Utopia and Pluralism: Demanding Too Much in the Name of Justice

ABSTRACT

In recent literature on utopianism, in particular non-ideal and realist work, the distinction between scepticism and non-scepticism has been to the fore. The main concern of this article, in contrast, is to show the importance of the distinction between pluralist and monist approaches. Firstly, pluralists can identify when utopian projects are guilty of demanding too much even when those projects are, all things considered, legitimate. Secondly, monists are unable to discern such prima facie wrongs, even when monism is combined with a sceptical critique of ideal theory. I advance this argument through a novel reading of Judith Shklar’s work, specifically her arguments concerning Rousseauian utopianism. In sharp contrast to the prevailing view in the literature, I maintain that the pluralism and scepticism of her early work is replaced by a monist scepticism in her mature work, a transformation that itself demonstrates the benefits of pluralism over (sceptical) monism.

KEYWORDS:

• monism
• pluralism
• scepticism
• Judith Shklar
• utopia

Notes

1. Williams, In the Beginning; Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal Theory”; Sagar, “From Scepticism to Liberalism”; Gaus, Tyranny of the Ideal; Hall and Sleat, “Realist Political Theory.”

2. Berlin, “Two Concepts”; Nagel, Equality and Partiality; Berlin and Williams, “Pluralism.”

3. See also my earlier work on this topic: Parental Power, “Freedom of Extremists,” “Paternalism and Moral Conflict,” “Who Gets to Decide?”, and “Working from Both Ends.”

4. Shklar, After Utopia, 219.

5. Shklar, “Liberalism of Fear,” 26, 30, 32–33.

6. Shklar, Legalism, 115.

7. Shklar, “Cruelty First,” 81–82.

8. Shklar, “What is the Use of Utopia,” 187–90.

9. Shklar, “Images of Authority,” 922.

10. Shklar, Montesquieu, 86, 90.

11. Whiteside, “Justice Uncertain,” 503, 513; Forrester, “Hope and Memory,” 602.

12. Ashenden and Hess, “Totalitarianism,” 525.

13. Misra, “Doubt and Commitment,” 87–88.

14. Williams, In the Beginning, 52–61; Sagar, “From Scepticism to Liberalism,” 381.

15. Rosenblum, “Everyday Life,” 43; Forrester, “Political Realism,” 260; Misra, “Doubt and Commitment,” 86; Thaler, “Hope Abjuring Hope,” 12.

16. Rousseau, Social Contract, 1:6, 1:8.

17. Shklar, Men and Citizens, 6, 14, 16.

18. Rawls, Lectures, 241.

19. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 42–43.

20. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 6–7.

21. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 169, 172–73.

22. Williams, “Ethical Consistency,” 117; see also Nagel, “Fragmentation of Value,” 129–30, and Equality and Partiality, 26–27.

23. Berlin, “Two Concepts,” 169, 172–73. See also Crowder, Isaiah Berlin, 75; Gray, Isaiah Berlin, 61.

24. Berlin, “Freedom and its Betrayal,” 43, 47.

25. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 12–13.

26. Berlin, “Two Concepts,” 177 note 1.

27. See Dworkin’s critique of value pluralism in Justice in Robes, 105–16.

28. Ibid., 245.

29. Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal Theory,” 845.

30. Gaus, Tyranny of the Ideal, 141.

31. Williams, In the Beginning, 8, 10, 25, 27.

32. Berlin and Williams, “Pluralism.”

33. Gray, Isaiah Berlin, 77. And some critics of ideal theory do not accept pluralism. Farrelly, for example, takes a monist approach, giving priority to the principle of utility in order to better account for the costs associated with pursuing political projects in non-ideal situations. Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal Theory,” 851.

34. Sagar, “From Scepticism to Liberalism,” 368. See also Hall, “Contingency”; Hall and Sleat, “Realist Political Theory.”

35. Jubb, “Kant in King Arthur’s Court.”

36. Philp, “Realism,” 634.

37. Shklar, After Utopia, 218–19, 272.

38. Shklar, “Liberalism of Fear,” 26.

39. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 264.

40. Benhabib, “Dystopic Liberalism,” 57.

41. Rosenblum, “Everyday Life,” 43.

42. Forrester, “Political Realism,” 260.

43. Thaler, “Hope Abjuring Hope,” 6.

44. Misra, “Doubt and Commitment,” 86.

45. Sagar, “From Scepticism to Liberalism,” 381.

46. Shklar, Legalism, 57, 63, 114.

47. Ibid., 113.

48. Ibid., 114–16.

49. Shklar, Men and Citizens, 3.

50. Shklar, “Rousseau’s Images of Authority,” 929, 922.

51. Shklar, “Political Theory of Utopia,” 165.

52. Shklar, “Rousseau’s Images of Authority,” 922, 932.

53. Whiteside, “Justice Uncertain,” 503, 513.

54. Ashenden and Hess, “Totalitarianism,” 525. The pluralist argument of Legalism also goes unnoticed by Samuel Moyne in “Criminal Law.”

55. Shklar, Legalism, 100.

56. Shklar, “Rousseau’s Images of Authority,” 920, 931.

57. Berlin, “Two Concepts,” 169–70, 172–73, 195.

58. Berlin, “Soviet Russian Culture.”

59. Or, as Williams puts it, the problem is that “Rousseau believed there were no socially presentable claims against the state in a just society:” Williams, In the Beginning, 120–21.

60. Shklar, “Cruelty First,” 81.

61. Shklar, “Liberalism of Fear,” 30.

62. Shklar, Montesquieu, 86, 90.

63. Misra, “Doubt and Commitment,” 87–88.

64. Shklar, “Liberalism of Fear,” 28.

65. See Kekes’s argument that putting cruelty first in this way is more compatible with political conservatism than it is with liberalism, as it will require restricting freedom (the freedom of cruel people) in ways that liberals would object to: Kekes, “Cruelty and Liberalism,” 843–84.

66. Galston, “Realism in Political Theory,” 394–99.

67. Shklar, Ordinary Vices, 87–137.

68. Thaler, “Hope Abjuring Hope,” 12.

69. Shklar, “What is the Use of Utopia,” 189.

70. Forrester, “Political Realism,” 260.

71. Shklar, “What is the Use of Utopia,”187.

72. Shklar, “Nineteen Eighty-Four,” 348.

73. Shklar, “What is the Use of Utopia,” 187, 189.

74. Ibid., 190, 186, 190, 187, 190.

75. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 6–7.

76. Ibid., 176.

77. Shklar, Faces of Injustice, 122.

78. Benhabib, “Dystopic Liberalism,” 60.

79. Shklar, Faces of Injustice, 122.

80. Shklar, Men and Citizens, 174.

81. Shklar, Faces of Injustice, 26, 110.

82. Whiteside, “Justice Uncertain,” 522 (emphasis in original).

83. Shklar, Faces of Injustice, 45–46; see also Shklar, Ordinary Vices, 235.

84. Nagel, Equality and Partiality, 26–27.

85. Shklar, “Liberalism of Fear,” 21.

86. Shklar, American Citizenship, 92.

87. Ibid., 99.

88. Shklar, “Liberalism of Fear,” 32.

89. Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds.

90. Shklar, “Liberalism of Fear,” 33.

91. Shklar, American Citizenship, 99, 114 note 50.

92. See Crowder’s similar approach to Williams’s, using the latter’s own value pluralism to question his turn towards political realism and hence his defence of the relativism of distance: Crowder, “Value Pluralism vs. Relativism,” 134.

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Notes on contributors

Allyn Fives

Allyn Fives, Ph.D., is lecturer in political theory at National University of Ireland, Galway. His most recent publications address two questions in particular: how we are to respond to moral conflict and how we are to conceptualize freedom and engage critically with the work of such philosophers as Judith Shklar, Isaiah Berlin, and Bernard Williams.