [The Threat that Will ‘Not Be Resolved’ by Itself], Nezavisimaya voyennoye obozreniye [Independent Military Observer], February 22, 2008. It should be noted that while Khramchikhin is far from the first Russian to be interested in Chinese emigration northward, most do not speak of actual border changes. A detailed review of Russian views of China and vice versa can be found in Yevgeny Bazhanov, China: From the Middle Kingdom to a Superpower of the XXI Century (Moscow: Izvestia Press, 2007).

39. Dmitry Trenin and Vitaly Tsygichko, “China to Russia: Comrade or Master?” Security Index 2 (2007).

40. Bazhanov, China: From the Middle Kingdom to a Superpower of the XXI Century.

41. Bazhanov, China: From the Middle Kingdom to a Superpower of the XXI Century. p. 329.

42. Bazhanov, China: From the Middle Kingdom to a Superpower of the XXI Century., p. 331–32.

43. Cited in Bazhanov, China: From the Middle Kingdom to a Superpower of the XXI Century, p. 333.

44. V.L. Sedelnikov, “Military and Economic Strategy and the Restructuring of China's Armed Forces,” Military Thought, Issue 9 (2007), p. 68.

45. For example, Vladimir Malyavin argues that Russia does not have a clear understanding of how to interact with China. Vladimir Malyavin, “Podlinnyy Kitay sokryt ot vneshnogo mira” [The Real China is Hidden from the Outside World,” Russkiy zhurnal, June 10, 2009.

46. Tsyganok further argues that Chinese expansion will pose a threat to Russia. Anatoliy Tsyganok, “Plyusy i minusy ‘Strategii natsionalnoy bezopasnosti” [Pluses and Minuses of the ‘National Security Strategy’], Polit.ru, June 19, 2009, <www.polit.ru/author/2009/06/19/nats.html>.

47. For additional Chinese views of Russian nuclear capabilities, see Lora Saalman, “Chinese Analysts’ Views on Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War,” in Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter, eds., Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 15, April 2009. Saalman notes, for example, that Qian Shaojun argues that Russia's work to miniaturize low-yield nuclear weapons and pursue new weapons designs, along with U.S. actions, has lowered the threshold for nuclear conflict. Qian Shaojun, ed., Hewuqi Zhuangbei [Nuclear Weapons Equipment] (Beijing: Zongzhuangbeibu Dianzi Xinxi Jichubu, Yuanzineng Chubanshe, Hangkong Gongye Chubanshe, and Bingqi Gongye Chubanshe, July 2003), p. 153, as cited in Saalman.

48. Guojia Anquan Gongmin Shouce [Public Handbook on National Security] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2003), as translated in “Excerpt of PRC Handbook on National Security,” FBIS Document CPP20070911320005.

49. Guojia Anquan Gongmin Shouce. See also Ren Xiangqun, “World Military Security Becoming More Complex by the Day,” Liaowang [Outlook], October 2, 2006 (as translated in “PRC Expert Analyzes Increasingly Complex Global Military Security,” FBIS Document CPP20061011718014), for yet another military expert's assessment of the current U.S.–Russian “strategic arms race.”

50. An entire session of a Chinese-Russian-U.S. conference on trilateral relations held in September 2008 was devoted to the topic of a new Cold War. Shen Dingli of Fudan University averred that a new Cold War had indeed already begun, with actual hot conflicts involving states linked to Moscow and Washington already fought (in Serbia and Georgia). However, he noted that this Cold War did not have to continue and that from the Chinese perspective, a new Cold War was not positive (“if the U.S. loses, China loses”). Pan Xingming of the East China Normal University School of Advanced International and Area Studies defined “Cold War” as “international containment” with a struggle over interests, influence, and power and noted that this was what U.S. policy looks like today. U.S. and Russian conference participants did not share the view that a Cold War had already or would soon emerge. “Trilateral Relations Among China, Russia, and the U.S.A.: Structure, Perceptions and Politics,” Shanghai, China, September 26–28, 2008.

51. Indeed, China was party to a new Asian Development Bank loan made to Georgia on extremely preferential terms and expressed its “concern” about Russia's actions in Georgia in August 2008. Keith Bradsher, “Loan to Georgia Illustrates Asian Dismay With Russia,” New York Times, September 13, 2008, p. A9.

52. Cui Liru, ed. Dongbeiya Diqu Anquan Zhengce Ji Anquan Hezuo Guoxiang [Regional Security Policy and Security Cooperation Blueprints for Northeast Asia] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2006), as translated in “Summary of PRC Book on Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” FBIS Document CPP20071016320001.

53. “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” April 5, 2009.

54. Wang Zhongchun, “Nuclear Challenges and China's Choices,” China Security, Winter 2007, pp. 52–65.

55. Further discussion of Wang Zhongchun's views and his book Hewuqi, Heguojia, Hezhanlue [Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Powers and Nuclear Strategies] can be found in Saalman, “Chinese Analysts’ Views on Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War.”

56. Evidence that Second Artillery planners are concerned about the vulnerability of China's silo-based missiles to an attack by conventional precision-guided munitions is discussed in Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, eds., Zhanyixue [The Science of Campaigns] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, May 2000); and Chase and Medeiros, “China's Evolving Nuclear Calculus,” pp. 144–45.

57. See Vladimir Dvorkin, “Reducing Russia's Reliance on Nuclear Weapons in Security Policies,” in Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter, eds., Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 15, April 2009.

58. Walter Pincus, “Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan: Strategy Includes Preemptive Use Against Banned Weapons,” Washington Post, September 11, 2005, p. A1.

59. Stephen Dinan, “Obama Science-Tech Team Takes Aim at Global Warming,” Washington Times, December 21, 2008; “Obama Taps Nonproliferation Expert as Science Adviser,” Global Security Newswire, December 22, 2008, <gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20081222_5906.php>.

60. Stephen Dinan, “Obama Science-Tech Team Takes Aim at Global Warming,” Washington Times, December 21, 2008; “Obama Taps Nonproliferation Expert as Science Adviser,” Global Security Newswire, December 22, 2008, <gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20081222_5906.php>.

61. “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” April 5, 2009.

62. Valery Loschinin, Statement to the CD, January 20, 2009, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches09/1session/20january_Russia.html>.

63. For a recent official Chinese statement, see the May 9, 2007 Chinese statement, Reaching Critical Will, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom07/statements/9mayChina_morning.doc>. For more information, see Shen Dingli, “China's Negative Security Assurances,” Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction: Electronic Essays, Stimson Center, October 1998, as cited in Chase and Medeiros, “China's Evolving Nuclear Calculus,” p. 140.

64. Although it may be argued that China has no other option, since it currently lacks the early warning system necessary to ensure an earlier response, the authors believe that even with a better satellite system, China would continue to maintain its current policy due to its overarching concept of its nuclear posture, which calls for the use of nuclear weapons in retaliatory strikes only.

65. Current Chinese systems, except for the DF-31 and DF-21, are structurally de-alerted, given that warheads and missiles are separated and that it takes hours to get them ready with liquid-fueled propellants. As China upgrades to solid-fueled missiles, analysts have questioned whether they too will be kept separately from their warheads; at present, this appears to be the case. See Hans Kristensen, “China Defense White Paper Describes Nuclear Escalation,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, January 23, 2008, <www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/01/chinapaper.php#more-701>.

66. As of 1997, the United States was estimated to have 100 metric tons (MT) of plutonium and 635 MT of highly enriched uranium (HEU); Russia had 130 MT of plutonium and 1,010 MT of HEU; and China had 4 MT of plutonium and 20 MT of HEU. “World Inventories of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium,” in David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, eds., The Challenges of Fissile Material Control (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security Press, 1999), Institute for Science and International Security, <www.isis-online.org/publications/fmct/primer/Section_VI.html>.

67. Li Bin, “The Impact of U.S. NMD on Chinese Nuclear Modernization.”

68. The above discussion draws largely upon Anatoli Diakov, “Russia,” chapter in Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty (Princeton: International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2008).

69. Statement by Kang Yong, representative of the Chinese Delegation at the Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons, 63rd Session of the UN General Assembly First Committee, November 10, 2008, Chinese Foreign Ministry, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjfywj/t521626.htm>.

70. They have noted the need to “consider security concerns” and to build a “strong foundation for the work programme.” It is not clear whether the latter includes means to ensure that negotiations on areas of particular interest to China—such as space—are not superseded by talks in other areas—such as an FMCT.

71. “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” April 5, 2009.

72. Statement by Kang Yong, November 10, 2008.

73. Li Bin, “The Impact of U.S. NMD on Chinese Nuclear Modernization.”

74. Existing treaties regulating outer space include the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1979 Moon Agreement, and some bilateral agreements; they prohibited nuclear testing, deployment of weapons of mass destruction, and certain military activities in outer space. The now-abrogated ABM Treaty of 1972 required parties not to develop, test, or deploy space-based antimissile systems. Russia and China view these instruments as playing a positive role in promoting the peaceful use of outer space but inadequate to prevent its weaponization, since they fail to address the issue of deployment in outer space of conventional weapons that could be used to attack both ground and space targets; additionally, they do not prevent potential attacks on objects in outer space from the ground.

75. Jean-Michel Stoullig, “Rumsfeld Commission Warns Against ‘Space Pearl Harbor,’” Agence-France Presse, January 11, 2001.

76. “Russia-China CD Working Paper on New Space Treaty,” Acronym Institute, June 27, 2002, <www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0206/doc10.htm>.

77. Both documents can be found on the website of the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, <www.china-un.ch/eng/>.

78. “China, Russia Present Joint Initiative on Space Arms Race Control,” People's Daily, February 13, 2008, <english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6353226.html>.

79. The UN General Assembly has consistently voted in favor of negotiating a treaty on PAROS; the United States and Israel have abstained on these votes. The United States is the only country that is blocking further discussion on this issue at the CD. In 2002, John Bolton, then U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and nonproliferation, stated to the CD, “The current international regime regulating the use of space meets all our purposes. We see no need for new agreements.” John Bolton, statement to the CD, Geneva, January 24, 2002, <www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0201/doc09.htm>.

80. For detailed analysis, see Pavel Podvig, “Russia and the Military Use of Space,” in Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, eds., Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space, A Report of the Reconsidering the Rules of Space Project (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2008).

81. Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, statement at the Plenary of the Second Part of the 2005 Session of the CD, Geneva, June 23, 2005, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches05/June23China.pdf>.

82. “Chinese Nuclear Forces, January 2008,” SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 386.

83. Hui Zhang, “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China,” Arms Control Today, December 2005, p. 9.

84. Hui Zhang, “Chinese Perspectives on Space Weaponization,” in Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, eds., Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space, A Report of the Reconsidering the Rules of Space Project (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts & Sciences, March 2008), p. 51.

85. For detailed analysis see Hui Zhang, “Chinese Perspectives on Space Weaponization.”

86. Edward Cody, “China Confirms Firing Missile to Destroy Satellite,” Washington Post, January 24, 2007, p. A8.

87. Wade Boese, “Chinese Satellite Destruction Stirs Debate,” Arms Control Today, March 2007, p. 27.

88. Ambassador Christina Rocca, statement to the Conference on Disarmament on Prevention of the Arms Race in the Outer Space, February 13, 2007, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/1session/Feb13USA.pdf>.

89. According to U.S. officials, the satellite carried hazardous toxic fuel. Thom Shanker, “U.S. to Attempt to Shoot Down Faulty Satellite,” New York Times, February 15, 2008.

90. Statement by Kang Yong, November 10, 2008.

91. White House, “Joint Understanding for the START Follow-on Treaty,” Office of the Press Secretary, July 8, 2009.

92. For a detailed review of Chinese views of U.S. and Russian improvements of their nuclear arsenals and the implications for China joining in arms control measures, see Saalman, “Chinese Analysts’ Views on Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War.”

93. Tsyganok, as quoted in Ivan Konovalov, “The Defense Ministry Acknowledges U.S.,” Kommersant, August 4, 2008, <www.kommersant.com/p1007705/r_1/military_defense/>.