What Works: The Role of Confidential Integrity Advisors and Effective Whistleblowing

Abstract

Whistleblowing and whistleblowers have received a great deal of attention over the last decade. By now, we know quite a bit about the whistleblower. Whistleblowing (in particular, internal reporting systems) has received less attention. When it comes to effective whistleblowing, we know least about those factors we can most easily influence. Here, the focus is on one possible part of an internal reporting system: the confidential integrity advisor (CIA). Our main research question is: What is the most effective internal reporting system and what role should the confidential integrity advisor play? The analysis of this research is based on different data sources. First, 25 CIAs from many different types of public organizations were interviewed. Second, a survey was carried out among Dutch civil servants (n = 7543). CIAs can play an important role in an effective reporting system. It is important that they are supported by management, have clear descriptions of their duties and tasks, and receive support from supervisors. To improve the effectiveness of the reporting system, addressing the role of supervisors is a logical place to start.

INTRODUCTION

Whistleblowing and whistleblowers have received a great deal of attention over the last decade. There have been many discussions—inside and outside politics—about the best way to afford legal protection to people in their position. The discussion is not confined to popular discourse. Whistleblowers have also been the subject of discourse and the object of research in academia. Several enlightening reviews (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran 2005; Maesschalck and Ornelis 2003; Miceli, Near, and Dworkin 2008; Vandekerckhove 2006; Near and Miceli 1996) have summarized the studies on whistleblowers. The studies lay emphasis on the personal characteristics of the whistleblower, and on determining what makes whistleblowers come forward (Vandekerckhove 2006). Many factors have been associated with the willingness to whistleblow and these include the reporter's personal characteristics (gender, self-esteem, personality traits, religion) and situational aspects (type of alleged wrongdoing, quality of supervision, status of the recipient, organizational integrity policy, and so on).

By now we know quite a bit about the whistleblower. Whistleblowing, and in particular internal reporting systems, has received less attention. This is remarkable: previous research in various countries has shown that the vast majority of external whistleblowers first report internally, and most internal whistleblowers do not ever report outside their own organization (De Graaf 2010; Miceli and Near 2002; West, Bottomley, and Vandekerckhove 2013; Miceli et al. 2012; Brown 2008; Roberts, Brown, and Olsen 2011; Miceli, Near, and Dworkin 2008). Furthermore, when there is no effective response to internal reporting, whistleblowers are more likely to go to the media (Callahan and Dworkin 1994). “Reports to external parties may be even more threatening, because such reports may result in adverse publicity or legal intervention” (Miceli and Near 2002, 456). We also know that most employees who observe wrongdoing do not report it to parties who can correct it (Miceli, Near, and Dworkin 2008; Roberts, Brown, and Olsen 2011; Brown 2008). In this scenario, management does not get a chance to correct the wrongdoing (Keil et al. 2010), which may then very well worsen (De Graaf and Huberts 2008).

In a seminal article on whistleblowing theory, Near and Miceli (1995, 680) concluded: “Unfortunately, there has been little research specifically dealing with the conditions that enable whistle-blowers to be effective in bringing about change … werecommend that research attention be directed toward identifying the conditions under which the whistle-blowing can be effective.” In 2002 (Miceli and Near, 456), “there is virtually no empirical research and little theory concerning the conditions associated with whistle-blowing effectiveness.” According to Miceli et al. (2008), there is still little research on the effectiveness of whistle blowing (notable exceptions include Bjørkelo et al. 2011; Skivenes and Trygstad 2010). In a study on reporting in public organizations, De Graaf (2010) advises—among other things—designing a reporting protocol and discussing it with supervisors, and designing a reporting procedure where the report is taken seriously and where the reporter is given attention and offered guidance. Yet, there is not much evidence of how best to organize and manage internal reporting systems nor of when whistleblowing is most effective—the conditions under which internal reporting most often works well. When it comes to effective whistleblowing, we know least about those factors management can most easily influence.

Here, the focus is on one possible part of an internal reporting system: the confidential integrity advisor (CIA). By the year 2000, most Dutch public organizations had confidential advisors whom employees had the opportunity to speak to in private and to report presumed inappropriate behavior (sexual intimidation, discrimination, etc.) by their colleagues. In the decade that followed, all Dutch public organizations were required to have confidential integrity advisors, who should play some role in the internal reporting of wrongdoing in the organization. There was no further specification, however, as to the exact duties of such an officer, how many officers there should be, what qualifications they should have, whether the confidential integrity advisor and confidential advisor for inappropriate behavior should be combined, etc. As a result, what is in place differs from one public organization to another. Our main research question is: What is the most effective internal reporting system and what role should the confidential integrity advisor play? This question will be answered here through a multi-method study.

RESEARCH HEURISTIC

Central Concepts

A reporter is here defined as one who discloses information about a perceived integrity violation to someone with the ability to effect action (Near and Miceli 1985). The reporter has no authority over the accused and thus lacks the power to directly rectify and punish. The reporting of integrity violations includes at least three parties, each of which takes action in response to the other (Near and Miceli 1996; Akerstrom 1991): the reporter, the wrongdoer, and the information receiver. The reporter takes three steps: observing an act (a broad category; observation can include hearing, for example); defining the act as an integrity violation; and reporting the act (Near and Miceli 1996).

Integrity is defined broadly as the quality of acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms, and rules (Huberts 2005). Our focus, however, is on integrity violations: behavior that violates relevant moral and/or legal values, rules, and norms. Note that many integrity violations are also legal violations, but not necessarily so. Unethical and illegal are not one and the same. Here, the term “integrity violations” is therefore used as shorthand for “violations of integrity and/or the law,” or wrongdoing. The internal reporting system is the way in which members of an organization are able to report (alleged) integrity violations.

Research Methods: Interviews and Surveys

According to Groeneveld et al. (2015), very few studies in the public administration field employ a mixed-methods design. Here, a multi-method design was used: the analysis of this research is based on three data sources. First, 25 confidential integrity advisors from many different types of public organizations were interviewed in the spring of 2012. Of those interviewed, 14 had received special training from the Dutch National Integrity Office on what being a CIA involves; they were recruited for the study from a list of people who had taken the course. Public organizations were then approached randomly, asking if their CIA would be willing to be interviewed. The interviews were semi-open and were taped and later transcribed literally.

For triangulation, a survey commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations was carried out among Dutch civil servants. The survey questionnaire was sent to about 38,000 civil servants from all sectors of public governance and was completed by 7,543 respondents in September 2012.

Third, the first question in the survey was whether the respondent was a CIA. The 137 administrators who answered “yes” to this question received a separate list of questions (many of which were open questions) which had much overlap with the semi-open interview questions used in the CIA interviews.¹

Qualitative Analysis: Interviews and CIAs in Survey

The interviews and surveys were used to research the effectiveness of internal reporting systems, and qualitative and quantitative research were combined. Interviews and surveys both register subjectivities from which the conclusions about what works and what needs to be changed are derived. Because not much is known about (effective) internal reporting systems, for the first step, an explorative and inductive strategy was chosen (Eisenhardt 1989; Glaser and Strauss 1967).

The analysis of the qualitative data was hampered by the many contingencies that play a role in the research object at hand. What is considered an effective situation in one organization need not be thought effective in another. And that, in itself, is a judgment call by the interviewee. In carrying out the within-case analyses, the causal relationships within each case were examined.

Analyzing the 25 interviews was a challenge. Although the study began using within-case analyses (in this explorative phase, the nuances and context of every case were considered), this was followed with what was in many ways the logic of multiple-case study analysis. According to Eisenhardt (1989), the multiple case-study design offers the researcher the opportunity for more accurate formulation of concepts than single case-studies. To be more specific, the logic of our data-analysis is the “retrospective comparison of cases” (Den Hertog and Wielinga 1992): an in-depth analysis of a large set of aspects in a number of cases (the 25 respondents). According to Eisenhardt (1989), the advantage of this design is that it allows the researcher to recognize general patterns in different settings. Its disadvantage, however, is that every case, with its own context and contingencies, has to be reduced to a more abstract level in order to make between-case comparisons possible (Dyer and Wilkins 1991). Usually, after semi-open interviews, researchers are confronted with a great deal of data. This case was no different. The data transcribed to more than 150,000 words. To find patterns in research data, Eisenhardt (1989, 541) suggests using techniques that force investigators to go beyond initial impressions:

Overall, the idea behind cross-case searching tactics is to force investigators to go beyond initial impressions, especially through the use of structured and diverse lenses on the data. These tactics improve the likelihood of accurate and reliable theory, that is, a theory with a close fit with the data. Also, cross-case searching techniques enhance the possibility that the investigators will capture the novel findings which may exist in the data.

The study looked at which circumstances were judged by the interviewees to be especially negative or positive, and why. Negative circumstances—for example, there being no reports or only a few in a given year—were compared with those instances where there had been several reports. What are the possible explanations for the difference? In every organization things go wrong. We know from previous research (e.g., De Graaf 2010) that most potential whistleblowers have serious doubts about whether to report a wrongdoing. Special attention in the analysis was therefore given to the circumstances that lower the threshold in the process so that people do report or contact a CIA.

In order to find patterns, the suggestion of Miles and Huberman (1994) of using a monster-grid was helpful (De Graaf and Huberts 2008). On one axis of the grid are the 25 CIAs interviewed, and on the other are different categories such as “place within internal reporting system,” “most important dilemmas,” “most time spent on,” “background,” etc. The option, however, of insights and novel findings based on other variables emerging from the data was left wide open. The cells of the grid do not contain numbers but various verbal comments and citations (Swanborn 2003). From this grid, patterns were derived, which were then juxtaposed with the empirical data. This inductive process was repeated many times before the final analysis was written (Eisenhardt 1989, 541).

After analysis of the 25 interviews, the patterns were compared (triangulation) with the data coming out of the survey of the 137 people who had said in the questionnaire that they were CIAs. The data was examined to see if there was further support for the emerging theory.

Quantitative Analysis: Satisfied Reporters in the Large Survey

The literature offers several definitions of effective whistleblowing (Apaza and Chang 2011), and different measures of success; for example, whether whistleblowers win in court cases (Near and Miceli 1995). To Elliston et al. (1985), effective whistleblowing has two aspects: (1) did the whistleblower achieve what they had in mind; and (2) did others, in some way, heed their warnings? Dworkin and Baucus (1998) see whistleblowing as effective “if the organization launched an investigation into the whistleblower's allegations—on their own initiative or as required by a government agency—or if the organization took steps to change policies, procedures, or eliminate wrongdoing.” Here, the definition of effective whistleblowing by Near and Micheli (1995, 681) is used: “The extent to which the wrongdoing is terminated at least partly and within a reasonable time frame.” Additionally, Near and Micheli (1995) stress that to measure effectiveness one has to look at three elements in order to assess that a practice has been terminated: (1) there has to be some concrete evidence that an action has been halted; (2) cessation should be attributed to the whistle blower; and (3) the time period is reasonable. “Lacking this, some consensus should exist among the parties involved in the whistleblowing that it has been effective. Obviously, researchers may have to rely on the perceptions of only one of the parties involved in the whistleblowing” (Near and Miceli 1995, 681). In this study, too, the research was limited in having to rely on one party—the reporter. This is logical; if the reporter is satisfied—either because she or he was listened to, there was investigation and it transpired the suspicions of integrity violations were not founded, or the wrongdoing was corrected—it is a clear sign of an effective reporting system.

A sample was drawn from the larger data set. Respondents who indicated they had reported integrity violations were asked how satisfied they were with how the report was handled. This question is the main focus of the quantitative analysis here and was formulated as follows: “To what degree are you satisfied or dissatisfied with how your report of wrongdoing was handled?” Of the 7,452 respondents, 1,259 answered this question. These respondents had the option to choose between seven categories: very satisfied, satisfied, somewhat satisfied, neutral, somewhat dissatisfied, dissatisfied, and very dissatisfied. The 1,259 respondents had been pre-selected to answer this question on the basis of two preceding questions which were: (1) “In the last two years, did you ever suspect that integrity violations were taking place in your working environment?” People had the opportunity to answer “yes” or “no.” Respondents who answered “yes” (2035) were asked to label the misconduct they suspected from nine possible categories. Then they were asked the following question: (2) “Did you inform others about the (suspected) misconduct? And to whom or what did you turn?” Respondents had 21 categories of answer to choose from, but selecting any one of the first three categories precluded respondents from answering further questions. These first three categories were considered as “non-reporting” respondents, since the options were: (1) I did not inform others about the (suspected) misconduct, but kept it to myself; (2) I only talked about the misconduct with a colleague or colleagues; and (3) I only addressed the offender. Categories 4–20 contained a wide range of institutions or persons to whom respondents could have reported their suspicion of misconduct. The options were not mutually exclusive. Finally, option 21 offered blank space for respondents to describe the institutions or persons they reported to that were not included in the list.

Out of the 1,259 reporters, 38.9% were “very satisfied” to “somewhat satisfied” with how their reporting of an instance was handled. A total of 9.8% had a neutral stance towards the question and 51.3% were “somewhat dissatisfied” to “very dissatisfied” (Table 1).

RESULTS

Knowledge of Integrity Procedures and Institutions

All Dutch public organizations are required by law to have explicit whistleblowing procedures, even though what the procedure should look like is rarely specified. In all of these procedures, it is suggested that the most logical place to lodge a report is with the alleged offender's immediate supervisor. That way, the information receiver is closest to the integrity violation. A CIA is required in almost all of these reporting procedures within the different public sectors. From the survey, it appears that, among public administrators, there is a lack of knowledge of the internal reporting procedures (Table 2). For example, despite the requirement to have reporting procedures, only 61% know such a procedure exists, and most barely know what the procedure is; only 15% of the respondents are familiar with the mandatory whistle blowing procedures. This must diminish the effectiveness of the reporting procedures.

TABLE 1 Satisfaction of Reporters

	Frequency	Percent
Very satisfied	91	7.2
Satisfied	237	18.8
Somewhat satisfied	162	12.9
Neutral	123	9.8
Somewhat dissatisfied	123	9.8
Dissatisfied	227	18
Very dissatisfied	296	23.5
Total	1259	100

TABLE 2 Knowledge on Reporting Procedures and Institutions

N = 7453	No, I do not think so	Yes, I think so
My organization has an internal procedure for the reporting of (suspected) wrongdoing.	39.0%	61.0%
My organization has an integrity code in which what to do with (suspected) wrongdoing is set out.	47.7%	52.3%
My organization has a Confidential Advisor on Harassment.	33.8%	66.2%
My organization has a Confidential Integrity Advisor.	54.0%	46.0%
My organization has an Integrity Bureau or an appointed integrity functionary/coordinator.	76.3%	23.7%
My organization has a formal reporting place.	55.0%	45.0%
My organization has a whistleblowing procedure.	84.9%	15.1%
My organization provides the opportunity for its employees to report (suspected) wrongdoing to an external (whistleblowers) committee.	88.1%	11.9%
My organization provides the opportunity to report (suspected) wrongdoing confidentially so that the name of the reporter is not made public.	78.0%	22.0%
My organization provides the opportunity to report (suspected) wrongdoing anonymously, so that no one—including the information receiver—knows the identity of the reporter.	89.4%	10.6%

Further analysis suggests that having the procedures generally known in the organization influences the effectiveness of the reporting system (see Table 3). About 30% more of the satisfied reporters than unsatisfied reporters know about internal reporting procedures. There is a significant association between the awareness of the internal procedure and whether or not respondents were satisfied with how the report of wrongdoing was handled, χ² (1) = 98.238, p < .001. The awareness of internal procedure is significantly correlated to satisfaction or non-satisfaction.

TABLE 3 My Organization has an Internal Procedure for the Reporting of (Suspected) Wrongdoing

		Frequency	Valid Percent
Satisfied	No, I do not think so	97	19.8
	Yes, I think so	393	80.2
Unsatisfied	No, I do not think so	312	48.3
	Yes, I think so	334	51.7

Where Reported

Table 4 shows what the respondents did with information or suspicions of integrity violations. Of the 2,035 respondents with knowledge or suspicions of integrity violations, 93% claim they have made the information known. However, the first three categories of Table 4 are not part of the definition of a reporter used here. According to the definition, only 62% reported integrity violations.

TABLE 4 Reporting of Wrongdoing

N = 2033	Yes
I have not made the information known but kept it to myself	7.0%
I discussed the information with a colleague	25.9%
I have only spoken with the wrongdoer	5.2%
Internally reported to manager	39.5%
Internally reported to CHA	4.2%
Internally reported to CIA	5.5%
Internally reported to an Integrity Bureau or an appointed integrity functionary/coordinator	3.8%
Internally reported to Work/Employees Council	7.9%
Reported to an external (whistleblowers) committee	0.3%
Reported to the Public Prosecution	0.9%
Reported to the National Ombudsman	0.2%
To a Union	4.5%

Of those who reported, the great majority reported to their direct manager, underlining the crucial importance of managers and supervisors in the reporting system. In the existing reporting protocols, the supervisor is seen as the most obvious place to report wrongdoing (the “Royal Way” of making disclosures). Those respondents who had not witnessed an integrity violation in the last two years (n = 3835) were asked a hypothetical question about whom they would have reported to had they witnessed wrongdoing; 61% of these respondents indicated that their supervisor would be the most logical place for them to report wrongdoing.

Given this crucial place of the supervisor in the reporting system, it is striking that they do not seem to be well prepared for that important role. In the same way as the CIAs, the supervisors (n = 1427) were also asked some specific questions; about 75% of them indicate they have not been specifically prepared for their role as “reporting point.” Less than 10% have undertaken special training, or taken part in intervision, or received any specific information or instructions from their employer.

Of the 803 reporters who had reported to their supervisor, 40% were satisfied. Of the 161 who reported to the Work/Employees Council, only 22% were satisfied. Of the 112 who reported to the CIA, 43% were satisfied, roughly the same satisfaction level of the reporters overall (39%). This is an indication that it is not necessarily better to be able to report to a CIA (as opposed to just asking for advice; more on this later).

Of the 78 who reported to an Integrity Bureau or an appointed integrity functionary/coordinator, 63% were satisfied. This is evidence that taking integrity seriously (having an integrity bureau) is an important influence on whether reporting is seen to be effective or not (more on this later).

Of those who reported externally, seven people reported to an external (whistleblowers) committee, and six said they were unsatisfied. Similarly, the five who reported to the National Ombudsman, and 70 of the 91 who reported to a union, were all unsatisfied. This is an indication that reporting to external institutions with few investigative powers is not deemed to be successful, but we know that most external previously reported internally (Miceli and Near 2002), so their dissatisfaction might also be with the internal channel. Yet, in contrast, of the 19 who reported to the Public Prosecutor—who does have strong investigative powers—14 were satisfied.

CIA as Part of Integrity Policy

Table 5 clearly indicates that a CIA can play a useful role in an effective internal reporting system; the role enhances the effectiveness of the system. How it happens is still to be determined, as well as the way in which the role of the CIA can be embedded in the organization.

TABLE 5 Satisfied and Unsatisfied Reporters’ Agreement on Statements

	Satisfied reporters who agree	Unsatisfied reporters who agree
The CIA has a good reputation in my organization	65%	27%
The CIA is visible and well-known in my organization	55%	27%
The CIA in my organization has enough knowledge and quality	56%	24%
The CIA in my organization handles wrongdoing well	48%	18%
The CIA in my organization can protect me satisfactorily	49%	15%
The CIA in my organization is accessible enough for employees	63%	36%
The CIA in my organization has enough authority and is hierarchically well-embedded in the organization	44%	16%
I see the CIA as part of a broader integrity policy	73%	47%
It is clear to me what the difference is between the CIA and other places in my organization where I can report (suspicions of) integrity violations	48%	29%

The analysis of the CIA interview data clearly showed diversity in practice in relation to the role of the CIA. In most official procedures, the CIA is merely mentioned; what exactly the role should be was (intentionally) left open by the legislators. Some organizations permit the role to combine responsibility for both harassment and integrity, others do not. Some have external CIAs, although most are internal to the organization. In some cases, the CIA functions as a reporting point—the place where a formal report can be lodged. In others, the CIA only directs the potential reporter (not the report) to the relevant authority.

There is no doubting the importance of the internal reporting system as part of an integrity policy within public organizations. The specifics can differ, as long as integrity in general and reporting in particular get attention. As an interviewed CIA stated it, “The important thing is the vision. What signals does management give? The role of supervisors is very important.” Organizations that attach least importance to CIAs and reporting systems appear to have the lowest number of reports. These organizations give the CIA minimal time for the specific CIA tasks, or have very few CIAs compared to the number of employees.

The value top management attaches to integrity is particularly important for the effectiveness of internal reporting systems. An adequate reporting structure with many CIAs is much less effective when the organization shows no interest in integrity issues. In contrast, when the organization stresses the importance of integrity, the reporting system functions better; it is more effective. The goal should be to have an organization with integrity, not to have as many reports as possible. A CIA installed only because the law requires it, and not trained or given proper guidance, is a clear sign that integrity is not high on the agenda of that organization. In such an organization, there will be fewer reports, and CIAs will get fewer requests for information or guidance, damaging the effectiveness of the reporting system.

CIA's Tasks

CIAs generally consider reporting to the direct supervisor to be the most desirable way of making reports—the Royal Way. CIAs spend most of their time as sounding boards, with giving advice coming second (Table 6)

TABLE 6 CIA's Activities

On which task do you spend most of your time as CIA?	Frequency	Percentage
Offering an attentive ear	88	66.7
Taking in a report and notifying the authorities	1	8
Advice to the reporter	9	6.8
Advices to supervisors and management	2	1.5
Informing within the organization	12	9.1
Mediation in conflicts	9	6.8
Investigating the (suspected) wrongdoing	2	1.5
(Advice about) settlement	2	1.5
Providing after-care	1	.8
(Involvement in) development of integrity policy	5	3.8
Registration and/or annual report	1	.8
Total	132	100.0

.

This is a remarkable finding. As stated earlier, the CIA came into existence as part of mandatory reporting regulations. Yet, they spend most of their time listening and giving advice. “Holding talks. Yes, that is by far what I spend most time on.” “Mostly I am a sounding board. Just let people tell their story; confirm that they are not crazy and that what they are talking about is not normal. If you can support people in that, it's usually already a big help.” There are many rules and protocols governing integrity in Dutch public organizations and these are often not known. Nor is integrity always a matter of black and white. As a result, public administrators might have many questions about integrity and could find themselves in a dilemma. The availability of an attentive ear is then much appreciated. “For many people having one conversation is enough. They have told you their thing and then they are very grateful. Telling your story helps to organize your thoughts.” So CIAs do not spend as much of their time filing reports about third parties as one might have expected, given that they are in post in the first place because of reporting regulations. Most of their time is spent advising on integrity questions and examining the dilemmas of those who approach them.

Notably, several of the interviewed CIAs—and 45 of the 137 CIAs from the survey (33%)—see it as their task not only to receive reports, but also to investigate wrongdoing. The supportive and advisory function with respect to reporters is then combined with an investigative role, which requires neutrality toward the parties involved, including the accused Among some CIAs, but especially among employees in general, there is much misunderstanding about the official role of the CIA. Since many people consider it the CIA's job to be a “reporting point” where breaches of integrity are received, they also believe the CIA is the person that does the investigation and even the judging, instead of simply directing the report to the relevant authority. Thus, there is much confusion around the idea of a “reporting point.” But it was not the intention of the legislators that this role should be an investigative one.

In order to have low reporting thresholds and effective whistleblowing, it would seem that the CIA's role should be more that of a sounding board than an official locus where reports can be lodged (a reporting point). Of the CIAs in the survey, 61% say they are an official reporting point, and 39% say they are not. Being an official point where reports can be made requires more of the CIAs. For example, there need to be formal requirements for the report itself. The CIA would also be required to demonstrate loyalty to the organization, making it necessary to divide loyalty between the reporter and the organization. Being “only” a sounding board and simply escorting reporters to the authorities to make their report means that the CIA can remain close to the reporter. It also makes it clear to all parties that the CIA will not carry out the investigations. A CIA pointed out: “The effectiveness of the integrity policy is determined by the entire system. That means a separate entity handling the report. We as CIAs can then do our work independently. It makes it clear to all what the position of the CIA is in the entire process.” Under this rubric, the CIA can then continue to help the reporter; for example, when the reporter has questions during the investigation process. Nevertheless, it should always be clear where an official report can be made in an organization.

The Nature of Reports

In the 1990s in the Netherlands, the role of the Confidential Harassment Adviser (CHA) was introduced in many organizations, advising mostly on sexual harassment (Adams-Roy and Barling 1998; O'Leary-Kelly et al. 2009) and bullying (Einarsena and Skogstada 1996; Kaplan, Pope, and Samuels 2010). Most Dutch public organizations already had a CIA dealing with integrity issues, of which harassment issues are a part. However, in harassment it is not the organization but usually the reporter that is involved (as the victim); in matters of integrity, the organization is generally involved and not the reporter. Public organizations in the Netherlands asked themselves whether it is better to combine both functions. In addition to harassment and integrity issues, one can also distinguish labor disputes—between an employee and the organization—which are not considered integrity disputes and not part of the jurisdiction/function of CIAs.

It emerges that most CIAs are in favor of combining the harassment and the integrity function. Only 15% of the CIAs surveyed disagree with the statement that combining them in one function is better than separating them. The main advantage is that potential reporters then have only one place to go; they are confused when they have two. Furthermore, the distinction between harassment and integrity issues is often not clear, certainly to public servants in general, but sometimes also to the CIAs themselves. “At first we thought we could make a clear distinction between harassment and other integrity matters, but over time we found out that there is no clear dividing line.” When a manager discriminates, it is a clear case of harassment, but it is also an integrity violation and most often even a criminal act. Generally, CIAs are able to distinguish most cases as one or the other, but it appears that most public administrators cannot. “Employees cannot distinguish between what is harassment, an issue of integrity or a labor dispute; they have a problem, feel frustrated, and talk to the first person they find.” “I think that for reporters it is easier to be able to go to one place. The boundaries are complicated, even for those who have studied them; I do not think it is wise to bother people who are already struggling by introducing something that is a matter of definition.” “You do not want to lose reporters. After they have overcome the first hurdle, they come to you and if they then hear you saying ‘you need to go to someone else,’ it could mean losing potential reporters.” “The boundaries are not clear to the employees, so they often go to the wrong advisor. Or they simply go to the advisor they personally feel most comfortable with.” This points to another important reason only 15% of the CIAs feel that harassment and integrity should not be combined in one post: taking the first step to seek out an advisor is a big step and an emotional one for most people. Once someone has taken that first difficult step, they do not want to hear that they need to go to another person and repeat the same story. The threshold to be crossed to approach a confidential advisor is lower when the advisor is responsible for both harassment and integrity matters, which enhances the effectiveness of the reporting system. “We combined them so that employees have the possibility of reporting a little further from their own department … we have one man and one woman as CIAs, so people also have a gender choice.” “The main advantage of combining is that there are fewer people to refer to.”

Combining harassment and integrity issues also has disadvantages. In general, different levels of confidentiality apply in harassment and integrity matters (more on confidentiality later). In most harassment matters, confidentiality is guaranteed. This is not the case for integrity matters, because they may involve cases where the law has been broken, and that must be reported to the police. Yet, most confidential advisors find a way of dealing with this situation, “With my harassment hat on, I am more empathetic, with my integrity hat on, I am more businesslike.” Of course it matters to the reporter whether he or she is a victim of the wrongdoing or is not involved at all (De Graaf 2010), and often a difference between harassment and integrity is significant. Nevertheless, most advisors say that all reporters are emotional. “Even when people come to tell you that a co-worker is stealing, they need an attentive ear; people hate to have to tell you that, because they feel like a snitch. So you have to reassure them. People who come to you are emotional, regardless of whether it is about harassment or other integrity issues.”

There are also other issues to take into account for the CIA when combing harassment and integrity issues: “Harassment asks for different skills and competences of the CIA, where often the reporter is also the victim. In most integrity issues, the organization is the victim.” “Integrity issues have a different character. Integrity issues are usually more business-like (theft, fraud, leaking of info, unlawful use of means, etc.) while harassment is very personal by nature. The approaches for the CIA differ enormously.” It also raises questions like: Do harassment complainants feel the need for advice more than integrity complainants, who favor reporting? A question that cannot be answered here, but is certainly interesting for further research.

Confidentiality

The term “confidential” in Confidential Integrity Advisor is a source of misunderstanding. Confidentiality means two things: keeping the reporter's information secret, and keeping the reporter's identity secret, ensuring anonymity. But confidentiality cannot always be guaranteed. When the information concerns not only a violation of integrity, but also a criminal violation of the law, it must be reported to the police. Dutch citizens, especially public administrators—CIAs included—are obliged to report crimes to the police. Where a police investigation leads to prosecution, the wrongdoer's attorney will receive full disclosure of information, including the identity of the reporter.

It emerges that most CIAs do not know where they should draw the line on confidentiality, and they find this problematic because they feel it hampers their work. “The basis of my work is the confidentiality which I want to guarantee.” Table 7 shows the importance for the CIA of clarity about confidentiality. It also shows the importance of clarity about all the stages of the reporting process.

TABLE 7 Satisfied and Unsatisfied Reporters’ Agreement with Statements

	Satisfied reporters who reported to a CIA	Unsatisfied reporters who reported to a CIA
The CIA made clear whether the report could be made confidentially, and explained clearly what confidentiality means.	88%	51%
The CIA made very clear what the reporting process would entail.	54%	30%
The CIA made sure there was enough after-care after the reporting process.	48%	15%

Around 43% of the CIAs from the survey had been on a course or received other training for the CIA role, but in follow-up questions it emerged that 90% of them had not been prepared in any other way for their new role. Such training is important to familiarize CIAs with the legal position on confidentiality and to ensure they know how to work in a confidential context. Many CIAs remark that, because of the “confidential” in their job title, most reporters assume that everything they say is strictly between them and the CIA, unless the reporter decides to take it further. It is important that CIAs explain clearly the role of the CIA and the rules about confidentiality before the potential reporter gives information. “I always start talking myself and explain the limits to confidentiality and anonymity. And then I explain that when a situation is in breach with the law, I might have to take further steps which might be in conflict with confidentiality.” The art is to be clear—on one hand—about the important matter of confidentiality, and—on the other hand—not to scare off the potential reporter. It is in the organization's interest that the alleged wrongdoing is reported.

CIAs and Management

In every (large) organization there are integrity violations, and it is important that all the signals about the wrongdoing are detected early and dealt with. In a study on corruption (De Graaf and Huberts 2008), peers of corrupt officials were often seen to have had suspicions—sometimes even evidence—of something being amiss long before any investigation began, but they kept the information to themselves. De Graaf and Huberts describe the process of becoming corrupt as a “slippery slope” and, in many cases, even the corrupt official wished he had been reported on earlier so that he could have been stopped when the issue was relatively minor. The sooner an integrity violation is discovered, the sooner action can be taken to minimize damage. And, as noted earlier, in order to receive early warning of wrongdoing, the threshold for reporting should be as low as possible.

From previous studies, we know how important the role of management and supervisors is for integrity within organizations (e.g., Lasthuizen 2008). Here, it becomes clear that CIAs also believe it is crucial that they are supported by management. Nevertheless, CIAs have observed that managers and supervisor sometimes feel “passed over,” especially when they themselves are official reporting points. “I experience resistance, ‘why are you meddling in my business?'” “Employees are often warned by supervisors not to approach a CIA.” Despite this, the survey reveals that most CIAs are happy about their relationships with supervisors and management; 69% indicate they have a good relationship. CIAs also clearly indicate they consider a good relationship important for the effectiveness of reporting. Both findings emerge from the answers to the open questions in the survey. Answers also indicated that management should avoid giving the impression that reports are a nuisance. And where management is vague about the CIA's role, its legitimacy and effectiveness is diminished. An advisor said: “Being a CIA is a lonely role. Management supporting you is the most important prerequisite.” This resonates with the findings of earlier research (De Graaf 2010).

If vagueness about the CIA's role diminishes its legitimacy and effectiveness, there is room for improvement. Only 39% of the CIAs agree with the statement that, in their organization, it is clear what the difference is between the CIA and other reporting points when an employee wants to report (alleged) integrity violations. And, in general, it seems that the better known the CIA is within an organization, the more they are approached. In an open question, the CIAs were asked which problems they encountered most. Many mentioned the need for greater familiarity with the CIA. “The function should be given more attention and more respect.” “It should be better recognized in my organization.”

Split Between the Organization and the Reporter

It emerges that CIAs often find themselves caught between the organization's interest and the interests of the reporter; 23% of the CIAs in the survey report say they are regularly in that situation. “Sometimes you think, this is so serious, it should be reported. But you also know that it will undermine collegiality … mud will be thrown at the reporter once he reports.” CIAs deal differently with this situation. Most feel their greater loyalty is to the reporter. “The CIA is there first of all for the employee.” This can be a CIA's downfall; they have been put in place by the organization and clearly should also serve the organization's interests. “Sometimes I see other CIAs becoming the advocate of a reporter and pleading for them against the organization. They should be able to deal better with the double mandate they have.” In general, it is important that an organization and its management have a keen eye for the loyalty conflicts that can arise for a CIA and that they respect the confidentiality of the CIA–reporter relationship, even when management suspects the CIA has very valuable information which is not being shared. It is in the interest of the organization and—as has been made clear from this study—in the interests of effective whistleblowing that thresholds for reporting are low. The CIA can play a crucial role in keeping them low. Confidentiality is important for this and the CIA needs to feel trusted by management. In order to have low reporting thresholds, it is advisable that where conflict of loyalty arises, the CIA chooses the reporter over the organization. That can be achieved by positioning the CIA more as a sounding board than an official “place” where reports can be made (a reporting point).

CONCLUSION

In this research, the internal reporting systems of public organizations were studied, with special attention given to the role of CIAs. The central question was: What is the most effective internal reporting system, and what role should the confidential integrity advisor play?

CIAs can play an important role in an effective reporting system. It is important that they are supported by management, have clear descriptions of their duties and tasks, and receive support from supervisors. It is important that management is aware of the divided loyalties that CIAs can experience and gives them the trust and space they need. Thresholds will be lowest if the CIA is not the person to receive formal reports, but functions as a sounding board for (potential) reporters. The CIA must acknowledge the interest of both the reporter and the organization, but the system will be most effective when they are closer to the (potential) reporter. This best exploits the confidentiality their title promises. CIAs handling all integrity issues—including harassment issues—are most effective. To be most effective, CIAs should be aware of the difference between anonymity and confidentiality and, from the outset, should explain both to potential reporters.

Although the role was introduced because of reporting regulations, CIAs do not spend their time submitting reports about third parties. Most of their time is spent advising on the questions and dilemmas that are brought to them. Integrity is not always a matter of black or white. Public administrators frequently encounter questions of integrity and many of them find themselves in a dilemma. In these circumstances, the availability of an attentive ear is much appreciated.

Many, if not most, CIAs cannot clearly explain their proper role or the confidentiality rules, which is problematic. Explaining the CIA's role to potential reporters before they give information is one key to the effectiveness of the process. Hence, training about confidentiality before the law and to facilitate working in a confidential context is important to CIA success. Unfortunately, this training is all too often inadequate.

It seems, therefore, that if management wants to improve the effectiveness of the reporting system, addressing the role of supervisors is a logical place to start. Supervisors and management play an important role in the reporting system (Lasthuizen 2008); logic dictates that they are the obvious place to report. Many supervisors are not aware of this obligation and do not make it easy for employees to report to them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors wish to thank Janet Near for her valuable and insightful comments on a previous version of this manuscript, and Karin Lasthuizen for her valuable contribution to this research.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Gjalt De Graaf

Gjalt de Graaf ([email protected]), PhD, is Full Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the VU University Amsterdam. He co-chairs the Permanent EGPA Study Group on the Quality and Integrity of Governance. His research focuses on the integrity of academic education, the management of conflicting public values, and the influence of social media on public governance and whistleblowing.

Notes

For more details on the background of the study, see: De Graaf, G., K. Lasthuizen, T. Bogers, B. ter Schegget, and T. Strüwer. 2013. Een luisterend oor. Onderzoek naar het interne meldsysteem integriteit binnen de Nederlandse overheid. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Onderzoeksgroep Quality of Governance.