THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

Abstract

The nuclear weapon states (NWS) have different perspectives on the desirability and feasibility of a world without nuclear weapons. A review of each of the current nuclear doctrines, postures, and disarmament policies of the five NWS shows that there is a clear divide between them, with some showing relatively determined leadership (the United States and the United Kingdom) and others expressing skepticism, if not complete disinterest (France, Russia, and China). Nevertheless, the prospects for progress on disarmament by the NWS at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remain reasonably good. Yet complete success will require much time as well as sustained and applied efforts from the NWS, first and foremost to improve their performance as international security guarantors.

Keywords:

• Nuclear weapon states
• diplomacy
• disarmament
• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Notes

1. “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009.

2. George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A15; and George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, p. A13.

3. During his campaign, Obama made it clear that he was determined to pursue the abolition of nuclear weapons. See for instance Barack Obama, “Remarks by Senator Barack Obama,” speech at the Summit on Confronting New Threats, West Lafayette, IN, July 16, 2008.

4. William Walker, “Nuclear Order and Disorder,” International Affairs 76 (October 2000), p. 709. Emphasis in original.

5. Statement by U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, First Committee, General Assembly, United Nations, April 26, 1968. Article VI reads: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970, Art. VI.

6. Carlton Stoiber, “The Evolution of the NPT Review Conference Final Documents, 1975–2000,” Nonproliferation Review 10 (Fall/Winter 2003), p. 130. Coral Bell explains, “An international norm defines ‘expected and required’ behavior in the society of states.” See Coral Bell, “Normative Shift,” National Interest 70 (Winter 2002/2003), p. 44. The phrase was first used in the nuclear field by Brad Roberts in “Nonproliferation—Challenges Old and New,” Counterproliferation Papers 24 (August 2004), p. 20.

7. “Statement by H.E. Mr. Triyono Wibowo, Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Vienna,” First Preparatory Commission for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Vienna, May 1, 2007.

8. Sharon Squassoni, “The New Disarmament Discussion,” Current History 714 (January 2009), p. 36.

9. For a study of the first nuclear disarmament projects, see “Atomic Energy Commission,” International Organization 1 (February 1947), pp. 99–102. At that time, nuclear abolitionists formed their own organizations, notably the now well-known Federation of American Scientists and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, founded in 1945 and 1957, respectively. For an insider's perspective on the debate about the abolition of nuclear weapons, see Jonathan Schell's two influential books: The Fate of the Earth (New York: Viking, 1982); and The Abolition (New York: Knopf, 1984).

10. See, for instance, the creation of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (1995) and the discussions in favor of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Known for promoting a hard line toward the Kremlin during the Cold War, defense strategist Paul Nitze questioned the value of nuclear weapons in the 1990s. See Paul H. Nitze, “Is It Time to Junk our Nukes? The New World Disorder Makes Them Obsolete,” Washington Post, January 16, 1994, p. C1; and Paul H. Nitze, “A Threat Mostly to Ourselves,” New York Times, October 28, 1999, p. A31.

11. Lewis Dunn, “The NPT: Assessing the Past, Building the Future,” Nonproliferation Review 16 (July 2009), p. 161. The end of the Cold War also witnessed a wave of “de-proliferation,” notably with South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine abandoning their nuclear weapons.

12. NWS heavily emphasized the importance of nuclear disarmament in the “Principles and Objectives” of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference; see NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Decision 2. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, NWS also committed to thirteen important disarmament steps. In particular, they reaffirmed their “unequivocal undertaking … to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all the State Parties are committed under Article VI.” See NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), pp. 14–15.

13. John Simpson and Jenny Nielsen, “The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Mission Impossible,” Nonproliferation Review 12 (July 2005), p. 288.

14. For a historical review of nuclear abolitionist waves, see Michael Krepon, “Ban the Bomb. Really,” American Interest 3 (January/February 2008), pp. 88–93.

15. Kim Salomon, “What is the Use of International History,” Journal of Peace Research 30 (November 1993), p. 386.

16. “Remarks by the President after Meeting with Former Secretary of State George Schultz [sic], Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Former Senator and Chairman of the Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn, and Former Secretary of Defense William Perry to Discuss Key Priorities in U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy,” White House, Washington, DC, May 19, 2009.

17. A large majority of Americans (77 percent) are in favor the elimination of nuclear weapons according to a timeline. See “Publics around the World Favor International Agreement to Eliminate All Nuclear Weapons,” World Public Opinion.org, December 9, 2008, <www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/international_security_bt/577.php?lb=btis&pnt=577&nid=&id=>.

18. “Remarks by the President at the New Economic School Graduation,” Moscow, July 7, 2009.

19. In his Prague speech, President Obama explained that his administration will push for a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation (such as an international fuel bank) and seek to secure the world's vulnerable nuclear material within four years.

20. “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Prague, April 5, 2009.

21. At the time of this writing, the Department of Defense had issued three documents providing key insights into the NPR process. Of particular significance is that one of the documents embraces a “whole of government” approach. The “2009 NPR Terms of Reference Fact Sheet” stresses that the Department of Defense “will consult with the other U.S. Government departments and agencies and appropriate Congressional committees” and that the NPR “will be conducted concurrently with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMD), the Space Policy Review, various other interagency reviews, the START follow-on negotiations, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 2010 Review Conference preparations.” See Department of Defense, “2009 NPR Terms of Reference Fact Sheet,” June 2, 2009, <www.defenselink.mil/news/d20090602NPR.pdf>. The two other documents were issued on August 6, 2009 and are available at ArmsControlWonk.com, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/2415/npr-roundtable>.

22. William Perry and James Schlesinger, America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, May 2009), p. xii.

23. “Advance Questions for Michèle Flournoy: Nominee for Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy,” January 15, 2009, <armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/January/Flournoy%2001-15-09.pdf>.

24. The U.S. nuclear stockpile reached a peak of more than 32,000 warheads in 1967, then decreased by 30 percent over the next twenty years and has decreased by an additional 75 percent since the early 1990s to approximately 5,200 warheads, 2,700 of which are operational and the rest in reserve. (Of the 2,700 operational warheads, 2,200 are strategic and 500 non-strategic.) See Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2009, p. 60; and Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Warheads, 1945–2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2009, p. 73.

25. “Joint Statement by President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America,” London, April 1, 2009.

26. Although the United and Russia initially expected to agree on a final agreement to replace START before it expired (December 5, 2009), it will take months for the two sides to ratify it. That is why Senator Richard Lugar (Republican of Indiana) introduced a bill that would, on a reciprocal basis, maintain the START verification regime for six more months. See Martin Matishak, “Lugar Introduces Legislation to Extend START Verification Regime,” Global Security Newswire, November 6, 2009.

27. The RRW Program is intended to develop a new warhead design to provide a long-lasting, low-maintenance, and less expensive nuclear force. Candidate Obama indicated in his campaign that he would not support “a premature decision to produce the RRW.” Quoted in Elaine Grossman, “Inside Obama Administration, A Tug of War over Nuclear Warheads,” Global Security Newswire, August 18, 2009, <gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090818_1478.php>.

28. “Remarks by the President on Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe,” White House, September 17, 2009.

29. Garold N. Larson, “Statement to the Conference on Disarmament,” Geneva, July 2, 2009.

30. “Remarks by Senator John McCain to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council,” Los Angeles, California, March 26, 2008.

31. Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, “The Logic of Zero,” Foreign Affairs 87 (November/December 2008), p. 81.

32. Elbridge Colby, “Nuclear Abolition: A Dangerous Illusion,” Orbis 52 (Summer 2008), p. 427.

33. These arguments can be found in numerous publications, such as Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007, p. A19; Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” Washington Quarterly 31 (Winter 2007–08), pp. 7–22; and Melanie Kirkpatrick, “Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009, p. A14.

34. Defense Science Board, “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, report no. A725954, December 2006, p. 1.

35. Elaine Grossman, “U.S. Defense Official Skeptical of Revising Nuclear Deterrence Strategy,” Global Security Newswire, July 28, 2009, <gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090728_5416.php>.

36. Perry and Schlesinger, America's Strategic Posture, p. 22.

37. “Gates: Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21^st Century,” transcript of remarks by Robert Gates, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, October 28, 2008. Gates expanded on his thoughts in “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs 88 (January/February 2009), pp. 28–40. Among others, see Defense Science Board, “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, report no. A389784, September 2008; Jon Kyl and Richard Perle, “Our Decaying Nuclear Deterrent,” Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2009, p. A13; and Center for Security Policy, “U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21^st Century—Getting it Right,” July 2009. At the time of this writing, U.S. Defense Department leaders planned to submit to an independent technical review their recommendation on how to proceed with nuclear warhead modernization, which could delay a decision on the plan until 2010. See Elaine Grossman, “Pentagon Vetting Could Delay Warhead Modernization Plan,” Global Security Newswire, August 27, 2009, <www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090827_3782.php>.

38. Cole Harvey, “Obama Shifts Gears on Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today, October 2009, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/missiledefense>.

39. Perry and Schlesinger, America's Strategic Posture, p. xiii.

40. “Progress Made in Nuclear Treaty Talks, U.S. Says,” Global Security Newswire, July 24, 2009, <www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090724_8592.php>.

41. “Progress Made in Nuclear Treaty Talks, U.S. Says,” Global Security Newswire, July 24, 2009, <www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090724_8592.php>. See also, Martin Matishak, “Obama to Largely Preserve Missile Defense Policies, U.S. Defense Official Says,” Global Security Newswire, July 30, 2009, <gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090730_1285.php>; and Bill Gertz, “Russia Violating Treat, Developing Missiles,” Washington Times, October 22, 2009, <www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/22/inside-the-ring-8537762/#>.

42. “Influential Republicans Could Throw Weight Behind CTBT,” Global Security Newswire, July 27, 2009, <www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090727_1871.php>.

43. Michael Quinlan, “Abolishing Nuclear Armouries: Policy or Pipedream,” Survival 49 (Winter 2007–08), p. 8.

44. Arguably, Quinlan's distinction is not entirely accurate in the current context because many of today's abolitionists are motivated by practical goals at least as much as by moral ones, if not more. As Mark Smith, program director and member of the Wilton Park Academic Staff, has rightly indicated to me, perhaps they are best labeled “realist abolitionists.”

45. Brad Roberts, “The Nuclear Order—Build or Break,” remarks at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, DC, April 6, 2009, <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/npc_build_or_break4.pdf>.

46. U.K. Secretary of State for Defense and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, “The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent,” Cm 6994, December 2006, p. 7, <merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/unitedkingdom2006.pdf>.

47. U.K. Secretary of State for Defense and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, “The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent,” Cm 6994, December 2006, p. 5.

48. Quoted in John Gittings, “After Trident: Proliferation or Peace?” International Relations 21 (2007), p. 391.

49. Mark Smith, “The United Kingdom and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” in U.S.–European Nonproliferation Perspectives (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), p. 38.

50. Mark Smith, “The United Kingdom and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” in U.S.–European Nonproliferation Perspectives (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), p. 34.

51. Mark Smith, “The United Kingdom and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” in U.S.–European Nonproliferation Perspectives (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), p. 37.

52. Note, however, the existence of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, a British organization that advocates unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain and campaigns for international nuclear disarmament and tighter nonproliferation rules. I thank Christophe Carle for highlighting this important point. On June 14, 2007, the Scottish Parliament expressed its opposition to the proposal of the U.K. Government White Paper to replace the existing Trident defense system.

53. William Hague, “Preventing a New Age of Nuclear Insecurity,” speech at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, July 23, 2008.

54. U.K. Secretary of State for Defense, Strategic Defence Review (London: Ministry of Defence, 1998), notably pp. 24–28.

55. The United Kingdom has offered security assurances to the Latin American, South Pacific, and African NWFZs, but not to the Southeast Asian and Central Asian ones.

56. “Statement by Ambassador John Duncan, Head of the UK Delegation to the First Preparatory Committee for the Eighth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Vienna, April 30, 2007.

57. Margaret Beckett, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?,” keynote address at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, DC, June 25, 2007, <carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1004>.

58. The study was published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies as an Adelphi Paper in September 2008: see George Perkovich and James Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” Adelphi Paper 396. It is the basis of a book, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (Washington, DC: CEIP, 2009), which includes seventeen critiques from renowned international security experts.

59. Des Browne, “Laying the Foundations for Multilateral Disarmament,” remarks to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, February 5, 2008.

60. John Duncan, “UK Statement to the 2008 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee: Cluster 1—Nuclear Disarmament,” Geneva, April 30, 2008.

61. Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen, and George Robertson, “Start Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb,” Times (London), June 30, 2008, <www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4237387.ece>.

62. “General Calls for Trident Rethink,” BBC News, January 29, 2009, <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7859046.stm>.

63. Field Marshal Lord Bramall, General Lord Ramsbotham, and General Sir Hugh Beach, “UK Does Not Need a Nuclear Deterrent,” Times (London), January 16, 2009, <www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article5525682.ece>.

64. Smith, “The United Kingdom and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” p. 41.

65. A national security report produced by an influential think tank has urged the British government to reassess the Trident decision. See Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) Commission on National Security in the 21^st Century, Shared Responsibilities—A National Security Strategy for the UK (London: IPPR, 2009). According to a recent ComRes poll, most British people believe that the Trident program should be abandoned because of the state of public finances. See “Scrap Trident, Voters Tell Brown,” The Independent, September 8, 2009, <www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/scrap-trident-voters-tell-brown-1783443.html>.

66. Richard Norton-Taylor, “Trident Excluded from Defence Review,” Guardian, July 7, 2009, <www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/jul/07/trident-excluded-from-defence-review>; and “U.K. Postpones Major Spending Decision on Nuclear Deterrent Until 2010,” Global Security Newswire, July 20, 2009, <gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090720_3422.php>.

67. U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Lifting the Nuclear Shadow: Creating the Conditions for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons (London: FCO, 2009); and U.K. Prime Minister Cabinet, The Road to 2010—Addressing the Nuclear Question in the Twenty-First Century (London: Office of Public Sector Information, 2009).

68. Samy Cohen, La monarchie nucléaire: Les coulisses de la politique étrangère sous la Vème République [The Nuclear Monarchy: The Fifth Republic's Foreign Policy Behind the Scenes] (Paris: Hachette, 1986).

69. Nicolas Sarkozy, “Presentation of Le Terrible in Cherbourg,” Cherbourg, March 21, 2008, <www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20001&prog=zgp&proj=znpp>.

70. The French White Paper on Defence and National Security (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2008).

71. The French White Paper on Defence and National Security (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2008), p. 64.

72. For a study on French nuclear doctrine, see Bruno Tertrais, La France et la dissuasion nucléaire: Concept, Moyens, Avenir [France and Nuclear Deterrence: Concept, Operation, Future] (Paris: La documentation française, 2007).

73. Sarkozy, “Presentation of Le Terrible in Cherbourg.”

74. Sarkozy, “Presentation of Le Terrible in Cherbourg.”

75. Jacques Chirac, “Speech by Jacques CHIRAC, President of the French Republic, during His Visit to the Stategic [sic] Air and Maritime Forces at Landivisiau/L'Ile Longue,” Ile Longue, Brest, January 19, 2006.

76. Sarkozy, “Presentation of Le Terrible in Cherbourg.”

77. France is currently modernizing its nuclear arsenal and has recently purchased a second nuclear attack submarine. See French Ministry of Defence, “Commande du deuxième sous-marin d'attaque Barracuda” [Order of the Second Nuclear Attack Submarine], June 26, 2009.

78. French White Paper on Defence and National Security, p. 64.

79. Sarkozy, “Presentation of Le Terrible in Cherbourg.”

80. For instance, on February 7, 2009, at the occasion of the forty-fifth Munich Security Conference, Sarkozy stressed his commitment to work with the United Kingdom in more closely aligning their nuclear policies. This was reiterated at the joint French-U.K. Summit that took place on July 6, 2009.

81. For studies on the origins of the French nuclear weapon program, see Camille Grand, A French Nuclear Exception? (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998).

82. France has ratified the two protocols of the Tlatelolco Treaty, signed the three protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty, and protocols I, II, and III of the Pelindaba Treaty after its last nuclear test campaign. France has also been engaged in negotiations with ASEAN and the Central Asian NWFZ.

83. This goal was achieved in September 2008. See Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “French Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September-October 2008, pp. 52–57.

84. For studies on French views about the abolition of nuclear weapons, see Bruno Tertrais, “The Last to Disarm? The Future of France's Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review 14 (July 2007), pp. 251–73; and Camille Grand, “France, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation,” U.S.–European Nonproliferation Perspectives (Washington, DC: Center of International and Strategic Studies, 2009), notably pp. 16–17.

85. “Statement by H.E. François Rivasseau, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament,” 2005 NPT Review Conference, New York, May 5, 2005.

86. That is why France tends to emphasize the multidimentional character of Article VI. For instance, as the Head of the French Delegation stated at the 2007 NPT PrepCom, “France reaffirms for the future its determination to contribute to nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament” emphasis added.

87. “Statement by H.E. Eric Danon, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament, Head of the French Delegation,” Third Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, New York, May 6, 2009.

88. Sarkozy, “Presentation of Le Terrible in Cherbourg.”

89. Tertrais, “The Last to Disarm?,” p. 269.

90. Russian Federation Security Council, The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Moscow: Russian Federation Security Council, 1993).

91. “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation,” Paris, May 27, 1997.

92. Nikolai Sokov, “The Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia's Security Policy,” in Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter, Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament (Monterey: MIIS/CNS, 2009), Occasional Paper No. 15, pp. 73–75.

93. For a study on the origins of the Russian nuclear doctrine, see Nikolai Sokov, “The Origins of and Prospects for Russian Nuclear Doctrine,” Nonproliferation Review 14 (July 2007), notably pp. 212–18.

94. Nikolai Sokov, “Russia's Nuclear Doctrine,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies/Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 2004, specifically the section on the “Russian Ministry of Defense 2003 Policy Paper,” <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_55a.html#Russian_Ministry_of_Defense_2003_Policy_Paper:_The_Nuclear_Angle>. See also Jakub Godzimirski, “Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000: A Comparative Analysis,” European Security 9 (2000), pp. 73–91.

95. RIA Novosti, “Russia's New Military Doctrine Allows Pre-Emptive Strikes,” October 14, 2009, <en.rian.ru/russia/20091014/156461160.html>.

96. Vladimir Orlov, “U.S.–Russian Relations on Nonproliferation after the Georgia Crisis: A Skeptical (Re-) Engagement or an (Un-) Happy Divorce?” in Jean du Preez, ed., Nuclear Challenges and Policy Options for the Next U.S. Administration (Monterey, CA: MIIS/CNS, 2008), Occasional Paper No. 14, p. 44. Emphasis in original.

97. Sokov, “Russia's Nuclear Doctrine”; and Denis Dyomkin, “Putin Pledges Russian Conventional Weapons Funds,” Reuters, June 10, 2008.

98. Sokov, “The Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia's Security Policy,” p. 76.

99. “Russia Won't Drop Bulava Missile Despite Setbacks, Admiral Says,” Global Security Newswire, July 20, 2009, <globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090720_2498.php>.

100. “Interview with Sergey Kislyak, Russian Ambassador to the United States,” Arms Control Today, December 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/20081114_Kisylak>.

101. Statement by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Geneva, Conference on Disarmament, February 12, 2008.

102. “Joint Statement by President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America,” April 1, 2009.

103. Jeffrey Lewis, “Lugar on START Verification,” ArmsControlWonk.org, November 5, 2009, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/2529/start-verification>.

104. Thomas Young, “The Reconfiguration of European Missile Defense, Russia's Response and the Likely Implications,” issue brief, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, October 2009, <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_missile_defense.html>.

105. Nikolai Sokov, Jing-dong Yuan, William C. Potter, and Cristina Hansell, “Chinese and Russian Perspectives on Achieving Nuclear Zero,” in Hansell and Potter, eds., Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, p. 13.

106. Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2009, p. 60.

107. Chinese State Council, China's National Defense in 2006 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2006). Notably, China has never publicly discussed the exact number or locations of its nuclear weapons.

108. For the latest data on the Chinese nuclear arsenal, see Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2008, pp. 42–45.

109. Chinese State Council, China's National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2009).

110. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress—Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008 (Washington, DC: Defense Department, 2008), p. 26.

111. For a study on China's nuclear posture, see Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007).

112. Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 62–110.

113. As quoted by Brad Roberts, in “U.S.–China Strategic Stability,” panel at 2009 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009, <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/npc_us_china3.pdf>.

114. Evan Medeiros and Jing-dong Yuan, “The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and China's Responses,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 1, 2002; and Jing-dong Yuan, “Effective, Reliable, and Credible: China's Nuclear Modernization,” Nonproliferation Review 14 (July 2007), pp. 277–78.

115. Jing-dong Yuan, “China and the Nuclear-Free World,” in Hansell and Potter, eds., Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, p. 25.

116. “Statement by H.E. Mr. Cheng Jingye, Head of the Chinese Delegation at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” New York, May 4, 2009.

117. Yuan, “China and the Nuclear-Free World,” p. 27.

118. “Statement by H.E. Mr. Cheng Jingye,” May 4, 2009.

119. “Statement by H.E. Mr. Cheng Jingye,” May 4, 2009.

120. “Statement by H.E. Mr. Cheng Jingye,” May 4, 2009; Rebecca Johnson, “Enhanced Prospects for 2010: An Analysis of the Third PrepCom and the Outlook for the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” Arms Control Today, June 2009, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_6/Johnson>.

121. Jinq-dong Yuan “Sino-U.S. Relations: Dealing with a Rising Power,” in du Preez, ed., Nuclear Challenges and Policy Options for the Next U.S. Administration, p. 62.

122. “China Profile: Nuclear Overview,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies/Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 2009, <www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/China/Nuclear/index.html>.

123. Christopher Twomey, “Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism,” Arms Control Today, January 2009, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/china_us_dangerous_dynamism>.

124. Jeffrey Lewis, “Chinese Nuclear Posture and Force Modernization,” Nonproliferation Review 16 (July 2009), p. 207.

125. Walker, “Nuclear Order and Disorder,” p. 709.

126. For studies of the 2009 NPT PrepCom, see Miles Pomper, “Report from the NPT Preparatory Committee 2009,” CNS Feature Stories, May 26, 2009, <cns.miis.edu/stories/090526_npt_report.htm>; and Johnson, “Enhanced Prospects for 2010.”

127. Ian Kelly, “P-5 Non-Proliferation Treaty,” State Department, May 15, 2009, <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/05/123538.htm>. Two months later, the Group of Eight also agreed, for the first time, on common language on nuclear abolition: “We are all committed to seeking a safer world for all and to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT.” See “L'Aquila Statement on Non-Proliferation,” July 8, 2009, <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/2._LAquila_Statent_on_Non_proliferation.pdf>.

128. Three sets of draft recommendations were issued, on May 8 (NPT/CONF.2010/PCIII/CRP.4), May 13 (NPT/CONF.2010/PCIII/CRP.4/Rev.1), and May 15 (NPT/CONF.2010/PCIII/CRP.4/Rev.2). They are available at <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/2009index.html>.

129. Johnson, “Enhanced Prospects for 2010.”

130. Johnson, “Enhanced Prospects for 2010.”

131. For instance, a U.S. Defense Department document indicates that the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review “will examine ways to reduce both the role and number of nuclear weapons, although the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is not anticipated in the timeframe of this review.” See Nuclear Posture Review 2010 Fact Sheet, “The NPR, Arms Control, and Deterrence,” August 6, 2009, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/192/NPR_Arms_Control_Deterrence.pdf>.

132. Barack Obama, “Speech at the United Nations Security Council Summit on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament,” September 25, 2009.

133. Michael Krepon, “Nuclear Abolition: Then and Now,” Henry L. Stimson Center, July 16, 2007, <www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=551>.

134. Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002).

135. However strong it might seem, the argument that a major nuclear catastrophe will drive the international community to swiftly move toward disarmament is also contestable. After all, major powers failed to abolish nuclear weapons after Hiroshima and Nagasaki and after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

136. Tasker H. Bliss, “What is Disarmament?” Foreign Affairs 4 (April 1926), p. 367.

137. Rose Gottemoeller, “The Long Road from Prague,” speech at Williams Conference Center, Colonial Williamsburg, VA, August 14, 2009, <www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/127958.htm>.

138. Quinlan, “Abolishing Nuclear Armouries,” p. 10.

139. Statement by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, February 12, 2008.

140. Most studies show that more disarmament by NWS is unlikely to decrease the attractiveness of nuclear weapons (see Dunn, “The NPT—Assessing the Past, Building the Future,” p. 162). The implication, therefore, is that proliferation crises will continue to break out as the disarmament process proceeds, and the latter will in turn be influenced by such crises.

141. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 97. For a discussion on the relationship between the concepts of order and justice in international relations, see pp. 77–98.

142. Brad Roberts, “On Order, Stability, and Nuclear Abolition,” in Perkovich and Acton, eds., Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, p. 169.

143. Seminal work on the role of the permanent five (P-5) states in the international system was conducted in dialogues organized by senior foreign policy analysts and policy makers from the P-5 at Wilton Park between 1999 and 2001. This led to two publications: an interim report written by Richard Latter, “The P-5 and International Security,” Wilton Park Paper No. 148, 2000; and the main report, put together by Brad Roberts, “American Primacy and Great Power Concert,” Institute for Defense Analysis, Paper P-3751, 2002. Another key study on the subject is Robert Einhorn, “The P-5 and Nuclear Proliferation,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007.