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Articles

The existential fragment of second-order propositional intuitionistic logic is undecidable

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Pages 55-74 | Received 12 Jun 2023, Accepted 24 Dec 2023, Published online: 06 Mar 2024
 

Abstract

The provability problem in intuitionistic propositional second-order logic with existential quantifier and implication (,) is proved to be undecidable in presence of free type variables (constants). This contrasts with the result that inutitionistic propositional second-order logic with existential quantifier, conjunction and negation is decidable.

Acknowledgements

We thank the anonymous referees for comments that helped to improve the paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 A position in a formula is negative when it occurs in the assumption part of an odd number of implications; otherwise it is positive.

2 The depth of root is zero.

3 For the cautious reader: P(x,y)εΓ means P(φ,ψ)Γ, where tg(φ)=x,tg(ψ)=y. In addition ΓVar(φ) and ΓVar(ψ), because Γ is legal. Hence x, y are individual variables (Lemma 4.2), so |x|,|y| are well defined.

Additional information

Funding

The work of Aleksy Schubert and Paweł Urzyczyn was partly supported by Ministerstwo Edukacji i Nauki IDUB POB 3 programme at the University of Warsaw. The work of Ken-etsu Fujita was partly supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research KAKENHI [grant numbers 17K05343 and 20K03711].

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