Legitimacy and Authoritarian Decline: The Internal Dynamics of Hybrid Regimes

ABSTRACT

While the literature on the definition, features, and establishment of hybrid regimes has been extensive, a gap exists about their internal dynamics. The article develops a four-stage model of the political cycle to trace changes in input and output legitimacy. Using Hungary as a case study, it shows a downward spiral of corruption and ideological degeneration due to the inherent contradictions between the initial promises and the real objectives of governance. These developments have undermined output and input legitimacy as shown by the changing composition of government supporters toward poorer, less educated, rural, older people and the increasing manipulation of the electoral process. Such dynamics imply significant vulnerabilities for the regime.

Acknowledgments

With the usual caveats we are grateful for helpful comments to András Bozóki, Laurence Cockroft, László Csaba, Péter Gedeon, György Lengyel, and two anonymous reviewers. All remaining errors are ours.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Supplementary Material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher’s website at https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2021.2023579.

Notes

1. For a translation of the (in)famous speech at Tusnádfürdő in 2014 see Tóth (2014).

2. For an extensive review of the conceptual categories used to describe hybrid regimes see Magyar and Madlovics (2020, 5–7).

3. Can we assume an enlightened autocrat where there is a complete overlap between the preferences of the ruling party and the public good? Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew is often mentioned as an example (Rothstein 2011, 203–5). However, empirical evidence shows that it is the exception rather than the rule. The general trend is that there is a significant correlation between the lack of democracy and high levels of corruption; see the overview by Doorenspleet (2019, 165–200).

4. This answer came in response to a question after his presentation. See the report by Index (2007).

5. See the OECD’s data on general government deficit: https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-deficit.htm. Accessed: January 15, 2021.

6. For details see Győrffy (2020).

7. See Eurostat data on economic growth: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tec00115/default/table?lang=en. Accessed: 16 July, 2021.

8. See Tóth (2014) for the full speech in English.

9. On the campaign against Soros see Enyedi (2018).

10. See Bruning (2017).

11. For a detailed overview about the main steps against the LGBTQ community see Beauchamp (2021).

12. See Fábián (2021) for a detailed overview of promises.

13. See the report: https://apnews.com/article/budapest-viktor-orban-elections-hungary-voting-4b220d91f290635544d1032b0fe14eca.

14. See the report at: https://hungarianspectrum.org/2016/05/18/andras-lanczi-what-others-call-corruption-is-the-raison-detre-of-fidesz/.

15. In December 2018 the Hungarian edition of Forbes magazine reported first that Lőrinc Mészáros had become the wealthiest Hungarian: https://forbes.hu/a-magazin/magyarorszag-50-leggazdagabb-embere-mar-nem-csanyi-az-elso/.

16. See TI Hungary (2021) for individual cases.

17. Rothstein (2011, 203) describes the system in Singapore as a combination of “elitism and managerialism,” which provides high-quality governance without liberal democracy. This combination of illiberalism and high rates of growth made the country a reference point in Orbán’s discourse; see Tóth (2014).

18. See the extensive report of Oktatói Hálózat (2020).

19. See the report on the famous Őszöd speech given by Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/18/1. Accessed: July 20, 2021.

20. For a detailed overview of the various emergency regimes see Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2021).

21. For example, Princeton University scholar Kim Lane Scheppele said to the Hungarian radio station Klubrádió on April 5, 2020: “What is this if not a military dictatorship?” See: https://www.klubradio.hu/adasok/kim-lane-scheppele-mi-ez-ha-nem-katonai-diktatura-111922.

22. On these measures see TI Hungary (2021, 12–13).

23. See the report at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/12/world/hungary-sinopharm-covid.html.

24. See the report at https://telex.hu/belfold/2021/01/15/nagyon-szinvonalas-megis-kezd-kinos-lenni-hogy-oda-tartoztam-a-kormanykozeli-elitkepzo-belulrol.

25. For an extensive overview about the management of the economic crisis see Mellár (2020).

26. This includes the introduction of a flat tax system and tax-based family support for the middle class and the cutting of welfare benefits, such as the reduction of the length of unemployment insurance, and an extensive public works program for the poor. For a detailed overview see Szikra (2015).

27. The Hungarian population fell from 10.014 million to 9,.772 million between 2010 and 2019. Data: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/demo_pjan/default/table?lang=en.

28. See https://www.statista.com/statistics/1011177/hungary-net-migration/.

29. This ratio was 3% in 2010 then reached a peak in 5.6% in 2014, then decreased to 2.7% in 2017, and rebounded to 4.6% in 2020. See the data at https://ec.europa.eu/budget/graphs/revenue_expediture.html.

30. The base interest rate was set at 0.9% in May 2016, was lowered in two steps to 0.6% in 2020, and then re-increased to 0.9% in 2021. Data: https://tradingeconomics.com/hungary/interest-rate. Inflation exceeded 1% in October 2016, and since then, it increased significantly in several waves, reaching 5.3% in summer 2021. The resulting credit boom fueled asset prices and gave the impression of a booming economy. Data: https://tradingeconomics.com/hungary/inflation-cpi.

31. Data: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&pcode=tepsr_wc310&language=en.

32. See the report by GKI at https://www.gki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/GKI_konj_1911-forditásra_eng-GB-1.pdf.

33. The recession was the third largest in the EU. Data: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/10545471/2-08092020-AP-EN.pdf/43764613-3547-2e40-7a24-d20c30a20f64.

34. Data: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/.

35. See the map at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp, Accessed: July 30, 2020.

36. While in July 2016, 17% of Fidesz voters had tertiary education, by April 2017 their share declined to 10%. See the report by Index.hu: https://index.hu/belfold/2017/05/16/integrity_lab_kutatasa_a_diplomasok_sorra_fordulnak_el_a_fidesztol/. Accessed: July 30, 2020.

37. Hobolt (2016) uses similar characteristics to describe Brexit voters; Rodden (2019) provides an extensive overview about the urban–rural divide in the United States; the 2020 Polish presidential elections showed a divide not dissimilar to that in Hungary (Santora 2020).

38. See: https://444.hu/2019/10/15/az-osszefogas-100-legnepesebb-telepulesebol-50-et-megnyert-az-ellenzek.

39. For these data see https://index.hu/belfold/2019/10/14/videk_onkormanyzati_valasztas/.

40. Since 2010 Hungarian polling data from different public opinion surveys is collected at https://kozvelemenykutatok.hu.

41. See the trends at https://kozvelemenykutatok.hu/partpreferencia-listas-eredmeny/.

42. See the report at https://hungarytoday.hu/survey-poll-hungarians-accept-homosexuality-lgbtq-party/.

43. See the report at https://hvg.hu/itthon/20201209_median_rekordon_eu_tagsag_tamogatottsag.