Contested “Logic of Anarchy” in the Post-Soviet Space: The “Near Abroad” Faces Russia’s Power

ABSTRACT

The paper examines the sources of Russia’s proclivity to institutionalize subordination and intervention as patterns of regional order in the post-Soviet space. Methodologically, the study relies on theoretical assumptions of the English school that help explore the essence of the hegemonic projects Russia has sought to implement in its neighborhood since the middle of the twentieth century. In the end, the author concludes that distinct legitimacy concerns have decisively shaped Russia’s hegemonic strategy of arranging its “spheres of influence” as hierarchical international societies relying on their own rules of membership and conduct.

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to the editor and the anonymous reviewers of Problems of Post-Communism for their helpful comments, remarks, and suggestions on the earlier drafts of this paper.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. For a comprehensive overview of the current debates on the sources of Russia’s policy toward the post-Soviet space, see (Götz 2017).

2. Insofar as this paper focuses on the ways in which the dominant state’s power is legitimized, I refer to a narrow definition of “hierarchy” as a relationship of legitimate authority. For a detailed analysis of broader understandings and manifestations of hierarchy, see (Zarakol and Mattern 2016).

3. It should be stressed that in order to perform an “international role,” a state “should be constantly taken into account by the others as an influential actor” with specific rights, privileges, and duties (Buzan 2004, 69–70). In this sense, the roles of “great powers” or “hegemons” normally entail socially ascribed rights to manage international affairs and to promote order (Hurrel 2005, 54) through such means as creating spheres of influence or conducting military interventions. Accordingly, the dominant state seeking to legitimize its preponderant power should enact the role of hegemon by pursuing practices socially ascribed to this position.

4. It is worth noting that until 1955 the relationships between the Soviet Union and East European states “had been of a bilateral nature, and there had been no attempt to integrate East European forces with each other or with the Red Army.” Signing of the Warsaw Pact, however, established a multilateral framework for cooperation in the security area that “allowed for the setting up of a joint command of the Soviet and East European forces,” and “provided Moscow with justification for the stationing of troops throughout East and Central Europe” (Kennedy-Pipe 1998, 109).

5. Notably, as the working classes in Eastern Europe made progress in building their own “socialist states,” the Soviet Union shifted from “proletarian” (class-based) to “socialist” (state-based) internationalism as the normative foundation for the relationships within the Soviet bloc. By the 1960s, the principles of “proletarian internationalism” were serving as guidance primarily for the Soviet Union’s relations with non-ruling Communist and leftist parties in the developing counties (I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for clarifying this important point—A.B.).

6. This geopolitical competition was mainly fueled by the “color revolutions” in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and the Kyrgyz Republic (2005); the “fifth wave” of NATO expansion, which absorbed (along with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) three post-Soviet states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); the emergence of the United States’ military presence in post-Soviet Central Asia as part of its “war on terror” and Washington’s policies aimed at deployment of the elements of an anti-ballistic missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic; and the launching of the “European Neighborhood Policy” (2003–2004) and “Eastern Partnership” (2008), which assigned to the European Union the role of “region-builder,” and thus implied that the post-Soviet space represented a “shared neighborhood” rather than Russia’s exclusive “sphere of influence” (Delcour 2018, 17–18).

7. It is worth mentioning that, along with establishing a security hierarchy in the South Caucasus, Russia seeks “to utilize the security sphere to reinforce and demonstrate Russian dominance” (Deyermond 2009, 160) of Central Asia through multilateral (Collective Security Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and bilateral (defense pacts with Armenia and Tajikistan) agreements. In addition, Russia continuously enhances economic hierarchy in the post-Soviet space through the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, designed to shape a single economic area within the post-Soviet space. Effectively, these integrationist projects constitute basic pillars of the Russian economic hierarchy, relying on dependency relations and presupposing that subordinate polities have to cede some part of their authority over external economic relations and domestic economic policy to the dominant state (Lake 2009, 57).