“Cogito, Ergo Sum”: Proof or Petitio?

ABSTRACT

E. M. Curley has said that Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum “is as obscure on examination as it is compelling at first glance.” Why should that be? Maybe because the cogito raises so many textual and interpretive questions. Is it an argument or an intuition? If it is an argument, does it require an additional premise? Is it best interpreted as a “performance?” Is it best seen as the discovery that any reason proposed for doubting its success entails the meditator’s existence? And so on. But all these questions typically arise in the wake of worries about the cogency of the cogito when it is treated as an argument and worded in its canonical form, “I think, therefore I exist.” In this essay, I focus on what I take to be the most fundamental reason for questioning the cogito’s cogency when it is so treated—namely that the “I” in its premise is question-begging. I distinguish that reason from other reasons that are sometimes conflated with it, and I argue that it is not a good reason. I then comment on some of the questions mentioned above in light of my defense of the cogito seen in that traditional way.

KEYWORDS:

• Descartes
• ”I”
• ” question-begging
• substance
• intuition
• deduction

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics, 72.

2. Ibid., 80.

3. See Wilson, Descartes, 55, 62, 63; Baker and Morris, Descartes’ Dualism, 65–66; Sarkar, Descartes’ Cogito, 155; Dicker, Descartes, 48–49, 63; Dicker, Descartes, 2d ed., 47–48, 71–74; Larmore, “The First Meditation,” 59–60; Newman, “Descartes’ Epistemology.”

4. Williams, “The Certainty of the Cogito,” 97, 100, 105 (italics in original).

5. Hatfield, Descartes and the Meditations, 104.

6. Russell, The Problem of Philosophy, 19.

7. Descartes, Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II, 18. Hereafter cited in the text as CSM, followed by volume and page number; Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, VII, 27. Hereafter all references to the Oeuvres are to the second edition, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, abbreviated as AT, followed by volume and page number.

8. Cottingham, Descartes, 36.

9. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, 49.

10. Dicker, Descartes, 53–56; Dicker, Descartes, 2d ed., 54–58.

11. Kenny, Descartes, 62.

12. Dicker, Descartes, 63.

13. Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen, 32, 61–67, 73.

14. Dicker, Descartes, 137–41; Dicker, Descartes, 2d. ed., 170–76.

15. Gewirth, “The Cartesian Circle,” 388.

16. See Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 199, and Prichard, “Descartes’ Meditations,” 147.

17. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 20.

18. Sarkar, Descartes’ Cogito, 170–71.

19. Hintikka, “Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference of Performance,” 7–8.

20. Descartes, Philosophical Writings, ed. Anscombe and Geach, 301.

21. Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, 90; See Hatfield, Descartes and the Meditations, 114.

22. See Hatfield, Descartes and the Meditations, 113–15.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Georges Dicker

Georges Dicker is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the College at Brockport, State University of New York. He is the author of Dewey’s Theory of Knowing, Perceptual Knowledge: An Analytical and Historical Study; Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction (two editions); Locke on Knowledge and Reality: A Commentary on An Essay Concerning Human Understanding; Berkeley’s Idealism: A Critical Examination; Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Introduction; Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Analytical Introduction, and numerous articles, book chapters, and reviews.