Militant Democracy: The Legacy of West Germany’s War on Terror in the 1970s

Abstract

In the 1970s the Federal Republic of Germany found itself locked in a battle with leftwing extremism, when groups of self-styled urban guerrillas attempted to press through a radical agenda using methods that included bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations. This essay examines the counterterrorist initiatives of West Germany’s ruling social-liberal coalition as anti-state violence forced officials to reconsider the principles of democracy and state power. With the collapse of the Weimar Republic casting an ominous shadow, political leaders gradually forged a consensus around the concept of “militant democracy.” In practice, this meant a more centralized state, prepared to forcefully defend the lives and property of its citizens against terrorist attacks. Although the country embraced a new image of German militarism in the form of counterterrorist commandos, citizens expressed a growing concern over computerized crime fighting as an intrusive surveillance of their private lives.

Notes

1. Research on this work was supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the American Council of Learned Societies. I would like to thank Robert G. Moeller for his feedback on an earlier draft.

“GSG 9” is an abbreviation of Grenzschutzgruppe 9, the “Border Protection Group 9” of the federal police. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) carried out this hijacking in support of jailed German comrades from the Red Army Faction. For a detailed account, see Butz Peters, Tödlicher Irrtum: die Geschichte der RAF (Berlin: Argon Verlag, 2004), 397–470.

2. For the concept of “militant democracy” as originally articulated by Karl Loewenstein in 1937, see “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights,” The American Political Science Review 31.3 (1937): 417–32.

3. For a comprehensive examination of the Munich Olympics, including security measures and the hostage crisis, see Kay Schiller and Christopher Young, The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), and Matthias Dahlke, Der Anschlag auf Olympia ’72: Die politischen Reaktionen auf den internationalen Terrorismus in Deutschland (Munich: Martin Meidenbauer Verlag, 2006).

4. The name “Black September” was chosen to evoke memories of the violent conflict between Palestinian militants and the Jordanian Army in September of 1970.

5. Jürgen Offenbach, “Frauen als Furien des Terrors,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 9 July 1976.

6. These CIA figures are taken from Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, “From 1968 to Radical Islam,” in The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al Qaeda, ed. Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), 244.

7. Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 173.

8. For further comparisons with the nineteenth-century anarchists, see esp. Andreas Elter, Propaganda der Tat. Die RAF und die Medien (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008), 58–70; and Olivier Hubac-Occhipinti, “Anarchist Terrorists of the Nineteenth Century,” in Chaliand and Blin, History of Terrorism, 113–31.

9. Walter Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Continuum, 2004), 24. For further comparisons with nineteenth-century anarchists, see esp. Elter, Propaganda der Tat, 58–70; and Hubac-Occhipinti, “Anarchist Terrorists of the Nineteenth Century,” 113–31.

10. Kollektiv RAF, “Das Konzept Stadtguerilla,” in Rote Armee Fraktion: Texte und Materialien der RAF (Berlin: ID Verlag, 1997), 36–37.

11. The members of Tupamaros West Berlin and Movement 2 June viewed themselves as anarchists, while the Red Army Faction guerrillas embraced the Marxist-Leninist tradition.

12. Jeremy Varon’s comments on “revolutionary internationalism” are useful here. See Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 224.

13. For a thorough examination of West German protest culture in the late 1960s, including alternate conceptions of political citizenship, see Michael L. Hughes, “Reason, Emotion, Pressure, Violence: Modes of Demonstration as Conceptions of Political Citizenship in 1960s West Germany,” German History 30.2 (2012): 222–46.

14. For a recent study of the 1968 protests in a divided Germany, see Timothy S. Brown, “‘1968’ East and West: Divided Germany as a Case Study in Transnational History,” American History Review 114.1 (2009); 69–96.

15. Particularly useful on the splintering of the APO movement is Andrei S. Markovits and Philip S. Gorski, The German Left: Red, Green, and Beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 56–64.

16. Ensslin, as quoted during her arson trial in Jillian Becker, Hitler’s Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1977), 86. For a longer discussion of the arson attack, see Charity Scribner, “Buildings on Fire: The Situationist International and the Red Army Faction,” Grey Room 26 (2007); 30–55.

17. Gerd Koenen, Das rote Jahrzehnt: unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution, 1967–1977 (Cologne: Verlag Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 2001), 360.

18. Chaliand and Blin, “From 1968 to Radical Islam,” 221. Another useful source for conceptualizing the strategy of publicity terrorism is the interview with Black September commando member Jamal al-Gashey in the documentary film One Day in September. Also see al-Gashey’s comments and a Black September communiqué on the success of the operation, as quoted in Elter, Propaganda der Tat, 134–35.

19. Five hijackings were attempted in all, beginning with four simultaneous hijackings on September 6. The passengers and crew on one of the targeted planes, El Al flight 219, managed to foil the attack and capture assailant Leila Khaled.

20. Sepp Binder, Terrorismus: Herausforderung und Antwort (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1978), 38.

21. Black September communiqué following the Munich Olympics, published in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Sayad and quoted from Elter, Propaganda der Tat, 134–35.

22. Wolfgang Kraushaar, Die Bombe im Jüdischen Gemeindehaus (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition HIS, 2005), 63; See also Schwarze Ratten TW, “Schalom und Napalm,” in Der Blues. Gesammelte Texte der Bewegung 2. Juni (Dortmund: Antiquariat “Schwarzer Stern,” 2001), 152–53.

23. Kollektiv RAF, “Anschlag auf das Hauptquartier der U.S. Army in Heidelberg von 24 May 1972,“ in Texte und Materialien der RAF, 147–48.

24. Kollektiv RAF, “Anschlag auf das Hauptquartier der U.S. Army in Frankfurt/Main, Erklärung von 11 May 1972,” in Texte und Materialien der RAF, 145.

25. See “No Right,” and “Stop Fighting,” in The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1967–1980, ed. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), 475.

26. Kollektiv RAF, “Das Konzept Stadtguerilla,” in Texte und Materialien der RAF, 44. The RAF’s vision of “armed propaganda” bears striking resemblance to the concept of “propaganda of the deed” developed by nineteenth-century anarchists.

27. Michael “Bommi” Baumann, How It All Began: The Personal Account of a West German Urban Guerrilla (London: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2000), 27. Baumann was a member of Tupamaros West Berlin and Movement 2 June.

28. Kollektiv RAF, “Über den bewaffneten Kampf in Westeuropa,” in Die alte Strassβenverkehrsordnung (Berlin: Tiamat, 1987), 83, 90. For a detailed discussion of revolutionary terrorism in a variety of national contexts in the 1970s, see H. Edward Price Jr., “The Strategy and Tactics of Revolutionary Terrorism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 19.1 (1977): 52–66.

29. Kollektiv RAF, “Dem Volk Dienen. Stadtguerilla und Klassenkampf,“ in Texte und Materialien der RAF, 136.

30. Carlos Marighella, “Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla,” as quoted in Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” in Chaliand and Blin, The History of Terrorism, 35; see also Price, “Revolutionary Terrorism,” 56–58; and Chaliand and Blin, “From 1968 to Radical Islam,” 231.

31. RAF, “Über den bewaffneten Kampf,” 78.

32. Dieter Kunzelmann, Leisten Sie keinen Widerstand! Bilder aus meinem Leben (Berlin: Transit Buchverlag, 1998), 49.

33. “Die ‘Rote Armee Fraktion’ bekennt sich zu Attentat,” Frankfurter Neue Presse, 16 May 1972.

34. This difficult undertaking has been tackled in considerable detail by scholars such as Gerd Koenen, Wolfgang Kraushaar, and Jeremy Varon, among others.

35. Franz Josef Strau (CDU/CSU), Verhandlungen des Bundestages (hereafter cited as VDB) (VII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 155. Sitzung, 13 March 1975. Also see the comments of party colleague Hans Maier (CSU), “Der neue Terrorismus,” 1977, in Hans Maier, Religion und moderne Gesellschaft: Schriften zu Kirche und Gesellschaft Band III (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 1985), 229. Maier criticized the New Left for promoting an attitude of “negation” on university campuses in the late 1960s.

36. Aldred Dregger (CDU), VDB (VIII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 53. Sitzung, 28 October 1977.

37. Willy Brandt (SPD), VDB (VII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 155. Sitzung, 13 March 1975. Also noteworthy here are Herbert Marcuse’s comments in “Mord darf keine Waffe der Politik sein,” Die Zeit, 16 September 1977; and Guntram von Schenk, “Terrorismus als deutsches Phaenomen?” Neue Rundschau 89.1 (1978): 30–41. While Marcuse saw the terror of the 1970s as constituting “much more of a break” with the APO movement, von Schenk argued that the terrorism of the 1970s “unquestionably” emerged from the student revolts.

38. The West German “SDS” was an abbreviation for the Socialist German Student League, which played a prominent role in the extra-parliamentary opposition movement of the late 1960s.

39. The other two Frankfurt arsonists, Thorwald Proll and Horst Söhnlein, served out their prison sentences and never became involved in the urban guerrilla movement.

40. See Rudi Dutschke, as quoted in “Die Saat der Gewalt,” Die Zeit, 2 June 1972, and Dutschke’s speech at the International Vietnam Congress in February, 1968 in West Berlin, as quoted in Peter Brückner, Ulrike Meinhof und die deutsche Verhältnisse (Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1995), 139.

41. “Reject Use of Violence,” in Noelle-Neumann, The Germans, 168.

42. See Stauffenberg’s comments in Werner Birkenmaier, “Ist die Frankfurter Schule an allem Schuld? Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Kritischer Theorie und Terrorismus,” Stuttgarter Zeitung, 17 December 1977, 49. Stauffenberg is the third son of Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, the architect of the 1944 assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler known as “Operation Valkyrie.”

43. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Bundesminister des Auswärtigen, VDB (VII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 155. Sitzung, 1975.

44. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1995), 141.

45. Diether Posser, “Rechsstaat = Recht + Staat: Terrorismus, Radikalismus, Toleranz: Lehren aus den Bombenanschlägen,” Die Zeit, 9 June 1972.

46. Among numerous articles on this topic, see Kuno Kruse, “Der Fall Kurras: Als der Staat zum Feind wurde,” Stern, 25 May 2009.

47. See Karrin Hanshew, “Daring More Democracy? Internal Security and the Social Democratic Fight Against West German Terrorism,” Central European History 43 (2010): 122–23.

48. See Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, “Politische Gewalt und Terrorismus: Einige historiographische Anmerkungen,” in Terrorismus, ed. Klaus Weinhauer et al., 69; and Stephan Scheiper, Innere Sicherheit: politische Anti-Terror-Konzepte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland während der 1970er Jahre (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2010), 148.

49. For more on the concept of “high modernism,” see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 4.

50. See Varon, Bringing the War Home, 276; and Hanshew, “Daring More Democracy?” 120.

51. Brandt, as quoted in Varon, Bringing the War Home, 277.

52. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) successfully campaigned for re-election in 1957 under the slogan “Keine Experimente!”

53. Helmut Kohl, VDB (VIII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 22. Sitzung, 20 April 1977. For similar assurances from other leaders, see VDB (VII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 155. Sitzung, 13 March 1975; and VDB (VIII.), 42. Sitzung, 15 September 1977.

54. Eberhard Gretz, “Paragraph 129 des Strafgesetzbuches: Strafrecht als Waffe politischer Verfolgung,” Juristen Info, 1–2, 26 February 1972.

55. Klaus Von Beyme, “West Germany: Federalism,” International Political Science Review 5.4 (1984): 382–83.

56. Wolfgang Renzsch, “German Federalism in Historical Perspective: Federalism as a Substitute for a National State,” Publius 19.4 (1989): 23.

57. Von Beyme, “West Germany: Federalism,” 384.

58. See Stephan Scheiper,“Der Wandel in staatlicher Herrschaft in den 1960er/70er Jahren,” in Weinhauer et al., Terrorismus, 196; Hanshew, “Daring More Democracy?” 117–47; and Genscher, Erinnerungen, 122, 140.

59. See Dieter Schenk, Der Chef: Horst Herold und das BKA (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe, 1998), 139; and Scheiper, “Wandel in staatlicher Herrschaft,” 196.

60. See Freie Demokratische Partei, “Freiburger Thesen zur Gesellschaftspolitik der Freien Demokratischen Partei,” 25–27 October 1971. Also see Scheiper, Innere Sicherheit, 224.

61. Scheiper, “Wandel in staatlicher Herrschaft,” 195.

62. For figures on overall police personnel and expenditure growth between 1970s and 1980, see Klaus Weinhauer, “Zwischen ‘Partisanenkampf’ und ‘Kommissar Computer’: Polizei und Linksterrorismus in der Bundesrepublik bis Anfang der 1980er Jahre,” in Weinhauer et al., Terrorismus, 246; Binder, Terrorismus, 111; Bundeskriminalamt, Festschrift für Horst Herold zum 75. Geburtstag: Das BKA am Ausgang des 20. Jahrhunderts. Beiträge von Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern des Bundeskriminalamtes (Wiesbaden: Bundeskriminalamt, 1998), 93; and Genscher, Erinnerungen, 141. Sepp Binder provides a figure of 930 BKA staffers in 1969, as taken from the SPD’s own July 1976 “Theses on Inner Security,” while the 1981 figure of 3,536 comes from Festschrift.

63. Schenk, Der Chef, 122; and Jana Kunath, RAF: Die Reaktion des Staates auf den Terrorismus der Roten Armee Fraktion (Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 2004), 39.

64. See Scheiper “Wandel in staatlicher Herrschaft,” 211.

65. Hanshew, “Daring More Democracy?” 124.

66. Franz Josef Strauß (CSU), Ministerpräsident des Freistaates Bayern, “Terrorbekämpfung – eine noch ungelöste Aufgabe,” in Freiheit und Sicherheit, 58.

67. Scheiper,“Wandel in staatlicher Herrschaft,” 199.

68. Scheiper, “Wandel in staatlicher Herrschaft,” 192–93, 196.

69. See Scheiper, “Wandel in staatlicher Herrschaft,” 196; and Hanshew, “Daring More Democracy?” 124.

70. Bundeskriminalamt, Festschrift, 86–87.

71. Schenk, Der Chef, 54.

72. Herold, as quoted in Dorothea Hauser, Baader und Herold. Beschreibung eines Kampfes (Berlin: Alexander Fest Verlag, 1997), 181.

73. Scheiper, Innere Sicherheit, 226–27.

74. Herold, as quoted in Kay Schiller, “Political Militancy and Generation Conflict in West Germany during the ‘Red Decade’,” Debatte 11.1 (2003): 32.

75. Weinhauer, “Zwischen ‘Partisanenkampf’ und ‘Kommissar Computer’,” 253.

76. Schenk, Der Chef, 150.

77. Binder, Terrorismus, 74; also see Schenk, Der Chef, 82.

78. Bundeskriminalamt, Festschrift, 87; and Hauser, Baader und Herold, 19.

79. This label is taken from Volker Speitel, as quoted in Schenk, Der Chef, 249. Schenk provides similar commentary from Andreas Baader.

80. Hauser, Baader und Herold, 93.

81. Herold as quoted in Schenk, Der Chef, 44.

82. Weinhauer and Requate, “Einlietung,” 20.

83. Scheiper, “Wandel in staatlicher Herrschaft,” 207.

84. Fifty-seven percent of the public supported the reinstitution of the death penalty following the kidnapping of CDU politician Peter Lorenz. See Der Spiegel, 10 March 1975. During the RAF’s 1977 kidnapping of Daimler executive Hanns Martin Schelyer, Quick magazine claimed that two-thirds of the public favored reinstitution of the death penalty. See “Kopf ab für Terroristen?” Quick, 22–28 October 1977.

85. “Unser Staat ist gerüstet – warum tut er nichts?” Quick, 6 March 1975.

86. “Policemen Wanted,” “Limitations of Personal Rights,” and “Security First,” in Noelle-Neumann, The Germans, 169 and 139 respectively.

87. Hanshew, “Daring More Democracy?” 133.

88. See Alfred Dregger, VDB (VII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 155. Sitzung, 13 March 1975.

89. See Hanshew, “Daring More Democracy?” 133; and the CDU’s “Theses on Inner Security” 11 September 1975, in Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart EA 1/107, Bü 338.

90. See Alfred Dregger, VDB (VIII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 53. Sitzung, 28 October 1977; the September 1977 statement from the Council of the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD), as quoted in Binder, Terrorismus, 96; and Maier, “Der neue Terrorismus,” 224. While serving as the Bavarian Minster of Culture and Education from 1970 to 1986, the Catholic Maier wrote extensively on the relationship between religion and politics.

91. See Uta Demes, Die Binnenstruktur der RAF. Divergenz zwischen postulierter und tatsächlicher Gruppendynamik (New York: Waxmann Verlag, 1994), 223. According to Demes, the Süddeutsche Zeitung reported on 10 September 1977 that Christian Socialist Union leaders discussed shooting RAF prisoners every ten minutes until Schleyer was freed.

92. Helmut Kohl, VDB (VIII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 22. Sitzung, 20 April 1977.

93. Michael Schwelien, Helmut Schmidt: Ein Leben für den Frieden (Munich: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 2006), 287.

94. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, VDB (VII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 155. Sitzung, 13 March 1975. See also Demes, Binnenstruktur der RAF, 64. For a discussion of Bundestag debates after the Lorenz case, see also Weinhauer, “Zwischen ‘Partisanenkampf’ und ‘Kommissar Computer’,” 256.

95. Paragraph 129a defined terrorist organizations as any groups carrying out murder, genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.

96. See Bundeskriminalamt, Festschrift, 94–95; and Varon, Bringing the War Home, 261.

97. Helpful in this regard are attorney Jens A. Brückner’s comments, as quoted in Scheiper, “Wandel in staatlicher Herrschaft,” 189. See also Belinda Davis, “Jenseits von Terror und Rückzug: Die Suche nach politischem Raum und Verhandlungsstrategien in der BRD der 70er Jahre,” in Weinhauer et al., Terrorismus, 165.

98. Schwelien, Helmut Schmidt, 262.

99. Munich Police President Manfred Schreiber led a team of untrained officers. See Weinhauer, “Zwischen ‘Partisanenkampf’ und ‘Kommissar Computer’,” 283–84; and Genscher, Erinnerungen, 148.

100. Willi Winkler, Die Geschichte der RAF (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 2010), 336.

101. West German participants in the hostage-taking raid on the OPEC headquarters included Hans-Joachim Klein and Gabriele Kröcher-Tiedemann, and those involved in the hijacking of an Air France jet to Entebbe, Uganda included Wilfried Böse and Brigitte Kuhlmann from the group “Revolutionäre Zellen.”

102. See Scheiper, “Wandel in staatlicher Herrschaft,” in Weinahuer et al., Terrorismus, 199–201.

103. Weinhauer, “Zwischen ‘Partisanenkampf’ und ‘Kommissar Computer’,” in Weinhauer et al., Terrorismus, 258.

104. For more on the use of this term, see Varon, Bringing the War Home, 234. For a discussion of the RAF’s change in tactics, see Elter, Propaganda der Tat, 161; Patricia Melzer, “‘Death in the Shape of a Young Girl’: Feminist Responses to Media Representations of Women Terrorists during the ‘German Autumn’ of 1977,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 11.1 (2009): 46; and Stefan Wisniewski, Wir waren so unheimlich consequent. Ein Gespräch zur Geschichte der RAF mit Stefan Wisniewski, 3d ed. (Berlin: ID Verlag, 2003), 26–35.

105. Noteworthy in this regard are Helmut Kohl’s remarks in the Bundestag in VDB (VIII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 22. Sitzung, 20 April 1977.

106. For the RAF’s official statement on this incident, see Susanne Albrecht aus einem Kommando der RAF, “Erschieβung von Jürgen Ponto und Anschlag auf das Bundesanwaltschaft in Karlsruhe: Erklärung vom 14. 8. 1977,” in Die Erklärungen der RAF, ed. Manfred Burdich (Münster: MV-Verlag, 2005), 134–35.

107. Helmut Kohl VDB (VIII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 42. Sitzung. 15 September 1977.

108. Lutz Hachmeister, Schleyer: Eine deutsche Geschichte (Munich: Verlag CH Beck, 2004), 12. For more on Schleyer’s Nazi activity, see Peters, Tödlicher Irrtum, 399–400.

109. Hachmeister, Schleyer, 259.

110. Varon, Bringing the War Home, 250.

111. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, as quoted in Scheiper, “Wandel in staatlicher Herrschaft,” 188.

112. “Der Brief der Entführer,“ Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 September 1977. See also Peters, Tödlicher Irrtum, 408–11; and Kommando Siegfried Hausner, “Entführung von Hanns-Martin Schleyer,“ 6 September 1977, in Burdich, Die Erklärungen der RAF, 129–30.

113. Wisniewski, Wir waren so unheimlich consequent, 51.

114. Kommando Siegfried Hausner, “Erklärung,” 134–35.

115. Peters, Tödlicher Irrtum, 430; and Wunschik, Baader-Meinhofs Kinder, 268. The commando named itself after West German Brigitte Kuhlman—known to them as “Halimeh”—who was fatally shot during the Israelis’ hostage liberation at Entebbe. See Winkler, Die Geschichte der RAF, 334.

116. Peters, Tödlicher Irrtum, 434; Winkler, Die Geschichte der RAF, 336; Andreas Mussolf, “Terrorismus im öffentlichen Diskursder BRD: Seine Deutung als Kriegsgeschehen und die Folgen,” in Weinhauer et al., Terrorismus, 312; and Wunschik, Baader-Meinhofs Kinder, 33.

117. Schiller and Young, The 1972 Munich Olympics, 207.

118. “Das Drama der 45 Tage: (Dokumentation der Bundesregierung), Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung: Auslandsecho auf die Entführung von Hanns-Martin Schleyer und die Folgen,” Die Zeit, 4 November 1977. Note that the assailants had already executed flight captain Jürgen Schumann.

119. Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt, “Abgabe der Erklärung der Bundesregierung,” VDB (VIII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 50. Sitzung, 20 October 1977.

120. Theo Sommer, “Frisch gewagt – erst halb gewonnen,” Die Zeit, 21 October 1977.

121. Doktor Hans-Jochen Vogel, Bundesminister der Justiz, VDB (VIII.) Deutscher Bundestag, 53. Sitzung, 28 October 1977.

122. Hauser, Baader und Herold, 230.

123. See Bundeskriminalamt, Festschrift, 91–93.

124. See Weinhauer, “Zwischen ‘Partisanenkampf’ und ‘Kommissar Computer’,” 262–65.

125. Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 97.

126. One notable exception involves the GSG 9 attempt to apprehend RAF fugitives in 1993, which led to the controversial death of RAF member Wolfgang Grams.

127. Chalk, West European Terrorism, 104.

128. Matthias Dahlke, “Das Wischnewski-Protokoll Zur Zusammenarbeit zwischen westeuropäischen Regierungen und transnationalen Terroristen 1977,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 57.2 (2009): 204.

129. Wegener’s training with British and Israeli Special Forces is mentioned in Winkler, Die Geschichte der RAF, 335.

130. Winkler, Die Geschichte der RAF, 341.

131. See esp. Peter Chalk, “The Development of EC/EU Anti-Terrorist Cooperation, 1970–94,” in West European Terrorism, 117–41.

132. See Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy,” 432.

133. For more on the “Celle Hole” affair, see Winkler, Die Geschichte der RAF, 424–27; and Thomas Moser,“RAF un kein Ende,” Deutschland Archiv: Zeitschrift für das vereinigte Deutschland 42.2 (2009): 319. Moser discusses several other controversial uses of agents and informants.