Delegated Rebellions as an Unwanted Byproduct of Subnational Elites’ Miscalculation: A Case Study of the Donbas

ABSTRACT

The literature on delegated rebellion has treated principals (external states) and their agents (rebel groups) as the main factors in the inception of rebellion. Intriguingly, no attention has been paid to subnational elites as a separate, third actor. This article takes a novel perspective on delegated rebellion by ascribing agency to subnational elites. It introduces the theoretical concept of strategic entrapment, which shows that even subnational elites unwilling to follow the path of rebel violence may be trapped between the incipient rebel groups and a principal. As a result, subnational elites are sidelined and replaced by the principal’s rebel proxies.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Rebel is defined as a member of a rebel group that opposes the national government militarily and has political goals (Jo, Dvir, and Isidori 2016).

2. The terms war, rebellion, and insurgency are used interchangeably, and so are principal and external actor.

3. Agency is defined as the capacity to act independently and make free choices (Barker 2005).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the GA UK under Grant number 402119 Pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk: External support of the rebellion, financed by Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic.