THE DEFIANT STATES

Abstract

This article explores the potential impact of U.S. disarmament leadership on the nuclear diplomacy of North Korea and Iran, the “defiant states.” The first part of the article introduces the concept of “interaction capacity,” which measures a state's integration into international society, based on its physical communication systems and its adoption of shared norms. The theory predicts that lower levels of interaction capacity will generate a greater propensity for nuclear defiance, as the affected states reject and try to resist integration pressures. In the second and third parts of the article, this conceptual framework is applied to the cases of North Korea and Iran. The analysis suggests that efforts to reassert U.S. disarmament leadership could increase the alienation of North Korea and Iran, leading to provocation and escalation of nuclear tensions. The final part of the paper explores the policy implications of this analysis for the potentially defunct six-party talks, for hopes of renewed negotiations with Iran, and for the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Keywords:

• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• International Atomic Energy Agency
• disarmament
• North Korea
• Iran
• United States
• noncompliance

According to an April 7, 2009 Wall Street Journal editorial, President Barack Obama “is offering pleasant illusions, while mullahs and other rogues plot explosive reality.”1 This was just one of many damning assessments of the new U.S. disarmament agenda that Obama had set out in Strasbourg and Prague earlier that same week. Such assessments have been circulated by critics who pour scorn on what they regard as a dangerous fallacy: the notion that U.S. disarmament leadership and moral authority can persuade North Korea and Iran to end their nuclear defiance and encourage them to cooperate with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. “There is a fashionable notion,” complained former assistant secretary of defense Richard Perle and Senator Jon Kyl (Republican of Arizona) in the same news paper two months later, “that if only we and the Russians reduced our nuclear forces, other nations would reduce their existing arsenals or abandon plans to acquire nuclear weapons altogether. This idea … assumes that the nuclear ambitions of Kim Jong Il or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be curtailed or abandoned in response to reductions in the American and Russian deterrent forces. … This is dangerous, wishful thinking.”2

Influential U.S. nonproliferation experts quickly dismissed these charges as misrepresentations of the administration's actual vision (which many of them helped shape) and stressed that no one is naive enough to believe that moral example alone can end years of determined nuclear defiance by proliferators. Rather, the Obama administration's rationale is that a new era of U.S. disarmament leadership will motivate other states (including members of the Non-Aligned Movement, or NAM, which have often been sympathetic to regime violators) to agree to tighten nonproliferation rules and enforcement in response to noncompliance, including through tougher sanctions and interdiction.3 This is an entirely different vision—one underpinned by careful consensus-building in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This approach is based on assessments that the George W. Bush administration's failure to uphold U.S. disarmament commitments seriously undermined U.S. moral authority and was perceived as a self-serving, “do as I say and not as I do” approach to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, which generated resentment among both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).4 According to these assessments, the Bush administration's approach led to a legitimacy problem that played into the hands of states that violated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and were able to exploit divisions within the regime and weaken international responses to noncompliance.5 It also appeared to increase proliferation pressures, as a new U.S. nuclear doctrine and subsequent statements on potential nuclear use undermined negative security assurances and raised fears of nuclear recklessness.6 Prominent U.S. nonproliferation experts assert that the Obama administration's goal is to undo some of this damage, and in so doing, create a less permissive environment for nuclear aspirants. Obama emphasized this point in his Prague speech. “We go forward with no illusions,” he declared. “Some will break the rules, but that is why we need a structure in place that ensures that when any nation does, they will face the consequences.”7

The idea that assertive U.S. disarmament leadership could directly influence the nuclear diplomacy of “defiant states” has thus been rejected, both by critics of the Obama administration and by influential figures who have helped shape the government's nonproliferation and disarmament policies. No one on either side of the fence is seriously using the arguments set out by Kyl and Perle; the debate appears to have burned brightly for a few weeks and then quickly died down. Yet it may be premature to abandon this discussion altogether. To date, the arguments have been expressed in stark, all-or-nothing terms, making them easy to dismiss. But is it necessarily the case that regenerated disarmament momentum will have little or no impact on the nuclear diplomacy of either North Korea or Iran? Or is it possible that assertive U.S. disarmament leadership could indeed influence the defiant states, with positive or negative, direct or indirect effects? A deeper exploration of the debate opens up these and other interesting questions, including the issues of what causes states to engage in nuclear defiance, why such behavior is tolerated (and to some extent supported) by other states, and what conditions, domestic and/or systemic, are needed for non-nuclear norms to influence regime violators.

This article begins with a brief discussion of the theoretical scholarship on nuclear proliferation dynamics, introducing the concept of “interaction capacity” as a new contribution to the literature. I explore whether this concept, when applied within an English School of International Relations theory framework, can help us understand why some states engage in nuclear defiance, even though it may sometimes appear risky and irrational. The second and third sections of the article examine the nuclear defiance of North Korea and Iran, focusing primarily on the period of 2002 through 2009, during which both states came to be regarded as the most serious challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In the final section and conclusion, I assess the implications of this analysis for U.S. policy, for the suspended (possibly defunct) six-party talks, for renewed nuclear negotiations with Iran, and for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Explaining Nuclear Defiance: The Concept of “Interaction Capacity”

This article defines “nuclear defiance” as a state's refusal to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and UN Security Council resolutions that have been passed in response to known and suspected nuclear safeguards violations. It also refers to a state's failure to negotiate in good faith in nonproliferation and disarmament negotiations, whether they take place within the UN purview (referred to here as multilateral negotiations) or via ad hoc arrangements (bilateral or plurilateral talks). Nuclear defiance thus describes a belligerent approach to nuclear diplomacy, which is notable because it represents a rejection of international law and expectations of appropriate behavior and thus results in an escalation of international tensions. It goes beyond nuclear noncompliance—which can be detected or undetected, intentional or unintentional, major or minor—and moves into the realm of deliberate, overt, repeated abuse of international law and norms.8 The core question addressed here is what impact, if any, the new disarmament momentum will have on the nuclear diplomacy of North Korea and Iran, two states currently engaging in nuclear defiance. Will new impetus help create conditions that encourage violators to engage in more cooperative behavior, such as allowing greater transparency, participating in constructive negotiations, and following through consistently on commitments? Or might the disarmament momentum contribute—directly or indirectly—to conditions that result in escalation?

These are challenging questions to answer because they require some understanding of nuclear intentions. Different explanations of what motivates states to engage in nuclear defiance or nuclear cooperation lead to very different conclusions about the likely impact of U.S. disarmament leadership on the states in question. They also have very distinct—often competing—policy implications, which is one reason why the complex task of understanding intentions is so important. For example, if North Korea's or Iran's nuclear defiance is primarily driven by strategic considerations, then the U.S. disarmament agenda could have a major impact on their cost-benefit calculations, particularly if that agenda leads to changes in the nuclear doctrines of the United States and other states and in Washington's alliances and extended deterrence relationships.9 If the nuclear defiance of North Korea and Iran is primarily motivated by internal, domestic considerations, such as political and economic crises or concerns, then the U.S. disarmament agenda could be much less significant.10 Another possibility is that nuclear defiance is driven by ideational and psychological rather than material factors: for example, a belief that defying the nuclear nonproliferation regime represents a rejection of Western values and cultural dominance and legitimizes an alternative worldview.11 In each of the three cases (the first derived from realist assumptions, the second from domestic politics approaches, and the third from constructivist analysis), the policy implications would be different, requiring different types of engagement and/or containment to prevent escalation.

The reality is that nuclear intentions are notoriously difficult to divine, as scholars and practitioners are acutely aware.12 Due to the difficulty of acquiring information on closely guarded nuclear decision making and the challenge of deciphering the actions of isolated states with closed societies and/or unique political systems, it is unlikely that anyone outside a small group of elite decision makers in North Korea and Iran truly understands the nuclear intentions of either state. These empirical obstacles lead us to fall back on the deductive use of theoretical tools to draw conclusions about complex proliferation dynamics, but many of these seem unsuited to the task: the more elegantly parsimonious the theory, the more simplistic the analysis (and the more limited the policy advice that is derived from it), and the more complex the theory, the more descriptive it becomes, sometimes resulting in “theory soup.” Many qualitative and quantitative studies on nuclear intentions have highlighted this dilemma and have combined theoretical models in order to attempt to capture the multi-causality of nuclear motivations.13 Most also acknowledge the limitations of using theory as a heuristic device and are cautious about the reliability of any conclusions that they are able to draw. This article is underpinned by that same circumspection and analytical modesty; the choice of theoretical framework attempts to strike a balance between parsimony and complexity to offer just one perspective on the nuclear defiance of North Korea and Iran.

The theoretical framework chosen for this analysis draws on two concepts developed by the English School of International Relations theory: “international society” and “interaction capacity.”14 The concept of international society relates to the international environment in which states operate. It could be conceived of as a form of constrained anarchy, in which the competitive dynamics among states, often characterized by arms racing and trade wars, are tempered by the existence of rules, regimes, and institutions, which promote peaceful coexistence. One of the key points about international society is that it is constantly evolving, becoming more socially ambitious and intrusive over time. What begins as a collective recognition of the value of a few basic rules begins to develop into a system of multilayered global governance, which empowers international institutions and places stronger and stronger limits on state sovereignty.15 This process can be understood as a gradual shift from minimalist to maximalist norms and institutions, or, as it is referred to in this article, a shift from “pluralist” to “solidarist” international society. In a pluralist international society, collective security mechanisms and other formal structures are created to facilitate international cooperation, but state sovereignty remains sacrosanct, and the principle of non-intervention is respected by the vast majority of its members. In contrast, in a solidarist international society, states are expected to conform to certain standards of behavior that stretch beyond state-to-state relations to include the conduct of domestic affairs.16 In this form of international society, sovereignty shifts from the national to the international level, from the states that created the growing network of international organizations to the international organizations themselves. States that favor solidarist international society support this transition and are prepared to relinquish some of their sovereignty and comply with increasingly burdensome international obligations for two main reasons: first, because they derive mutual material benefit from doing so (the laws, treaties, and obligations associated with the transition improve the regulation and control of international interaction, including in the areas of transportation, trade, finance, investment, security, crime, culture, science, technology, and so on); and second, because they believe that the norms that underpin international society represent progression along a path to universal justice (shared norms help the world's diverse international actors strive for a greater good by clearly establishing and communicating expectations of legitimate behavior).17

The concept of interaction capacity refers to the level of each state's integration into international society, based on the physical movement of its goods, people, and information around the system, and on the existence, at the unit level, of systems of governance that reflect the norms embedded in international institutions.18 As international society evolves, the latter becomes more important than the physical measure of a state's interaction capacity, and an increasingly important determinant of international relations. States with low interaction capacity are regarded as a challenge to the system by the other members of international society and in turn are more likely to see international society itself as a threat to their independence. They operate on the periphery of the system: alienated because they do not share the norms on which international society is based; vulnerable because they are swimming against the tide of societal evolution; and insecure because the other members of international society have a vested interest in their integration into society's core, but only on the condition that they undergo unit-level change.19 In a solidarist international society, the pressure on states to conform to international norms dramatically increases, leading states with low interaction capacity to use all available means to resist—including by attempting to delegitimize the norms on which international society is based.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime can be thought of as a part of an overarching international society and as one of the many interlinking regimes that constrain state behavior.20 It is by no means far-fetched to view it in this light, as membership of the linchpin of the regime, the NPT, is almost universal, and the vast majority of states comply with their treaty obligations because they believe in non-nuclear rules and norms and the value of global nuclear governance. It could even be argued that, through the Additional Protocol (a voluntary agreement that expands IAEA access to information and sites to confirm declared—and detect undeclared—nuclear activities), many states have even ceded a certain amount of their sovereignty to the IAEA because they believe nuclear transparency and higher levels of intrusiveness are a fair price to pay to protect against nuclear threats, especially the threat of nuclear terrorism. While important divisions within the nuclear nonproliferation regime do exist (as demonstrated by the international furor over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq), the long-term trend has been toward consensus on how to identify threats to the regime and how to respond to them. This is signaled by the greater willingness among members of the UN Security Council to pass Chapter 7 resolutions to punish states that violate their safeguards agreements; by the emergence of ambitious new multilateral nonproliferation obligations, such as those set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and by the growing popularity of U.S.-led plurilateral nonproliferation arrangements, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, which have attempted to plug the gaps in the UN nonproliferation architecture. Together, these developments can be seen as part of a broader shift in international society toward solidarism and away from pluralism, a trend that, in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, gathered momentum following a series of state-led proliferation challenges in the 1990s and accelerated after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent exposure of the A.Q. Khan network dramatically elevated fears of nuclear terrorism.21

States with low interaction capacity are attempting to resist this shift toward solidarism, not only in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, but in the context of international society more generally. They are under increasing external pressure to change, conform, comply, or pay the penalty. The more the legitimacy of the state is subjected to criticism from outside, the harder it tries to resist that pressure and rally domestic and international support by defying solidarist international society. In terms of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, there are three ways a state with low interaction capacity can do this: it can attempt to create divisions among regime members; it can try to delegitimize the nonproliferation regime's processes, rules, and procedures; and it can refuse to comply with the regime's demands. The extent to which the Obama administration's disarmament leadership will influence this behavior will depend on whether it is seen to strengthen solidarist trends in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and in international society generally.22 If so, the likely impact would be increased resistance and defiance.

North Korea's Belligerent Nuclear Defiance

The roots of North Korea's nuclear endeavors stretch back to the 1960s, when, having failed to persuade Mao Tse-tung to share China's nuclear secrets, North Korea quietly set about developing an indigenous nuclear capability, initially with Soviet assistance.23 The nuclear defiance that is characteristic today began soon after Pyongyang's plutonium facilities were detected by U.S. satellites in 1980, and Pyongyang came under international pressure to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Kim Il Sung appeared to acquiesce in 1985, signing the NPT, but subsequent activities, including the reprocessing of spent fuel in 1989, provided strong indications that Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions remained intact.24 So began a pattern of nuclear defiance that continues to this day, with North Korea making and breaking commitments, playing cat and mouse with the IAEA and international negotiators, periodically appearing to climb down, and all the while pursuing an independent nuclear deterrent.25 The current extent of North Korea's nuclear capabilities is unknown: it is estimated to have produced between 30 and 50 kilograms of plutonium, and since the Kim Jong Il regime's most recent nuclear and missile tests in 2009, one U.S. expert has speculated that it could now probably deploy a nuclear weapon (deliverable by a Nodong missile) and be fairly confident that it would work.26 Other experts, however, have cautioned against exaggerating North Korea's delivery capabilities. As recently as January 2007, for example, Jonathan Pollack, professor of Asian and Pacific studies at the U.S. Naval War College, argued: “It is likely that the DPRK has only begun to ponder what an operational [nuclear] capability might entail.”27

Pyongyang's current round of nuclear defiance began in October 2002, when the Bush administration confronted it with intelligence indicating it had been secretly pursuing a parallel uranium enrichment program.28 Since that time, North Korea has been more determinedly belligerent: in December 2002, it announced that it was restarting its 5-megawatt nuclear reactor that had been shut down under the 1994 Agreed Framework; in January 2003 it withdrew from the NPT; in February 2005 it publicly declared for the first time that it had developed nuclear weapons; in October 2006 it conducted its first nuclear weapons test; and in 2009 it engaged in a long succession of escalatory behavior in clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Pyongyang's most recent actions, including a second nuclear test on May 25, 2009 and subsequent announcement that “it has become an absolutely impossible option for the DPRK to even think about giving up its nuclear weapons,” have been particularly disturbing because they came after five years of painstaking negotiations via the six-party talks and a controversial decision by the Bush administration to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.29 Moreover, these actions followed a period of optimism that a policy of engagement by the Obama administration would reap rewards for the nonproliferation regime.30

This series of confrontational nuclear and missile activities has led to head scratching among North Korea analysts, many of whom have looked to domestic events in Pyongyang to explain the escalation. One of the most popular explanations is that Kim Jong Il's ill health and an impending power transition are responsible for the increased defiance: the nuclear issue is being used by the leadership to shore up domestic support while a successor is found for the ailing Kim.31 Others have speculated that the succession issue has provided an opportunity for military leaders to take control, and that Kim Jong Il has yielded to their demands for a more aggressive nuclear posture.32 Others suspect that the escalation is the result of jostling between political factions, each attempting to outdo the other by demonstrating their hardline credentials and thus their suitability to assume key positions in a post-Kim regime.33

The succession issue may well have affected the timing of recent events, but North Korea's Foreign Ministry has issued statements (which negotiators claim are the most reliable source for gauging Pyongyang's intentions) that suggest additional important internal and external drivers are at work and that the series of escalatory acts that took place in the first half of 2009 were long in the planning.34 For example, a statement released in February 2005 referred to a U.S. plot “to topple the political system in the DPRK at any cost,” compelling Pyongyang “to bolster its nuclear arsenal in order to protect the ideology, system, freedom and democracy chosen by its people.”35 The statement went on to declare that “we … have manufactured nukes for self-defense to cope with the Bush administration's evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK.” More recent statements indentify not just the United States and its allies (especially Japan) as threats to North Korea's survival, but also the other negotiating partners from the six-party talks, the members of the UN Security Council, and even New Zealand, which participated in naval exercises off the coast of South Korea in April 2009.36 There are also indications that Pyongyang's leaders feel as threatened by the Obama administration as they did by its predecessor: a signed commentary in Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, recently declared that “the present U.S. administration is talking about what it calls a ‘change’ and ‘bilateral dialogue,’ but it is, in actuality, pursuing the same reckless policies followed by the former Bush administration to stifle the DPRK by force of arms.”37 This last point is crucial, as it provides some insight into Pyongyang's failure—or refusal—to differentiate between an Obama administration that is committed to engagement, and the previous Bush administration, which led the preemptive invasion of Iraq. This can be understood in the context of Pyongyang's hostility and resistance to what it perceives as a U.S.-dominated international society underpinned by norms that it does not share.38

North Korea's nuclear defiance must be understood in the context of its history and national ideology of self-reliance, referred to as juche ideology—a unique version of Marxism-Leninism. This national ideology was first proclaimed in 1955 by North Korea's founder, President Kim Il Sung, who, after failing to conquer the south in the Korean War of 1950–53, developed the concept of juche as a check against excessive Soviet or Chinese influence.39 Over the years, the ideology has been adapted to achieve the North Korean leadership's contemporary domestic and foreign policy goals: to consolidate and legitimize the leadership, achieve economic self-sufficiency, deter external threats, and promote national unity through a strong national identity. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and declining influence of communism, under Kim Jong Il juche has gradually morphed from an ideology that identifies external communist influence as its main adversary to one that defines itself in opposition to international society more generally, and specifically to what it sees as imperialist, capitalist, Western- and U.S.-dominated international society.40 The effects of this ideology have changed little over time: North Korea is a secretive, highly centralized, authoritarian, rigidly stratified political hierarchy with extremely low interaction capacity. In terms of physical interaction, information is tightly controlled, freedom of expression and movement are severely restricted, and societal contacts with the outside world are minimal. On a normative level, North Korea's lack of integration into international society goes even deeper, as the Kim regime is considered one of the most repressive in existence, described as a “vast gulag” with a “repellent elite” capable of “extreme brutality.”41

The tensions that exist between juche ideology and the norms that underpin international society help account for North Korea's nuclear defiance. As a state on the periphery of a more socially ambitious international society, North Korea's interaction capacity has declined almost to the point of no return: its political influence has virtually shrunk to its borders; its trade, transport, people-to-people contacts, and other forms of societal interaction are minimal; its socio-cultural systems and legitimacy are constantly under attack from international opinion; and regime survival constantly hangs in the balance. Recently, external pressure for change has even begun to emanate from China, which had previously been careful to distance itself from the more strident U.S. and Western criticisms of the brutal Kim regime.42 The leadership's nuclear belligerence represents the ultimate rejection of this pressure, not just from the United States, but from international society more generally; it can be understood as the last resort of a state that sees no other way to increase its interaction capacity on its own terms. From the perspective of a state in this position of extreme marginalization, outright defiance of the nonproliferation regime and development of a nuclear deterrent send a clear message to international society: “We reject your values, laws and systems of governance, just as you reject ours. We are independent; we have a right to exist on our own terms. Cross us at your peril.”

Given this bleak assessment of North Korea's nuclear defiance, what does the future hold? What impact is the Obama administration's pro-active disarmament leadership likely to have on the Kim regime's nuclear diplomacy? Unfortunately, as compliance pressure grows stronger, as may well happen if the Obama administration achieves its goal of building greater consensus in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the consequences may be that North Korea feels more alienated and increases its nuclear defiance as a result, conducting further nuclear and missile tests in order to demonstrate its independence from foreign influence and its rejection of international norms. Indeed, despite periodic signs of softening, North Korea's immediate response to the UN Security Council's unanimous decision on June 12, 2009 to pass Resolution 1874, which imposed security and economic sanctions, including a trade and arms embargo, may be a more reliable sign of things to come. Condemning the resolution as a “vile product of the U.S.-led offensive international pressure aimed at undermining the DPRK's ideology,” Pyongyang declared a three-point plan: first, it intends to weaponize its newly extracted plutonium; second, it will commence uranium enrichment; and third, it will consider any attempt at a blockade as “an act of war.”43

Iran's Calculated Nuclear Defiance

Iran's nuclear ambitions date back to the days of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who, having embarked on an ambitious nuclear energy program with U.S. assistance, set up a clandestine research organization to explore the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons. Although the work of this group was disbanded when the shah was overthrown, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini developed nuclear weapon ambitions of his own, and in 1985 he launched a new program that drew on assistance from China, North Korea, and Pakistan.44 For years, Iran's clandestine nuclear activities developed out of sight of IAEA inspectors, who inspected Iran's declared facilities but were unaware of the parallel program. This changed in 2002, when an Iranian dissident group based in France accused Tehran of building a secret enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy water production facility at Arak, exposing more than fifteen years of illicit nuclear development. Seven years later, despite mounting international pressure and condemnation—including numerous IAEA reports, statements, and resolutions; four UN Security Council resolutions; and years of diplomatic negotiations by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU-3) and subsequently the EU-3 with China, Russia, and the United States (the P5 + 1)—Iran's enrichment activities continue. As of August 28, 2009, Iran had installed more than 8,000 centrifuges and is estimated to be three to six months away from a breakout capability at either the Natanz facility or a clandestine gas centrifuge facility.45 It is also estimated to have accumulated enough low-enriched uranium (LEU) to be able to enrich enough weapon-grade uranium for one nuclear weapon. While concerns about Iran's impending breakout capability continue to grow, the IAEA has been unable to make any progress in its investigations into the suspected military dimensions of Iran's nuclear activities, including alleged studies indicating weaponization-related research and development.46 In the absence of reliable information, proliferation experts in the United States and Europe have concluded that Iran is probably seeking a latent nuclear weapons capability but may not have made a final decision to build an actual bomb.47

Iran vehemently denies that it is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, despite what Mark Fitzpatrick has referred to as “numerous indicators of military involvement in the program, from the very front end of the fuel cycle through to various aspects of weaponization.”48 Iranian leaders and officials insist that the nuclear facilities uncovered since 2001 are part of a legitimate civilian program and deny any wrongdoing.49 However, such claims of peaceful intent are becoming less convincing as time passes and Iran continues to flout international demands to suspend enrichment, delays or denies IAEA access to key scientists, information, and facilities, and engages in diplomatic maneuverings involving continuous obfuscations and blatant lies.50 Iran's response to the June 2009 IAEA report on its activities provides the perfect example of this behavior. The report flagged numerous serious concerns about Tehran's defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, yet Iranian officials announced that the report had given Tehran a “clean bill of health on the peaceful use of nuclear energy”; provided “no evidence of … prohibited activities”; and confirmed that the IAEA has been able to “continue its verification activities without any obstacle.”51 The statement went on to declare the UN Security Council resolutions “unjust and with no legal basis”—a claim Iran bases on an “inalienable right [to] utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including [the] nuclear fuel cycle, specifically enrichment.”52 Ali Akbar Velayati, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's top advisor on international affairs, re-emphasized this position in his response to a Group of Eight (G-8) announcement that Iran must either accept negotiations over its nuclear ambitions or face tougher sanctions, stating that Iran “will not retreat even one step from its peaceful nuclear activity.”53 This bold defiance led former IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei to finally admit, after seven years of careful diplomacy and circumspection, that Iran “would like to have the technology to enable it to have nuclear weapons.”54

As in the case of North Korea, it is difficult to acquire accurate, unclassified information regarding Iran's nuclear intentions and motivations, but a variety of internal, external, material, and ideational forces appear to be in play. Iran's regional and global ambitions appear to be one important driver, and its leaders have long looked to scientific advancement, including mastering the nuclear fuel cycle, as one way to secure regional dominance and to achieve the international status and prestige that they regard as Iran's natural right.55 These ambitions are mingled with insecurity and perceptions of regime vulnerability that have systemic and domestic roots: fear of U.S. and Israeli strategic dominance, including their nuclear capabilities and intentions; growing concerns over regional isolation; and an acute awareness that the ideas, values, and systems on which Iran's theocracy is based face strong ideological opposition from groups within Iran and from outside.56 Iran's nuclear defiance could be viewed as a strategy for countering these threats, a way of attracting allies who share the same insecurities and of bolstering the theocrats’ legitimacy by rallying domestic support for Iran's nuclear achievements.57 If these motivations are as important as they seem, then the regime instability brought on by the return to office of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the disputed election of June 2009, combined with the international condemnation of the regime's violent repression of political demonstrations, could result in an escalation in nuclear defiance, including a possible rejection of a P5 + 1 initiative to renew negotiations or at the very least an intractable response to any new proposals.58 Indeed, regime insecurity appears to have been an important factor in Iran's rejection of the October 2009 research reactor fuel proposal, which would have been a significant (although temporary) confidence-building measure, involving nearly 80 percent of Iran's enriched uranium being sent to Russia by the end of 2009.59

The concept of interaction capacity offers an interesting perspective on Iran's nuclear defiance. In common with North Korea, many of Iran's insecurities stem from its unique system of governance (in Iran's case, a theocracy), which lacks international—and increasingly, domestic—legitimacy.60 This has saddled the regime with low levels of interaction capacity and has led Tehran's clerical and political leaders to use the nuclear issue to compensate for that weakness. But unlike North Korea, which has pushed nuclear defiance to new heights of belligerence and isolated itself still further, Iran's skilled diplomats have had some success in operating on the fringes of international society, exploiting ambiguities and inconsistencies in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and appealing to states that share its reservations over the transition to a more socially ambitious international society. In particular, its nuclear negotiators have elicited sympathy from some members of the NAM, who are keen to ensure that the obligations associated with NPT and IAEA membership do not increase while the benefits become more difficult to obtain.61 Aware of the opportunities that this sympathy provides for reducing its isolation, Tehran's leaders have accused the United States and other states of undermining the nuclear nonproliferation regime by engaging in “gross violations of Article IV obligations … depriving states parties from exercising their inalienable right,” and by pursuing a “hidden agenda … to turn [the IAEA] into a ‘U.N. Watchdog’ with maximum intrusiveness,” thus “jeopardizing the spirit of cooperation the Agency needs more than ever.”62

Iran's nuclear negotiators are keen to ensure that the Obama administration's pledge to resume moral authority on nuclear issues does not heal divisions within the nuclear nonproliferation regime, thus reducing its opportunities to exploit them. Tehran has spent years attempting to justify and legitimize Iran's nuclear defiance by focusing on what it calls the “unbalanced, discriminatory, and double-standard approach” of the United States to implementing the NPT, particularly regarding Article VI disarmament obligations. The prospect of greater unity among NNWS and NWS—especially strengthened mutual resolve to deal effectively with safeguards violators—could place new restrictions on Iran's diplomatic strategy, increasing the costs of its nuclear defiance.63 This has led Tehran's diplomats to scoff at Obama's pledge of a new era of disarmament leadership. “U.S. officials have recently pledged to change their approach toward nuclear weapons and have expressed their intention to move towards nuclear disarmament,” Iran's deputy foreign minister, Mohammad Ali Hosseini, stated at the May 2009 Preparatory Committee meeting in New York, but “given the facts of the past 40 years, the international community has noticed that such pledges have never been materialized.”64 A few weeks later, these comments were echoed at the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna, where the Iranian delegation stated, “We are witnessing that there is no change in [U.S.] policies and action … therefore all peace loving people have to reconsider their views about dealing with such a country.”65 Khamenei echoed these sentiments as negotiations on the research reactor fuel deal were taking place in October and November 2009: “Every time [U.S. negotiators] have a smile on their face they are hiding a dagger behind their back. … Iran will not be fooled by the superficial conciliatory tone of the United States.”66

It will be interesting to observe the medium- to long-term impact of U.S. disarmament diplomacy on Iran's diplomatic maneuverings. If the above analysis is correct, then it is likely that Iran will continue to find fault with the Obama administration's disarmament agenda, even if reductions are made to the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the salience of nuclear weapons is diminished in U.S. national security strategy and nuclear doctrine. Furthermore, rather than dialing down its nuclear defiance in response to signs that U.S.-led disarmament initiatives are healing divisions in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the opposite may happen, as Iranian leaders scramble to retain the support of key NAM partners, perpetuate differences among the NWS on the implementation of sanctions and the use of force, and rally domestic opinion around a regime that is increasingly fragile.67 The danger is that if it becomes clear to Iranian leaders that their diplomatic strategy of resisting pressure through eliciting sympathy is failing, they may resort to increasingly belligerent behavior, potentially leading Iran down the same path as North Korea. Red flags that this is happening would include sudden spikes in defiance as Iran attempts to compensate for its declining interaction capacity. This behavior could include reduced transparency and cooperation with IAEA inspectors, efforts to build closer relations with North Korea and other states on the fringes of international society, withdrawal from any new negotiations, and signs of accelerated nuclear activities.

Dealing with North Korea and Iran

The argument that a new era of U.S. disarmament leadership could provoke North Korea and Iran to continue to escalate their nuclear defiance prompts important questions about how the international community—and the United States, in particular—should respond. If North Korea and Iran have been engaging in nuclear defiance to counter declining legitimacy and interaction capacity, it suggests that an increase in the latter may decrease the level of nuclear defiance and could even strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This section explores the opportunities for external actors to directly or indirectly enhance the interaction capacity of both states, and the implications of this for U.S. nonproliferation policy, revived six-party talks, and renewed negotiations with Iran. It also identifies alternative strategies for dealing with the defiant regimes without legitimizing their systems of government, which may not increase interaction capacity but could offer crucial means for limiting the proliferation dangers associated with nuclear defiance.

One way to increase the interaction capacities of North Korea and Iran would be to attempt to transform the norms and values that underpin international society so that they become more compatible with—or at least less hostile to—the ideologies that shape the regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran. This strategy would necessitate a shift back to a more pluralist international society that places renewed emphasis on the principles of sovereign sanctity and non-intervention and subjects the domestic sphere to less international scrutiny and criticism. Some scholars and practitioners would support this retreat from international solidarism, particularly after what many saw as the self-serving agenda of the Bush administration.68 But how would a return to international pluralism shape nonproliferation policy under the Obama administration? How would it influence the negotiating strategies of participants in the six-party talks and Iran negotiations? And what would be the practical implications for the nuclear nonproliferation regime? Caution, careful engagement, and compromise would be the watchwords in all cases: a move away from past “disciplinarian” approaches to dealing with North Korea and Iran; an effort to increase the international and domestic legitimacy of the regimes in question, despite their defiance of the nonproliferation regime and of international society more generally; an end to assertions that “all options are on the table” to deal with noncompliance (i.e., taking force off the table); and strenuous efforts to reassure Pyongyang and Tehran that hidden and overt agendas based on a desire for regime change no longer exist.69 This would require a shift by the United States and other negotiating parties toward China's approach, which, in the case of Pyongyang, has been underpinned by a desire to prevent regime collapse and by a desire to limit U.S. and Western dominance of international society. In terms of the mechanisms of the nonproliferation regime itself, such an approach might also include a deliberate rollback of the nonproliferation obligations that have been growing in recent years. These steps could include: decreasing pressure on states to bring the Additional Protocol into force (leading to fewer, less intrusive IAEA inspections); abandoning controversial multilateral fuel bank proposals; ending the reporting obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and generally reducing nuclear transparency.

This approach would help prevent North Korea and Iran from becoming more alienated and would serve the purpose of preventing further escalation. But a shift back to a pluralist approach would be regressive—a step back to the moral relativism of the past, at a time when international society is becoming more socially ambitious and the nonproliferation regime more comprehensive. A second way to increase interaction capacity would be to retain the commitment to solidarism but attempt to bring about significant change in the regimes themselves so that they are able to integrate into international society. There are a number of ways this could be achieved, but most fall into one of two categories: regime overthrow by external force; or regime change via peaceful political, economic, and societal integration. Given ongoing and well-publicized problems associated with forced regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq, it does not seem necessary to list the pitfalls of the first strategy.70 The second strategy also has certain potential pitfalls but may be more feasible: at the domestic level, supporting opposition movements and promoting people-to-people contact in the hope that this will foster bottom-up regime change; and at the international level, keeping channels of diplomatic communication open in the hope that, over time, political elites will become less resistant to international norms.71

What are the implications of this approach for nonproliferation diplomacy? It is likely that any evidence of heavy-handed external (especially U.S.) interference in the fragile domestic affairs of North Korea or Iran would delegitimize opposition groups and leaders, scupper negotiations, and could even lead to a serious escalation of nuclear defiance. Some proponents of the regime change approach may not consider this a negative development, given that the negotiating positions of Pyongyang and Tehran are more entrenched than ever and appear unlikely to shift significantly over the longer term, even if there are temporary lulls in defiance.72 Tehran, for example, has made it very clear that it will not accept the P5 + 1 deal that has been on the negotiating table since 2006, and—as recent negotiations over the research reactor fuel proposal have demonstrated—it is just as unlikely to accept any new deal that involves significant restrictions on its nuclear program.73 And while Pyongyang may agree to revive the six-party talks in return for concessions, its past actions suggest that it is unlikely to follow through on any new commitments to the extent that its nuclear capabilities are permanently compromised.74 Renewed negotiation efforts may appear futile and wasteful in this context, but on the other hand, relying on—even assisting—current domestic political instability in Pyongyang and Tehran in the hope that it will lead to new, more cooperative regimes, seems unwise. Furthermore, the risk that Iran could follow in North Korea's footsteps and terminate IAEA cooperation and even withdraw from the NPT is too serious to ignore.75

A more appropriate strategy for dealing with the defiant states would combine elements of the two above approaches and retain the most useful aspects of a pluralist nonproliferation and disarmament agenda without regressively stepping away from solidarism. Given the potential for the actions of the defiant states to further undermine the nonproliferation regime, efforts to keep diplomatic channels open are essential, even if the negotiating process is only an end in itself (i.e., preventing total alienation) rather than a means to an end (i.e., leading to agreements that ensure irreversible disarmament and full transparency and compliance). In terms of U.S. nonproliferation policy, utilizing the political leverage provided by China and Russia and certain NAM leaders and observers to keep negotiations alive (especially in the event that stronger, Western-initiated sanctions are imposed) may be the best option, as these states continue to value elements of pluralist international society despite edging ever closer to solidarism, and are perceived by the defiant states to be more attuned to their priorities and insecurities than the United States or its allies. Making use of the political leverage that these states could provide would also help to overcome perceptions, strongly exacerbated during the Bush administration, that the United States and a few of its Western allies have been using the goals of solidarist international society to camouflage the self-interested pursuit of foreign and security policy objectives in the Middle East and Asia.

Thus far, the strategy for dealing with the defiant states has focused on the goal of drawing them into international society by increasing their interaction capacity, but the urgent need to deal with the nuclear defiance of North Korea and Iran means that dependable, short-term strategies are also required.76 Attempting to reduce or prevent nuclear defiance by increasing interaction capacity is fraught with obstacles and pitfalls; long-term strategies need to be combined with ones that more immediately limit the impact of repeated and determined nuclear defiance via coordinated containment and interdiction efforts.77 These efforts run the risk of driving Pyongyang and Tehran to escalate still further, because they perpetuate the disciplinary approach to nonproliferation diplomacy that has motivated both regimes to engage in nuclear defiance. But the risks associated with failing to contain the threat, especially in the case of North Korea, are so serious that the priority for the nonproliferation regime must be to continue working toward consensus on the effective implementation of sanctions and on the important nonproliferation and interdiction roles of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Financial Action Task Force, and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. To have any chance of success, this multilayered containment strategy will require strong support and cooperation from other states, including some developing states that in the past have resisted U.S.-led nonproliferation initiatives and have supported defiant states.78 The key question is whether any renewed trust and goodwill generated by the Obama administration's disarmament leadership can help change this behavior, as hoped, and in doing so, strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The early signs have been mostly positive, with improved international cooperation on the implementation of Resolution 1874 on North Korea; slow but growing support (including among some NAM states) for U.S.-led interdiction initiatives; constructive P5 + 1 participation in negotiations over Iran (although at the time of writing both Russia and China were opposed to tougher sanctions); and evidence of waning sympathy for Iran's duplicitous nuclear activities among its traditional NAM supporters.79

Conclusion

President Obama's speech in Prague drew criticism from those who misunderstood his rationale for embarking on a new era of disarmament leadership; they mistook his pragmatism for an idealistic and naive belief that disarmament steps by the United States and other NWS would persuade North Korea and Iran to abandon their nuclear ambitions. “If the implications were not so serious,” remarked Frank Gaffney, a Reagan-era Pentagon official, “the discrepancy between Mr. Obama's plans and real-world conditions would be hilarious.”80 He went on to state the obvious, that “there is only one country on earth that Team Obama can absolutely, positively denuclearize: Ours.”

But the Obama administration's approach to disarmament is far from idealistic. In his speech in Prague, Obama made it clear that he did not expect North Korea or Iran to suddenly fall into line if the United States resumed moral authority on nuclear issues. Instead, his plan set out to heal some of the divisions among NWS and NNWS by demonstrating a more balanced approach to disarmament and nonproliferation. His expectation is not that this will achieve nuclear rollback by Pyongyang or Tehran in itself, but that it will help create conditions for a new consensus to emerge on the need for stronger enforcement of international nonproliferation obligations. One of the unintended consequences of this strategy is that if it succeeds, decision makers in Tehran and Pyongyang may engage in more and more desperate bids to shore up their domestic legitimacy and undermine signs of growing international consensus. But it would be a mistake to interpret this as a sign of failure or use it to justify a hasty retreat from the current U.S. consensus-building approach to nonproliferation and disarmament. It would, however, necessitate a reconsideration of one aspect of the Obama administration's policy: that of engagement. This is not to suggest that efforts at constructive engagement should be abandoned altogether. Rather, expectations of achieving positive results should be couched in realistic assessments of defiant states’ interaction capacity and the challenges associated with trying to change it. Additionally, it may be more productive for the United States to pursue a strategy of indirect engagement, focusing on encouraging more pro-active nonproliferation diplomacy from China, Russia, and other states, such as Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa.81 At the same time, emphasis should be placed on promoting effective multilateral sanctions and interdiction and on longer-term opportunities to bring about regime change through people-to-people contact and the diffusion of ideas.

One of the many challenges for the 2010 NPT Review Conference is to agree on clear language condemning the nuclear defiance of North Korea and Iran—and to ensure that diplomatic maneuvering by violators and their sympathizers does not prevent this from happening. Dealing frankly and directly with the problem of nuclear defiance is therefore crucial. Past review conferences have failed to do this, and as a result North Korea's behavior appears to have been tolerated, and Iran has been able to claim the moral high ground, focusing attention on the failure of the NWS to uphold their disarmament commitments.82 The 2010 NPT Review Conference provides all states that are committed members of international society with an opportunity to break this cycle and to reinforce the nonproliferation norms that have been challenged by repeated nuclear defiance. Much will depend on the U.S. delegation's ability to demonstrate that Iran's accusations no longer hold water: not only is it ready to take concrete steps toward a nuclear-weapon-free world, it is prepared to address past actions that have led many states to become cynical about the existence of double standards in the nonproliferation regime.83 Most importantly, this requires the United States to demonstrate a commitment to work with Israel toward the elimination of that state's nuclear arsenal—something that will require a clear shift in U.S. policy. But not all of the responsibility rests with the United States; the other NWS and NNWS must also maximize the opportunities for consensus-building on noncompliance, for dealing with treaty withdrawal (Article X) issues, and for ensuring that defiant states are no longer able to exploit divisions between NPT parties over sanctions and enforcement.84 While there is a possibility that agreement and clear consensus language on these issues in 2010 could trigger further defiance from Iran and North Korea, it could be argued that the risk is worth taking in the interests of a credible, more resilient nuclear nonproliferation regime and a more united, progressive international society. At the same time, however, strategies for minimizing the risk of spikes in defiance need to be adopted by the states and coalitions that have the greatest opportunity for positive influence: steps by China, Russia, and others to directly engage the defiant states prior to and during the 2020 NPT Review Conference are crucial, as are commitments from the United States and other Western states to indirectly support and assist these efforts.85

Notes

1. Editorial, “The Nuclear Illusionist,” Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2009, p. A14.

2. Jon Kyl and Richard Perle, “Our Decaying Nuclear Deterrent,” Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2009, p. A13.

3. James M. Acton, Pierre Goldschmidt, and George Perkovich, “Defending U.S. Leadership on Disarmament,” Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 7, 2009, <www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23354>.

4. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Recovering American Leadership,” Survival 50 (February/March 2008), p. 55–68; Tanya Ogilvie-White, “International Responses to Iranian Nuclear Defiance: The Non-Aligned Movement and the Issue of Non-Compliance,” European Journal of International Law 18 (June 2007), pp. 453–76; George Perkovich, Jessica T. Matthews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Jon B. Wolfsthal, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007), pp. 16–30.

5. Ogilvie-White, “International Responses,” pp. 461–64.

6. Andy Butfoy, “Washington's Apparent Readiness to Start Nuclear War,” Survival 50 (October/November 2008), pp. 115–40.

7. “Remarks of President Barack Obama,” Prague, April 5, 2009, <prague.usembassy.gov.obama.html>.

8. Some developing states do not comply with their legal obligations and political commitments, not because they are unwilling to do so, but because they are incapable due to capacity problems. There are many examples of this form of unintentional noncompliance in the nuclear nonproliferation regime—a problem that has become more obvious since UN Security Council Resolution 1540 made it mandatory for all states to report on their progress in implementing WMD controls. This is a separate phenomenon to the determined nuclear defiance that is addressed in this article, although the two could potentially occur in tandem.

9. Studies and reports that highlight the strategic determinants of nuclear defiance include: Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback,” Nonproliferation Review 13 (November 2006), pp. 539–53; “Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East,” report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., February 2008; Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (February 2007), pp. 167–94.

10. Studies that highlight domestic determinants, with the focus on state type, domestic coalitions, or sub-state organizations, include: Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Alternative Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Richard K. Betts, “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Non-Proliferation Revisited,” Security Studies 2 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 100–26; Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); and Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18 (1994), pp. 66–107.

11. Studies of this type are less common, partly because it is so difficult to quantify ideational determinants. However, there are some important studies on how ideas (including norms) influence behavior and on how the psychology of individual leaders can affect nuclear decision making. See Maria Rost Rublee, “Persuasion, Social Conformity and Identification: Constructivist Explanations for Non-Nuclear States in a Nuclear World,” PhD diss., George Washington University, 2004; Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 192–212.

12. William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay,” International Security 33 (Summer 2008), pp. 139–69; Alexander H. Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Predicting Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), pp. 302–28.

13. Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Fall 1996), pp. 43–60; Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (1996–97), pp. 54–86; and James J. Walsh, “ Bombs Unbuilt: Power, Ideas and Institutions in International Politics,” PhD diss., MIT, 2001; Victor Asal and Kyle Beardsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” Journal of Peace Research 44 (2007), pp. 139–55; and Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2004), pp. 859–85.

14. Barry Buzan and Richard Little develop these ideas in their study of the evolution of the international system. As they admit, the idea that the units within an empire or an anarchic arena can be constrained by an ideology or set of beliefs about appropriate norms and behavior is a departure from conventional English School analysis, taking it closer to constructivist analysis and historical sociology. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations,” in Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, eds., Historical Sociology of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 210–11; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); and Christian Reus-Smit, “Imagining Society: Constructivism and the English School,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 4 (October 2002), pp. 487–509.

15. This process is explored in Samuel Makinda, “Hedley Bull and Global Governance: A Note on IR Theory,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 56 (2002), pp. 361–71; and Onuma Yasuaki, “The Functions of International Law in International Society,” European Journal of International Law 14 (2003), pp. 105–39.

16. Where some theorists, such as Makinda, view this as a pernicious, destabilizing development and favor pluralist international society, others, such as David Held, view the transition in a positive, progressive light. See Makinda, “Hedley Bull and Global Governance”; and David Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,” Legal Theory 8 (March 2002), pp. 1–44.

17. For a more detailed explanation of the role of international society and the evolution of the concept in international relations theory, see Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1998). For an alternative perspective on the concept (seen through the lens of competing civilizations and with the focus on the role of international law), see Onuma Yasuaki, “When Was the Law of International Society Born? An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective,” Journal of the History of International Law 2 (2000), pp. 1–66.

18. Buzan and Little, “International Systems in World History,” pp. 210–11.

19. Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Theorising Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Understanding the Nuclear Policies of India, South Africa, North Korea and Ukraine,” unpublished PhD thesis, University of Southampton, 1998.

20. I have used this framework in the past to explain the responses of NAM members to Iran's nuclear defiance. See Ogilvie-White, “International Responses to Iranian Nuclear Defiance.”

21. This trend was already quite apparent in the nonproliferation regime by the mid-1990s (as demonstrated by the introduction of the Additional Protocol), but the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have led to an acceleration. The trend toward solidarism has been visible in many areas of international cooperation and is perhaps most pronounced in the areas of peacekeeping, intervention, and post-conflict reconstruction, all of which are increasingly underpinned by the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine. See UN General Assembly, “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary General,” A/63/677, January 12, 2009; and Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

22. President Obama's speeches in Cairo, Moscow, and Ghana in June and July 2009 provide an early insight into the administration's vision of international society and the U.S. role in it. The speeches focused on human rights, democracy, good governance, neo-liberal institutionalism, and the responsibility to protect—principles that underpin a more solidarist vision of international society. At the same time, Obama was careful to stress the importance of religious tolerance and acceptance of cultural diversity (as long as human rights are respected). Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament,” speech in Accra, Ghana, July 11, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-Ghanaian-Parliament/>; Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the New Economic School Graduation,” speech in Moscow, July 7, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-The-President-At-The-New-Economic-School-Graduation/>; Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning,” speech at Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt, June 4, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/>.

23. Don Oberdorfer, “Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Threat,” E-Notes, Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 8, 2005, <www.fpri.org/enotes/20050608.asia.oberdorfer.northkoreannuclearthreat.html>.

24. Hy Sang-Lee, North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000), p. 11.

25. For years, analysts worked on the assumption that Pyongyang was pursuing a symbolic nuclear capability to use as a bargaining chip to extract economic concessions. But events since 2002 suggest that North Korea is pursuing an operational nuclear deterrent and that it may have been on this track for some time. It is possible that a strategic decision may have been taken early in the George W. Bush's first term, following: the publication of the U.S. National Security Strategy and nuclear doctrine; Bush's references to North Korea as part of an “axis of evil”; and the administration's subsequent use of preemptive force against Iraq. See “U.S. Warmongers Accused of Stepping up Military Moves Against the DPRK,” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), May 26, 2009; Jonathan D. Pollack, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program to 2015: Three Scenarios,” in Tim Cook, North Korea and Iran: Nuclear Futures and Regional Responses, NBR Special Report, No. 13 (May 2007), pp. 12–16, <www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/SR13.pdf>; Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Regional Overview: Old Challenges, New Approaches,” Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2009, pp. 2–3, <csis.org/files/publication/0902q.pdf > ; Hui Zhang, “Don't Play Nuclear Chicken with a Desperate Pariah,” ForeignPolicy.com, June 2009, <www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=5020>; Bertil Lintner, “Pyongyang's 60-Year Obsession,” Asia Times, October 10, 2006; U.S. House of Representatives, “Recognizing North Korea as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United States,” staff report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, September 28, 2006, p. 12; Sang-Hun Choe, “North Korean Parliamentary Supports Pyongyang's Decision to Build up Nuclear Capabilities,” Associated Press, September 4, 2009.

26. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), quoted in Eli Lake and Barbara Slavin, “Analysis: North Korea Joins Nuclear Club,” Washington Times, May 25, 2009, <www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/25/analysis-north-korea-joins-nuclear-club/>. For a more detailed assessment of North Korea's nuclear program and the uncertainties surrounding weaponization, see Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy,” CRS report for Congress, RL33590, May 27, 2009.

27. Pollack, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program to 2015,” p. 121. As of 2009, most experts remained skeptical over the reliability and payload capacity of North Korea's ballistic missiles. See Andre de Nesnera, “Does North Korea's Taepodong-2 Ballistic Missile Pose a Serious Threat?” Voice of America, May 14, 2009, <www.voanews.com/english/archive/2009-05/2009-05-14-voa45.cfm?CFID=316081862&CFTOKEN=86185279&jsessionid=8830f6918969f20c500b651712e631a747e5>.

28. Hui Zhang, “Assessing North Korea's Uranium Enrichment Capabilities,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, web edition, June 18, 2009, <www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/assessing-north-koreas-uranium-enrichment-capabilities>.

29. Cossa and Glosserman, “Regional Overview,” pp. 1–4.

30. Insook Kim, “Issue Brief: The Six-Party Talks and President Obama's North Korea Policy,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies/Nuclear Threat Initiative, February 2009, <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_six_party_obama_north_korea.html>; Barack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affairs 86 (July/August 2007), pp. 2–16.

31. Tania Branigan, “Kim Jong-Il ‘Has Pancreatic Cancer,’” Guardian, July 13, 2009; Scott Snyder, “What's Driving Pyongyang?” Nautilus Institute, Policy Forum Online 09-055A, July 7, 2009, <www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09055Snyder.html>.

32. For example, see the comments of Koh Yu-hwan, professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University, Seoul, quoted in Blaine Harden, “North Korea Says it Will Start Enriching Uranium,” The Washington Post, June 14, 2009.

33. Victor Cha, a North Korea expert at Georgetown University who served on the George W. Bush National Security Council during the second term, quoted in Michael Hirsh, “Alone at the Table: Obama Is a Pro-Engagement President with Nobody to Engage,” Newsweek, May 27, 2009, <www.newsweek.com/id/199668>.

34. Kim Myong Chol, “Kim Jong Il's Perspective on the Nuclear Standoff,” paper presented at 2003 Forum on Prospects in Asia and republished by Association for Asian Research, December 11, 2003; Cossa and Glosserman, “Regional Overview,” pp. 2–3; Takashi Yokota, “Deciphering Kim Jong Il: The Real Intentions Behind North Korea's Nuclear Test,” Newsweek.com, May 26, 2009, <www.newsweek.com/id/199444>.

35. “N Korea's Statement in Full,” BBC News, February 10, 2005.

36. “DPRK Foreign Ministry Vehemently Refutes UNSC's ‘Presidential Statement,’” KCNA, April 14, 2009; “KCNA Rebukes Japan's Moves to Go Nuclear,” KCNA, April 28, 2009; “U.S. and S. Korean War Exercises and Aerial Espionage against DPRK under Fire,” KCNA, April 30, 2009; “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Clarifies Its Stand on UNSC's Increasing Threat,” KCNA, May 29, 2009; “DPRK Opposes UN Resolution, Vows to Pursue More Nuclear Weapons,” Xinhua, June 13, 2009.

37. Quoted in Park Chan-Kyong, “After Nuclear Blast, N. Korea Fires Missiles,” Agence-France Presse, May 26, 2009.

38. Despite their different strategic visions, U.S. presidents have all shared a commitment to a socially ambitious, progressive international society. Obama's speeches during June and July 2009 may have reinforced North Korea's perception that little has changed.

39. C. Kenneth Quinones, “Beyond Collapse: Continuity and Change in North Korea,” International Journal of Korean Reunification Studies 11 (2002), pp. 25–62.

40. In his theoretical study of North Korean nuclear intentions, Jacques Hymans also makes the point that the “hermit kingdom defines itself in opposition to a whole gamut of others beyond the Korean peninsula—not only the United States, but also Japan, China, the Soviet Union/Russia and everyone else.” Whereas he explores the unit-level reasons for this via psychological approaches, I offer an explanation that attempts to capture both the systemic and domestic determinants of nuclear defiance. Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Assessing North Korean Nuclear Intentions and Capacities: A New Approach,” Journal of East Asian Studies 8 (May/August 2008), pp. 262–65.

41. Amnesty International describes some of this brutality, including: mass starvation and hunger caused by deliberate restriction of food distribution; forced labor and torture in prison camps; politically motivated and arbitrary use of detention and executions; and severe restrictions on freedom of expression and movement. Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2009: State of the World's Human Rights,” <report2009.amnesty.org/en/regions/asia-pacific/north-korea> ; Andrew Scobell, “North Korea's Strategic Intentions,” first paper in a series entitled “Demystifying North Korea,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2005, p. 5; “North Korea: Dealing with an Impossible Regime,” Economist, September 25, 2008.

42. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has issued statements strongly condemning North Korea's nuclear tests and has supported UN Security Council sanctions, although it has not implemented these consistently and continues to provide economic support to the regime. Chinese media have also begun to criticize Pyongyang openly for its nuclear activities. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” May 25, 2009, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/1179/t564332.htm>; “North Korea Should Not Offend the Chinese People,” Global Times, June 3, 2008, quoted in Hui Zhang, “Ending North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions: The Need for Stronger Chinese Action,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2009, <www.armscontrol.org/print/3726>.

43. “DPRK Opposes U.N. Resolution, Vows to Pursue More Nuclear Weapons,” Xinhua, June 13, 2009. The Korean Central News Agency has since announced that Pyongyang is in the “final phase” of uranium enrichment and has also “successfully completed reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods… for the purpose of bolstering up the nuclear deterrent.” Peter Foster, “North Korea in ‘Final Phase’ of Uranium Enrichment,” Telegraph, September 4, 2009, <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/6136348/North-Korea-in-final-phase-of-uranium-enrichment.html > ; Lim Chang-Won, “NKorea Says It Has Produced More Bomb-Making Plutonium,” Agence-France Presse, November 3, 2009.

44. Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 298.

45. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2009/55, August 28, 2009; David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire, “IAEA Report on Iran: Centrifuges Increase; Rate of LEU Production Steady; Progress on Inspection Requests at Arak and Natanz; No Progress on Possible Military Dimensions,” ISIS report, August 28, 2009, <www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Analysis_IAEA_Report.pdf>.

46. Albright, Brannan, and Shire, “IAEA Report on Iran,” p. 2.

47. Mark Fitzpatrick, “Lessons Learned from Iran's Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review 13 (November 2006), p. 527; George Perkovich, remarks at a panel discussion, “Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Ambitions: What Future Strategy for the International Community?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, March 11, 2008.

48. Fitzpatrick, “Lessons Learned from Iran's Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 528.

49. In the case of the Natanz enrichment facility, Iranian diplomats claim that its development was driven underground by a hostile international environment and a Western conspiracy of technology denial. In the case of the second enrichment facility outside Qom, disclosed in a letter to the IAEA in September 2009, Ahmadinejad has claimed that the plant's development was neither secret nor illegal (because Iran has informed the IAEA of the plant's existence well before nuclear material is introduced). M. Javad Zarif, permanent representative of Iran to the United Nations, statement to the Security Council, New York, July 31, 2006; author interviews in person with Mansour Sadeghi (political advisor) and Reza Najafi (counselor, First Committee) at the permanent mission of Iran to the United Nations, New York, September 5, 2006; “Ahmadinejad: Iran Not Worried Over Legal Nuclear Site,” PressTV.com, September 26, 2009, <www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=107124>.

50. For example, Iran denied IAEA inspectors access to the nuclear reactor at Arak for a year, finally allowing access in August 2009. Also, as Western diplomats have pointed out, although Iran allowed IAEA access to the new enrichment facility outside Qom in October 2009, officials should have notified the IAEA of plans to build the facility well before construction even began. See “Nuclear Experts Visit Iran Site,” BBC News, August 20, 2009; Mark Heinrich, “Struggle Looms to Build on Iranian Nuclear Deals,” Reuters, October 8, 2009.

51. “Response of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Remarks Made by Some Delegates on Implementation of Safeguards Agreement in Iran at the Board of Governors,” June 17, 2009, <www.pmiran.at/sts2009/Iran-response-BOG%20June%2009-final.pdf>.

52. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Soltanieh, Permanent Representative of Islamic Republic of Iran at Board of Governors of the IAEA,” June 17, 2009, <www.pmiran.at/sts2009/Statement-Iran-IAEA%20BOG%2017%20June%2009.pdf>

53. “G8 Sets Iran Deadline for Nuclear Talks,” Reuters, July 8, 2009; “Iran Won't Back Down ‘One Step’ in Atom Row,” Reuters, July 9, 2009.

54. In an interview with the BBC, ElBaradei stated that “it is my gut feeling that Iran would like to have the technology to enable it to have nuclear weapons. … They want to send a message to their neighbors, to the rest of the world, don't mess with us.” “Iran ‘Would Like Nuclear Option,’” BBC News, June 17, 2009.

55. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Soltanieh,” June 17, 2009; “Iran ‘Would Like Nuclear Option,’” BBC News; Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, “Address to Foreign and Iranian Guests,” June 2, 1999, quoted in Karim Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), p. 21.

56. Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei, pp. 16–31; Fitzpatrick, “Lessons Learned,” p. 531; Shahram Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p. 28; Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), p. 212.

57. The majority of Iranian public opinion supports the regime's nuclear defiance, despite the international condemnation and associated costs. In a study conducted by the Iranian Students Polling Agency in January 2006, 74.3 percent responded that they supported the resumption of Iran's nuclear program, even if that led to a Security Council referral; 64 percent still supported it if it led to sanctions, and 55.6 percent supported it even if it led to military action. Michael Herzog, Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program: A Potential Asset for the International Community (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006).

58. In April 2009, the P5 + 1 invited Iran to participate in fresh talks on finding a diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff. No time frame was initially given for the talks, but at the G-8 summit in L'Aquila, Italy in July 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France set September 2009 as a deadline for Iran to accept new negotiations over its nuclear ambitions or face tougher sanctions. Besides the October 2009 research reactor fuel proposal (outlined in footnote 60), which has delayed serious discussions over further sanctions, two proposals remain on the table: an EU-3–initiated proposal dating back to 2006, which calls on Iran to suspend its enrichment activities while negotiations on a package of concessions take place, and an Iranian proposal dating back to 2008, which rejects suspension demands and proposes establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel consortiums around the world, including in Iran. Letter from Manuchehr Mottaki, Iranian minister of foreign affairs, to Ban Ki-Moon, UN secretary-general, May 13, 2008, <www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IranProposal20May2008.pdf>; Letter from the foreign ministers of the P5 + 1 to Manouchehr Mottaki, June 12, 2008, <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Diplomatic_Offer_20080612.pdf>; Emmanuel Jarry and Jeff Mason, “G8 Sets Deadline for Nuclear Talks,” Reuters, July 8, 2009.

59. Iran originally tentatively agreed to accept the October 2009 research reactor fuel proposal, which would have required three-quarters of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) to be sent—in one batch—to Russia for further enrichment by the end of 2009, potentially delaying Iran's ability to turn its stockpile into fuel for a bomb. But shortly afterward, Iranian negotiators put forward a counter proposal, which reportedly entailed Iran keeping possession of the majority of its LEU stockpile while small batches are sent to Russia (thus removing the original proposal's crucial confidence-building element). Deepti Choubey, “Iran and the West at a Crossroad,” Yaleglobal, November 2, 2009, <www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24078>; Glenn Kessler and Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran Counters U.N. on Uranium Plan,” Washington Post, October 30, 2009, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/29/AR2009102900418.html>.

60. Afshin Molavi, “Iran's ‘Crisis of Legitimacy’ Could Prompt Authoritarian Political Alternative,” Eurasia Insight, August 29, 2003, <www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav082903.shtml>; Farnad Darnell, “The Iranian Revolution: A Process of Theocratic Legitimacy,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Philadelphia, August 12, 2005; Emile El-Hokayem, “As Iran Simmers, the Nuclear Clock Ticks On,” Henry Stimson Center, July 2, 2009, <www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=826>.

61. This subject deserves a separate paper in its own right, given the huge implications of the renaissance of nuclear energy for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. A number of states, from Morocco in North Africa to Vietnam in Southeast Asia, are embarking on nuclear energy programs and are concerned that new nonproliferation obligations, brought about by cases of state and non-state proliferation, are increasing the restrictions to their access of nuclear technology. Iran's diplomats have been able to exploit these insecurities among some nuclear aspirants, eliciting sympathy for its own position. But the nuclear energy aspirations of many NNWS also create opportunities to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime (potentially reducing Iran's leverage) if handled well. This is because some of the new nonproliferation initiatives that are being discussed (fuel bank proposals, for example) could reduce the huge technical and economic hurdles associated with developing nuclear energy and help NNWS enhance their energy security. See, for example, Michael S. Malley and Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Nuclear Capabilities in Southeast Asia: Building a Preventative Proliferation Firewall,” Nonproliferation Review 16 (March 2009), pp. 25–45.

62. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Soltanieh,” June 17, 2009; “Statement by H.E. Mr. Mohammad Ali Hosseini,” May 2009, <www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT2010Prepcom/PrepCom2009/statements/2009/04May2009/04May2009PMSpeaker-11-Iran-Edited.pdf > ; “Response of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Remarks Made by Some Delegates on Implementation of Safeguards Agreement in Iran at the Board of Governors,” June 17, 2009.

63. For example, see remarks of Ambassador Mohammad Khazaee, permanent representative of Iran, before the UN Disarmament Commission, in the official records of the 285th meeting of the General Assembly, A/CN.10/PV.285, April 7, 2008.

64. “Statement by H.E. Mr. Mohammad Ali Hosseini,” May 2009.

65. “Response of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Remarks Made by Some Delegates on Implementation of Safeguards Agreement in Iran at the Board of Governors,” June 17, 2009.

66. Farhad Pouladi and Jay Deshmukh, “Khamenei Says US Hiding a Dagger in Talks with Iran,” Agence-France Presse, November 3, 2009.

67. See remarks of Abbas Milani, director of Iranian studies, Stanford University, in the roundtable discussion entitled “Iran's Clenched Fist Election: What's Next for U.S. Policy?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 23, 2009.

68. See, for example, Jon Delury, “North Korea: 20 Years of Solitude,” World Policy Journal 25 (Winter 2008), pp. 75–82.

69. Similar recommendations are set out in Snyder, “What's Driving Pyongyang?” pp. 5–6; Graham Allison, Martin B. Malin, and Hui Zhang, “North Korea's Nuclear Program: Looking Forward,” Belfer Center, Harvard University, June 9, 2009; and Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, “Halting Iran's Nuclear Programme: The Military Option,” Survival 50 (October/November 2008), pp. 13–19.

70. Some hawks are calling for the use of force in response to Iranian defiance, but they are few and far between. See John R. Bolton, “Time for an Israeli Strike?” Washington Post, July 2, 2009, p. A19.

71. For a discussion of societal engagement and cultural diffusion as a driver of regime change, see Andrei Lankov, “Toppling Kim Jong Il,” Newsweek, April 27, 2009, <www.newsweek.com/id/194602>.

72. Some of these hurdles are discussed by Chung Min Lee, “Nuclear Sisyphus: The Myth of Denuclearising North Korea,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 61 (March 2007), pp. 15–22.

73. Alternative arrangements have been proposed. Jean-Louis Gergorin, for example, has suggested that negotiations could resume on the basis that Iran continue indigenous uranium enrichment on condition of full transparency and tighter international oversight. This would limit Iran's military options, which may therefore ultimately become a sticking point. Jean-Louis Gergorin, “Iran: Breaking the Deadlock,” Survival 51 (June/July 2009), pp. 19–25.

74. According to Hui Zhang, Beijing lured Pyongyang to each round of the six-party talks with tens of millions of dollars in incentives. Hui Zhang, “Ending North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions: The Need for Stronger Chinese Action,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2009, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/zhang>; Chung Min Lee, “Nuclear Sisyphus,” pp. 19–20.

75. Scott Snyder, “North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Tests and the Six-Party Talks: Where Do We Go From Here?” testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 17, 2009; Nicholas D. Kristof, “Rethinking North Korea, With Sticks,” New York Times, August 5, 2009, p. A29.

76. Dealing with North Korea's nuclear defiance is especially urgent, as proliferation experts argue that there is a serious risk that Pyongyang will transfer nuclear material or components to non-state actors, either directly via state-controlled activities, or indirectly through criminal networks over which it has little or no control. Furthermore, evidence suggests that North Korea has engaged in collaborative nuclear activities with Syria, Iran, and possibly Myanmar. Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Koran Smuggling Networks,” International Security 32 (Summer 2007), pp. 80–111; Zhang, “Assessing North Korea's Uranium Enrichment Capabilities”; Niksch, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy,” p. 14; and Kristof, “Rethinking North Korea.”

77. Ralph Cossa, “Lee-Obama Summit: Solidifying a Joint Approach toward Pyongyang,” PacNet Newsletter Number 44 (June 12, 2009); John Hughes, “North Korea's Defiance Puts Obama in a Corner,” Christian Science Monitor, June 5, 2009, p. 9.

78. This is recognized by the Obama administration, which has been trying to build support for UN and plurilateral nonproliferation initiatives, for consistent implementation of existing UN sanctions on North Korea, and for expanded sanctions against Iran in the event that Ahmadinejad rejects renewed nuclear negotiations. However, there has been significant resistance from Russia, in particular. Howard LaFranchi, “G-8 Issues September Deadline for Iran,” Christian Science Monitor, July 10, 2009, p. 2; David E. Sanger, “U.S. Weighs Iran Sanctions if Talks are Rejected,” New York Times, August 2, 2009, p. A4; “U.S. Senate Urges Review of NKorea Terrorism Blacklist Status,” Agence-France Presse, July 22, 2009.

79. See Philip S. Goldberg, “Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1874 on North Korea,” State Department, August 13, 2009; “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Ehab Fawzy, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt and Chair of the Vienna Chapter of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) before the IAEA Board of Governors,” September 15, 2009, <www.namegypt.org/en/NAMActivities/Pages/IranBOGfinalstatement.aspx>; Guy Faulconbridge, “Kremlin Says Sanctions Against Iran Unlikely,” Reuters, October 28, 2009; Chris Buckley, “Chinese Premier Hails Cooperation with Iran,” Reuters, October 15, 2009.

80. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Youthful Ideals Shaped Obama Goal of Nuclear Disarmament,” New York Times, July 5, 2009, p. A1.

81. Some commentators have argued that Pyongyang's recent defiance signals the failure of the Obama administration's “engagement doctrine.” See, for example, Michael Gerson, “Death of a Doctrine: Obama Discovers Engagement's Limits,” Washington Post, July 29, 2009, p. A17.

82. Khazaee's speech at the UN Disarmament Commission in April 2008 illustrates Iran's claim to the moral high ground: “Some nuclear-weapon States have no genuine will and intention of accomplishing the disarmament part of the NPT bargain. To depict the scale of this crisis, I draw your attention to some worrying trends and related developments taking place in the context of Article VI of the NPT. … A dangerous trend has been initiated by certain nuclear-weapon States to reinterpret their unequivocal undertakings to nuclear disarmament. They cunningly assert that the fulfillment of their disarmament obligations is subject to the emergence of an international security environment—the definition of which is only known to them. … [As a result] they not only flout what they have solemnly agreed to, but also set a counterproductive model for others, a model that is not in the interest of the integrity of the NPT.” See remarks of Khazaee before the UN Disarmament Commission, April 7, 2008.

83. The latter would involve efforts by the United States to deal with the issue of universality, to address the issue of consistency in exposing noncompliance, and to recommit to many of the disarmament steps set out in 2000 (including the commitment to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrine). These steps would reassure other states that the United States is a committed member of international society, rather than (as sometimes appeared to be the case during previous U.S. administrations) a hyper-power that exploits international society when it suits its narrow self-interest and abandons it when it does not. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Intervention on Non-Proliferation Issues at IAEA Board of Governors,” IAEA, June 17, 2009, <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2009/ebsp2009n007.html>; Pierre Goldschmidt, “Exposing Nuclear Non-Compliance,” Survival 51 (February/March 2009), pp. 143–64; Ogilvie-White, “International Responses to Iranian Nuclear Defiance,” p. 475; and Tanya Ogilvie-White, “The Limits of International Society: China's Response to Nuclear Breakout and Third-Party Non-Compliance,” Asian Security 1 (April 2005), pp. 129–56.

84. For sensible suggestions on dealing with Article X at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, see Lewis A. Dunn, “The NPT: Assessing the Past, Building the Future,” Nonproliferation Review 16 (July 2009), p. 166.

85. The arguments set out in this article have some wider implications for the nonproliferation regime that are worth exploring. By providing some insight into why states flout their nonproliferation commitments, the concept of interaction capacity could help identify states that present an increased proliferation risk. Here, states that have openly defied the nonproliferation regime have been the focus of the analysis, but quiet, clandestine nuclear activities may also be more common in states with very low interaction capacity. Directing resources to ensure that the nuclear activities of such states are monitored as closely as possible—including states that claim to possess minimal nuclear technology and have yet to introduce safeguards or revise their small quantities protocol—should be a priority for intelligence organizations. Reports on the nuclear activities of Myanmar's military junta are a case in point: there may or may not be any substance to the defector allegations of a clandestine nuclear weapons program, but Myanmar's profile as a state operating on the margins of international society may serve as a warning to investigate the reports as fully as possible and to share any strong evidence of illicit nuclear activities with the IAEA Board of Governors.