The Control of Public Networks

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the control of networks, an issue that we believe is critical for explaining the overall effectiveness of public networks. We first discuss why it is important to study the issue and why it has been neglected as a topic by public management and organization scholars. We then present the various types of control and how they are utilized in a network context. Finally, we discuss how the mechanisms of control might be related to network effectiveness, drawing heavily on an understanding of how this relationship is addressed by contingency theorists. We close by posing challenges to researchers for developing new insights into the control of networks and why this knowledge is relevant for public managers and policy makers.

Notes

*“Bureaucratic formalized control” includes behavior and output control.

Sources: For the column on organizations: Pugh et al. 1968; Blau and Schoenherr 1971; Thompson 1967; Van de Ven et al. 1976; Child 1984; Galbraith 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; March and Simon 1958; Minztberg 1983; Burns and Stalker 1961; Khandwalla 1977; Hage et al. 1971.

Some of the major studies on the topic include work by March and Simon (1958), Blau and Scott (1963), Thompson (1967), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Child (1973 1984), Galbraith (1973), Ouchi (1977 1979 1980), Mintzberg (1979 1983), Bartlett and Goshal (1989), and Martinez and Jarillo (1991).

In their seminal book, The External Control of Organizations, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) examined how organizations are constrained by environmental uncertainty and resource dependencies, and how organizations respond to uncertainty through various bridging and buffering strategies. Although we borrow Pfeffer and Salancik's title, we focus not on organizations, but on networks, and on intentional control imposed by external sources (cf. Zald 1978).

This is a very interesting conceptual piece. Although the article and the issues Zald addressed are highly relevant from a network governance perspective, the article has rarely been cited over the last 25 years, according to the Social Science Citation Index.

“Hierarchies have a difficult time fighting networks. […] It takes networks to fight networks. Governments…have to adopt organizational designs and strategies like those of their adversaries.[…] Whoever masters the network form first and best will gain major advantages.[…] However, governments tend to be so constrained by hierarchical habits and institutional interests that it may take some sharp reverses…before a willingness to experiment more seriously with networking emerges” (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2001, 20 f.).

This corresponds with the argument of Hennart (1993), who made a significant contribution to transaction cost theory by distinguishing between methods of organizing (the price system and hierarchy) and economic institutions (markets and firms).

This might include: the parliament (via elections, parliamentary committees, parliamentary questions, informal lobbying of ministers by MPs, lobbying by outsiders), a ministry or department (via framework documents and business plans, performance indicators, etc.), a citizen's charter, local authorities (via elections, publicly open meetings and minutes, monitoring officers, competitive tendering regulations, scrutiny committees, etc.), third party mechanisms (ombudsmen, an audit commission, courts, tribunals) mechanisms of property (via registers of interest, codes of conduct, rules for appointments, encouragement of transparency), the market (via consumer choices), horizontal mechanisms (professional accountability from peers, representativeness of board members), press and other media, and many different kinds of stakeholders (see McConnel 1996).

Persons, groups, organizations, industries, or as we discuss here, networks.

This could refer to control over almost any objective (see Kenis 2001b), but our focus here is primarily goal attainment and negative externalities.

These might include: the degree to which those who control are identifiable to those who are controlled; the degree to which those who are controlled are identifiable to those who control; the degree to which those controlled and the controllers share norms; the degree to which the controlled trust that the controllers abide by shared norms; the degree to which institutions exist that provide settlement of disputes over the interpretation of these norms, and whether the rules have abided them (cf. van Kersbergen and van Waarden 2001, 27).

This might include regulation, incentives, payments, infiltration, etc. (cf. Howlett, 2001).

This might include power, money, information, etc.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Patrick Kenis

Patrick Kenis ([email protected]) is a professor of policy and organization studies at the Department of Organizations Studies, Tilburg University. His current research examines the effectiveness of policy and organizational networks.

Keith G. Provan

Keith G. Provan ([email protected]) is the Eller Professor in the School of Public Administration and Policy, University of Arizona. His current research examines organizational networks and interorganizational relationships, especially in a public and nonprofit context.