Bandwagoning for status: Canada's need of the F-35

Abstract

Why does Canada need a fifth generation combat aircraft? Four rationales put forth by Canadian decision-makers to justify this procurement are examined in this article: to support Canada's aerospace industry, to protect the country's sovereignty, to ensure the interoperability between Canadian and American air forces, and to contribute to international security. The article critiques the financial and industrial benefits arguments made by the government; it discusses the security threats that Canada is likely to face in the future and the ways in which the F-35 might address them; it assesses how the acquisition of the F-35 accords with Canada's traditional “defence against help” strategy; and finally, it stresses the importance that status-seeking and perceptions of reliability play into the choice of the F-35. Simply put, interoperability and international prestige seem necessary (but insufficient) conditions of Ottawa's perceived need to procure F-35s. The Canadian government seeks, by bandwagoning with the United States on this issue, to preserve its capacity to maintain (or enhance) its status as a reliable and prominent ally in Western-led air campaigns.

Keywords:

• F-35
• Canadian Defence Policy
• Status

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Srdjan Vucetic for having offered him the opportunity to write this article, and Richard Shimooka and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Notes

Other counter-arguments include the alleged low cost of the model selected by the Canadian government, as well as the signature of a contract that would shelter it from price increases. For a critical analysis of these, see Pennie (2011, p. 38), Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO 2011, p. 8), and Castonguay (2011).

There is evidence that the Harper government selected the F-35 as early as September 2006, that is, before the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed with Lockheed Martin and four years before DND's operational requirements were drafted (Castonguay 2010).

Contrary examples include Canada's decision not to develop the capabilities needed to detect and intercept nuclear submarines operating in its Arctic waters, and not to pursue nuclear military capability programs.

This is of course institutionalized by the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), a binational organization charged with the missions of aerospace warning and control, as well as maritime warning for North America.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Justin Massie

Justin Massie is an assistant professor of public and international affairs at the University of Ottawa, and a research associate at the Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy (UQÀM). Postal address: 55 Laurier East, DMS 11101, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, K1N 6N5. Email: [email protected]