Orders and borders: Unipolarity and the issue of homeland security

Abstract

Much has been written about the ordering principle known as “unipolarity” in international politics. Ever since the prospect of “systemic change” first began to be glimpsed in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War's ending, controversy has swirled about whether the international system, once so easily styled as a “bipolar” order, had now become by default a unipolar one, and if it had, many turned to wondering what its implications must be. This article argues that unipolarity, while on the wane, continues to be a reasonably accurate label for the current structure of that international system, and moreover that it possesses implications for the management of the Canada-US border, in an era when “homeland security” has become an important theme in discussions of North American security.

Keywords:

• security
• US-Canada
• polarity
• borders
• unilateralism
• multilateralism

Notes

This section draws on Haglund, D.G. “Western Europe and the Challenge of the ‘Unipolar Moment’: Is Multipolarity the Answer?”, published in the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies in 2004.

On “systemic” versus “systems” change, see Gilpin (1981, pp. 39–43).

As he stated on 11 October 2000, during the second presidential debate with his Democratic rival, Vice-President Al Gore.

For the claim that the Western allies share a “collective identity”, see Risse-Kappen (1995).

The first expression was attributed to Richard Haass, director of policy planning at the State Department; the second sprang from the keyboard of William Safire.

This is not the only manner in which power can be assessed; a major competing usage has power as a synonym for influence, the expression of which is rendered in the familiar formula of “A's ability to get B to do that which B would not ordinarily wish to do”. For this alternative, see Baldwin (1989, chapter 7).

For a rare exception, see Mamère and Warin (1999, p. 12). For a brilliant critique of Yalta myths (France's and others') see Plokhy (2010).

Misnamed, because of course most of Canada's population back then lived, just as it does today, south of the fabled 49th, so that whatever else this parallel of latitude is supposed to conjure up, it should never be taken to represent the most accurate line of demographic division between Canadians and their southern neighbors.

Those were the War of the League of Augsburg (1689–1697), brought to a close with the treaty of Ryswick, and known in North America as King William's War; the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713), ending with the treaty of Utrecht, called in North America Queen Anne's War; the War of the Austrian Succession (1744–1748), ending with the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, known in North America as King George's War; and the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), better remembered in North America as the French and Indian War, and terminated with the treaty of Paris, ceding Canada to England. See Duroselle (1976, pp. 11–12).

For alarmist perspectives on the threat of Europe-based Islamists, see Lebl (2010), Bawer (2006), Broder (2006) and Laqueur (2007).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David G. Haglund

David G. Haglund is a Professor of Political Studies at Queen's University (Kingston, Ontario, Canada). His research focuses on transatlantic security, and on Canadian and American international security policy. He co-edits the International Journal. Among his books are Latin America and the Transformation of US Strategic Thought, 1936–1940 (1984), and Over Here and Over There: Canada-US Defence Cooperation in an Era of Interoperability (2001). His current research project is on ethnic diasporas in North America and their impact upon security relations between the United States and Canada.