THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD STATES

Abstract

“Nuclear threshold states”—those that have chosen nuclear restraint despite having significant nuclear capabilities—seem like the perfect partners for the reinvigorated drive toward global nuclear disarmament. Having chosen nuclear restraint, threshold states may embrace disarmament as a way to guarantee the viability of their choice (which may be impossible in a proliferating world). Supporting disarmament efforts affirms their restraint, both self-congratulating and self-fulfilling. Additionally, the commitment to their non-nuclear status springs at least in part from a moral stance against nuclear weapons that lends itself to energetic support of global disarmament. However, threshold states also offer significant challenges to the movement for nuclear weapons elimination, in particular in relation to acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing facilities. This article analyzes both the challenges and opportunities posed by threshold states by examining the cases of Brazil and Japan.

Keywords:

• Nuclear disarmament
• nuclear energy
• nonproliferation
• nuclear fuel cycle
• Brazil
• Japan

Acknowledgements

This article draws in part on my research on norm entrepreneurs in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, funded in part by the University of Auckland Faculty Research Development Fund. I would like to thank participants at the May 2009 University of Queensland seminar, “Revitalizing Disarmament Debates in the Asia-Pacific: Workshop on Nuclear Weapons Elimination,” for their comments on the linkages between nonproliferation and disarmament.

Notes

1. It should be noted that in contrast to traditional antinuclear movements, the current push for disarmament has been largely driven by Western elites. I thank Christine Wing for this insight.

2. Any future restrictions on national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities would likely take place in conjunction with multilateral fuel banks or other regional or global institutions to ensure countries retained access to nuclear fuel (as noted later in this article). Nonetheless, concerns about energy independence have made threshold states nervous about such proposals.

3. Jim Wurst, “U.S. Says Nonproliferation Treaty Faces Crisis,” Global Security Newswire, April 27, 2004.

4. See, for example, James A. Russell, “A Tipping Point Realized? Nuclear Proliferation in the Persian Gulf and Middle East,” Contemporary Security Policy 29 (December 2008), pp. 521–37.

5. However, it should be noted that increased proliferation could potentially spur on greater efforts toward disarmament. For example, the French nuclear tests in 1960 generated support for a global treaty, and today, fears of a proliferation tipping point provide motivation for the current drive for disarmament.

6. If, however, inspections result in anomalies that governments refuse to clarify (such as with Iran), then inspections can erode confidence in the existing approach to compliance and verification. I thank Christine Wing for this important point.

7. “Statement by Ambassador Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares,” Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, May 20, 2008, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/2session/May20Brazil.pdf>.

8. Hugh B. Stinson and James D. Cochrane, “The Movement for Regional Arms Control in Latin America,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 13 (1971), p. 7.

9. Hugh B. Stinson and James D. Cochrane, “The Movement for Regional Arms Control in Latin America,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 13 (1971), p. 6.

10. Hugh B. Stinson and James D. Cochrane, “The Movement for Regional Arms Control in Latin America,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 13 (1971), pp. 7–9. Mexico ended up taking the leadership role for the nuclear-weapon-free zone.

11. Hugh B. Stinson and James D. Cochrane, “The Movement for Regional Arms Control in Latin America,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 13 (1971), p. 11.

12. For analyses of motivations behind both the nuclear weapons program and its renunciation, see Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, August 2007; T.V. Paul, Power vs. Prudence (Montreal: McGill, 2000); Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995); Etel Solingen, “Macropolitical Consensus and Lateral Autonomy in Industrial Policy: Nuclear Industries in Brazil and Argentina,” International Organization 47 (Spring 1993), pp. 263–98; and Jean Krasno, “Non-Proliferation: Brazil's Secret Nuclear Program,” Orbis 38 (Summer 1994), p. 425. For a norm-centered analysis of Brazil's decision to forgo nuclear weapons, see Thiago Grijó Dal-Toé, “Constructivist Explanations for Brazil's Nuclear Posture,” unpublished master's thesis, University of Kent, Brussels, Belgium, 2007.

13. Sharon Squassoni and David Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment,” Arms Control Today, October 2005, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/Oct-Brazil>.

14. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Celina Assumpção do Valle Pereira, Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations,” First Session of the 2005 NPT PrepCom, New York, April 8, 2002.

15. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Celina Assumpção do Valle Pereira, Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations,” First Session of the 2005 NPT PrepCom, New York, April 8, 2002.

16. Maria Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review 10 (2008), pp. 430–31.

17. “Brazil Reaches out to Iran, Suggests Presidential Visit,” Associated Press, November 2, 2008. On the expanding trade between the two countries, see Joshua Goodman and Ladane Nasseri, “Iran's Ahmadinejad Cancels Brazil Trip Indefinitely,” Bloomberg News, May 4, 2009, <www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=apRIS8bKWwPw>.

18. Goodman and Nasseri, “Iran's Ahmadinejad Cancels Brazil Trip Indefinitely.”

19. “Amorim Says Brazil-Iran Ties Can Move beyond Trade Exchanges,” Tehran Times, November 3, 2008.

20. “Iran ‘Essential Player’ in Middle East Peace: Brazil FM,” Agence-France Presse, July 28, 2009.

21. “Amorim Says Brazil-Iran Ties Can Move beyond Trade Exchanges,” Tehran Times.

22. “North Korean Nuclear Test Upsets Efforts toward Closer Ties with Brazil,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, October 13, 2006.

23. “North Korean Nuclear Test Upsets Efforts toward Closer Ties with Brazil,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, October 13, 2006.

24. “Brazil Opens Embassy in North Korea,” PressTV.com, July 9, 2009, <www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=100195&sectionid=351020405>.

25. See, for example, Richard E. Petty and Duane T. Wegener, “Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion Variables,” in D.T. Gilbert and S.T. Fiske, eds., The Handbook of Social Psychology, vol. 2 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1998). For a discussion of the application of this principle to nuclear decision making, see Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009), pp. 49–52.

26. Marco Sibaja, “Israel: Brazil Can Help Halt Iran's Nuke Program,” Associated Press, July 22, 2009.

27. “Brazil To Question Iran Nuclear Aims When Ahmadinejad Visits,” Agence-France Presse, September 4, 2009.

28. Achilles Zaluar, “A Realistic Approach to Nuclear Disarmament,” in George Perkovich and James M. Acton, eds., Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), p. 195.

29. George Perkovich and James M. Acton, “What's Next?” in Perkovich and Acton, eds., Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, p. 324.

30. Jessica Lasky-Fink, “Brazil, Argentina to Pursue Nuclear Cooperation,” Arms Control Today, April 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/BrazilArgentina>.

31. Marco A. Marzo and Hugo E. Vicens, “Safeguards Challenges from the ABACC View,” ABACC, 2003.

32. Marco A. Marzo and Hugo E. Vicens, “Safeguards Challenges from the ABACC View,” ABACC, 2003.

33. Dal-Toé, “Constructivist Explanations for Brazil's Nuclear Posture,” p. 25.

34. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Celina Assumpção do Valle Pereira.”

35. Frank Braun, “Analysis: Brazil and Additional Protocol,” UPI International Intelligence, July 1, 2005.

36. Frank Braun, “Analysis: Brazil and Additional Protocol,” UPI International Intelligence, July 1, 2005.

37. Daryl Kimball, “Unfinished Business for the NSG,” Arms Control Today, October 1, 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_10/focus>

38. Denise Lavoie, “Specialists Seeking to Restart Brazil Nuclear Plant,” America's Intelligence Wire, January 26, 2005. See also Matthew Flynn, “Brazil: Nuclear to the Rescue?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2001, pp. 15–17.

39. Daphne Morrison, “Brazil's Nuclear Ambitions, Past and Present,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies/Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 2006, <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_79.html>; see also Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test.”

40. Morrison, “Brazil's Nuclear Ambitions, Past and Present.”

41. Erico Guizzo, “How Brazil Spun the Atom,” IEEE Spectrum, March 2006, <spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/how-brazil-spun-the-atom>.

42. Liz Palmer and Gary Milhollin, “Brazil's Nuclear Puzzle,” Science 306 (October 22, 2004), p. 617.

43. Quoted in Guizzo, “How Brazil Spun the Atom.”

44. Elias Palacios, “Preserving Technological Secrets vs. Proliferation Risk,” ABACC News, No. 3 (June–October 2004), p. 5.

45. Palmer and Milhollin, “Brazil's Nuclear Puzzle.”

46. George Perkovich and James Acton, “Managing the Nuclear Industry in a World without Nuclear Weapons,” in Perkovich and Acton, eds., Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, p. 94.

47. Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test.”

48. Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test.”

49. Perkovich and Acton, “Managing the Nuclear Industry in a World without Nuclear Weapons,” p. 95.

50. Bradley Brooks, “Brazil Spending $160M on Nuclear Propelled Sub,” America's Intelligence Wire, August 30, 2008.

51. “President Says Brazil Soon to Have Nuclear Submarine,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, December 12, 2008.

52. Lasky-Fink, “Brazil, Argentina Pursue Nuclear Cooperation.”

53. Demands for disarmament did not seriously begin in Japan until 1954, after a Japanese tuna boat was contaminated by fallout from a U.S. nuclear test in the Pacific (the Daigo Fukuryu-Maru, or Lucky Dragon, incident). Within a few months, more than half of Japan's registered voters had signed petitions calling for immediate disarmament, and the Japanese Diet passed a resolution calling for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. It was the Lucky Dragon incident that re-activated the horror of the atomic bombings, giving them political significance. For further discussion, see Nobumasa Akiyama, “The Socio-Political Roots of Japan's Non-Nuclear Posture,” in Benjamin Self and Jeffrey Thompson, eds., Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics and Policy in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), pp. 64–91.

54. For an overview of Japanese nuclear weapons decision making, see Paul, Power vs. Prudence; Kurt Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable,” in Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004); Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime”; Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms; Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo,” Nonproliferation Review 14 (July 2007), pp. 303–28; Llewelyn Hughes, “Why Japan Won't Go Nuclear (Yet)—An Examination of the Domestic and International Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan,” International Security 26 (Spring 2007), pp. 67–96; and Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

55. See, for example, the criticisms reported by Marianne Hanson, “New Initiatives to Advance Arms Control: The Tokyo Forum Report,” in Carl Ungerer and Marianne Hanson, eds., The Politics of Nuclear Non-proliferation (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2001), p. 180.

56. “Japan's Proactive Peace and Security Strategies—Including the Question of ‘Nuclear Umbrella,’” National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), Research Report No. 20000005 (Tokyo: NIRA, March 2001), p. 21.

57. Hirofumi Nakasone, “Conditions toward Zero: 11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament,” Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 27, 2009.

58. “Japan's Efforts in Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education,” working paper of the delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, April–May 2007, <www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/statements/Statement/0704-05-1NPT.htm>.

59. “Japan's Efforts in Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education,” working paper of the delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, April–May 2007, <www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/statements/Statement/0704-05-1NPT.htm>.

60. Despite being a sponsor, the Japanese government distanced itself from the negotiations and written reports. For an excellent discussion of the Tokyo Forum initiative, see Hanson, “New Initiatives to Advance Arms Control.”

61. Nakasone, “Conditions toward Zero.”

62. “Implementation of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,’” Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April–May 2007, <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/npt/review2010/report0704.html>.

63. Peter Alford, “Japan Aims for Nuke-Free World,” The Australian, April 27, 2009.

64. Nakasone, “Conditions toward Zero: 11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament”

65. Sharon Squassoni, “Grading Progress on 13 Steps Toward Nuclear Disarmament,” Carnegie Endowment Policy Outlook No. 45, May 2009.

66. Anthony DiFilippo, “Can Japan Craft an International Nuclear Disarmament Policy?” Asian Survey 40 (July–August 2000), p. 592.

67. “Implementation of Article VI.”

68. Peace Depot 2005 Report Card, accessed August 21 2009, available at <www.peacedepot.org/e-news/nd/engfinalreport2005.pdf>.

69. Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, p. 82.

70. Scott Parish, “Prospects for a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone,” Nonproliferation Review 8 (Spring 2001), p. 147.

71. Nakasone, “Conditions toward Zero.”

72. “Implementation of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

73. “Japan, Kazakhstan Share Fate as Nuclear Victims,” Japan Times, August 12, 2009; “Japan's Efforts in Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education,” working paper.

74. Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, p. 79.

75. Hiroyuki Koshoji, “Japan Pursues Plutonium-Based Fuel,” UPI Asia, April 6, 2009.

76. For an in-depth discussion of Japan's plutonium program, see Selig S. Harrison, ed., Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996).

77. Koji Kosugi, “Letters: Still Powering up in Japan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2001, pp. 4–5, 19–20.

78. On the amount of spent fuel Japan produces annually, see “Reprocessing,” Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, undated, <www.jnfl.co.jp/english/reprocessing.html>. On the comparison to the total amount of spent fuel reprocessed in the past thirty years, see Shinichi Ogawa and Michael Schiffer, “Japan's Plutonium Reprocessing Dilemma,” Arms Control Today, October 2005, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/Oct-Japan>. For additional analysis, see Masafumi Takubo, “Wake Up, Stop Dreaming: Reassessing Japan's Reprocessing Program,” Nonproliferation Review 15 (March 2008), pp. 71–94.

79. Ogawa and Schiffer, “Japan's Plutonium Reprocessing Dilemma.”

80. “Japan Delays MOX Nuclear Fuel Goal by 5 Years,” Reuters, June 12, 2009.

81. Nakasone, “Conditions toward Zero.”

82. Ogawa and Schiffer, “Japan's Plutonium Reprocessing Dilemma.”

83. Ogawa and Schiffer, “Japan's Plutonium Reprocessing Dilemma.”

84. For details on the seriousness of the South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear weapons programs, and the forceful U.S. pressure required to stop the programs, see Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback,” Nonproliferation Review 13 (November 2006), pp. 539–53.

85. Paul L. Leventhal, “Introduction: Nuclear Power without Proliferation?” in Paul Leventhal, Sharon Tanzer, and Steven Dolley, eds., Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2002), p. 8.

86. Nakasone, “Conditions toward Zero.”

87. Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” p. 437.

88. “Japan's Proactive Peace and Security Strategies,” NIRA, p. 18. See also Shinichi Ogawa, “How Japanese View Nuclear Proliferation?” South Asian Journal (January–March 2004).

89. Kazumi Mizumoto, “Non-Nuclear and Nuclear Disarmament Policies of Japan,” in Wade L. Huntley, Kazumi Mizumoto, and Mitsuru Kurosawa, eds., Nuclear Disarmament in the Twenty-First Century (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Institute, 2004), p. 259.

90. Anthony DiFilippo, “Breaking the NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) Stalemate: Japan Could Help,” Foreign Policy In Focus, June 21, 2005.

91. Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” p. 443.

92. Daniel Flitton, “Australia, Japan in Nuclear Rift,” The Age, September 4, 2009.

93. One of the main controversies over the FMCT is whether it merely stops all future production of fissile material for weapons purposes (Japan's view, along with the United States, India, and Russia), or if it should be called the Fissile Material Treaty, incorporating all fissile material for weapons purposes, not just future production (the view of many NNWS, including Brazil and South Africa).

94. For example, at the August 2009 commemoration activities in Hiroshima, then-prime minister Taro Aso emphasized the importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and argued that nuclear disarmament was “unimaginable.” The DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama (now prime minister) said that Japan would strongly support Obama's drive for disarmament and argued that Japan must play a leading role. See “U.S. Nuclear Umbrella Crucial: Aso,” Japan Times, August 7, 2009.

95. Kyodo News, “Many in DPJ Want Japan to Cut Link to U.S. Nukes,” Japan Times, October 11, 2009, <search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20091011a1.html>.

96. See, for example, Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Not Going Nuclear: Japan's Response to North Korea's Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Today, June 2007, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/CoverStory>. On the likely impact of a North Korean nuclear attack against Japan, see Maria Rost Rublee, “The Future of Japanese Nuclear Policy,” Strategic Insights 8 (April 2009), <www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Apr/rubleeApr09.html>.

97. See, for example, Mochizuki, “Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo”; and Hughes, “Why Japan Won't Go Nuclear (Yet).”

98. Interview, Japanese defense expert, Tokyo, March 2007.

99. “Tokyo Politician Warns Beijing It Can Go Nuclear ‘Overnight,’” Agence-France Presse, April 8, 2002. For additional discussion, see Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, pp. 74–76.

100. See, for example, George Perkovich, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead,” Policy Brief No. 66, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2008, p. 3.

101. Christine Wing, “Nuclear Weapons: The Challenges Ahead,” Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, 2007, p. 10.

102. Perkovich, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead,” p. 2.

103. Perkovich, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead,”, p. 4.

104. Ogawa and Schiffer, “Japan's Plutonium Reprocessing Dilemma.”

105. “Statement by the Head of the Delegation of Brazil, Ambassador Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares,” Second Session of the NPT PrepCom, Geneva, April 28, 2008.

106. John Deutch et al., “Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy,” Survival 46 (Winter 2004/2005), p. 67.

107. Perkovich and Acton, “What's Next?” p. 325.

108. Scott Sagan, “Good Faith and Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations,” in Perkovich and Acton, eds., Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, p. 209.

109. For an excellent review of the most recent proposals, see Fiona Simpson, “Reforming the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Time is Running Out,” Arms Control Today, September 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_09/Simpson>.

110. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Celina Assumpção do Valle Pereira, Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations,” April 8, 2002. Before the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the Brazilians also stated they would consider adopting the Additional Protocol, based on progress made on disarmament in conference. Given the failure of the conference, it is not surprising they still refuse to accept it. However, should the 2010 NPT Review Conference conclude more successfully, Brasilia may change its mind.

111. Rebecca Johnson, “Enhanced Prospects for 2010: An Analysis of the Third PrepCom and the Outlook for the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” Arms Control Today, June 2009, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_6/Johnson>.

112. Ibid. Johnson offers additional arguments as to why the 2009 NPT PrepCom should be seen as a success despite its lack of consensus on formal recommendations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

113. On the poll of Lower House DPJ members, see Kyodo News, “Many in DPJ Want Japan to Cut Link to U.S. Nukes.” On Foreign Minister Okada's remarks, see Atsuko Tannai and Hiroyuki Maegawa, “International Commission Weighs No-First Use of Nukes,” Asahi Shimbun, October 19, 2009, <www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200910190053.html>.

114. On the poll of Lower House DPJ members, see Kyodo News, “Many in DPJ Want Japan to Cut Link to U.S. Nukes.” On Foreign Minister Okada's remarks, see Atsuko Tannai and Hiroyuki Maegawa, “International Commission Weighs No-First Use of Nukes,” Asahi Shimbun, October 19, 2009, <www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200910190053.html>. While Iran still posed a number of challenges to the 2009 NPT PrepCom, its delegates were more cooperative than in past sessions.