Mycoplasma bovis in New Zealand: a content analysis of media reporting

ABSTRACT

Mycoplasma bovis, a disease affecting cattle worldwide, was first reported in New Zealand in 2017. Classed as an unwanted organism, the Government attempted eradicating it via culling of infected herds. This study reviews media coverage of this process over the first two years following the incursion. Content analysis was used to explore media framing of the management, containment and progress towards eradication of cattle infected by M. bovis over time. The analysis revealed that farmers and communities affected by M. bovis reported many forms of adverse health and well-being impacts. Apparent causes included the outbreak itself, the Government’s eradication programme, the way that programme was delivered, and the cumulative nature of stressors on the sector. The analysis also underlined media focus on raising the profile of the human cost of this biosecurity disaster. Arguably this approach amplified deficits within the processes and management strategies adopted by the Ministry for Primary Industries. This research adds to the small but growing body of evidence relating to the health and social impacts of exotic animal disease incursions on rural communities in New Zealand and elsewhere. Findings can be used to facilitate planning for future responses.

KEYWORDS:

• Mycoplasma bovis
• farmer health and wellbeing
• psychosocial impact
• biosecurity
• policy impact
• governance
• contingency plans
• media coverage
• community impact
• New Zealand

Introduction

Mycoplasma bovis is a bacterium that causes illness in cattle. Typically, it produces mastitis and arthritis in adult cattle and pneumonia in calves, but is not particularly contagious and does not present any food safety or human health risks. It is spread animal to animal through close contact and through bodily fluids, such as mucus and milk. Drinking milk or colostrum from infected cows is a very effective means of transmission to calves. It does not appear to travel any significant distance in the air, relying on cattle to cattle contact (Nicholas et al. 2016). Other than for contiguous farms, between-farm infection relies on the movement of cows from farm to farm. This is a key issue for New Zealand (NZ) where cattle – and whole herd – movements are high (Stevenson et al. 2014). In addition to routine high stock movements, many thousands of cows are also moved during the annual ‘Movement Day’ when sharemilkers move their cows, equipment and families to new farms (Adams-Hutchenson 2017).

Widespread internationally (Nicholas et al. 2016), M. bovis was only recently detected in NZ. On 21 July 2017, samples collected from a dairy herd in South Canterbury, NZ tested positive. Subsequent investigations by the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) revealed that the disease had established itself in NZ approximately 18 months prior. Despite the difficulties this presented in detecting and containing movement of infected livestock, a decision to eradicate M. bovis from NZ via culling of infected herds was announced by the NZ Government on 28 May 2018.

The NZ Government’s decision to eradicate M. bovis was unique, as no other country has attempted eradication. Experience from overseas suggests that any significant disease eradication programme presents a number of challenges to both agricultural and rural communities, including major disruptions to both ‘business as usual’ and social and community norms. Reflecting on literature from the United Kingdom (UK) following the 2001 Foot and Mouth disease (FMD) outbreak, it is clear that the outbreak was not just an animal tragedy; its effect on people was catastrophic. Studies revealed a wide-ranging group of people, from within and beyond the farming community, were impacted. In particular, research identified feelings of distress and bereavement, concerns of new disasters, loss of faith in authority and control systems and annoyance at the undermining of local knowledge (Mort et al. 2005). Similarly, research following the Ovine Johne’s Disease (OJD) management programme in Victoria, Australia highlighted that disruptions to community activities caused by the imposition of movement and other controls, which resulted in new or increased social tensions (Environment and Natural Resources Committee 2000). A ‘culture of blame’ developed between infected farmers and other farmers; between farmers and others in the community; and between those exercising government policy, farmers and the remainder of the community (Environment and Natural Resources Committee 2000). These and other factors, such as a lack of understanding of the disease and its effects, uncertainty for the future and a reduced sense of control over one’s life, contributed to the observed divisiveness among communities, with flow-on effects for health and well-being for farmers, their families and the wider rural community (Environment and Natural Resources Committee 2000; Hood and Seedsman 2004).

This agricultural event attracted significant media attention as it played out and this caught the attention of the research team who were already in the early stages of a research project investigating the impact of M. bovis on Southland and Otago farmers and their communities. For MPI, M. bovis represented a biosecurity breach that must be resolved. For farmers, M. bovis was personally devastating. The research team became increasingly curious about the representation of the M. bovis outbreak by the media. Tearful farmers and images of dead cattlebeasts against rural backdrops vied for viewers’ attention along with suited politicians, scientists and MPI officials against the backdrop of government buildings. What was the story that was being told in these news reports?

Reporting of news is never neutral. Examining media frames and framing concerning a given phenomenon provides a means by which to interrogate the power of a communicating text and its selection of a particular problem definition (Entman 1993). In this sense framing is a tool to facilitate the method of analysis rather than being an end in itself. Consequently, as Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen (2011) note, it has much to offer studies of news and journalism, notwithstanding a contemporary tendency for those deploying it to make assumptions about the relative autonomy of both news producers and consumers in their respective roles. Framing by news reporters and media influences the ways in which the public interprets events (Nerlich 2004; Ward et al. 2004; Cannon and Irani 2011; Maeseele 2011; Nollet 2020). Framing is defined as techniques by which information is categorised by mass media and made sense of by audiences (Cannon and Irani 2011). Maeseele (2011) noted that frames provide story lines that are highly persuasive. Furthermore, media representation is a site where representations and interpretations are legitimised and naturalised, but also contested (Maeseele 2011). Maeseele (2011) points out that the mass media represents a dominant cultural system and as such plays a major role in the reproduction of social and political power that maintains the dominant positions of certain groups. This reflects the accumulation of media capital by political agents (Nollet 2020). Challenges to the dominant framing are likely to come from affected but excluded groups according to Ward et al. (2004), while Cannon and Irani (2011) note that the media cannot control how their frames are read and interpreted by the public.

The foot and mouth outbreak (FMD) that occurred in the UK in 2001 was the subject of previous research exploring the media framing of an agricultural crisis. Ward et al. (2004) identified an early framing of FMD as an agricultural issue of animal welfare and health. This framing had the effect of privileging some strategies over others (eradication over vaccination). Nerlich (2004) identified a predominant framing of FMD in terms of battle and war metaphors as the media seized on the ‘fight’ against FMD, while fear predominated the media framing analyses conducted by Cannon and Irani (2011) on The New York Times and The Guardian. Despite the framing impact described here, other factors potentially mediate strategy choices for managing FMD that may not be so relevant for the M. bovis incursion. For example, Convery et al. (2008) note tensions between eradication and vaccination strategies, and regarding loss of FMD-free status, in the management of FMD that would not necessarily apply to the management of M. bovis.

Notwithstanding dissimilarities between incursions described above, this framing effect illustrates processes of social constructionism, the process by which meaning and knowledge are generated in the multiple interactions between individuals participating in everyday social life and interacting with the resources and repertoires of information in their social environment. In this way social reality is dependent on inter-subjectivity and shared understandings (Gergen 2001). Nollet (2020) suggests that the media contributes to the social construction of social issues, particularly when a newsworthy issue receives wide cover from multiple journalists and media organisations. Political agents and journalists with high levels of media capital are able to engage with the media in ways that can influence its construction of social issues, and at the same time the media can bring pressure to bear on change agents such as politicians through their framing of issues (Nollet 2020).

Returning to the story of the New Zealand outbreak of M. bovis, there is a story to tell about the story told by the mainstream mass media as they reported on government press releases, science, and the human interest elements of the outbreak. This paper tells that story. We identify the frames apparent in the mainstream media attention to M. bovis, and show how media attention was dominated by different frames at different phases of the story.

Methodology and methods

As noted above, this research inquiry sits within the broad methodology of social constructionism. Within this theoretical orientation, a primarily qualitative approach (Thomas 2006; Elo and Kyngas 2008) was adopted as the most pragmatic means to examine reporting in mainstream and rural media on the M. bovis outbreak and its consequent management in New Zealand. Our research design was similar to that used by Maeseele in his study of media framing of the European debate on agricultural biotechnology. In the present study, the data set comprised written texts published online and in the public domain, as well as content from a range of national, regional and farming press media within NZ. Human ethics approval was not deemed necessary for this study because the data were within the public domain and there were no face-to-face interviews. The research team is diverse comprising a former nurse, FD-N, two anthropologists GN, and CJ and a veterinarian epidemiologist MB. FD-N, GN and CJ have extensive experience in qualitative methodologies, while CB has a background that includes linguistics.

The news media database Fuseworks (Fuseworks media) was searched for all relevant content using the following search terms, ‘Mycoplasma bovis’ OR ‘M bovis’ OR ‘M. bovis’. Media items were limited to those published between 25th July 2017 and 31st July 2019. This census generated 1803 search results. To narrow the scope of the data for analysis, this sample was further refined to all relevant newspaper articles (including editorials, opinion pieces and columns), while content from television and radio websites, organisational press releases, blogs and newsletters was excluded. Duplicates, and articles that made only minimal reference to the outbreak (e.g. indexes and news briefs), were also excluded from the sample.

The data were analysed using a range of methods. An interpretive framing matrix, adapted from Crabtree and Miller (Crabtree and Miller 1999; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006; Maeseele 2011), comprising a priori frames was developed by FD-N and CJ to manage the large amount of data generated from the initial search. This was based on a preliminary survey of a sample of news items on M. bovis. To verify and substantiate this framing matrix, the stakeholder panel of experts for the larger research programme was consulted.

Content analysis (Elo and Kyngas 2008) within a pragmatic inductive framework (Thomas 2006) was then undertaken with each media item manually-coded by a single coder (CB), against the framing matrix. This matrix, therefore, provided a revised structure for the data, while also allowing the addition of de novo codes as necessary. Codes were then categorised and grouped into overarching frames and sub-frames, and the frequency of each frame’s occurrence measured to help quantify the prominence of the frame in the media.

The frequency of media coverage of the issue was initially grouped into quarterly time periods spanning two years, with this subsequently modified when reporting the frequency of frames to better correlate the data with event chronology. This modified split allowed better management of the volume of articles, as the original quarterly periods contained significantly uneven amounts of data.

Emergent frames and interpretation of findings were discussed over several research team meetings and with the main study’s wider stakeholder panel to establish analytic concordance. As a means of data triangulation, the verification process included monitoring a selection of audio media from the Radio New Zealand (2020) and New Zealand Herald (2020) websites to confirm that emergent frames were consistent with other media reports not included in the analysis.

Results

A total of 591 articles, published online during the two-year period between 25 July 2017 and 31 July 2019, met inclusion criteria. The volume of media coverage related to the M. bovis outbreak and associated response fluctuated over each quarter of the two-year period as described in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Changes in media coverage intensity relating to the M. bovis incursion between July 2017 and July 2019.

The thematic analysis of the content from all articles uncovered 10 overarching frames with 27 sub-frames, as depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Thematic network for media articles related to the impact of M. bovis in New Zealand.

The quantification of these frames within the modified five time periods is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Occurrence of themes across articles.

Frame	Jul 17–Oct 17 (n = 96)	Nov 17–Apr 18 (n = 142)	May 18–Jul 18 (n = 201)	Aug 18–Apr 19 (n = 74)	May 19–Jul 19 (n = 78)	Total (n = 591)
Farmer and community impacts	40	49	105	36	31	261
Eradication-related issues	21	45	122	22	28	238
Biosecurity	66	89	53	-	-	208
MPI-related issues	29	65	59	14	27	194
Industry impacts	36	40	63	21	23	183
On-farm biosecurity and compliance issues	4	36	58	14	19	131
Systemic issues	2	6	24	5	9	46
Human health matters	13	16	7	-	-	36
Animal welfare issues	17	9	8	-	1	35
Veterinarian issues	2	2	4	-	4	12

Several frames maintained their prominence throughout the two-year period, whereas others became more salient in particular phases of the response. The five modified periods across the two years were redefined as phases:

• Acute phase, July to October 2017;

• Uncertainty phase, November 2017 to April 2018;

• Eradication commencement phase, May to July 2018;

• Implementation phase, August 2018 to April 2019;

• Enduring phase, May to July 2019

A detailed summary of the key frames and their evolution over each phase is presented in the five tables below. Each table contains a frame label, its associated explanation and illustrative quotes or text segments drawn from the data set. Frames are presented in descending order of prominence for each phase.

Acute phase, July to October 2017

This phase reflects the frames pertaining to the period immediately following the Government’s announcement of the incursion on 25 July 2017. The media coverage during this phase tended to focus on the biosecurity risks and the initial response efforts by MPI to contain the spread of the infection and identify the source of the outbreak. There was also a focus on communicating appeals from central government to the NZ public that they remain calm, highlighting that the disease posed no risk to food safety or human health, and was primarily an animal welfare and productivity issue. Nonetheless, even in this initial phase there are hints of conflicting views about the steps being taken to manage the incursion and questions over efficacy, reflecting tensions between central government and those most directly impacted by the disease (Table 2).

Table 2. Themes present during the acute phase of the response coverage, July 2017 to October 2017.

Frame	Explanation	Exemplar 1	Exemplar 2
Biosecurity and risk	Coverage around tracing and containment measures being undertaken by MPI, together with attempts to identify the source of the outbreak, dominated this period. Other biosecurity challenges (e.g. testing difficulties, resourcing issues) also raised.	‘We are urgently working to understand the spread of the disease and how widely distributed it may be. It is not certain that this farm is the first case of the disease in New Zealand, which is why it is important to determine how widespread it possibly may be. Tracing animal and other movements on and off the farm is what is being done right now to help establish this. This is also the reason why we have put movement restrictions in place – this still allows for eradication if it turns out to be the most effective option.’ – MPI spokesperson (July 2017)(Hutching 2017a)	‘This whole operation is about managing the disease while keeping our future options open. We want to minimise the risk of further spread of the disease. Moving ahead with de-population of the affected farms will allow them to get back to normal business as soon as it is safe to do so.’ – MPI spokesperson (October 2017)(Otago Daily Times 2017)
Farmer and community impacts	Coverage is focused on the initial ‘shock’ felt by those affected.	‘It’s devastating, especially for the people working on the farm. It just hits you and you don’t know what to think, you don’t know where it comes from.’ – Farmer (July 2017) (Hutching 2017c)	‘It’s no different to when someone is diagnosed with cancer – initially grief and then you have to wait.’ – Farm Consultant (September 2017)(Gillies 2017a)
Industry impacts	Coverage focuses on down-playing the impact on agricultural businesses, although some media commentary warns the impact could swell.	‘It’s in every other dairying country in the world. It would be a cost to a farm owner, but I couldn’t imagine it would cause businesses to go under. It would be a manageable disease.’ – Representative organisation spokesperson (August, 2017) (Gillies 2017b)	‘Although Mycoplasma bovis is nowhere near as devastating as foot-and-mouth, it should be seen as a stark reminder as to the ripple effect something like this can have on New Zealand agriculture.’ – Journalist (October 2017)(Eade 2017)
MPI-related issues	Coverage was broadly positive towards MPI’s handling of the response, although there was some concern over MPI’s slow response, together with more general concern over MPI’s performance in preventing biosecurity incursions.	‘[MPI] are getting a huge number of tests done over the next month – 33,000. Farmers were impressed with the professionalism of the staff. … You have to give them credit for fronting up at the first meeting when so little was known about the disease.’ – Representative organisation spokesperson (August 2017)(Hutching 2017b)	‘The official flow of information following the outbreak has been both limited and contradictory. No doubt MPI officials have worked to the limit of their ability. But as so often seems to be the case in New Zealand with risk management issues, there were insufficiently detailed in-place systems to deal with the outbreak.’ – Journalist (August 2017)(Woodford 2017)
Eradication-related issues	Debate regarding the longer-term options of eradication or contained management is raised during this early period.	‘If MPI makes a decision to destroy, and the problem is a lot more widespread than they have estimated, the question then becomes should they kill all the rest. It comes back to the question that has not been answered; does MPI want to eradicate this disease or has it already given up on that prospect. Because the words “managing this disease” are used too often rather than the word “eradicate”.’ – Labour Party spokesperson (July 2017) (Deavoll 2017)	‘I’m optimistic we will get the size of the picture identified and if it looks like it can be eradicated by containment of all infected farms that could mean the destruction of tens of thousands of animals. But I would only authorise such a drastic measure if it were proven it would eliminate the disease and only following consultation with all stakeholders and industry professionals involved in the response.’ – MPI spokesperson (September 2017)(Scott 2017b)
Animal welfare issues	There is a strong focus on the clinical characteristics and animal welfare implications of the disease, including debate surrounding whether intensive robotic systems had more severe clinical manifestations.	‘Animal welfare was also an important consideration, as the disease might progress to a chronic, debilitating condition that was unresponsive to treatment.’ – Academic (August 2017) (Rae 2017b)	‘What we are seeing, finding and know under intensive environment (under roof) type farming, we are seeing some of the worst clinical cases and overseas literature shows us that too. On one infected indoor property the clinical signs were horrendous. On the second infected, related outdoor property there were no signs.’ – MPI veterinarian (October 2017)(Scott 2017c)

Uncertainty phase, November 2017 to April 2018

The second phase of the response we considered the ‘uncertainty’ phase. It was during this phase that reports of farmer anxiety and uncertainty relating to the lack of any definitive decision regarding future management of the outbreak began to be more regularly reported. Biosecurity issues remained the predominant focus, however, coverage increasingly began to shift to the impacts of the outbreak and the nature of the Government’s response on affected farmers and industry. Media framing emphasised the logistics for livestock under movement restrictions or culling orders; associated productivity and financial losses; compensation-related issues; and emotional trauma associated with the culling of herds. Over this period there was a notable waning of media interest as it became clearer that the outbreak was essentially an issue for the primary sector. Table 3 provides detailed information related to this period.

Table 3. Themes present during the uncertainty phase, November 2017 to April 2018.

Frame	Explanation	Exemplar 1	Exemplar 2
Biosecurity	Coverage concerning MPI’s tracing and containment measures dominates, with MPI portraying a broadly positive outlook regarding control of disease spread. There is discussion around the source of the outbreak and possible pathways of entry.	‘There was still a lot of work to be done to ascertain the source of infection at the confirmed infected property and building a picture of animal movements between all three farms and possible other farms.’ – MPI spokesperson (November 2017)(Rae 2017a)	‘At the moment it is believed it is still contained and the overall aim remains to eliminate the disease from the district.’ – MPI spokesperson (November 2017)(Scott 2017a)
MPI-related issues	There is increased coverage on the perceived lack of transparency and timely information from MPI, together with delays and other issues relating to disease testing and the Government’s compensation scheme.	‘I left the meeting with little or no confidence in their ability to shut this outbreak down. MPI appeared hopelessly outgunned, under-resourced to stop this bacterial invasion M. bovis for which I feel the horse has already bolted.’ – Farmer (December 2017)(Andrew 2017)	‘There’s still missing bits. That fuels the rumour mill and has left people gossiping and speculating and that does a lot of damage. What has happened in the past week around warranted searches, announcements to cull and the release of the reports has not been on the fly. If they want farmers to co-operate we need transparency – ongoing surface information, lack of detail and reports blacked out, is not transparency.’ -Representative organisation spokesperson(March 2018)(Scott 2018a)
Farmer and community impacts	Continuing farmer uncertainty and anxiety highlighted. Movement restrictions and resulting productivity issues were a significant focus, together with psychosocial impacts such as guilt at inadvertently infecting neighbouring farms; feelings of fear or inability to prevent possible future infection; emotional tolls associated with delays in receiving compensation pay-outs; and trauma/sadness associated with culling of cows.	‘There’s been lots of issues, as you can imagine. … The farms have [had] their whole world interrupted. It’s been pretty stressful losing their cows. Some of them are quite attached.’ – Rural Support Trust Chairperson (December 2017)(Johnston 2017)	‘I’ve had grown men break down in tears to me, talking about how they can’t pay their bills, can’t sleep at night and are not leaving their properties or socialising because they’re feeling so ashamed about the situation they’ve found themselves in.’ – Minister of Parliament (March 2018)(Industry commits $11.2m to ‘M. bovis 2018)
Eradication-related issues	Coverage around eradication vs. contained management increased during this period, with mixed views among officials, farmer representative groups and local farmers emerging. The implications for industry if disease could not be eradicated were also raised.	‘We are trying to work on a way of eradicating it if possible. I’m not even going to contemplate if not, because that should be the sole focus of everyone – to identify how far it has spread, then contain, and then eradicate if possible.’ – Minister for Agriculture and Rural Communities (February 2018)(Sharp 2018)	Effort to eradicate the disease is ‘madness’ … ‘It’s made out to be such a terrible thing, but it’s very, very manageable; it’s been here for a long period of time already; it is worldwide. So instead of ripping communities apart, sending people broke … I would say this madness needs to stop.’ – Farmer (January 2018)(MacLean 2018)
Industry impacts	Coverage emphasising the national implications of the outbreak, noting that impacts were being felt beyond the dairy industry. There is also significant focus on New Zealand’s unique, ‘highly mobile’ farming system and its implications for disease management.	‘Farming has huge impacts across our whole economy, and if anyone thinks they will be free from the effects of this they are dreaming. While it is an acute challenge for the farming sector, it is a major challenge for the whole economy.’ – Minister for Agriculture and Rural Communities (February 2018)(Bonthuys 2018)	‘We move animals around very freely and that’s been convenient and it’s a profitable model. Unfortunately that model is not a good model if [it contributes to M. bovis staying here].’ – DairyNZ spokesperson (January 2018)(Rural News Group 2018e)
On-farm biosecurity and compliance issues	There is strong messaging around improving on-farm biosecurity and record-keeping practices. Issues relating to the government’s National Animal Identification and Tracing (NAIT) system also received significant coverage, with much of the focus directed to the high rates of non-compliance with NAIT among local farmers and the resulting challenges this raised for tracking the disease spread; but also that there were varying opinions about NAIT’s utility.	‘You’ve heard a lot of comment from the experts that one of the things that has not helped the response team progress as quickly as they could have is incomplete record-keeping – not across the board but in several situations that mattered. MPI is saying this slowed them down a lot, and that could have added time to this disease. So … we’ve got to do a much better job of record-keeping and staying on top of that stuff, so when something like this happens they can move quicker and get on top of it.’ – DairyNZ spokesperson (January 2018)(Malthus 2018a)	‘Those who are dealing with it (NAIT) on a day-to-day basis don’t share the same confidence as those who are administering it … For the good of the industry and the country this can’t be glossed over … It’s the absolute lack of leadership that concerns us. No one is stepping up to take responsibility.’ – Livestock and Agribusiness General Manager (January 2018)(Scott 2018b)

Eradication commencement phase, May to July 2018

This phase witnessed a considerable increase in intensity of communication. Media coverage was dominated by commentary related to the Government’s decision to cull over 150,000 cattle as part of a 10-year ‘phased eradication’ programme, announced on 28 May 2018 (just under a year since the incursion was first detected). Reporting highlighted mixed views among local farmers, with those who were unsupportive often pointing to the significant mental trauma associated with eradication of entire herds and/or highlighting a lack of confidence in MPI’s ability to eradicate the disease. Conversely, industry and farmer representative groups, veterinarians and other zoonotic disease experts were typically supportive of the Government’s position, highlighting the significant cost burden for the sector and animal welfare issues if contained management was pursued. There was also considerable focus on farmer and community impacts, with reporting often linking farmers’ emotional and financial harm to MPI’s management of the outbreak, rather than the disease itself (Table 4).

Table 4. Themes present during the eradication commencement phase of the response coverage, May to July 2018.

Frame	Explanation	Exemplar 1	Exemplar 2
Eradication-related issues	Coverage predominantly focused around the Government’s May 28th eradication decision, and the support for eradication expressed by government officials and farmer and industry representative groups on the one hand, and more divided views among local farmers (particularly those in the South Island) on the other hand. There is also significant focus on the costs of eradication, and potential difficulties posed in implementing any eradication programme.	‘Our farmers have been waiting for almost 11 months on a way forward and part of the challenge has been a lack of certainty about the long-term solution for New Zealand. Today we have that certainty. Over 99 per cent of our dairy herds in New Zealand have no signs of this disease, and we want to keep it that way.’ – DairyNZ spokesperson (May 2018)(Gray and Bennett 2018)	Meanwhile, Hansen believes the M.bovis response was ‘a knee-jerk reaction to a disease that the rest of the world’s got’. ‘I could understand if it were foot and mouth; I’d want them to be going as hard as they could on it because that’s such a devastating disease,’ he told Rural News. ‘It would be lovely if they could get rid of it, but unless you’re checking all the lifestyle farms and all the beef farms and all the dairy grazing farms how can you be confident you haven’t just killed the portion of the industry that you know about?’ – Farmer, Canterbury (May 2018)(Rural News Group 2018c)
Farmer and community impacts	Media coverage focused significantly on farmer and community impacts, increasingly linking emotional and financial harm suffered by farmers to MPI’s management of the response, rather than to the disease. There was also increased coverage around impacts of the outbreak on rural communities, such as the ‘stigma’ of living next to an infected property causing businesses to collapse, cancellation of community events like ‘calf days’ and the emergence of a perceived ‘us vs them’ sentiment within affected rural communities. Trauma associated with culling herds, and the disruption that large-scale culling caused to livelihoods and businesses were also covered.	‘I’ve spoken directly to farmers who are upset that herds are being destroyed. They say the medicine is worse than the cure. That has weighed on my thinking a lot. The stress and pain that is caused by depopulating farms and movement controls is not something I take lightly. I’m acutely aware of the strain placed on farmers.’ – Minister for Agriculture and Rural Communities (May 2018)(O’Connor 2018)	‘It is difficult to explain to non-farming people what it means to dairy farmers to have their healthy cows taken from them to be slaughtered when only one might be infected. Apart from the huge financial loss and massive interruption to a very busy lifestyle, the loss of their cows, many of which they have hand-reared and nursed through difficult calvings and various illnesses, is a gut-wrenching tragedy. There is also the loss of many generations of line-breeding which no monetary compensation can replace.’ – Journalist (May 2018).(O’Connor 2018b)
Industry impacts	Coverage does not portray the eradication decision as posing a significant economic risk or impact nationally, although there is focus on the consequences of opting for eradication on farming systems and the sustainability of share milking in future.	‘This is not foot and mouth or BSE (mad cow disease). It is not in the scale of where we would be revising economic forecasts or might be thinking about the economy going into recession.’ – Rural economist (May 2018)(Vance 2018)	‘There are no issues in terms of trade or the consumption of meat. There are issues in terms of the cost of production for our internal farming system. I think people who look at this, and we’ve had the best international advice we can, are saying that we’ve done the best possible thing we could to try and eradicate this.’ – Minister for Agriculture and Rural Communities (May 2018)(Taunton 2018)
MPI-related issues	Coverage continued to focus on growing ‘discontent’ among some local farmers over MPI’s handling of the outbreak, including criticism around long delays in compensation and perceived inadequate communication/transparency and under-resourcing.	‘And the people in charge of this are the same people, the Ministry for Primary Industries, who yesterday apologised over their handling of matters thus far. So not the sort of people you might want to trust going forward.’ – Journalist (May 2018)(Hosking 2018)	‘It’s totally unacceptable why it’s taking so long. Everything was agreed to (by MPI), the valuation was done by an organisation picked by the Government. No-one ever knows what the hold up is. Personnel change and we have to start (chasing up) all over again. It’s typical bureaucratic behaviour. We can only keep this business going so much longer.’ – Farmer (May 2018)(Fox 2018)
On-farm biosecurity and compliance issues	There is increasing focus on improving on-farm biosecurity practices and individual responsibility to take steps to prevent the risk of further disease spread, to aid in the eradication effort. There is also coverage relating to previous ‘poor practice’ by some farmers, such as inadequate record-keeping and failing to comply with NAIT requirements.	‘Alongside this, we as farmers have to take ownership of our responsibilities and ensure we observe the correct protocols and processes that are in place to prevent further infections.’ – Farmer (May 2018)(Lambly 2018)	‘If NAIT (National Animal Identification and Tracing) was being used correctly and covered all animal movements, then MPI’s response to M bovis would have been significantly quicker and way more effective.’ – Federated Farmers spokesperson (May 2018)(Brooker 2018)
Biosecurity	There was still continued focus on the details of and cost of response efforts to date, together with coverage relating to ongoing attempts to identify the source of the outbreak and challenges associated with identifying and testing for the disease.	‘It’s not a simple eradicate or not. There’s a lot of factors – the disease is very difficult to test, to measure, to identify. Given all those factors it is going to take some time. Spring milking was given perhaps as a time to decide whether to eradicate or not.’ – Minister for Parliament (May 2018)(Carle 2018)	‘No one has established how M bovis got here, but it could only have been brought in by a few farmers who have put the rest of their peers to enormous emotional and economic stress. Unless the origin of the disease is established, there is no way of being confident we are protected from a more serious disease.’ – Journalist (May 2018)(O’Connor 2018a)

Implementation phase, August 2018 to April 2019

The focus of the coverage during this 9-month period was predominantly on the direct and indirect impacts of the Government’s eradication decision on farmers and rural communities. There was increasing economic framing through recognition that the impacts of the outbreak were extending beyond just productivity and business losses for those directly affected by the slaughter of animals. In particular, possible mental health effects and social stresses affecting farming families and the wider rural community were frequently raised. Coverage also continued to highlight the challenges MPI faced in gaining and maintaining support among farmers (particularly those in Southern New Zealand) for eradication of a disease that is recognised as being endemic in nearly all other countries, has no trade impacts, and which has a low incidence of clinical disease (Table 5).

Table 5. Themes present during the implementation phase of the response coverage, August 2018 to April 2019.

Frame	Explanation	Exemplar 1	Exemplar 2
Farmer and community impacts	Coverage of individual mental health and welfare of affected farmers dominated, in the context of the decision to eradicate, but also given wider sector stressors including climate, geopolitical trade issues, and other biosecurity incursions. Media focus also continued on the outbreak’s community impact, and on emerging rifts between farmers of affected properties and other members of the community.	‘The stress and anxiety being felt in our district is quite extraordinary and the biggest part of my work is providing support for farmers under stress and in difficult times. … Farmers are facing isolation and loneliness and there’s the stigma of seeking help – they’re supposed to be Kiwi tough guys.’ – Rural Support Trust employee (August 2018)(McKay 2018)	‘Thousands of rural businesses will be affected. The social and financial pressure felt by farming families, including their kids, will be high. Whatever happens, we can’t let it break us.’ – MPI spokesperson (March 2019)(McIlraith 2019)
Eradication-related issues	Mixed views surrounding the eradication decision continued to be a significant focus of coverage, together with coverage around emerging details of the Government’s eradication programme, associated challenges, and costs.	‘We’re better off in New Zealand not having to live with M.Bovis, that’s why the Government and the industry are throwing everything at it to try and eradicate it.’ – Member of Parliament (August 2018)(Nicoll 2018)	‘I’ve got people who are pretty convinced they’ve had similar outbreaks, or similar incidences of untreatable mastitis with high mortality, quite a long time before 2015. But MPI is very reluctant to entertain any of that, unfortunately, which I think is quite disappointing. Because if it was found to be in the country much before the MPI contention of a 2015 incursion, then this eradication programme would likely be a waste of time.’ – Veterinarian (August 2018)(Malthus 2018b)
Industry impacts	Coverage focused on the impacts of the Government’s eradication decision on dairy and beef sectors (particularly in terms of new levies to fund the cost of the eradication programme), reports of low farmer confidence due to uncertainty caused by M. bovis, and impacts of the outbreak on farm sales. There was also continued focus on the long-term impact for the industry as a whole, including around the need for farming systems to change and wider issues facing the sector.	‘We understand that the financial contribution to the M.bovis response, via the levy, will be challenging for some farmers. However, we believe it was the right decision to eradicate rather than let the disease spread through our stock. Letting M.bovis spread would have been a more serious challenge and much higher and longer lasting costs.’ – DiaryNZ spokesperson (February 2019)(Rae 2018a)	‘The workload has increased significantly in the past 12 months [in response to the M. bovis outbreak]. There has been uncertainty also since the change of government and some issues have got bigger, such as fresh water, biodiversity and climate change.’ – Federated Farmers spokesperson (January 2019)(Tobin 2018)
MPI-related issues	Ongoing compensation issues and lack of timely communication remained a significant focus of the coverage during this period.	‘The amount of hours I’ve put in from day one through to now of chasing things up and talking to people. … You don’t mind the situation as long as [MPI] look after you and get things sorted out – they just haven’t.’ – Farmer (November 2018)(Rae 2018b)	‘Some farmers have found the compensation process very slow. This makes it even more difficult for them to remain positive in a time where their stress levels are at a record high. This outbreak has hit Southern farmers and the region hard and for the wellbeing of the province MPI needs to make improvements on the speed in which compensation claims are handled.’ – Member of Parliament (September 2018)(Kelly 2018)
On-farm biosecurity and compliance issues	The importance of good on-farm biosecurity and accurate and complete record-keeping was still a key focus.	‘I don’t think farmers appreciated NAIT until now. We can see the benefits after the M.bovis outbreak. As food producers and sellers it is in our interests to support the NAIT online system. It provides a platform to leverage and pitch our products overseas and to the top end of the market. There’s the provenance aspect too – our story unique to New Zealand. We can’t claim to have these values without a traceability system like NAIT.’ – Farmer (December 2018)(Rural News Group 2018b)	‘It’s time for farmers to see value in the NAIT system and start using the data to their advantage, to improve their farm, productivity and their defence against a biosecurity incursion.’ – Farmer(October 2018)(Rural News Group 2018a)
Systemic issues	Coverage also began to focus on planned changes to biosecurity legislation, proposed in response to the M. bovis outbreak. The proposed changes included changes to the Biosecurity Act and NAIT legislation to enable improved tracing, tightened rules for handling untagged animals, and aligning the level of penalties with other acts to reflect the seriousness of non-compliance.	‘It’s become clear over the past year, as we deal with the fall out of Mycoplasma bovis, that some farmers haven’t been taking the requirements to record animal movements through NAIT as seriously as they should have been. Today’s legislation marks another meaningful step in bolstering NAIT. We are already implementing nearly two dozen changes that don’t require legislative change, and will revisit NAIT legislation again in coming months after consulting on more changes, including making NAIT easier to use.’ – DairyNZ spokesperson(August 2018)(Anonymous 2018)	‘None of us had anything to do with the S&S (Search and Surveillance) Act provisions put into NAIT changes. As Katie [Milne, Feds president] wrote, “we all supported 38 recommendations from the NAIT review, but nothing on S&S which was done under urgency without consultation & communications – not good”.’ – DairyNZ spokesperson (August 2018)(Rural News Group 2018d)

Enduring phase, May to July 2019

In the final phase of the data analysis the ongoing impacts of the outbreak on farmers and communities and coverage surrounding eradication efforts remained the focus of media reporting. There was, however, a renewed and more critical framing of MPI’s handling of the response effort. This coincided with release of two critical reviews undertaken into the eradication programme, which identified issues with MPI’s management, including insufficient staff to cope with the workload of the response, a critical shortage of appropriately skilled and experienced individuals in key roles, poor or absent liaison with local veterinarians, and poor systems and processes to support the response.(Paskin 2019; The Office of the Chief Science Adviser 2019). In response MPI issued a public apology on 4 July 2019 (Morrah 2019) (Table 6).

Table 6. Themes present during the enduring phase of the response coverage, May 2019 July 2019.

Frame	Explanation	Exemplar 1	Exemplar 2
Farmer and community impacts	There is continued coverage related to the impacts of the outbreak and response on farmers, with mental health and the need for practical support for farmers a key issue. Community impacts (such as cancellation of cattle events) also remain prominent, and there is continued (albeit limited) recognition of the impact of the outbreak on rural families.	‘I remember driving home from this farmer’s house in the early hours of the morning feeling helpless and sick to the stomach for this unfortunate family. The toll on farmers’ mental health has been the black sheep in the country’s battle against the disease.’ – Member of Parliament (June 2019)(Rae 2019)	‘Children have been bullied at schools about being dirty farmers, and told “your father is a bad farmer.” … Wives are often the member of the family that hold everyone together. They need support and that’s why the Trust runs events to get them off the farm. … We have calls from staff on farms as well, suffering from depression and with employment issues; they feel challenged by the loss of stock.’ – Rural Support Trust member (July 2019)(Tobin 2019)
Eradication-related issues, including its negative impacts on farmers’ wellbeing	The eradication decision and details of the eradication programme remain a key focus of media coverage, as does the overall cost of eradication.	‘People say you can manage the disease. Generally the people who say that haven’t dealt with it in a seasonal calving system and don’t really understand the peculiarities of the NZ system. … I think the [agriculture] minister and Prime Minster and the industry partners made a very brave decision to eradicate but I’m certainly 100% behind it.’ – MPI spokesperson (June 2019)(Malthus 2019b)	‘Critics of the eradication programme say M.bovis could have been latent in New Zealand cattle for many years but has only surfaced because of intensive dairying. He still supports the Government-industry decision to try to stamp out the disease here but is critical of aspects of the eradication programme. Farmers and farming families had been “placed under incredible stress”, he said. Some farms had been dealt with by MPI “effectively” and some not.’ – Journalist (June 2019)(Fox 2019)
MPI-related issues	MPI’s handling of the eradication programme was a significant focus, following release of two reports that were highly critical of MPI’s internal processes and systems and MPI’s subsequent public apology on 4 July 2019. Other reporting continues to highlight ongoing communication and compensation issues, and the impact these have on farmer welfare issues.	‘We’d like to see an improvement in communication and feedback to farmers so that information from MPI is clearer, as consistent as possible, and gives more certainty.’ – Regional Mayor (July 2019)(Williams 2019)	‘Hamish Walker, the Clutha-Southland National MP and the party’s associate agriculture spokesman … believes acknowledgement is lacking on the mental health effects of M. bovis eradication … “We’ve got to make sure everyone in the community supports those affected by M. bovis,” he said. Walker claims MPI “dropped the ball” in not having acted soon enough on the number of risk properties identified late last year.’ – Government MP (June 2019(Malthus 2019a)
Industry impacts	National economic implications of the outbreak continued to be downplayed. There was also ongoing coverage relating to the contributions beef and dairy sectors would need to make to cover response costs, noting the ‘grudging’ support among most farmers towards contributing to the cost of the response.	‘Two years on, beef farmers are facing a levy almost five times what they agreed to as their share of the Mycoplasma bovis eradication programme. Of the eradication costs of around $870 million over the next 10 years, the dairy sector will need to pick up $262 million and the beef sector has been allocated $17.4million.’ – Journalist (June 2019)(Melville 2019)	‘It is a strange concept for us to pay for a disease when we haven’t seen any sign of it. The sentiment is definitely different in the North Island compared to the South Island’ – Federated Farmers spokesperson (July 2019)(Hutching 2019)
On-farm biosecurity and compliance issues	There is also continued coverage of issues relating to on-farm biosecurity practices and NAIT compliance, including on-going dissatisfaction with the system.	‘While Agriculture Minister Damien O’Connor says farmers need to take responsibility, farmers say a flawed system is to blame … Farmer Marion Breach claimed in post on social media that people phoning a Nait call centre for assistance were being put on hold for 45-to-60 minutes. “Those that request a call back seemingly never get one”.’ – Journalist (May 19)(Chalmers 2019)	‘Farmers need to step up and take responsibility. This is not just a job for MPI – every farmer in New Zealand has to play their part. We’ve ramped up our compliance activities and those who don’t comply will face the music.’ – Minister for Agriculture and Rural Communities (May 2019)(Anonymous 2019)
Systemic issues	Coverage continued to focus on planned changes to biosecurity legislation, proposed in response to the M. bovis outbreak.	‘Implementing the programme for M. bovis exposed the clunkiness of the [Biosecurity] Act and its constraints on both action on the ground and compensation systems. Clearly, it’s overdue for an upgrade. We need an Act that’s more flexible and more appropriate.’ – Minister for Agriculture and Rural Communities (July 2019)(Chivers 2019)	‘Part of our challenge is that we are working with imperfect tools … The Biosecurity Act is 26 years old, and isn’t currently the legislation we might want. NAIT (the National Animal Identification and Tracing system) has issues, both with usability, data management, and compliance with the system. And the testing required to determine disease status is complex and nuanced.’ – Geoff Gwyn, Mycoplasma bovis Programme Director, MPI (July 19)(Gwyn 2019)

Discussion

Over the two year period within scope of this media review the M. bovis outbreak in NZ was extensively covered by both national and rural media. This highlights the national as well as rural significance of the outbreak, making it a high-profile incursion. As an island nation, New Zealand is particularly sensitive to biosecurity incursions and this may explain the high profile of this story, along with the substantial contribution of dairying to New Zealand’s export earnings. Frames pertaining to MPI’s management and the eradication programme, and impacts on industry, communities and farmers maintained their prominence throughout the two-year period. During the initial phases of the outbreak, all media outlets framed the unfolding drama in a similar fashion. Articles similarly depicted the discovery of the infection and its characteristics (e.g. Hutching 2017a), the first reactions among the affected farmers and officials (e.g. Gillies 2017a; Hutching 2017b), containment efforts being undertaken and associated challenges (e.g. Otago Daily Times 2017, Scott 2017a), details surrounding the nature and scale of infection and implications for food safety and public health (and hence international trade; e.g. Eade 2017; Gillies 2017b).

In later stages of the response media coverage became much more diversified. Differing and even conflicting framing of the response impacts, needs and activities were frequently portrayed across the various media outlets. For example, reports of frustration and confusion among local farmers as a result of perceived inadequate communication and slow action by MPI received strong media attention throughout the two-year period (e.g. Fox 2018; Gray and Bennett 2018), in turn influencing the public’s confidence in the Government’s ability to contain the outbreak and successfully eradicate the disease (e.g. Hosking 2018; Rural News Group 2018c). This illustrates the point made by Nollet (2020) that the media can set political agendas through framing. Yet other reporting detailed the efforts and resource input by MPI to communicate and engage with farmers on the ground, including through the establishment of regional groups to facilitate local decision-making and information dissemination (e.g. McIlraith 2019; Williams 2019), and attendance and presentations by MPI staff at public meetings and conferences. This might illustrate the ability of dominant groups to manipulate media framing through their accumulated media capital (Maeseele 2011; Nollet 2020).

Ward et al. (2004) identified the framing of FMD in the UK as an agricultural and thus rural problem. This was also evident in the early framing of M. bovis. By highlighting the importance of animal tracking systems (NAIT and MINDER), these frames also constructed the problem as a compliance issue which at the same time constructed affected farmers as non-compliant (e.g. Brooker 2018). These farmers were constructed as irresponsible, and the farming community urged to take responsibility for the spread of M. bovis, and for improved biosecurity practices on the farm (e.g. Rural News Group 2018a). The accusation by farmers that MPI was indecisive, lacked transparency, failed to communicate with farmers, and managed the eradication and compensation processes badly (e.g. Fox 2018; Kelly 2018) can be read as farmer resistance to these constructions (Ward et al. 2004). The findings demonstrate the eagerness of the New Zealand media to report on the human aspect of biosecurity disasters – perhaps because this is seen as appealing to the public.

The sustained attention by media to the psychosocial impact of M. bovis on famers and rural communities is interesting. The July 2019 reports on MPI’s management of M. bovis, and the subsequent apology by MPI renewed media interest that otherwise might have waned (Hosking 2018). To what degree did media framing of tearful traumatised farmers (and reports of slaughtered livestock) generate public sympathy for farmers, who had previously been framed as non-compliant and irresponsible? There is an element of ‘David and Goliath’ inherent within the media framing of M. bovis which has potentially amplified (Christian and Huberty 2007) the deficits in MPI’s processes and management of M. bovis. By maintaining a focus on farmer and community welfare the media sustained frames pertaining to animal welfare and productivity (e.g. O’Connor 2018b), as successful farming, including animal husbandry, are proxy measures of farmer wellbeing (Crimes and Enticott 2019), and thereby on the human cost of the outbreak.

Media framing effects invite particular readings of news events, thus contributing to distinct social constructions of the events themselves. The telling of the story of M. bovis through different frames and by different media contains many invitations to view it in specific ways. As Cannon and Irani (2011) note, the media cannot control how their frames will be interpreted by audiences. The farming sector in New Zealand represents a powerful political lobby, yet there is a perception that farmers are a wealthy rural elite (fuelled in part by media framing of diary payouts to farmers). A study of social media might have elucidated responses to the multiple framings of M. bovis. As Cannon and Irani (2011) noted in the UK FMD outbreak, media images of slaughtered livestock in New Zealand may have evoked public sympathies and trumped framing of affected farmers as non-compliant and irresponsible.

So, what is the story of M. bovis in New Zealand? Accounting for framing effects, the health and social impacts of M. bovis on rural communities appear to have been wide ranging, influenced as much by the Government’s handling of the response as the disease itself. Frames reporting the impact of M. bovis on farmers were likely supported by the high volume of reporting on the eradication programme. That is, it seems reasonable that farmers grieve their dead stock (e.g. O’Connor 2018b), which evokes public sympathy. It may be that farmers’ obvious grief for their stock and livelihoods were reported because they represented strong human interest stories. While this could explain their predominance, these stories also may have influenced public sympathy (e.g. Rae 2019). In many ways, the media story about M. bovis reinforces the perceived vulnerability of NZ as an island nation with a clean green image (although the ‘clean green’ trope is a highly contested social construction, see e.g. Blackett and Le Heron 2008). Farmers emerged as human players in the drama, ordinary people desperately trying to save their livestock, fighting a microscopic foreign viral invader at the same time as battling with the structural violence of the bureaucratic regulatory apparatus administrated by MPI.

This finding is similar to those associated with farmers’ experience of the OJD eradication programme in Australia (Hood and Seedsman 2004). In their paper exploring the psychological impact of the OJD response on individuals and communities, Hood and Seedsman concluded that the primary source of distress for those affected was due to the management control programme and not the disease itself (Hood and Seedsman 2004). Reports of farmer anxiety, loss of control around what happens on farms, shame and guilt associated with herds becoming infected, emotional trauma associated with culling of herds, loss of faith in authority and control systems, family disruptions and social divisiveness, among others, align closely with those identified through research into the impacts of FMD and OJD in the UK and Australia, respectively (Environment and Natural Resources Committee 2000; Mort et al. 2005).

Strengths and limitations

Convergence of findings from this study and others exploring similar phenomena must be considered a strength, as is the large dataset of published media reviewed. Despite the media dataset’s size, however, it did not encompass the entirety of the media on the topic. For example, television interviews, webinars and social media deliberating the topic were not reviewed and this needs to be taken into consideration when reading the findings, as it is possible some framing was missed by excluding these sources. Nonetheless, it should be noted that many of the stories identified in the present study were also shared on social media. Further, while video and other images were excluded from the analysis, there was no dramatic imagery, e.g. of distressed animals, although there were images of distressed farmers. This study will, however, add to the limited body of research on exotic disease responses and as such can be used to aid future biosecurity decision making. Additionally, this information could inform future decision making related to incursion management.

Conclusion

The New Zealand media framed M. bovis in multiple ways over the two years of media attention that was the subject of our study. These included frames pertaining to MPI’s management of the incursion, as well as the incursion’s impact on farmers and rural communities, and industry, as well as the contextualising of biosecurity generally. There was also a shift over time in frames’ depiction of content, i.e. from an early homogeneous characterising of the infection, reactions to it by affected farmers and officials, and containment efforts, to a more diversified and even conflicted framing during later stages of the incursion examined in this article. As media coverage continued through the incursion the Government response came to be framed as ineffective and opaque, while previously non-compliant farmers re-emerged as human players battling bureaucratic regulations to save their livelihoods. These frames represented and privileged the standpoints of various sectors at different times, and also constructed the ways in which M. bovis is likely to have been read by the public. They highlighted and thus reinforced the biosecurity risks and concerns of New Zealand as an island nation, and the economic implications for the primary sector from M. bovis.

The media also provided a frame for viewing the relationships between farmers and MPI, as well drawing attention to the human side of this outbreak. In this way the media told a story about M. bovis that was in itself a story about the social construction by the media of M. bovis. From a social science perspective, exploring this framing of M. bovis has implications for the interpretation of future similar events. It is unlikely, for instance, that M. bovis will be the last endemic animal disease incursion New Zealand experiences. Additionally, comprehending media framing of the M. bovis incursion has implications for interpreting the media portrayal of the current global pandemic, e.g. in terms of how media construct COVID as a risk, and how various actors and policy responses to that incursion are framed. Opportunities for examining the social construction of these current phenomena offer rich opportunities going forward.

Members of the stakeholder panel

Farmers – Lloyd and Kathy MacCallum, Broadlands and Green Meadows farms; Small businesses – Sheree Cary, CEO, Southland Chamber of Commerce; Agribusinesses – Luke MacPherson, Area Manager, Agribusiness, Southland Rabobank; Rural organisations – Katrina Thomas, Dairy Women’s Network, Southland; Veterinarians – Rebecca Morley, Veterinarian; MPI – Donna Mote, Team Manager, Farmer Support, MPI.

Acknowledgements

The research team wishes to acknowledge the funding for this study from Lotteries Health (LHR-2019-102211) and the work and contribution of the stakeholder panel listed below.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by a Summer Studentship from the University of Otago to support the work of CB; Lottery Health Research [grant number LHR-2019-102211].