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ABSTRACT
Both Rousseau and Charles Taylor are well-known for their support of positive freedom. However, Taylor criticizes Rousseau’s positive freedom and the general will for inducing the worst form of homogenizing tyranny in the French Revolution. Taylor prefers Tocquevillian republicanism because he claims that Rousseau’s general will fails to acknowledge the fact of pluralism. In this article, I compare Rousseau’s and Taylor’s positions on republicanism and argue that Taylor’s positive freedom is very similar to Rousseau’s. Both argue for an exercise-concept of freedom with moral judgment; both reject atomism and argue for some kind of communitarian self. Although Rousseau’s philosophy has several shortcomings, I claim that Taylor’s criticism of Rousseau’s general will is unwarranted, in view of the fact that the problem of political polarization in contemporary democracies seems to show that Tocquevillian republicanism, which Taylor supports, cannot sustain itself in the long run. I conclude that a slightly revised version of Rousseau’s concept of the general will in terms of collective intentionality can deepen our understanding of the political problems besetting Western democracies and the need to fight against political fragmentation.
Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Taylor, “Some Conditions of a Viable Democracy,” 71, 74.
2 For instance, Robert Wokler has edited an important collection of essays, Rousseau and Liberty, on Rousseau’s theory of liberty. Matthew Simpson’s Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom is also an important contribution. Regarding Taylor’s theory of freedom, there are many introductory chapters in books on his political philosophy, among which see Keith Dixon’s Freedom and Equality and J. P. Day’s Liberty and Justice.
3 There are only a few articles comparing Taylor’s and Rousseau’s philosophy, and these mainly focus on comparing their notion of authenticity, while comparing their notion of freedom and democracy has just been neglected. See Marks, “Misreading One’s Sources,” 119–34; Reisert, “Authenticity, Justice, and Virtue,” 305–30.
4 Cohen, Rousseau, 12.
5 Rousseau, Social Contract, 1.6. Hereafter references to the Social Contract, citing book and
chapter numbers, are given in the text.
6 Cohen, Rousseau, 11.
7 Dent, Rousseau, 145.
8 Simpson, Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, 48.
9 Wokler, Rousseau: A Very Short Introduction, 78.
10 Rousseau, Second Discourse, 140, 141. Hereafter abbreviated as SD with page numbers
cited in the text.
11 Simpson, Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, 52.
12 Cohen, Rousseau, 15.
13 James Miller seems to have misunderstood Rousseau’s theory and treats his moral freedom as a kind of negative freedom limited by the laws which the individual prescribes for herself. First, according to The Social Contract one’s moral freedom for Rousseau is acquired in civil society rather than in the state of nature. So the prescribed laws are obviously not simply personal moral goods but the common goods, expressing the general will, for the whole community. And obeying the general will is the way of becoming free. Second, Miller ignores the distinction between “obedience” and “being limited”: the latter in a sense is passive and means that there are some kind of restrictions external to oneself, while “obedience” means that one is actively exercising something, or actively limiting oneself. So Rousseau’s moral freedom should be considered as positive freedom rather than negative. See Miller, Rousseau, 182. See also Matravers, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau,” 197.
14 Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 213.
15 Berlin, Liberty, 169–70.
16 Ibid., 32.
17 Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 214
18 Ibid., 212
19 Ibid., 215.
20 Ibid., 219.
21 Ibid., 217–18.
22 Barry, “The Public Interest,” 224–27.
23 Miller, “Introduction,” 5; Simpson also identifies this as a category of freedom in Rousseau’s theory but calls it “democratic freedom.” See Simpson, Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, 71–90.
24 Taylor, “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate,” in Philosophical Arguments, 195.
25 Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 217.
26 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 241–42.
27 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginary, 124–25.
28 Marks, “Misreading One’s Sources,” 127.
29 Simpson, Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, 53.
30 Ibid., 89.
31 Cohen, Rousseau, 135–36.
32 Indeed, in his discussion of constitutional reform in Poland, Rousseau accepts that in such a large state the law is made by elected representatives of a legislative assembly. However, in order to avoid corruption and the temptation of self-interest, the law must be subject to frequent review, and representatives must adhere to specific binding instructions by citizen assemblies. See Rousseau, Considerations on the Government of Poland, 200–201; Cohen, Rousseau, 136.
33 Cohen, Rousseau, 155.
34 Ibid.
35 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 247.
36 Cristi and Tranjan, “Charles Taylor and Republican Democracy,” 94.
37 Taylor, “Some Conditions of a Viable Democracy,” 74.
38 Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 38.
39 Taylor, “Some Conditions of a Viable Democracy,” 77–78.
40 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 191–92.
41 Taylor, “Democracy, Inclusive and Exclusive,” 182.
42 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 236–52; Taylor, “Some Conditions of a Viable Democracy,” 83.
43 Taylor, “Some Conditions of a Viable Democracy,” 82.
44 Pew Research Center, “Amid Campaign Turmoil, Biden Holds Wide Leads on Coronavirus, Unifying the Country” (9 October 2020).
45 Wokler, Rousseau, 84–85.
46 Simpson, Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, 102–3.
47 Affeldt, “The Force of Freedom,” 318.
48 Williams, Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment, 95, 113.
49 Dagger, “Understanding the General Will,” 359–71.
50 Like Michael J. Thompson’s interpretation, I also consider the general will as a kind of moral cognition. However, while Thompson considers the general will as a set of constitutive rules by which the political community is formed and common good is found, I consider it as a kind of collective consciousness which has to be cultivated through cooperation and cultivation. See Thompson, “Autonomy and Common Good,” 271–72.
51 This formula is inspired by Michael Bratman’s idea of “shared cooperative activity,” although I disagree with Bratman that such shared intention can be reduced to a summation of I-intentions. See Bratman, “Shared Cooperative Activity,” 327–41.
52 Bratman, “Shared Cooperative Activity,” 328.
53 The idea of “we-intention” was originally suggested by Wilfrid Sellar, and later followed by Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller, and by John Searle. See Sellar, Essays in Philosophy, 41–42; Tuomela and Miller, “We-intentions,” 367–89; Searle, “Collective Intentions and Actions,” 401–15.
54 Searle, “Collective Intentions and Actions,” 404, 406, 415.
55 Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 189–98.
56 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginary, 117–20.
57 Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 38.
58 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 272.
59 Ibid., 295.
60 Ibid., 293.
61 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 252.
62 Thatamanil, Circling the Elephant, 133–24.
63 Taylor, “Democracy, Inclusive and Exclusive,” 183–84.
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Andrew Tsz Wan Hung
Dr Andrew Tsz Wan Hung is a lecturer in philosophy and Chinese culture in the College of Professional and Continuing Education, at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University. His research focuses on Charles Taylor, Christian ethics, and Confucianism. His recent publications include “Habermas and Taylor on Religious Reasoning in a Liberal Democracy,” The European Legacy 22, no. 5 (2017): 549–65; and “Mencius and Berlin on Freedom,” Philosophy East and West (forthcoming).
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