Hume’s Rejection of Hutcheson’s Moral Theology

Abstract

Hume did not criticize Hutcheson’s moral-empirical argument in his published philosophical works, even though he forcefully denied, especially in Parts X and XI of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, that we could empirically prove the moral attributes of the Deity. Yet he seemingly rejected this particular reasoning in a famous letter to Hutcheson, dated March 16, 1740. Hutcheson’s claim that our moral sense is a likely to be expected effect of divine benevolence and Hume’s critique of this claim are analyzed in this essay. It is argued that the particular criticism presented by Hume in that letter is not sufficient to refute Hutcheson’s argument. It is also suggested that Hume may be right after all in rejecting Hutcheson’s inference about God’s benevolent design on other grounds, that is, our deep-rooted knowledge of the annoying conspicuousness of evil in the world.

Notes

1. References to works of David Hume are to these editions, abbreviated as follows: DNR: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith, 2^nd ed. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1947; Indianapolis, 1981); E: David Hume: Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller, rev. ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1987); EHU: Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding, and EPM: Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3^rd ed., rev. and ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); L: The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); NHR: The Natural History of Religion, ed. H. E. Root (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1956); T: A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2^nd ed., rev. ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). Bk. I, Of the Understanding; Bk. II, Of the Passions; Bk. III, Of Morals. Hereafter references to these works are cited in the text. References to works of Francis Hutcheson are to the following editions: An Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises, ed. and intro. Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2004), Treatise I abbreviated as TB, and Treatise II as TV; An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, ed. and intro. Aaron Garrett (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2002), the Essay abbreviated as EP, and Illustrations as IM; A System of Moral Philosophy, in Collected Works of Francis Hutcheson, Facsimile Editions Prepared by Bernhard Fabian, vols. V and VI (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlund, 1969), abbreviated as SM. Hereafter references to these works are cited in the text.

2. This is a debatable contention that I cannot justify here. Against the mainstream view, I have tried to give a tenable defense of the view that Hume’s works clearly and sufficiently show that the belief in an intelligent cause of the universe is both natural and reasonable in a non-trivial sense. See Miguel A. Badía Cabrera, Hume’s Reflection on Religion (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), esp. chaps. 13 and 14, 249–307.

3. In the Introduction to The Natural History of Religion, and pointing to the “foundation in reason” of the belief in divinity, Hume says: “The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion” (21). At the end, he reaffirms that it is a conclusion inescapable for anyone of good understanding:“It scarcely seems possible, that any one of good understanding should reject that idea, when once it is suggested to him. A purpose, an intention, a design is evident in every thing; and when our comprehension is so far enlarged as to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the strongest conviction, the idea of some intelligent cause or author” (74).

4. “This desire of moral excellence, and love to the mind where it resides, with the consequent acts of esteem, veneration, trust, and resignation, are the essence of true piety toward God” (SM, 1.4.70).

5. See, especially, TB, 5.46–60, 8.78–81; TV, 7.194–96; EP, 6.116–18; SM, 1.2.35–37, 9.168–73, 9.204–5.

6. Referring to Treatise I (about our idea of beauty) and Treatise II (about our idea of virtue), Hutcheson asserts: “It has often been taken for granted in these Papers, ‘That the Deity is morally good;’ tho the Reasoning is not at all built upon this Supposition” (TV, 7.196).

7. I have previously dealt with this aspect of Hume’s reasoning in order to show that likening our ideas of moral good and evil to secondary qualities does not preclude viewing Hume as a moral realist of sorts; see my “Sancho Panza y la objetividad del juicio moral en Hume,” Diálogos 87 (2006): 59–97, and “El peculiar realismo moral de David Hume,” Diálogos 90 (2007): 51–80.

8. “If we go through all the list we shall find that all forms of virtuous [moral] conduct seen trifling and unworthy of the gods.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library XIX, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), bk. X, chap. VIII (1178 b716–18), 623. But why must the Gods, represented by us as supremely happy and self-sufficient, lack any other form of activity? To them it belongs only the supreme intellectual contemplation along with the highest happiness that the continuous and unencumbered exercise of the most excellent virtue brings with it (1178b720–24); but matter will conflict with these, and so the happiness imperfect rational animals, such as humans, can aspire to, and for which the possession of the moral virtues is an indispensable condition, is always interrupted by the many bodily and mental needs and cravings that can only be satisfied in society. That is why Aristotle says: “If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder.” Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), bk. XII, chap. 7, 880 (1072b23–24). However, most modern moral philosophers opposed the Aristotelian axiological priority of theoretical over practical virtue, which indeed Hutcheson and Hume also explicitly rejected.

9. The ontological presuppositions from which it follows that the only activity and happiness worthy of God is the theoretical view of himself are set forth by Aristotle in Metaphysics, bk. X, chaps. 1, 2, 6–7, 9; Nicomachean Ethics, bk. I, chaps. 1–7, 13, and bk. X, chaps. 1–8.

10. Plato, Parmenides, 134e. The term thaumastòs may be translated as ‘amazing,’ as R. E. Allen translates it in Plato’s Parmenides (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 13. Other scholars have rendered it as ‘strange’ and even ‘monstrous.’

11. See TV, 3.117–18. “So that the general Principle of Love, is the Foundation of all the apparent moral Excellence, even in the most fantastick Rites which were ever approv’d. For as to Rites design’d only to appease a furious Being, no Mortal, I fancy, apprehends there is any Virtue, or Excellence in them; but they are chosen only as the dishonourable Means of avoiding a greater Evil” (118).