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Abstract
Since 2008, tighter budget constraints have forced the Russian federal government to adjust the system governing its relations with the regions. This paper argues that more advanced Russian regions have the potential to develop a constructive response to the recent deterioration in their operational environment. This argument is based on an analysis of the experiences of coping with the external shocks that have occurred over the last 25 years in the Republic of Tatarstan. The paper identifies key factors that have helped the republic successfully tackle previous shocks, such as elite cohesion and internal consensus regarding republican developmental priorities.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The article was prepared within the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2016–2017. The authors express their appreciation to experts from the Leontief Center, representatives of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Tatarstan, participants in the IIMS seminar (April 2017), ICSID conference (June 2017) and the 2nd World Congress of Comparative Economics (June 2017), as well as anonymous referees for their comments on the previous drafts of this paper.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. As the former deputy prime minister Igor Shuvalov said at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2017, “everyone is used to Tatarstan being the leader” (https://realnoevremya.ru/articles/67146-prezentacii-nacreytinga-sostoyaniya-investklimata-v-regionah) .
4. Andrey Starodubtsev (Citation2018) also argues that the lack of elite cohesion represents a major developmental obstacle for Russia’s regions because intra-elite conflicts undermine the key element of good governance—state capacity. At the same time, in his view, a combination of elite cohesion with strong motivated leadership could overcome many of Russia’s traditional developmental constraints. Starodubtsev further points to Voronezh oblast as an example of a region that recently has benefited from such a combination of favorable political conditions.
5. Intra-elite cooperation in Bashkortostan, which has a much more diverse population structure, has been further strained by difficult relations between the Tatar and Bashkir populations. Bashkirs constitute an ethnic minority in the region, being less populous than Russians and Tatars.
6. Stanislav Shkel (Citation2019) explains why regional political machines that emerged in Russia’s regions in the 1990s proved to be most successful in the country’s ethnic republics. Kimitaka Matsuzato (Citation2001) and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova (Citation2013) provide a detailed analysis of the formation of the successful political machine in Tatarstan.
7. Specifically, de-criminalizing the control over JSC Kazanorgsintez and Nizhnekamskneftekhim created conditions for their successful modernization as part of the TAIF holding established in 1995.
8. This treaty was signed in 2007 after extensive negotiations for a term of ten years; although in many respects it was merely symbolic, it reconfirmed the special status still enjoyed by Tatarstan.
9. Although the holdings in the oil and petrochemical sectors had already emerged in the second half of the 1990s, the key event for other economic sectors was the establishment of the Svyazinvestneftekhim Joint-Stock Company in 2003, followed by the transfer of many enterprises to the Ak-Bars Holding Company in 2004–2005.
10. Compared to other Russian regions, Tatarstan shows the highest degree of cultural assimilation of its Muslim and non-Muslim population and an elevated level of religious tolerance (Braginskaia Citation2012).
11. Rushan Gallyamov (Citation2001) points to the importance of common professional experience for the formation of consolidated elite groups in the environment of Russia’s ethnic republics.
12. For instance, Farit Gazizullin, first deputy chairman of the Tatarstan government since 1991 in charge of matters of privatization and industrial management, in 1996 became first deputy chairman of the RF State Property Committee; and in 1997, vice-premier and minister of property relations. Kamil Iskhakov, Kazan mayor since 1991, in 2005 was appointed RF presidential envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District.
13. This event was later described by the regional media as an attempted “palace reshuffle” initiated by the chief of staff at the Tatarstan presidential administration (Khalyaf Nizamov), Naberezhnye Chelny administration head (Rafgat Altynbaev), and the interior minister (Iskander Galimov), with the support of several district administration heads (http://kazan.bezformata.ru/listnews/vsesilnij-avtor-putcha-glav/12834907/). Mintimer Shaymiev succeeded in retaining control over the State Council owing to the active support of Kazan administration head Kamil Iskhakov and chief of the presidential security service Asgat Safarov. As a result of this conflict, the interior minister was replaced by Asgat Safarov, and one of the coup’s main initiators was promoted to the Russian Federation Council. For more details see Matsuzato (Citation2001).
14. However, the strategic discussions over Tatarstan’s developmental agenda have been ongoing since the 1990s (Shaymiev Citation2001).
16. In all autocratic regimes, too much depends on decisions of the chief executive. Tatarstan is no exception in this respect, but the question remains as to what extent a charismatic leader can institutionalize his/her modernization policy. Will he/she succeed in creating a system of institutions capable of continuing to operate after leadership change? If this is not done, the country, which is functioning well in “a manual mode,” will most probably start degrading after the leader is replaced and may even fall into self-destruction (something we have witnessed in many countries in North Africa and the Middle East during the “Arab Spring”).
17. https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/341722, April 3, 2017.
18. https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/43593, July 19, 2011.
19. http://tatcenter.ru/news/tatfondbank-priznali-bankrotom-na-raschet-s-kreditorami-ne-hvataet-120-mlrd-rublej/, April 11, 2017.
20. https://www.rbc.ru/finances/03/03/2017/58b9d31b9a79476312dbade1, March 3, 2017.
21. It is worth noting that, in the 1990s and early 2000s, Tatarstan used to tax the elites at a higher rate; it utilized the mechanism of regional extra-budgetary funds to accumulate significant additional resources to finance its social policy and sectoral priorities.