Technique and teleology in plato's rhetoric

Abstract

This paper is an investigation of the place of rhetoric in Plato's judgement that philosophers must rule. The possibility that rhetoric could facilitate the rule of philosophy raises the question of whether rhetoric could also be used to undermine the governance of philosophy. It is my thesis that Plato argues for understanding rhetoric as limited in its ability to function at cross-purposes to those of philosophy because of a basic and direct relationship between the effectiveness of rhetoric and its ability to promote the ends of its audience. In the Phaedrus, we are told that persuasion requires rhetors to comprehend the nature of their audience so that appropriate methods of persuasion may be employed. This dependence on the nature of its subject is extended to include that subject's ends, an understanding of which is the province of philosophy. Since philosophy as it is put forward in the dialogues is interested in determining and promoting proper human fulfilment, then ultimately constraining the effectiveness of rhetoric in terms of the nature of its object ties rhetoric to the philosophic agenda.

Notes

The opening scene of the Republic dramatizes Socrates speculating over this possibility. As Socrates and Glaucon are about to leave the Piraeus, others force the two men to remain: “Well, you must either prove stronger than we are, or you will have to stay here,” says Polemarchus (327c). Thus we are presented with a microcosm of a possible class conflict that can arise in the polis. Socrates the philosopher attempts to disengage from the ensuing pleasures that the evening's festivities will bring, and he is accompanied by Glaucon, his friend and auxiliary support in the following conflict with the other interlocutors. Polemarchus, Adeimantus, and the rest are representatives of the artisan class in society, and this opening scene provides a terse example of differing interests in the community. Faced with Polemarchus' challenge, Socrates replies, “Isn't there another alternative, namely, that we persuade you to let us go?” (327c). Polemarchus asserts that he will not be persuaded of such action, but this may only be a restriction on the bounds of effective rhetoric. While Polemarchus will not be convinced of allowing the dissolution of the group, his words leave open the possibility that Socrates might be able to convince him of other policies.

It should be noted here that Plato's attitude towards the usefulness of rhetoric to the philosophic programme is a contentious issue. Since Rollin W. Quimby, “The Growth of Plato's Perception of Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (1974): 71–9, opinion generally supports the interpretation that Plato sees rhetoric as a valuable tool for philosophy. In 1974 Quimby could pronounce that “the majority of writers have believed that Plato disdained it [rhetoric] throughout his life” (71; see accompanying footnotes for references). Since then, articles have tended to focus on how Socrates uses rhetoric to further his own philosophic goals in the dialogues. By 1988, James Murray, “Disputation, Deception, and Dialectic: Plato on the True Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 21 (1988): 279–89, could pronounce that “some students of Plato's rhetorical theory have been moving more or less steadily in another direction. There has been an increasing tendency to treat seriously the Platonic theory of a true rhetoric have status as a bona fide and philosophically significant art” (279), and gives the appropriate references. Since Murray's article, this trend has continued. For example, see Livio Rossetti, “The Rhetoric of Socrates,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 22 (1989): 225–32; Jane Curran, “The Rhetorical Technique of Plato's Phaedrus,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 19 (1986): 66–72; and Joseph Vincenzo, “Socrates and Rhetoric: The Problem of Nietzsche's Socrates,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 25 (1992): 162–82. All of these authors accept that Socrates is a philosopher who practices rhetoric.

Thomas J. Lewis, “Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias,” Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (1986): 195–210, looks at the Gorgias and confronts a similar problem to the one being canvassed here. “Socrates' task in the Gorgias is to denounce and refute the false rhetoric which serves as a competitor to philosophy” (195). It should be noted that Lewis too is in favour of understanding the dialogues as putting forward a positive version of rhetoric that aids in the dissemination of philosophy.

Bernard K. Duffy, “The Platonic Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 16 (1983): 79–92, argues a case similar to the functions of rhetoric that are pointed to here, and expands it to include the Menexenus: “The Menexenus confirms the importance of epideictic rhetoric as a tool not only of statecraft, but of popular philosophy” (79).

Other commentators have noticed that the plot of the dialogue revolves around the question of Phaedrus' conversion from being a devotee of Lysias to Socrates. See R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus: Translated, with Introduction and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 13; G. R. F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 4–9, 20, 72–3, 227–9.

In explaining the choice of Phaedrus as the sole interlocutor of the dialogue, Michael Stoeber, “Phaedrus of the Phaedrus: The Impassioned Soul,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 25 (1992): 271–80, makes reference to this dramatic arc as well. By using Phaedrus, Plato forces us to recall his role in the Symposium. Phaedrus is the one who suggests that Eros be the topic of discussion, and he presents a view of Eros whereby life is greatly enriched by the presence of the lover. However, in the Phaedrus we see Phaedrus, under the sway of Lysias, extolling the virtues of the non-lover. Thus a reference back to the Symposium helps solidify our view of Phaedrus as malleable in opinion, a perfect audience for a contest in persuasive ability between rhetoric and philosophy: “In his initial disregard for truth, Phaedrus proves to be the ideal character for illustrating the power and danger of the Sophist” (275).

Duffy is prompted to consider what the proper role of rhetoric is because of the placement of rhetorical speeches in the dialogues themselves, and even coming out of the mouth of Socrates. As Duffy states, “the mere existence of these speeches tells us little. Rather we must ask what functions they show epideictic rhetoric performing within the context of political and philosophic life” (Duffy, “The Platonic Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric,” 83).

The case is admirably stated in Charles L. Griswold Jr, Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 198: “In the Phaedrus, techne is a rule-governed, precise, comprehensive, and rigorous method of analysis that is teachable and that allows one to know whatever one wishes. It requires that one follow a series of determinate steps in a set sequence and it operates on determinate forms. It is not concerned with the uses to which its results are put, and in that sense it is value free; techne is a means to a goal, not a science of ends.”

At 271c Socrates even seems to indicate that there in fact are rhetoricians (aside from the case of Pericles) who have gone through the necessary dialectical training and have gained insight into the application of their techniques. He states that “the present-day authors of manuals of rhetoric, of whom you have heard, are cunning folk who know all about the soul but keep their knowledge out of sight” (italics added).

Socrates' complaint about the inability of rhetors to teach skill at creating unity speaks to the heart of the divergence from philosophy that rhetoric is capable of. As becomes clear throughout the dialogues, it is the special task of philosophy to create unity within the polis and the individual. If rhetoric is a danger to philosophy, then it must ultimately undermine this unity, sowing dissent.

For the view that the passage may be ironic, see Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus, 281, n. 35: “One should add that Socrates may also be indirectly criticizing Pericles. Not only is it doubtful that Pericles really could define rhetoric in the required manner, Anaxagoras is criticized by Socrates in the Pho. and is associated in the Apol. (26d) with demythologizing, that is, with the kind of ‘boorish wisdom' rejected in the Phr. (229e3). Perhaps Pericles is thus tarnished by association.” Conversely, in considering the presentation of Pericles in the Menexenus, Duffy writes, “Plato's compliment to Pericles is undoubtedly sincere” (Duffy, “The Platonic Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric,” 83). This follows because “In the Phaedrus he tells us that Pericles' ability in rhetoric was the result of philosophical instruction—of ‘star gazing.' If Socrates' oration [in the Menexenus] is modeled upon Pericles', we expect it, then, to exhibit a philosophical basis” (83).

For the standard interpretation of the Isocrates passage as ironic, see R. L. Howland, “The Attack On Isocrates in the Phaedrus,” Classical Quarterly 31 (1937): 151–9; G. J. De Vries, A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1969), 15–8; Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus, 286, n. 18. The case is summarized by Ferrari thus: “My speculation is that Isocrates (as rival beloved, so to speak) represents for Plato how a worthy concern for what exceeds articulation by rules in ethical and intellectual practice can degenerate into mere conservatism and hostility to the virtues of reflection” (Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas, 159).

However, the understanding of the comments on Isocrates as being purely negative has also come under attack. Curran puts the case thus: “Others, doubtless also with the Gorgias's negative stance in mind, pay excessive attention to the eulogy of Isocrates at the end of the dialogue. Claiming it to be ironic, they view the whole dialogue as an attack on Isocrates, or try to detect Isocrates' style in one or other of the speeches” (Curran, “The Rhetorical Technique of Plato's Phaedrus,” 67). There is a call here to carry though with our re-evaluation of the place of rhetoric in Platonic philosophy. Since we are to balance our assessment of the art of persuasion, so too do we need to take a closer look at the comments on its practitioners, namely Pericles and Isocrates. Ronna Burger, Plato's Phaedrus: A Defence of the Philosophic Art of Writing (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1980), 114–26, gives an interesting example of this re-assessment, and concludes that “Isocrates' defence for his own activity of writing is grounded on its power to preserve the prudence of reasonable insight into political affairs and the persuasiveness of true opinion artfully presented” (125).

This interpretation follows somewhat the analysis offered by Hackforth: “The question is sometimes raised, whether Plato is here reversing (or mitigating) the adverse judgment passed on Pericles in the Gorgias is misplaced, for he was there regarded as a bad statesman whereas here it is merely his oratorical excellence, which neither Socrates nor Plato would deny, that is affirmed” (Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, 149).

Here it may be telling that Socrates does not call Pericles a philosopher, even though Pericles has studied with Anaxagoras (270a). Following up on Griswold's point, we notice that when in the Phaedo Socrates discusses the work of Anaxagoras in more detail, he faults it because of a failure to deal with moral ends, instead substituting material explanations. “It never entered my head that a man who asserted that the ordering of things is due to mind would offer any other explanation for them than that it is best for them to be as they are. I thought that … he would make perfectly clear what is best for each and what is the universal good” (98a–b).

Specifically, Heindorf has argued thus, and he is followed by Robin, Shanz, and Burnet. For an excellent summary of these opinions presented previous to his own commentary, see De Vries, A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato, 184–7, with accompanying notes and references. More recent translators have accepted the passage; see for example, Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, trans. Plato Phaedrus (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995), 49, with accompanying note.

Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, 114.

Fowler's translation. See Harold North Fowler, trans. Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, reprint 1999), 551.

Socrates describes the principle at Meno 77b–e, Hippias Major 296c, Gorgias 468b, Protagoras 345d. See also the Laws 731c.

C.f. the discussion from 263a–c.

The idea is also expressed at Gorgias 503a, where Socrates considers two sides of rhetoric, one of which “is something fine—the effort to perfect as far as possible the souls of citizens and the struggle to say always what is best.”

As Stoeber puts it, “Socrates gives Phaedrus a contrasting image of love that is more powerful than Lysias' speech and this contrast stimulates Phaedrus' previously latent faculty of reason. He sees Socrates' second speech over and against Lysias', becomes intellectually aroused, and begins to appreciate the theoretical principles that establish the formal superiority of Socrates' effort” (Stoeber, “Phaedrus of the Phaedrus,” 279).

In this way, the current analysis stays consistent with views of commentators who see in Plato the attempt to resist dogmatic philosophy while still attempting to reveal some level of truth in his work. For an exegesis of this project as it relates to rhetoric in the Platonic dialogues, see Kenneth Dorter, “Three Disappearing Ladders in Plato,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 29 (1996): 279–99. “But philosophers for whom the formulation even of that limited truth can only be provisional, require a rhetoric that functions in both a positive and negative way. Positively, it must lead the reader to experience the insights that they want to communicate; negatively, it must somehow convey that the formulations by which it does so are only functional, not foundational” (279).

In a different context, William G. Kelly Jr, “Rhetoric as Seduction,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 6 (1973): 69–80, compares this passage with Pausanius' conclusion in the Symposium at 180c of the one who loves solely in hopes of “getting something done.” For Kelly, “the men chose the poorer course because they did not know or chose not to distinguish the best from the worst; they acted randomly” (74).

Kelly goes on to conclude that “For Plato, the baseness of rhetoric grows out of its inherent randomness; in it there is no abiding affection for Truth” (Kelly, “Rhetoric as Seduction,” 79). We can agree with this attitude while asserting that there is another side to the analysis of rhetoric that Plato gives us. While rhetoric has its baser side, it could be added that the nobility of rhetoric lies in its connection to truth and an ability to promote proper ends.

Duffy writes that “In the Menexenus Plato presents epideictic as a means of publicly celebrating the values recognized to underlie the noble deeds of previous generations, values, as I said, which are at the core of future deliberation and action” (Duffy, “The Platonic Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric,” 90). What I have tried to show here is how a discussion and awareness of those values on the part of the philosopher can dominate the rhetorical context.

In a seminal work, Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), writes of the role of public discourse in the workings of the polis. “All questions of general concern that the sovereign had to settle, and which marked out the domain of arche [sovereignty], were now submitted to the art of oratory and had to be resolved at the conclusion of a debate. They therefore had to be formulated as a discourse, poured into the mold of antithetical demonstrations and opposing arguments” (50). But if rhetoric can effect persuasion and subvert real debate over the merits of policy, then the fundamental role of dialogue in city-politics that Vernant points out is threatened. What I have tried to do here is outline a Platonic response to the phenomenon of rhetoric that defuses this danger to the traditional foundations of the polis.